Reporting on contested territory: television news coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict by Berry, Mike
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Berry, Mike (2004) Reporting on contested territory: television news 
coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict. PhD thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1548/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 Reporting  on  Contested  Territory:  Television  News  Coverage  of  the 
Israel-Palestine  Conflict 
Mike  Berry 
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Department  of  Sociology,  Anthropology  and  Applied  Social  Science 
September  2004 Abstract 
This  thesis  is  an  examination  of  how  British  television  news  reported  on  the  Peace 
Accords  signed  between  Israeli  and  Palestinian  negotiators  at  the  Wye  River 
Plantation,  Maryland  USA  in  October  1998.  The  research  involves  three  elements. 
Firstly  a  review  of  the  historiography  of  the  conflict  which  sketches  out  the  range  of 
views  on  the  history  and  origins  of  the  dispute.  Secondly  a  content  analysis  of  the 
peace  negotiations  themselves.  This  examines  how  journalists  drew  on  the  range  of 
views  present  in  the  historiography  in  order  to  contextualise  coverage  and  provide 
explanations  for  the  conflict.  Thirdly  the  thesis  looks  at  the  various  factors  in 
production  which  influence  the  construction  of  news  in  this  area,  and  links  this  to 
theoretical  debates  in  the  area. TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
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The  former  Washington  Post  publisher  Philip  Graham  famously  described  j  ournalism 
as  the  'first  draft  of  history'.  Recent  research  suggests  that  if  anything  Graham  may 
actually  be  understating  the  true  influence  of  the  media.  The  important  role  played  by 
television  news  in  the  formation  of  public  knowledge  means  that  for  many  members 
of  the  public  this  type  of  journalism  represents  not  just  the  'first  draft'  but  the  only 
draft  of  history.  Studies  have  shown  that  approximately  80  percent  of  the  public  rely 
on  television  news  as  their  source  of  information  on  world  news  (Committee  on 
Standards  in  Public  Life,  2004;  Philo  &  Berry,  2004;  ITC,  2003).  Furthermore 
broadcast  j  ournalism  retains  a  relatively  high  degree  of  public  trust  compared  to  other 
media  and  pubic  institutions.  A  September  2004  survey  found  that  that  television 
news  is  considered  significantly  more  trustworthy  than  broadsheet  j  ournalism  and 
seven  times  more  so  than  the  tabloid  press.  Partly  this  may  be  related  to  inherent 
veracity  of  the  moving  image  embodied  in  the  famous  cliche  that  the  'camera  never 
lies'.  Tom  Bums,  the  historian  of  the  BBC  notes  that: 
because  television  news  and  current  affairs  programmes  convey  action, 
movement,  facial  expression  and  demeanour,  scenes  and  actors,  as  well  as 
verbal  messages,  they  seem  more  complete,  more  satisfactory  than  any 
account  provided  by  newspapers.  'Viewability'  is  easily  construed  as 
reliability  because  any  intervention  by  broadcasters  is  largely  invisible,  and 
because  the  dramatic  intensity  of  film  and  video  recording  carries  conviction 
and  guarantees  authenticity  in  ways  in  which  words  cannot  (Bums,  1977:  206, 
cited  in  Glasgow  Media  Group,  1993:  4) 
However  television  is  also  likely  to  be  trusted  because  of  its  claims  to  impartiality, 
neutrality  and  objectivity.  News  is  under  a  statutory  obligation  to  be  balanced  and 
impartial,  and  to  refrain  from  editorialising  in  its  broadcasts.  As  Schlesinger  notes  the 
notion  of  being  non-partisan  and  'above  the  fray'  in  matters  of  public  controversy  has 
been  the  defining  ethos  of  the  BBC: 
I Impartiality  is  the  linchpin  of  the  BBC's  ideology:  it  is  a  notion  saturated  with 
political  and  philosophical  implications.  What  the  BBC  claims,  when  it  says  it 
is  'impartial',  is  that  it  has  achieved  institutional  detachment  from  the  conflicts 
of  British  society,  and  that  the  Corporation  is  independent  of  all  interests.  The 
news  is  therefore  held  to  represent  all  interests  and  points  of  view  without  an 
evaluative  commitment  to  any  (1978:  163). 
What  appears  on  television  news  under  the  banner  of  impartiality  has  attracted 
academic  research  (e.  g.  Glasgow  Media  Group,  1993,1985,1983,1982,1976;  Miller, 
1994;  Schlesinger,  1978;  Murdock,  1973;  Morley,  1976).  Much  of  this  research  has 
tended  to  conclude  that  in  practice,  impartiality  has  usually  meant  reporting  on  the 
spectrum  of  views  present  at  the  Palace  of  Westminster.  This  is  not  to  say  that 
oppositional  or  dissident  voices  are  never  heard,  but  that  due  to  a  variety  of  factors 
embedded  in  the  news  production  process,  they  tend  to  be  excluded.  As  Philo  notes  in 
the  struggle  to  be  heard  the  'structural  position  of  the  state  and  its  information 
managers  is  one  of  potential  dominance'  but  it  is  a  dominance  'contested  by 
oppositional  groups  and  through  the  interplay  of  the  different  organisational  and 
commercial  priorities  of  the  media'  (Philo  1995:  222). 
This  thesis  is  an  examination  of  how  television  news  approaches  its 
obligations  to  neutrality  and  impartiality  when  reporting  on  the  one  of  the  most 
controversial  of  all  foreign  news  stories,  the  long  running  conflict  between  the  Israelis 
and  Palestinians.  This  research  will  examine  whether  broadcasters  achieve  balance  or 
if  some  perspectives  predominate.  It  will  also  evaluate  the  various  factors  and 
constraints  which  impinge  upon  the  reporting  of  the  dispute,  and  relate  them  to  the 
theoretical  debates  in  the  area.  In  order  to  examine  the  range  of  views  on  the  origins 
and  history  of  the  conflict,  I  present  in  chapter  two  a  historiography  of  the  conflict 
indicating  the  areas  of  consensus,  and  the  points  where  historians  diverge.  In  Chapter 
three  I  present  a  content  analysis  of  television  news  coverage  of  the  peace  talks 
between  the  Israelis  and  Palestinians  which  took  place  in  America  in  October  1998. 
The  research  looks  at  how  much  context  and  background  is  present  and  whether 
certain  perspectives  and  explanations  predominate  in  reporting.  In  chapter  four  I  look 
at  the  constraints  and  pressures  that  journalists  face  in  reporting  on  the  conflict.  The 
final  chapter  pulls  all  the  threads  together  and  addresses  some  of  the  theoretical 
2 debates  around  how  the  various  political,  economic,  cultural  and  organisational 
contexts  affect  the  production  of  television  news. 
However  I  want  to  start  in  this  chapter  by  introducing  the  themes  and  debates 
which  follow.  This  will  involve  a  discussion  of  the  uniquely  controversial 
historiography  of  the  conflict,  together  with  a  literature  review  of  previous  content 
analyses  in  the  area,  and  an  assessment  of  the  theoretical  arguments  about  the  various 
factors  effecting  the  production  of  news. 
The  Controversial  Historiogrgphy  of  the  Conflict 
In  chapter  two  I  will  examine  various  different  perspectives  on  the  history  of 
the  conflict.  This  is  to  lay  out  the  competing  narratives  which  journalists  can  draw 
upon  in  explaining  the  conflict  to  viewers.  Although  there  are  areas  of  consensus 
amongst  historians  there  are  also  many  areas  over  which  there  is  still  great 
disagreement.  As  the  Princeton  historian  L.  Carl  Brown  has  noted  'Israel's  crowded 
history  has  been  matched  by  a  massive  historiography.  Israelis  and  foreigners,  friends 
and  foes,  participants  and  observers,  professionals  and  amateurs  --  all  have  entered  the 
debate.  '  (Foreign  Affairs,  July/August  1998).  Within  this  debate  there  has  been  much 
heat,  as  well  as  light,  with  accusations  of  academic  dishonesty  being  unusually 
common.  Indeed  some  have  suggested  that  the  historians  are  themselves  directly 
involved  as  'combatants'  in  the  conflict.  Writing  in  the  New  Statesman  Stephen  Howe 
comments  that: 
All  wars,  in  a  sense,  are  history  wars.  Their  protagonists  are  driven  by  rival 
visions  of  the  past,  and  people  are  willing  to  kill  or  die  for  those  visions,  at 
least  as  much  as  they  are  for  ideas  about  the  future.  The  unending  violence 
between  Israelis  and  Palestinians  is  a  particularly  extreme  case.  There, 
historians  themselves  are  combatants,  whether  they  are  working  to  sustain  the 
national  myths  that  fuel  the  conflict,  or  trying  to  undermine  them.  (5 August 
2002) 
For  more  than  thirty  years  after  the  1948  war  there  existed  within  Israeli 
society  what  could  be  described  as  an  official  or  canonical  Zionist  history  of  the 
3 conflict.  This  narrative  was  accepted  by  the  great  bulk  of  the  population  and  taught  in 
all  Israeli  schools.  According  to  the  Israeli  historian  Avi  Shlaim  (2004)  it  fulfilled  two 
objectives.  Firstly,  'it  instilled  a  sense  of  nationhood  in  Jews  from  various  countries  of 
origin'  and  secondly,  'it  enlisted  international  sympathy  and  support  for  the  fledgling 
State  of  Israel'  However  he  also  notes  that  'the  one  cause  it  emphatically  did  not  serve 
is  that  of  mutual  understanding  and  reconciliation  between  Jews  and  Arabs.  '  The 
traditional  narrative  maintained  that  the  Jewish  attempt  to  create  a  homeland  in  their 
ancestral  lands  in  Palestine  was  a  benign  affair,  which  sought  to  develop  the  backward 
and  sparsely  populated  country  and  bring  the  benefits  of  modernity  to  the  Arab 
population.  Under  the  British  Mandate  Jewish  attempts  to  foster  mutual  understanding 
and  cooperation  were  met  with  intransigence  and  outright  hostility  from  the  local 
Arab  population.  Avi  Shlaim  sketches  out  the  traditional  narrative  from  the  pivotal 
year  of  1948  onwards: 
The  conflict  between  Jews  and  Arabs  in  Palestine  came  to  a  head  following 
the  passage,  on  29  November  1947,  of  the  United  Nations  partition  resolution 
which  called  for  the  establishment  of  two  states,  one  Jewish  and  one  Arab. 
The  Jews  accepted  the  UN  plan  despite  the  painful  sacrifices  it  entailed  but  the 
Palestinians,  the  neighbouring  Arab  states,  and  the  Arab  League  rejected  it. 
Great  Britain  did  everything  in  its  power  towards  the  end  of  the  Palestine 
Mandate  to  frustrate  the  establishment  of  the  Jewish  state  envisaged  in  the  UN 
plan.  With  the  expiry  of  the  Mandate  and  the  proclamation  of  the  State  of 
Israel,  five  Arab  states  sent  their  armies  into  Palestine  with  the  firm  intention 
of  strangling  the  Jewish  state  at  birth.  The  subsequent  struggle  was  an  unequal 
one  between  a  Jewish  David  and  an  Arab  Goliath.  The  infant  Jewish  state 
fought  a  desperate,  heroic,  and  ultimately  successful  battle  for  survival  against 
overwhelming  odds.  During  the  war,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Palestinians 
fled  to  the  neighbouring  Arab  states,  mainly  in  response  to  orders  from  their 
leaders  and  despite  Jewish  pleas  to  stay  and  demonstrate  that  peaceful  co- 
existence  was  possible.  After  the  war,  the  story  continues,  Israeli  leaders 
sought  peace  with  all  their  heart  and  all  their  might  but  there  was  no  one  to 
talk  to  on  the  other  side.  Arab  intransigence  alone  was  responsible  for  the 
political  deadlock  that  was  not  broken  until  President  Anwar  Sadat's  visit  to 
Jerusalem  thirty  years  later.  (2004) 
4 The  Palestinian  narrative  of  the  conflict  could  hardly  be  more  different.  It 
regarded  Jewish  immigration  into  Palestine  as  a  form  of  European  colonialism  and 
questioned  the  right  of  the  British  government  to  set  up  a  Jewish  homeland  in  an  area 
where  a  settled  population  had  been  living  for  hundreds  of  years.  They  believed  that 
the  Jewish  immigrants  came  to  take  their  land  and  dominate  them,  rather  than  develop 
the  country  for  the  mutual  benefit  of  both  peoples.  The  1948  war  was  as  seen  as 
national  catastrophe  in  which  most  Palestinians  were  ethnically  cleansed  in  line  with 
long  held  plans  to  'transfer'  the  indigenous  population.  After  the  war  the  Israeli  state 
despite  pressure  from  the  'LN  refused  to  allow  the  return  of  the  refugees  it  had 
expelled,  strengthening  the  Palestinian  view  that  the  expulsions  were  premeditated. 
The  1956  and  1967  wars  were  seen  as  attempts  at  territorial  expansion  by  Israel,  and 
the  1982  invasion  of  Lebanon  as  well  as  the  settlement  program  in  the  occupied 
territories  were  seen  as  attempts  to  crush  Palestinian  nationalism  and  prevent  the 
emergence  of  a  Palestinian  state. 
It  is  clear  that  there  is  little  common  ground  in  the  official  Israeli  and 
Palestinian  narratives.  However  from  the  late  1970s  onwards  the  traditional  Israeli 
narrative  began  to  come  under  increasing  pressure  from  dissident  academics  within 
Israel.  Initially  it  was  sociologists  rather  than  historians  who  began  to  question  the 
dominant  perspective.  Sociologists  such  as  Shlomo  Swirski  and  Deborah  Bernstein 
questioned  the  dominant  functionalist  paradigm  in  Israeli  sociology  which  stressed  the 
integration  and  adaptation  of  Israel's  diverse  social  groups.  These  sociologists  saw 
Israeli  society  riven  by  inequality  and  schisms  between  Ashkenazi  (of  European 
origin)  and  Mizrahim  (of  Middle  eastern  origin)  Jews,  between  secular  and  orthodox 
Jews,  between  the  Arab  and  Jewish  citizens  of  the  state  and  between  the  Israeli 
occupying  forces  and  the  Palestinians  living  under  military  rule.  The  Israeli 
sociologist  Lawrence  Silberstein  suggests  that  the  controversial  1982  Israeli  invasion 
of  Lebanon  placed  further  strain  on  the  traditional  Israeli  version  of  history: 
Israel's  invasion  of  Lebanon  in  1982,  and  the  ensuing  sense  of  shock, 
disillusionment  and  demoralization  led  to  the  emergence  of  peace  groups 
previously  unknown  in  Israel.  In  the  wake  of  that  war,  many  Israelis  came  to 
feel  a  previously  unknown  scepticism  concerning  Israel's  officially  stated 
commitment  to  fighting  only  defensive  and  to  pursuing  peace  on  all  fronts. 
The  trauma  of  Lebanon  became  the  equivalent  of  the  trauma  of  Vietnam  in  the 
5 United  States  in  the  nineteen  sixties  and  seventies.  In  the  meantime  the  effects 
of  the  long  years  of  occupying  territories  conquered  in  the  1967  War  and 
controlling  a  hostile  and  restless  population  rendered  problematic  the 
dominant  representations  of  Zionism  as  a  humane,  progressive  movement. 
(Silberstein,  1999:  72) 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  Lebanon  invasion  the  prime  minister  Menachem  Begin 
gave  a  lecture  to  the  IDF  staff  academy  on  wars  of  choice  and  wars  of  no  choice  in 
which  he  argued  that  the  Lebanon  war  like  the  1956  Suez  War  was  a  war  of  choice 
undertaken  for  political  objectives.  Shlaim  suggests  that  with  'this  admission, 
unprecedented  in  the  history  of  the  Zionist  movement,  the  national  consensus  round 
the  notion  of  ein  breira  [no  choice]  began  to  crumble,  creating  political  space  for  a 
critical  re-examination  of  the  country's  earlier  history'  (2004).  The  following  year  an 
Israeli  sociologist  Baruch  Kimmerling  published  a  study  entitled  Zionism  and 
Territory:  The  Socio-  Territorial  Dimension  of  Zionist  Politics  which  challenged  the 
notion  that  pre-  1948  Jewish  settlement  was  undertaken  to  benefit  both  the  both  Jewish 
and  Arab  populations.  Kimmerling,  for  the  first  time  in  the  Israeli  academy,  utilized  a 
European  colonial  model  to  analyse  Jewish  settlement  policies,  thus  substantially 
narrowing  the  gap  with  the  Palestinian  perspective  of  this  period.  The  following  year 
Tom  Segev,  a  journalist  and  historian  published  1949:  The  First  Israelis  which 
challenged  other  aspects  of  the  official  history.  These  included  the  claims  that  the 
Palestinian  refugees  of  1948  had  left  their  homes  willingly,  that  Israel  did  everything 
it  could  to  bring  about  peace  after  1948,  and  that  the  Middle  Eastern  Jews  who  arrived 
in  Israel  after  1948  were  integrated  into  the  collective  without  economic  and  social 
discrimination.  Silberstein  suggest  that  Segev's  book  was  a  direct  challenge  to  many 
aspects  of  how  Israeli  saw  themselves  and  their  relationship  to  the  state: 
Typifying  the  new  scholarship  emerging  in  the  1980s  and  1990s,  Segev  argued 
that  his  book  'shattered  a  firmly  established  self-image  and  exposed  as  mere 
myths  a  large  number  of  long  established  truisms.  '  These  'myths'  grounded  in 
Zionist  discourse  and  produced  and  disseminated  by  the  state  apparatus, 
provided  Israelis  with  the  basic  materials  out  of  which  they  constructed  their 
self  understanding  as  a  collective.  Additionally  they  provided  the  state  with  its 
basic  legitimation.  Constituting  the  'common  sense'  of  Israeli  culture,  they 
6 shaped  the  way  in  which  most  Israelis  viewed  social,  cultural  and  political 
reality.  (1999:  77). 
However  it  wasn't  until  1988  that  the  issues  raised  by  the  'new  historians' 
broke  into  the  mainstream.  In  that  year  four  works  were  released  with  challenged 
fundamental  aspects  of  the  traditional  history:  Avi  Shlaim's  Collusion  across  the 
Jordan:  King  Abdullah,  the  Zionist  Movement,  and  the  Partition  ofPalestine;  Simha 
Flapan's  The  Birth  of1srael:  Myths  and  Realities;  Benny  Morris's  The  Birth  of  the 
Palestinian  Refugee  Problem,  1947-1949;  and  Ilan  Pappe's  Britain  and  the  Arab- 
Israeli  Conflict,  1947-5.  All  of  these  works  took  issue  with  the  traditional  Israeli 
narrative  of  1948  and  the  notion  that  Israel  had  earnestly  sought  peace  after  the  war. 
Benny  Morris's  book  in  particular  provoked  a  furious  backlash  amongst  some  Israelis. 
The  most  ferocious  criticism  came  from  Shabtai  Teveth,  a  journalist  and  biographer 
of  David  Ben-Gurion,  who  penned  an  article  entitled  'Charging  Israel  with  Original 
Sin'  which  appeared  in  the  conservative  American-Jewish  monthly  Commentary 
(September  1989).  In  the  article  Teveth  accused  Morris  of  producing  a  'farrago  of 
distortions,  omissions,  tendentious  readings,  and  outright  falsifications',  whose 
political  purpose  was  to  generate  sympathy  for  the  Palestinians  and  de-legitimate  the 
Israeli  state  (cited  in  Shlaim,  2004).  As  Silberstein  notes  the  debate  demonstrated  that 
'far  more  than  scholarly  methods  and  historical  accuracy  were  at  stake.  Extending  far 
beyond  the  walls  of  the  academy,  the  questions  raised  by  the  young  scholars  had  the 
effect  of  problematizing  prevailing  notions  of  Israeli  collective  identity  as  well  as  the 
trustworthiness  of  the  authorities  of  the  state'  (1999:  84).  Throughout  the  1990s  the 
new  historians  continued  to  question  further  aspects  of  the  traditional  Israeli  history 
and  in  particular  whether  it  was  the  Arab  or  Israeli  intransigence  which  was  to  blame 
for  the  failure  to  conclude  peace  treaties.  Shlaim  suggests  that  this  issue  is: 
particularly  sensitive  because  it  entails  the  allocating  of  responsibility  for  the 
persistence  of  the  conflict.  At  the  core  of  the  old  version  is  the  image  of  the 
Arab  world  as  a  monolithic  and  implacably  hostile  enemy.  According  to  this 
version,  Israel's  leaders  strove  indefatigably  towards  a  peaceful  settlement  of 
the  dispute  but  all  their  efforts  foundered  on  the  rocks  of  Arab  intransigence. 
The  revisionist  version  holds  that  Israel  was  more  inflexible  than  the  Arab 
states  and  that  she  consequently  bears  a  larger  share  of  the  responsibility  for 
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military  hostilities.  (2004) 
In  1999  the  debate  was  re-ignited  by  the  publication  of  two  highly  influential  works, 
Avi  Shlaim's  The  Iron  Wall:  Israel  and  the  Arab  World  and  Benny  Morris's 
Righteous  Victims:  A  History  of  the  Zionist-Arab  Conflict,  1881-1999.  Both  drew 
plaudits  from  European  and  some  Israelis  critics  but  were  also  subject  to  significant 
criticism.  In  a  Ha'aretz  article  Israeli  novelist  Ahron  Meged  accused  Shlaim  and 
Morris  of  leading  the  country  towards  collective  suicide,  whilst  in  a  ten  page  review 
of  the  books  in  The  New  Republic  Anita  Shapira  accused  the  authors  of  being 
'heretical  elements'  who  'doubted  the  right  of  Israel  to  exist  and  stressed  the  wrongs 
that  were  perpetrated  against  the  Arabs'  (29  November  1999).  Shlaim  claimed  that 
Shapira's  review  was  inspired  by  the  fear  that  the  'old  historians'  were  'losing  the 
battle  for  the  hearts  and  minds  of  their  compatriots'  and  that  the  article  was  'redolent 
of  defeat  on  the  intellectual  battlefield'.  The  outbreak  of  the  second  intifada  in  late 
2000  and  the  election  of  the  hardline  Sharon  administration  led  to  a  move  away  from 
the  'new  history'  and  a  return  to  the  traditional  narrative.  Six  months  before  his 
election  Ariel  Sharon  was  asked  what  changes  he  would  like  to  see  to  the  Israeli 
education  sysem  and  he  replied  that  he  'would  like  them  to  study  the  history  of  the 
people  of  Israel  and  the  land  of  Israel 
...  the  children  must  be  taught  Jewish-Zionist 
values,  and  the  'new  historians'  must  not  be  taught.  '  (cited  in  Shlaim,  2004).  When 
the  Sharon  administration  came  to  power,  the  new  education  minister  Limor  Livnat 
ordered  the  re-writing  of  all  the  history  books  for  secondary  school  and  the  removal  of 
all  traces  of  the  'new  history'. 
During  the  1980s  and  1990s  the  new  historians  had  considerably  narrowed  the 
gap  between  the  Israel  and  Palestinian  versions  of  the  conflict.  Pappe  suugest  that 
there  is  now  enough  common  ground  between  the  two  versions  to  create  what  he 
describes  as  a  'bridging  narrative'  on  the  events  of  1948.  This  he  suggests  is 
important  in  creating  the  conditions  for  a  sucessftil  resolution  to  the  conflict  since  it 
entails  the  recognition  by  Israel  of  'the  centrality  of  the  refugee  problem  in  the 
Palestinian  historical  narrative,  collective  memory  and  national  ethos'  (1999:  59). 
Similarly  another  of  the  'new  historians'  Avi  Shlairn  also  sees  a  narrowing  of  the  gap 
between  the  narratives  as  a  necessary  pre-condition  for  a  resolution  of  the  conflict: 
8 In  all  these  different  ways,  the  new  history  helped  to  create  a  climate,  on  both 
sides  of  the  Israeli-Arab  divide,  which  was  conducive  to  the  continuation  of 
the  peace  process.  As  Bishop  Tutu  pointed  out  in  the  South  African  context,  it 
is  difficult  to  know  what  to  forgive  unless  we  know  what  happened.  In  the 
Middle  East,  as  in  South  Africa,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  past  in  order 
to  go  forward 
...  Xenophobic  and  self-righteous  national  narratives  only  fuel 
and  prolong  this  tragic  conflict.  A  more  complex  and  fair-minded 
understanding  of  the  past  is  therefore  essential  for  preserving  at  least  the 
prospect  of  reconciliation  in  the  future  (2004). 
Both  the  Israeli  and  Palestinian  positions,  and  justifications  for  their  actions 
are  intimately  linked  to  their  particular  version  of  the  past.  Into  this  controversy 
journalists  must  select  certain  salient  information  to  contextualise  stories  and  explain 
events.  I  now  want  to  review  research  which  has  looked  at  how  j  ournalists  have  tried 
to  accomplish  this. 
Previous  Research  on  Media  Coverage  of  the  Israel-Palestine  Conflict 
American  Research 
One  approach  adopted  by  researchers  has  been  to  examine  how  reporting  on  the 
conflict  has  changed  over  time.  Zaharna  examined  the  portrayal  of  Palestinians  in 
Time  magazine  between  1947  and  1993.  He  suggests  that  because  of  the  close 
relationship  between  Israel  and  the  United  States  news  from  Israel  has  been  treated 
like  a  domestic  story,  and  that  rather  than  balancing  Israeli  and  Palestinian  sources 
Time  has  tended  to  quote  'extensively  from  American  politicians  and  Israelis'  and  that 
'because  American  politicians  tended  to  be  supportive  of  Israeli  views  this  practice 
[has]  served  to  reinforce  the  Israeli  perspective  and  negate  the  Palestinian  message' 
(1995:  3  8-39).  In  the  period  around  the  creation  of  the  Israeli  state  Zaharna  claims 
that  Jewish  leaders  were  cited  much  more  frequently  than  Arab  leaders  and  that  Time 
featured  many  personalised  stories  of  Jews  in  Palestine.  Personalised  stories  on 
Palestinians  did  not  begin  to  appear  in  the  magazine  until  the  first  intifada  in  1988.  In 
the  period  from  1950  until  the  Six  Day  War  Zaharna  found  that  descriptions  of  Arab 
9 leaders  corresponded  closely  with  American  foreign  policy.  Wl-iilst  the  US  ally  King 
Hussein  of  Jordan  was  presented  positively,  Nasser  was  portrayed  as  a  'prominent 
Arab  villain'  0  995:  4  1).  From  this  period  until  the  outbreak  of  the  first  intifada 
Palestinians  had  a  dual  image  of  terrorist  and  refugee.  Palestinians  were  portrayed  as 
'dedicated,  vicious  political  fanatics'  (Time,  21  September  1970)  or  'unpredictable 
terrorists'  (Time,  19  March  1973)  and  their  behaviour  described  as  'insensible  terror' 
(Time,  27  May  1974)  or  'savage  and  irrational'  (Time,  7  January  1974).  Zaharna 
suggests  that  President  Carter's  call  for  a  Palestinian  homeland  in  1977  and  the  Camp 
David  agreements,  which  called  for  expanded  Palestinian  autonomy,  increased  the 
legitimacy  of  their  cause  whilst  the  Sabra  and  Shatilla  killings  maintained  their  image 
as  victims.  During  the  first  intifada  the  author  found  that  Time  produced  more  positive 
images  of  Palestinians,  sometimes  highlighting  their  claims  to  independence  and  self- 
determination.  He  suggests  that  this  may  have  been  partly  due  to  attacks  on  foreign 
journalists  by  members  of  the  IDF.  In  the  period  leading  up  to  the  Oslo  accords 
Zahama  found  that  positive  images  of  Yasser  Arafat  became  much  more  frequent.  He 
suggests  that  Arafat's  deal  making  with  Israel  led  to  him  being  recognised  as  a 
legitimate  leader  of  the  Palestinians  nineteen  years  after  he  was  officially  recognised 
by  the  United  Nations  and  that  'the  irony  was  that  the  gap  between  the  Palestinian 
leadership  and  people's  media  image  was  ultimate  bridged  through  the  PLO's  ability 
not  to  align  itself  with  its  own  people  in  1974  but  with  Israel  in  1993'  (1995:  47). 
Noakes  and  Wilkins  (2002)  examined  a  random  sample  of  Associated  Press 
and  New  York  Times  articles  for  the  period  1984-1998  and  assessed  three  variables: 
how  much  attention  the  conflict  received;  which  sources  were  cited;  and  how 
Palestinian  actions  were  framed.  Noakes  and  Wilkins  found  that  both  the  first  intifada 
and  the  beginning  of  the  Oslo  peace  process  in  1993  led  to  a  large  increase  in  news 
coverage.  They  argue  that  the  first  intifada  'as  a  grassroots  protest  against  an 
oppressive  government  ... 
frame[d]  the  Palestinian  cause  in  terms  similar  to  those 
advanced  by  many  movements  in  the  US  including  the  Civil  Rights  Movement'  and 
that  'such  frames  resonate  [d]  with  the  producers  of  TV  news  and  the  American 
public'  (2002:  659).  However  the  authors  offer  no  evidence  in  form  of  interviews  or 
focus  group  studies  with  viewers  or  broadcasters  to  support  these  claims.  Other 
research  in  this  area,  suggests  that  it  can  be  dangerous  to  make  assumptions  about 
how  the  activities  of  Palestinians  opposing  the  occupation  will  be  read  by  audiences, 
as  a  crucial  factor  is  whether  viewers  see  the  struggle  as  legitimate  (Philo  &  Berry, 
10 2004).  Noakes  and  Wilkins  did  find  that  a  consistent  pattern  in  sourcing  that  official 
Israel  spokespersons  were  consistently  cited  more  than  official  Palestinian  sources  by 
a  factor  of  two  to  one,  although  the  use  of  official  Palestinian  sources  increased 
markedly  after  the  signing  of  the  Oslo  agreements.  They  also  found  that  the  framing 
of  Palestinian  resistance  changed  over  time.  Prior  to  the  first  intifada  Palestinians 
were  three  times  more  likely  to  be  portrayed  as  'terrorists'  rather  than  the  'victims'  in 
the  struggle,  whilst  during  the  uprising  they  were  presented  as  terrorists  only  slightly 
more  than  victims.  The  authors  claim  that: 
It  was  also  during  the  intifada  period  that  the  Palestinian  struggle  was  most 
likely  to  be  presented  as  just.  Fewer  than  one  out  of  ten  news  articles  framed 
the  Palestinian  struggle  as  justified  prior  to  the  intifada,  but  more  than  one 
quarter  (27.5  percent)  of  the  articles  did  so  during  the  intifada.  The  appearance 
of  this  frame  in  US  news  media,  however  declines  quickly  in  subsequent 
periods.  In  contrast,  Palestinians  were  most  likely  to  be  seen  to  have  a  right  to 
self-determination  or  national  sovereignty  after  the  Oslo  Accords  (2002:  664) 
Although  the  researchers  do  not  draw  the  conclusion,  one  possible  explanation 
for  the  media  choosing  to  portray  the  Palestinian  demand  for  national  self- 
determination  more  favourably  after  the  Oslo  Accords  was  that  they  were  taking  their 
cue  from  official  American  foreign  policy.  The  signing  of  the  accords  on  the  White 
House  lawn  in  1993  may  have  indicted  to  news  editors  and  j  ourrialists  that  the 
Palestinian  claim  to  self-determination  was  now  a  legitimate  perspective. 
Other  research  has  focused  on  how  the  media  reported  on  specific  events,  such 
as  the  first  Palestinian  intifada.  For  instance,  Daniel  (1995)  argues  that  images  from 
the  first  intifada  presented  a  challenge  to  the  dominant  representation  of  the  conflict. 
She  maintains  that  most  news  fits  into  standard  storylines  in  which  the  'prevailing 
conventional  wisdom  is  not  challenged  and  the  status  quo  interpretation  of  the  world 
is  preserved'  (1995:  64).  However  the  1987  uprising  'presented  a  serious  challenge  to 
the  predominant  conception  of  Israel  as  a  tiny  democracy  surrounded  by  hostile  forces 
and  constantly  threatened  by  Palestinian  terrorists'  (1995:  62).  She  suggests  that  the 
images  of  women  and  children  facing  faces  tanks  and  an-ned  with  stones  didn't  fit 
with  previous  images  of  'turban  shrouded,  almost  exclusively  male  militants'  (1995: 
67).  Thus  footage  from  the  conflict  'recontextualised  the  Palestinian  population  as  one composed  not  just  of  a  few  terrorist  males  but  of  families  and  community,  a  major 
base  for  identification'  (1995:  68).  Daniel  suggests  that  the  introduction  of  such 
complexities  'and  grey  areas  into  a  situation  that  was  previously  a  clear  contest  of 
good  and  evil,  of  victim  and  villain'  served  to  open  up  discussion  on  issues  such  the 
occupation,  and  Palestinian  demands  for  self-determination  (1995:  67).  She  also  cites 
American  public  opinion  data  to  argue  that  public  opinion  of  Palestinians  became 
more  positive  during  the  intifada. 
Wolfsfeld  in  an  another  study  of  American  media  coverage  of  the  first  intifada 
argues  that  the  uprising  provided  'an  almost  textbook  case  of  how  a  seemingly  weaker 
challenger  can  shatter  the  authorities'  domination  over  the  political  environment  and 
successfully  promote  their  frames  to  the  news  media'  (1997:  127).  Wolfsfeld  argues 
that  two  frames  vied  for  competition  in  the  intifada,  the  'law  and  order  frame'  which 
defined  the  uprising  as  composed  of  criminal  acts  and  social  disorder,  and  the 
'injustice  and  defiance  frame'  which  presented  the  uprising  as  a  response  to  a  'brutal 
military  occupation'.  Echoing  the  claims  made  by  Daniel  above,  Wolfsfeld  argued 
that  the  'injustice  and  defiance  frame'  was  more  successful  because  the 
'confrontations  in  the  streets  and  allies  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  provided  more 
than  just  journalistic  resonance,  they  also  had  a  good  fit  with  Palestinian  claims 
concerning  Israeli  brutality'  (1997:  153).  Also  in  line  with  the  position  taken  by 
Noakes  and  Wilkins,  Wolfsfeld  argues  that  the  'information  and  images  collected  by 
American  journalists  resonated  both  professionally  and  politically  with  an  injustice 
and  defiance  frame'  a  perspective  which  'dominates  the  political  culture  of  American 
television  news'  (1997:  160).  The  author  argues  that  the  'Palestinians  were  the  clear 
winners  in  the  cultural  contest  over  the  intifada'  because  they  were  successful  in 
emphasising  that  the  occupation  was  to  blame.  However  in  the  absence  of  any 
audience  research  it  is  speculative  to  impose  a  priori  categories  of  understanding  on 
viewers,  by  assuming  that  they  will  employ  an  'injustice  and  defiance  frame'  when 
interpreting  the  uprising.  Also  the  same  criticism  applies  to  his  assumption  that  the 
inequities  of  the  occupation  were  the  dominant  theme  in  coverage.  As  a  former 
member  of  the  IDF  the  consequences  of  the  intifada  may  be  clear  to  the  writer,  but 
some  audience  research  suggests  that  ordinary  viewers  are  unlikely  to  understand  its 
social  ramifications  unless  they  are  properly  explained  (Philo  &  Berry,  2004). 
Gilboa  (1993)  argues  that  the  media  coverage  of  the  intifada  was  'biased' 
against  Israel,  but  despite  this  'American  chiefly  blamed  the  PLO  for  the  violence  and 
12 were  divided  on  other  important  issues:  whether  the  riots  were  acts  of  violence  or  acts 
of  disobedience,  whether  the  reason  for  the  violence  were  legitimate  or  not'  (1993: 
98).  Gilboa  points  to  public  opinion  research  which  found  that  63  percent  of 
Americans  thought  the  PLO  a  'terrorist  organisation'  and  only  fourteen  percent  who 
saw  it  as  a  'national  liberation  movement',  and  claimed  that  'despite  the  forceful 
demands  of  the  Palestinians  to  establish  an  independent  Palestinian  state5  the  US 
public  did  not  support  this  solution'  (1993  :  102)  However  some  may  question  the 
impartiality  of  Gilboa's  methods.  Much  of  the  research  he  cites  which  purports  to 
show  an  anti-Israel  bias  was  produced  by  pro-Israel  lobby  groups  like  the  Anti- 
Defamation  League,  whilst  some  of  the  opinion  polling  questions  he  cites  are  leading. 
For  instance  one  question  asked: 
Which  of  the  two  opinions  is  closer  to  yours:  The  US  shouldn't  negotiate  with 
the  PLO  because  they  are  terrorists  and  they  refuse  to  recognise  the  right  of 
Israel  to  exist;  or  in  order  to  bring  about  peace  in  the  Middle  East  we  should 
be  willing  to  talk  to  all  parties  involved?  (1993:  104) 
More  recent  research  on  the  al  Aqsa  intifada  has  argued  that  there  is  an 
imbalance  in  media  coverage  which  favours,  Israel.  For  instance  Lowstedt  and 
Madhoun  (2002)  cite  research  which  looked  at  a  six  month  sample  of  American 
Public  Radio  (NPR)  broadcasts  which  found  that  81  per  cent  of  Israeli  deaths  in  the 
conflict  were  reported  as  opposed  to  only  34  percent  of  Palestinian  deaths.  The 
imbalance  was  even  more  marked  in  relation  to  the  deaths  of  children,  with  89  percent 
of  Israeli  child  deaths  reported  compared  to  20  percent  of  Palestinian  child  deaths. 
The  researchers  also  found  that  whilst  NPR  was  more  likely  to  report  the  deaths  of 
Israeli  civilians  than  Israeli  security  personnel  (84  percent  to  69  percent)  the  opposite 
was  true  with  regard  to  Palestinians  where  the  deaths  of  Palestinian  fighters  was  more 
likely  to  be  reported  than  the  deaths  of  Palestinian  civilians  (72  percent  to  20  percent). 
They  suggest  that  because  of  this  imbalance  'consumers  of  US  public  media  are  likely 
to  believe  that  nearly  50  percent  of  the  people  killed  were  Jews,  and  most  of  the 
children  killed  were  Jews  too'  (2002:  48).  Although  the  authors  offer  no  audience 
research  to  back  up  these  claims,  audience  research  on  British  perceptions  on  the 
conflict  did  suggest  that  viewers  tended  to  assume  that  Jewish  casualties  were  at  least 
as  high  as  Palestinian  ones  and  that  this  mirrored  their  relative  prominence  in  news 
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study  of  NBC,  CBS  and  ABC  reports  on  al  Aqsa  intifada  which  found  that  Israelis 
were  reported  as  'responding'  or  'retaliating'  to  Palestinian  far  more  often  than 
Palestinians  were  described  as  'retaliating'  (79  percent  to  9  percent).  They  suggest 
that  the  'impression  was  thus  fostered  that  Israel  acts  violently  in  self  defence,  in 
response  to  violence  initiated  by  their  foes  almost  nine  times  more  than  Palestinians' 
(2002:  48).  They  also  point  to  coverage  which  often  presents  attacks  on  Israelis  as 
breaking  a  period  of  'calm'  despite  the  fact  that  the  'calm'  had  included  the  killing  of 
many  Palestinians: 
When  Israelis  are  killed  by  Palestinians  the  acts  are  often  referred  to  by  the  US 
media  as  the  end  of  a  'calm'  period,  as  a  'flare-up  in  violence'.  For  example, 
on  September  18  and  19,2002,  six  Israelis  were  killed  in  the  two  Palestinian 
suicide  bomb  attacks  in  six  weeks.  All  major  US  news  outlets  referred  to  the 
preceding  six  weeks  as  'calm'.  However  during  that  time,  54  Palestinians  were 
killed  by  the  Israelis,  most  of  them  unarmed  civilians,  totally  uninvolved  in 
resistance  activities  (2002:  48) 
Ackerman  (2002)  also  argues  that  there  is  an  imbalance  in  American  media 
coverage,  in  that  the  Palestinian  perspective  that  they  are  resisting  a  violent  military 
occupation  is  presented  infrequently.  He  argues  that  even  the  use  of  the  words 
'occupied'  and  'occupied  territories'  has  become  rarer  in  recent  years: 
The  word  'occupation'  has  become  almost  taboo  for  American  reporters.  Even 
the  designation  'occupied  territories'  once  routine  has  all  but  disappeared.  In 
the  early  1990s  'occupied  territories'  showed  up  in  hundreds  of  AP  articles 
every  year-  699  in  1992  and  731  in  1993.  Nearly  a  third  of  all  articles 
mentioning  Palestinians  used  the  term.  By  the  end  of  the  decade  the  number  of 
appearances  had  dwindled  to  a  few  dozen.  During  the  first  eleven  months  of 
2000,  barely  one  I  percent  of  articles  mentioned  the  dreaded  phrase.  On  the 
three  major  networks'  evening  news  broadcasts-  'ABC  World  News  Tonight', 
'NBC  Nightly  News,  '  and  'CBS  Evening  News'-  the  West  Bank  or  Gaza  were 
ninety  nine  news  stories  since  the  fighting  began  in  late  September.  Of  those 
14 ninety  nine  stories,  only  four  used  the  word  'occupied,  '  6  occupation'  or  any 
other  variation.  (2002:  62). 
Ackerman  argues  that  the  upshot  of  this  is  that  'instead  of  honest  account  of 
each  sides'  grievances,  journalists  reporting  on  the  clashes  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
offer  what  is,  in  effect,  a  daily  catalogue  of  seemingly  unprovoked  Palestinian 
aggression'  (2002:  62).  For  instance,  Ackerman  points  to  a  bulletin  on  NBC's  'World 
News  Tonight'  (9  October  2000)  presented  by  Jim  Wooten  which  reported  on 
skirmishes  between  the  IDF  and  Palestinians  in  Nablus,  in  which  Palestinians  were 
presented  as  'looking  for  confrontation'  with  Israel,  wielding  'rocks  and  bottles', 
initiating  a  'gun  battle'  yet  'one  more  example'  of  how  their  'anger  is  turning  more 
violent  and  more  deadly'  (2002:  62).  However  Ackerman  argues  that  the  Palestinian 
grievances  are  not  difficult  to  locate  or present,  and  that  j  ournalists  also  avoid 
reporting  the  perspective  of  the  UN  which  has  frequently  criticised  the  occupation: 
But  what  are  the  Palestinians'  grievances?  Why  did  they  choose  to  confront 
Israel's  soldiers?  Like  most  of  his  colleagues,  Wooten  maintains  a  studious 
silence,  not  mentioning  the  Israeli  army  posts  surrounding  Nablus  or  the 
checkpoints  controlling  the  entrances  to  the  town-  even  before  the  current 
round  of  violence  began.  Nor  does  he  mention  the  bypass  roads  for  settlers 
only  or  the  ongoing  expropriations  of  Palestinian  land  for  expansion  of  the 
four  nearby  settlements,  which  are  populated  by  armed  militants  many  of 
whom  support  extremist  religious  leaders  like  the  late  Rabbi  Meir  Kahane, 
who  advocated  the  expulsion  of  Arabs  from  the  West  Bank.  And  finally,  he 
makes  no  reference  to  the  fact  that  the  entire  apparatus  of  military  occupation 
is  illegal  under  the  Geneva  Conventions  or  that  the  UN  Security  Council 
resolutions  have  repeatedly  demanded  Israel's  withdrawal.  (2002:  63) 
Ackerman  also  points  to  other  instances  where  US  newspapers  have  chosen 
not  to  report  criticism  of  Israel  by  bodies  such  as  the  United  Nations  and  Amnesty 
International.  For  instance  when  at  the  beginning  of  the  intifada  the  UN  security 
council  passed  a  resolution  condemning  Israel's  'excessive  use  of  force  against 
Palestinians'  Ackerman  claims  that  only  three  of  the  top  thirty  six  US  newspapers  in 
the  Nexis  database  devoted  an  article  to  the  vote  with  none  of  the  headlines 
15 mentioning  Israel  by  name.  Shortly  afterwards  Amnesty  International  released  a 
statement  condemning  Israel's  'pattern  of  gross  human  rights  violations  that  may 
amount  to  war  crimes'.  Ackerman  notes  that  this  statement  was  briefly  noted  by  the 
Boston  Globe  and  Washington  Post  but  ignored  by  most  of  the  other  major 
newspapers  including  the  New  York  Times.  Ackerman  also  suggests  that  the  US  media 
are  far  more  likely  to  accept  the  Israeli  version  of  events  when  Palestinian  civilians 
are  killed  in  controversial  circumstances  and  points  to  US  media  coverage  of  the 
killing  of  Mohammed  al-Dura.  Whilst  the  Palestinians  regarded  the  killing  as 
perpetuated  deliberately  by  the  IDF,  Israeli  spokesmen  argued  that  the  boy  had  been 
'killed  in  the  crossfire'.  Ackerman  found  that  the  phrase  'killed  in  the  crossfire': 
appeared  in  the  US  media  with  remarkable  uniformity:  'NBC  Nightly  News' 
and  'CBS  Evening  News'  (both  30  September  2000),  along  with  the  Baltimore 
Sun,  Boston  Globe,  Los  Angeles  Times,  and  Washington  Post  (all  I  October 
2000)  all  used  some  variation  of  'caught  in  the  crossfire'  to  describe  the  boy's 
shooting,  even  though  Israeli  responsibility  was  fairly  clear.  Israel  later 
acknowledged  its  soldiers  had  shot  the  boy  with  one  of  its  spokesmen 
admitting  that  the  initial  denial  had  damaged  the  government's  credibility. 
(2002:  66) 
Noam  Chomsky  (e.  g.  2000,1999,1996,1993,1992,1991,1988)  has  written 
extensively  on  US  media  coverage  of  the  conflict  and  accused  the  press  of 
systematically  misrepresenting  fundamental  aspects  of  the  dispute.  Chomsky's 
method  has  been  to  compare  what  appears  in  the  American  press,  with  a  particular 
emphasis  on  major  publications  such  as  the  New  York  Times,  Washington  Post,  Time 
and  Newsweek  with  reports  from  the  Israeli,  European  and  Arab  media,  the  United 
Nations,  human  rights  groups,  as  well  as  what  has  been  published  in  official 
government  documentation  and  historical  texts.  Chomsky  then  uses  these  alternative 
sources  of  information  as  a  method  for  evaluating  the  veracity  and  accuracy  of  what  is 
reported  in  the  American  press.  Chomsky  argues  that  the  American  press  has 
consistently  viewed  the  conflict  from  an  Israeli  perspective,  and  presents  evidence  to 
show  that  Israeli  human  rights  abuses  such  as  extra-judicial  killings,  torture,  collective 
punishments  and  theft  of  land  and  water  are  largely  ignored  by  the  media,  whilst 
Palestinian  attacks  on  Israelis  are  highlighted  and  condemned.  He  argues  that  the  long 
16 history  of  Israel  defying  U`N  resolutions  is  ignored,  whilst  American  diplomatic  and 
financial  support  for  policies  which  breach  international  law  and  the  Geneva 
Conventions  is  rarely  mentioned  in  the  media.  One  of  the  most  serious  charges  he 
makes  is  that  j  oumalists  have  consistently  misrepresented  the  Palestinian  and  wider 
Arab  position  towards  Israel,  presenting  it  as  intransigent  and  unwilling  to  come  to 
any  accommodation  with  Israel,  whilst  presenting  the  Israelis  as  the  more 
accommodating  partner.  Chomsky  presents  evidence  including  UN  resolutions,  peace 
plans  as  well  as  official  Arab  and  Israeli  statements  which  suggest  the  obverse,  that  it 
was  the  Palestinians  and  Arab  states  who  have  strived  for  a  negotiated  settlement 
since  the  1970s,  and  that  this  has  been  consistently  rejected  by  Israel  and  the  United 
States.  Such  evidence  he  suggests  has  been  dispatched  to  'Orwell's  useful  memory 
hole'  (1999:  71): 
American  commentators  are  still  more  extreme  in  their  rejection  of  the 
historical  record,  as  in  the  sample  of  cases  cited.  In  the  early  years  the  PLO 
was  no  less  re  .  ectionist  than  Israel,  and  its  call  for  a  'democratic  secular  state' 
was  not  what  it  appeared  on  the  surface.  But  it  simply  cannot  be  denied  that 
from  the  mid  1970s,  the  PLO  has  moved  increasingly  towards  an 
accommodationist  position.  Whilst  concealing  this  record,  propagandists 
search  desperately  for  statements  by  PLO  spokesmen  that  reveal  their 
unremitting  hostility  to  Israel  and  unwillingness  to  accept  it.  Israeli  doves  have 
regarded  such  efforts  with  contempt,  pointing  out  that  the  same  logic  would 
lead  to  the  conclusions  that  no  one  should  have  any  dealings  with  the  Zionist 
movement  or  the  State  of  Israel,  since  its  leaders  have  consistently  rejected 
any  Palestinian  rights  and  have  repeatedly  indicated  that  they  regard  as  any 
political  settlement  as  a  temporary  stage  leading  to  further  expansion.  What  is 
more  they  have  acted  on  these  principles.  We  return  to  the  record  which  is  not 
without  interest  and  is  generally  concealed  here.  That  outright  propagandists 
should  resort  to  these  practices  is  not  very  surprising;  that,  after  all,  is  their 
vocation.  It  is  interesting  that  the  practice  is  common  across  a  broad  spectrum 
of  western  opinion,  particularly  in  the  US  as  one  aspect  of  the  ideological 
support  for  Israel.  (1999:  76-77) 
17 In  an  analysis  of  the  'Oslo  11'  peace  agreement  struck  in  1995  and  the 
assassination  of  Yitzak  Rabin  soon  after,  Chomsky  claims  that  American  and  British 
journalists  misrepresented  what  had  been  agreed.  In  particular  he  points  to  claims  that 
Israel  had  agreed  to  relinquish  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  despite  the  fact  that  that 
Israeli  leaders  had  made  clear  public  statements  that  they  would  not  allow  the 
Palestinians  full  statehood,,  and  what  autonomy  they  would  be  granted  would  be 
confined  to  less  than  half  of  the  West  Bank: 
The  signing  of  Oslo  11  and  the  Rabin  assassination  shortly  afterwards  received 
enormous  attention  and  coverage.  Typical  headlines  after  the  signing  give  the 
flavour.  'Israel  agrees  to  quit  the  West  Bank.  '  'Israel  Ends  Jews'  Biblical 
Claim  on  the  West  Bank.  '  In  'Rabin's  historic  trade  with  Arabs,  '  a  'historical 
compromise.  '  'Israelis,  Palestinians  find  a  painful  peace,  '  establishing  an 
'undeniable  reality:  The  Palestinians  are  on  their  way  to  an  independent  state; 
the  Jews  are  bidding  farewell  to  portions  of  the  Holy  Land  to  which  they  have 
historically  felt  most  linked.  '  'Score  one  for  Clinton.  '  'At  White  House, 
symbols  of  a  day  of  awe'...  The  New  York  Times  lead  story  after  the 
assassination  reported  that  Rabin  had  'conquered  the  ancient  lands  on  the 
West  Bank  of  the  Jordan'  and  then  'negotiated  the  accord  to  eventually  cede 
Israeli  control  of  them  to  the  Palestinians'...  The  former  Jerusalem  bureau 
chief  of  the  Washington  Post  reported  that  'when  Rabin  Israelis  the  possibility 
of  'separation'  of  walling  off  the  Gaza  Strip  and  West  Bank  and  getting  the 
Palestinians  out  of  sight  and  mind-  the  majority  responded  with  enthusiasm'. 
'Those  who  murdered  Rabin,  and  those  who  incited  them,  didn't  do  so 
because  they  opposed  to  create  a  Palestinian  Bantustan'  the  New  Statesman 
correspondent  reported  from  Jerusalem,  chiding  Edward  Said  for  thinking 
otherwise.  'No:  they  knew  that  the  course  Rabin  was  charting  would  lead, 
unless  stopped,  to  a  Palestinian  state'...  One  intriguing  feature  is  that  the 
factual  assertions  are  not  even  close  to  true.  Israel  did  not  'agree  to  quit  the 
West  Bank'  or  'Ends  Jews'  Biblical  Claim  on  the  West  Bank.  '  It  signed  no 
4agreement  extending  Palestinian  rule  to  most  of  the  West  Bank'  or  4to 
eventually  cede  Israeli  control  of  West  bank  lands  to  the  Palestinians.  '  Rabin 
never  so  much  as  hinted  at  an  offer  of  'walling  off  the  Gaza  Strip  and  West 
18 Bank';  quite  the  contrary,  he  was  adamant,  clear  and  consistent  that  in 
stressing  that  nothing  of  the  sort  was  even  a  remote  possibility.  (1999:  553-4) 
Chomsky  claims  that  there  are  at  least  three  clearly  identifiable  reasons  why 
the  American  media  is  more  sympathetic  to  the  Israeli  position..  Partly,  he  claims,  it  is 
because  of  the  influence  of  the  pro-Israel  lobby,  but  he  suggests  that  this  extends 
beyond  the  American  Jewish  community  to  incorporate  'major  segments  of  liberal 
opinion,  the  leadership  of  the  labour  unions,  religious  fundamentalists'  as  well  as 
'conservatives'  who  support  high  military  spending  and  'adventurism  abroad'  (1999: 
13).  Secondly,  Chomsky  claims  that  Israel  serves  as  a  strategic  ally  of  the  United 
States  in  an  area  of  the  world  which  holds  the  bulk  of  the  planet's  energy  reserves' 
Thirdly  he  notes  that  Israel  had  proved  useful  as  a  conduit  for  military  aid  and  training 
to  repressive  regimes  who  could  not  be  directly  supported  because  of  adverse 
publicity  or  congressional  bans  imposed  because  of  major  human  rights  abuses.  2 
British  Research 
In  Britain  very  little  academic  research  on  media  coverage  of  the  conflict  has  been 
untaken,  reflecting  the  general  paucity  of  empirical  media  research  in  universities 
(Philo  &  Miller,  200  1).  However  Christopher  Mayhew,  an  MP  and  the  journalist 
Michael  Adams  produced  a  book  in  1975  accusing  the  press  and  broadcast  media  of 
favouring  the  Israeli  over  the  Palestinian  perspective.  The  authors  accused  the  press  of 
failing  to  report  Israeli  contraventions  of  international  law  in  the  occupied  territories 
such  as  land  expropriations,  the  bulldozing  of  houses,  and  the  use  of  torture  and 
collective  punishments.  They  also  argued  that  the  press  provided  little  historical 
context  and  didn't  feature  the  Arab  point  of  view: 
Editors  were  curiously  reluctant  to  criticise  Israeli  policies  and  actions,  even 
when  those  conflicted  with  United  Nations  resolutions,  as  over  Jerusalem,  for 
instance,  where  Israel's  annexation  of  the  Arab  sector  of  the  city  and  the 
subsequent  expropriation  of  hundreds  of  acres  of  Palestinian  land  were  carried 
out  in  defiance  of  specific  rulings  by  both  the  Security  Council  and  the 
General  Assembly 
... 
On  the  other  hand,  these  same  editors  fastened  with  relief 
on  the  mistakes  of  the  Arabs,  and  were  especially  severe  in  their  denunciations 
19 of  terrorism  on  the  part  of  a  desperate  minority  of  Palestinians,  who  now 
began  to  resort  to  force  in  an  effort  to  break  the  hold  of  the  Israelis  on  the 
occupied  territories  ...  In  short,  it  was  very  rare,  in  those  years  after  1967,  to 
find  in  the  British  press  any  coherent  statement  of  the  Arab  point  of  view  over 
the  Palestine  question  or  any  explanation  of  the  origins  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  (Mayhew  &  Adams,  1975:  80-8  1) 
The  authors  maintained  that  this  was  partly  as  a  consequence  of  the  existence 
of  a  number  of  'highly  articulate  supporters  of  Israel'  employed  as  correspondents  and 
editors.  They  pointed  to  reporters  such  as  David  Spanier  of  The  Times,  John  Kimiche 
of  the  Evening  Standard,  Eric  Silver  and  Terence  Prittie  at  the  Guardian,  as  well  as 
editors  of  the  New  Statesman  and  The  Economist.  Mayhew  and  Adams  argue  that  this 
influence  was  reinforced  by  broader  public  relations  involving  a  'wide  variety  of 
individuals  and  organisations'  (1975:  7  1): 
[The  Israeli  case]  was  made  openly  and  the  whole  ineffectively,  through  such 
organisations  as  the  Zionist  Federation  and  the  Jewish  National  Fund,  with 
their  research  bureaux  and  their  press  officers.  It  was  made  more  discreetly 
through  the  influential  Board  of  Deputies  of  British  Jews  and  the  powerful 
Zionist  members  of  the  Jewish  community  in  Britain,  men  like  Lord  Janner, 
Lord  Shinwell,  Sir  Marcus  Sieff,  as  well  of  many  Jewish  MPs,  who  can  claim 
the  ear  of  the  Editor  of  The  Times  or  the  Director-General  of  the  BBC  where 
lesser  mortals  would  be  turned  away.  It  was  made  more  crudely  through 
Jewish  advertisers.  And  it  was  perhaps  most  effectively  made,  in  the  long  run, 
by  the  many  Zionist  sympathisers,  both  Jewish  and  gentile,  who  were  actually 
employed  in  the  press  or  who,  as  freelance  commentators,  enjoyed  a  wider 
readier  access  to  the  columns  of  our  leading  newspapers  than  did  comparable 
writers  whose  views  were  critical  of  Israel.  Among  these  last,  we  must  note 
the  truly  extraordinary  phenomenon  of  the  Jewish  correspondents  employed  in 
Israel  by  almost  every  newspaper  and  the  BBC 
...  nor  should  one  forget  the 
Israeli  Embassy  in  London,  whose  staff  were  diligent,  as  they  had  every  right 
to  be,  in  cultivating  the  press  and  in  inviting  them  for  highly  organised  tours  of 
Israel.  (1975:  71-72) 
20 The  authors  spoke  of  the  problems  they  had  getting  articles  which  were  critical 
of  Israeli  actions  published  in  the  Guardian,  Times  or  Observer  and  the  controversy 
that  ensued  when  articles  were  published.  For  instance  Adams  recalls  the  pressure  that 
was  brought  to  bear  on  the  editor  of  the  Guardian  after  the  journalist  had  reported  on 
Israeli  violations  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  in  the  Gaza  Strip: 
The  editor  of  the  Guardian,  who  published  the  despatches  I  sent,  found 
himself  the  target  for  much  criticism  and  even  abuse  as  a  result.  A  campaign 
was  orchestrated  in  which  the  British  Embassy,  the  Jewish  press  in  Britain  and 
a  number  of  individuals  tried  to  discredit  me,  and  through  me  the  paper.  The 
Jewish  Observer  published  an  'Open  Letter  to  the  Guardian'  criticising  the 
editor's  irresponsibility  and  suggesting  that  somehow  he  was  in  league  with 
what  the  writer  called  'your  Arab  friends'...  A  paper  called  Israel 
Today 
...  openly  accused  me  of  publishing  anti-Semitic  material.  The  Israeli 
press  attache  wrote  a  very  long  letter  denying  the  precise  accusations  that  I 
had  made  about  breaches  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  by  the  Israelis  in 
Gaza 
... 
These  were  the  outward  and  visible  signs  of  the  pressure  being  exerted 
to  silence  me,  and  while  they  were  not  difficult  to  answer,  I  could  not  be 
surprised  if  the  editor  was  disturbed  by  them  and  the  personal  interventions 
which  were  being  made  to  him.  (1975:  78) 
On  television  and  radio  the  authors  suggested  that  the  situation  was  little 
different  because  a  'natural  pro-Israel  bias  was  built  into  our  broadcasting  simply 
because  our  society  includes  a  talented  and  influential  Jewish  minority.  '(1  975:  95). 
The  authors  pointed  to  a  study  showing  that  during  the  1973  October  War,  Israeli 
sources  interviewed  on  the  radio  programme  World  at  One  outnumbered  Arab  sources 
by  a  factor  of  four  to  one.  There  were  also  claims  that  organised  lobby  groups  were 
able  to  exert  pressure  on  television  broadcasters  if  material  was  considered  critical  of 
Israel.  Brian  Magee,  the  former  Labour  MP  for  Waltham  Forest  argued  that  television 
presented  reality  through  an  Israeli  prism: 
Unfortunately  we  in  this  country  tended  to  look  at  the  conflict  very  much  from 
one  side,  the  Israeli  side,  until  quite  recently.  And  when  we  were  infected  by 
the  one-sidedness,  the  fanaticism  almost.  For  instance,  our  television  and 
21 newspapers  reported  the  Six  Day  War  of  1967  almost  entirely  from  the  Israeli 
point  of  view,  without  much  audible  protest  from  anyone,  so  far  as  I  can 
remember.  Yet  when  it  was  all  over  I  presented  a  programme  on  ITV  which 
raised  the  questions,  how  did  the  Arabs  feel  now,  what  are  their  reactions  to 
defeat,  how  do  they  see  their  immediate  future,  and  before  the  program  had 
even  finished  the  switchboard  at  Television  House  was  jammed  with 
telephone  calls  protesting  about  British  television  being  given  over  to  the  Arab 
point  of  view.  There  were  shoals  of  letters  afterwards,  the  Directors  of  the 
Company  received  personal  complaints,  there  was  a  reference  to  the  program 
in  the  House  of  Commons.  (The  Listener,  19  March  1970,  cited  in  Mayhew 
and  Adams,  1975:  104) 
Such  pressure  appeared  to  effect  the  approach  taken  by  the  BBC  towards 
impartiality.  When  questioned  by  a  member  of  the  Council  for  Arab  British 
Understanding  about  perceived  pro-Israel  bias  in  programming,  the  BBC  Secretariat 
appeared  to  argue,  in  a  quite  remarkable  letter,  that  the  Corporation  should  not  seek  to 
provide  equal  coverage  of  the  Israeli  and  Palestinian  viewpoints,  but  instead  should 
reflect  in  its  coverage  the  greater  power  of  the  pro-Israel  lobby: 
One  must  acknowledge  that  j  ournalists  doing  an  honest  job  in  this  country 
have  to  take  an  account  of  the  Israeli  or  Zionist  public  relations  activities  are 
conducted  with  a  degree  of  sophistication  which  those  on  the  other  side  have 
rarely  matched,  and  that  supporters  of  Israel  in  this  country  represent  a  much 
more  vocal  and  powerful  minority  that  supporters  of  the  Arab  cause.  In  other 
words,  an  accurate  reflection  of  publicly  expressed  attitudes  on  the  issue  will 
inevitably  reveal  at  times  a  preponderance  of  sympathy  for  the  Israeli  side.  If  it 
exists  it  will  be  reflected  no  matter  however  hard  one  tries  to  be  neutral  and 
fair.  Indeed  we  would  be  open  to  justified  censure  if  we,  so  to  speak  cooked 
the  books  and  pretended  that  situation  was  different.  (Jim  Norris,  BBC 
Secretariat  to  Mr  Michael  Adams,  23  January  1974,  cited  in  Mayhew  and 
Adams,  1975:  98). 
I  want  to  finish  this  literature  review  by  noting  studies  which  have  examined  how 
Arabs  and  Palestinians  have  been  represented  in  popular  culture.  Although  these 
22 depictions  are  fictional,  there  is  a  danger  that  they  can  reinforce  representations 
present  in  news  and  current  affairs  programming. 
Representations  in  Popular  Culture 
A  number  of  studies  have  examined  how  Palestinians  and  Arabs  more 
generally  have  been  depicted  within  popular  culture  (Shaheen,  2003;  Al-Quazzaz, 
1983;  Said,  1981;  Suleiman,  1983;  Campbell  1995,  Fuller  1995).  For  instance 
Campbell  examined  depictions  of  Iranians  in  US  motion  pictures  and  argued  that 
'theoretically  these  films  represent  sheer  entertainment,  but  because  the  images 
duplicate  those  presented  on  television  and  in  newspapers  they  underscore  'factual 
portrayal"  (1995:  185).  Campbell  concluded  that  the  movie  depictions  of  Iranians 
fostered  'stereotypes  of  irrationality,  terrorism,  cruelty  and  barbarism'  (1995:  185)  and 
that  these  films  'contextaulised  within  a  political  climate  not  only  celebrate  hostility 
towards  Iranians,  they  foster  enmity  and  promote  military  aggression'  (1995:  186). 
Similarly  Fuller  in  another  study  of  US  films  found  that  depictions  of  Arabs  centred 
on  'predominant  terrorist  themes  of  kidnapping,  actual  violence,  bombs,  hijacking, 
political  terrorism'  and  were  embued  with  an  'underlying  US  overzealous  brand  of 
patriotism'  (1995:  195).  Shaheen  in  a  study  of  more  than  900  Hollywood  films  found 
that  Arabs  were  primarily  presented  as  'heartless,  brutal,  uncivilised  religious 
fanatics'  with  a  love  for  great  wealth  and  lascivious  fondness  for  white  women. 
Palestinians  he  found  were  never  presented  positively  as  'normal  folk'  and  no 
American  films  showed  'Palestinian  families  struggling  to  survive  under  occupation' 
(2003:  187).  Instead  Palestinians  were  frequently  portrayed  as  'ruthless  terrorists' 
particularly  during  the  1980s: 
Films  from  the  1980s  such  as  The  Delta  Force  (1986)  and  Wanted:  Dead  or 
Alive  (1987)  present  Lee  Marvin,  Chuck  Norris  and  Rutger  Hauer  blasting 
Palestinians  in  the  Mideast  and  in  Los  Angeles.  In  the  1990s,  Charlie  Sheen 
and  Kurt  Russell  obliterate  Palestinians  in  Lebanon  and  aboard  a  passenger  jet, 
in  Navy  Seals  (1990)  and  Executive  Decision  (1996) 
... 
Seven  films,  including 
True  Lies  (1994)  and  Wanted:  Dead  or  Alive  (1987)  project  the  Palestinian  as 
a  nerve  gassing  nuclear  terrorist.  In  more  than  eleven  movies  including  Haýf 
Moon  Street  (1986),  Terror  in  Beverly  Hills  (198  8),  and  Appointment  with 
23 Death  (1988),  Palestinian  evildoers  injure  and  physically  threaten  Western 
women  and  children  ... 
The  reader  should  pay  special  attention  to  Black  Sunday 
(1977),  Hollywood's  first  major  movie  showing  Palestinians  terrorising  and 
killing  Americans  on  US  soil.  Telecast  annually  the  week  of  Super  Bowl 
Sunday  the  movie  presents  Dahlia,  a  Palestinian  terrorist,  and  her  cohort  Fasil. 
They  aim  to  massacre  80,000  Superbowl  spectators,  including  the  American 
President,  a  Jimmy  Carter  lookalike.  (2003:  187) 
Clearly  researchers  have  employed  very  different  methodologies  in  assessing 
how  the  Israel-Palestine  conflict  has  been  portrayed  in  the  media.  However  some 
areas  of  consensus  can  be  located.  Most  of  the  research  appears  to  suggest  that  the 
Israeli  perspective  tends  to  be  more  heavily  featured  than  the  Palestinian  and  that 
Palestinians  have  been  portrayed  in  a  worse  light  generally  than  Israelis,  with  their 
grievances  rarely  explained.  Some  American  commentators  have  suggested  that  the 
fact  that  Israel  is  a  US  ally  partly  explains  the  preference  in  coverage.  Others  have 
suggested  that  the  imbalance  is  a  result  of  Israel's  more  developed  system  of  public 
relations.  The  research  into  popular  culture  representations  suggests  that  many  motion 
pictures  reinforce  the  most  negative  image  of  Palestinians  as  'ruthless  terrorists'. 
Factors  Affecting  the  Production  of  News 
In  chapter  four  I  discuss  the  various  constraints  and  forces  which  shape  the  contours 
of  news  reporting  of  the  conflict.  However  before  that  I  want  to  review  the  literature 
in  this  area.  Researchers  have  approached  the  subject  from  a  number  of  different 
perspectives.  Some  have  adopted  a  political  economy  approach  focusing  on  the 
impact  of  commercial  pressures  on  the  production  of  news.  Others  have  examined  the 
relationship  between  j  ournalists  and  sources,  questioning  who  gets  to  speak  and  who 
is  denied  the  opportunity  to  air  their  perspective.  Within  this  tradition  can  also  be 
added  research  which  examines  how  public  relations  and  political  advertising  has 
affected  the  interaction  of  journalists  and  sources.  Another  approach  has  been  to  look 
at  the  professional  and  institutional  values  that  journalists  profess  to  uphold  and  how 
these  affect  reporting,  chiefly  among  these  the  BBC  and  its  ethos  of  'impartiality'. 
Other  researchers  have  examined  how  news  coverage  can  be  constrained  by  a  nation's 
24 foreign  policy  and  how  state  and  corporate  actors  can  place  pressure  on  media 
organisations  to  curtail  critical  coverage.  Another  strand  of  research  has  examined 
how  lack  of  specialist  knowledge  and  the  formalised  nature  of  journalism  training  can 
effect  news  coverage,  whilst  another  approach,  which  looks  at  cultural  contexts  and 
value  systems,  has  examined  how  j  oumalists  are  influenced  by  society's  particular 
cultural  mores  and  traditions  in  determining  what  is  newsworthy  and  how  to  frame 
issues.  I  will  begin  this  review  by  examining  the  effects  of  commercial  pressures  to 
maximize  audiences. 
Commercial  Imperatives 
A  number  of  commentators  have  stressed  the  pressures  and  constraints  placed  on 
media  organisations  by  their  need  to  maximise  audiences  and  ensure  profitability  (e.  g. 
Miliband,  1973;  Golding  &  Elliot,  1980;  Curran  &  Seaton,  2004;  Philo,  1995: 
Barnett,  1998;  Herman  &  Chomsky,  1988;  Sparks,  1999).  Curran  and  Seaton  note 
how  the  need  to  deliver  mass  audiences  to  advertisers  serves  to  skew  programmes 
towards: 
...  a  preference  for  'entertainment'  as  opposed  to  'serious' 
programmes  ... 
Commercial  pressures  have  also  led  programme  makers  to 
emphasize  the  personal  and  human  interest  aspects  of  documentary  stories. 
Thus  structural  social  problems  are  treated  in  the  form  of  individual  case 
studies.  This  kind  of  audience  reaches  a  wider  audience,  particularly  amongst 
young  women,  than  other  documentary  styles.  The  prominence  given  to 
certain  types  of  programmes  on  commercial  television  is  a  direct  consequence 
of  the  pressures  generated  by  the  advertising  for  the  production  of  certain 
types  of  audiences.  (Curran  &  Seaton,  2004:  188-189) 
What  are  sometimes  referred  to  as  'news  values'  can  be  seen  partly  as  a 
consequence  of  commercial  pressures  to  produce  bulletins  which  grab  audiences.  In 
Making  the  News  Golding  and  Elliot  suggest  that  two  of  the  most  important  'news 
values'  are  visual  attractiveness  and  entertainment.  They  cite  comments  from  a  former 
head  of  ITN  news  who  argued  that  the  'key  to  putting  more  hard  news  on  the  air 
effectively  lies,  I  am  sure  in  putting  more  pictures  and  less  talk  into  news 
25 programs  ...  the  challenge  is  to  turn  hard  factual  important  news  into  pictures'  (cited  in 
Golding  &  Elliot,  1980:  87).  The  authors  also  noted  pressures  towards  'softer' 
coverage.  They  found  that  journalists  regarded  the  'human  interest  angle  as  an 
important  way  of  making  events  palatable  or  comprehensible  to  audiences  of 
broadcast  news',  and  that  this  sometimes  created  a  tension  between  those  journalists 
who  regarded  news  as  a  serious  weighty  issue  and  those  who  saw  it  Primarily  as  a 
product  to  be  packaged  and  sold. 
However  partly  tempering  commercial  pressures  in  British  j  ournalism  has 
been  both  the  public  service  tradition  of  the  BBC  and  a  framework  of  public 
regulation.  The  Independent  Broadcasting  Authority,  which  was  created  at  the  outset 
of  commercial  broadcasting,  had  a  strong  public  service  ethos  and  insisted  that  quotas 
of  news  and  current  affairs  programming  be  shown  in  prime  time.  Such  expectations 
were  made  conditions  of  franchise  renewals  despite  pressure  from  broadcasters  and 
advertisers.  'Advertisers  understand  that  current  affairs  and  news  programming  is  a 
condition  of  the  survival  of  the  commercial  television  companies,  there  is  no  use 
complaining  about  it'  remarked  an  advertising  executive  in  the  trade  j  ournal 
Campaign  in  1979  (cited  in  Curran  &  Seaton,  2004:  18  1).  However  the  1980s  and 
1990s  saw  moves  towards  the  de-regulation  of  broadcasting  in  Britain  and 
subsequently  the  creation  of  a  more  market  orientated  system.  Following  the  1990 
Broadcasting  Act  the  Independent  Broadcasting  Authority  was  replaced  by  the 
'lighter  touch'  Independent  Television  Commission  (ITC)  whose  remit  was  more 
geared  to  preventing  abuses  than  setting  aspirational  standards.  The  ITC  had  no  role 
in  fostering  quality  and  could  not  insist  that  news  or  current  affairs  is broadcast  in 
peak  time.  Stephen  Barnett  notes  that  even  before  the  new  body  came  into  being 
television  executives  were  threatening  to  axe  documentaries  like  World  in  Action 
unless  they  achieved  very  high  ratings: 
Even  before  the  new  regime  was  implemented  Carlton's  then  director  of 
programmes,  Paul  Jackson,  insisted  that  current  affairs  programmes  could 
only  keep  their  peak  time  place  through  consistently  high  ratings.  He  told  the 
Daily  Telegraph  in  1992:  'If  World  in  Action  were  in  1993  to  uncover  three 
more  serious  miscarriages  of  justice  while  delivering  an  audience  of  three, 
four  of  five  million,  I  would  cut  it.  It  isn't  my  job  to  get  people  out  of  prison' 
(Barnett,  1998:  82) 
26 Deregulation  also  led  to  a  further  concentration  in  the  broadcast  industry  with 
an  acceleration  of  the  trend  towards  corporate  oligopoly.  Curan  and  Seaton  note  that 
the  competition  amongst  a  small  bands  of  giant  conglomerates  led  to  further  pressures 
to  cut  costs  and  'an  almost  inevitable  lowering  of  standards,  it  is  [for  instance] 
cheaper  to  buy  in  agency  news  than  send  a  reporter  to  the  scene'  (2004:  184).  Barnett 
suggests  that  this  increase  in  competition  together  with  a  relaxation  of  regulation  has 
inevitably  led  to  programming  becoming  more  consumerist.  This  process  he  argues 
has  been  'accelerated  massively'  by  the  new  market  research  techniques  underpinned 
by  increases  in  the  power  of  statistical  analysis: 
The  result  is  a  focus  group  mentality  which  has  seeped  from  the  media  into 
business  and  of  course  into  politics.  If  focus  groups  tell  us  that  one  Brit  carries 
the  weight  of  ten  Americans,  a  hundred  Germans  or  a  thousand  Algerians,  we 
steer  our  news  bulletins  and  current  affairs  in  that  direction  and  adopt  the  same 
attitude  as  the  Sun  columnist  Richard  Littlejohn:  'Does  anyone  really  give  a 
monkey's  about  what  happens  in  Rwanda?  If  the  Mbongo  tribe  wants  to  wipe 
out  the  Mbingo  tribe  then  as  far  as  I'm  concerned  that's  a  matter  for  them 
(Barnett,  1999:  84) 
Barnett  suggests  at  its  most  extreme  this  approach  can  mean  that  broadcasters  avoid 
programming  which  might  challenge  viewers'  conventional  wisdom  in  case  such 
material  is  alienating  and  cites  comments  from  the  Discovery  Channel  as  to  why  they 
rejected  the  documentary  Living  Islam:  'For  us  Islam  means  terrorism, 
fundamentalism  and  the  mistreatment  of  women.  If  you  can't  major  on  that  then  we 
don't  want  to  know.  '  (cited  in  Barnett,  1999:  85).  Colin  Sparks  suggests  that  the 
trends  towards  deregulation  and  privatisation  are  eroding  the  space  for  public  debate 
and  collective  action: 
The  destruction  or  at  least  erosion  of  the  constitutive  public  life  of  society 
throws  the  private  sphere  into  even  greater  prominence.  The  disparate  pursuits 
of  the  individual  come  to  occupy  the  space  once  filled  by  the  citizen.  The 
growing  number  and  importance  of  the  fragmentary  and  specialised  media  of 
leisure  pursuits  are  the  concomitant  of  this  economic  process  ... 
As  the  public 
27 sphere  disappears  its  characteristic  organs  atrophy  or  transform  themselves  . 
Those  that  survive  and  the  newly  created  replacements  for  the  casualties  are 
and  more  and  more  concerned  with  the  narrow  private  world  defined  within  a 
pre-given  framework  of  Politics,  economy  and  society.  (1991:  7  1) 
Philo  (1995)  notes  that  the  1990  Broadcasting  Act  also  changed  the  structure  of  the 
BBC,  forcing  the  Corporation  to  commission  a  quarter  of  its  original  programming 
from  outside  companies.  This  introduction  of  market  forces  led  to  pressures  to  cost 
costs  and  hence  quality  in  news  and  current  affairs.  High  quality  news  and  current 
affairs  programming  require  continuity  in  staff,  in-depth  knowledge  and  expertise,  as 
well  as  the  ability  to  develop  projects  over  long  periods.  However  as  Philo  notes  the 
4new  pressures  mean  that  the  trend  for  television  production  as  whole  is  now  towards 
working  on  a  short  time  scale,  often  with  independent  companies  on  low  budgets' 
(1995:  227)  The  free  market  then  can  act  as  a  significant  impediment  to  a  critical  and 
informed  journalism: 
To  develop  television  which  is  critical  and  which  explains  required  in-depth 
study  and  commitment.  These  are  not  the  priorities  of  the  commercial  market 
which  in  its  most  unregulated  form  will  be  concerned  only  with  grabbing  the 
attention  of  audiences  and  delivering  them  to  advertisers  at  the  lowest  possible 
cost  (1995:  229) 
Sourcing 
Herman  and  Chomsky  (1988)  note  that  the  mass  media  are  drawn  into  a  symbiotic 
relationship  with  a  powerful  institutional  sources  by  economic  necessity  and 
reciprocity  of  interest.  The  requirements  to  produce  a  set  number  of  news  bulletins 
every  day  requires  a  constant  flow  of  information.  Fishman  (1980)  describes  this  as 
the  'principle  of  bureaucratic  affinity'  whereby  only  a  large  institution  can  cater  to  the 
information  needs  of  a  media  outlet.  In  practice  this  is  achieved  through  stationing 
reporters  on  'beats'  and  anticipating  future  events  through  the  use  of  the  'news  diary' 
(Golding  and  Elliot,  1980).  Journalistic  'beats'  serve  to  place  institutional  sources, 
often  state  bureaucrats  in  a  powerful  structural  position  as  suppliers  of  official 
information  and  statistics.  Many  studies  have  suggested  that  news  generation  mainly 
28 involves  the  interaction  of  journalists  and  government  bureaucrats  and  is  essentially 
'passive'.  For  instance,  Hess  (198  1)  in  his  study  of  Washington  correspondents  found 
that  j  ournalists  used  no  documents  in  approximately  three  quarters  of  their  stories. 
Official  sources  tend  to  be  perceived  as  credible  and  trustworthy  due  to  their  status 
and  prestige.  Fishman  suggests  that  this  is  because  j  ournalists  uphold  a  'normative 
order  of  knowers'  in  society,  which  can  mean  that  officials'  claims  to  knowledge  are 
sometimes  taken  as  factual  (1980:  144).  This  he  claims  can  lead  to  a  'moral  division 
of  labour:  officials  have  and  get  the  facts,  reporters  merely  get  them.  '  (1980:  145). 
Herman  and  Chomsky  (1988)  suggest  that  such  practices  also  have  other  advantages, 
since  if  journalists  want  to  utilise  unofficial  sources  they  have  to  check  material 
carefully  to  avoid  possible  libel  suits.  This,  of  course,  serves  to  increase  the  costs  of 
suchjournalism. 
In  Britain  the  relationship  between  the  state's  information  managers  and 
journalists  is  formalised  and  controlled  through  the  'lobby  system'.  Here  journalists 
are  granted  particular  'informational  privileges'  such  as  special  access  to  official 
documents  and  briefings  from  officials: 
The  largest  group  of  'lobby  correspondents'  are  the  140  political  journalists 
based  at  Westminster,  who  have  their  own  rules  and  'officers'  to  supervise  the 
system.  There  are  also  smaller  lobby  groups  covering  areas  such  as  education, 
industry  and  defence.  Lobby  correspondents  have  other  privileges  such  as 
access  to  White  Papers  and  Government  documents  before  they  are  released  to 
the  general  public.  Any  who  break  the  rules  may  have  their  lobby  privileges 
withdrawn.  The  system  has  been  attacked  by  some  j  ournalists,  especially 
American,  since  instead  of  encouraging  investigation  it  produces  a  reliance  on 
the  government  to  provide  pre-packaged  information.  (Glasgow  Media  Group, 
1985:  1) 
The  lobby  system  illustrates  at  least  three  key  features  of  British  journalism.  Firstly 
that  'political  authorities  can  assume  a  consensus  amongst  most  j  ournalists  on  the 
range  of  views  that  are  to  be  featured  in  any  'serious'  fashion'  (Glasgow  Media 
Group,  1985:  3).  The  reliance  on  political  sources  ensures  that  debates  then  become 
framed  and  bounded  by  the  political  consensus  at  Westminster.  Secondly  that  a 
hierarchy  of  authority  and  credibility  exists,  reflecting  the  class  divisions  within 
29 society,  whereby  official  views  are  considered  inherently  more  authoritative  than 
those  offered  by  oppositional  sources.  In  replying  to  this  charge  Richard  Francis,  the 
former  Director  of  News  and  Current  Affairs  at  the  BBC  only  served  to  confinn  its 
validity: 
The  BBC's  j  ournalists  do  indeed  find  it  natural  to  ask  'an  important  person'-  a 
senior  civil  servant  or  government  minister,  for  instance-  for  they  are  the 
people  whose  decisions  largely  determine  how  things  will  be  run  in  our 
democracy  (New  Statesman,  20  April  1979,  cited  in  Glasgow  Media  Group, 
1985:  2-3) 
Thirdly  the  structural  position  of  the  state's  public  relations  professionals  and  their 
monopoly  on  the  dissemination  of  public  policy  information  hinders  the  ability  of 
journalists  to  report  critically  on  issues  of  public  concern.  As  David  Leigh  notes: 
Deprived,  in  theory  at  least,  of  independent  right  of  access  to  infort-nation 
about  public  affairs,  the  j  ournalists  depends  on  what  he  is  told  as  a  favour.  The 
frequent  reason  for  claiming  secrecy  on  power-holders'  operations  is  to  allow 
them  to  present  their  own  unchallenged  version  of  reality:  the  obverse  of  the 
secrecy  coin  is  always  propaganda.  From  the  point  of  view  of  a  politician,  the 
ideal  journalist  is  one  who  will  accept  misleading  statements  and  disguise  their 
source.  (Leigh,  1980:  33,  cited  in  Glasgow  Media  Group  1995:  5) 
The  close  professional  and  personal  relationships  linking  j  oumalists  and  official 
sources  also  gives  those  sources  leverage  through  the  use  of  threats  and  rewards  in 
ensuring  j  oumalistic  compliance.  They  may  encourage  reporters  to  carry  dubious 
stories  or  threaten  to  cut  off  information  if  other  sources  are  consulted. 
Hall  et.  al.  (1978)  have  described  the  position  of  official  sources  as  'primary 
definers'  due  to  both  their  institutional  legitimacy  as  elected  representatives,  and  the 
routine  practices  and  values  of  journalists.  Hall  et.  al.  argue  that  'primary  definers'  are 
routinely  'over-accessed'  by  the  media  and  are  able  to  establish  the  definition  of  the 
topic  in  question  and  map  out  the  terms  of  debate.  It  is  argued  that  this  definition  of 
the  scope  and  terms  of  an  issue  then  comes  to  pre-structure  any  further  discussions 
within  the  media,  and  future  commentators  must  work  within  this  framework  of 
30 debate.  However  this  theory  has  been  criticised  on  a  number  of  grounds.  Some  have 
argued  that  it  fails  to  take  account  of  the  effects  of  commercial  imperatives  and 
journalistic  cultures.  Others  have  attacked  it  for  presenting  a  model  of  source  access 
that  is  'structurally  over-determined'  and  unable  to  deal  with  situations  where 
'primary  definers'  lose  control  of  the  agenda  (Schlesinger,  1990;  Dalghren,  1995; 
Schlesinger  &  Tumbler,  1994;  Davis,  2000). 
Public  Relations 
Although  institutional  elites  may,  due  to  their  structural  position,  have  privileged 
access  as  sources,  they  also  heavily  utilise  the  services  of  public  relations 
professionals  (PRPs)  to  manage  their  messages.  The  UK  public  relations  industry  has 
been  grown  at  an  unprecedented  rate  since  the  1980s,  with  annual  growth  rates  of  20- 
25  percent  during  most  of  that  decade  (Davis,  2000).  Although  the  recession  at  the 
end  of  the  1980s  signaled  a  slowdown,  the  period  from  1993  onwards  has  again 
witnessed  a  rapid  expansion  in  fee  income  for  consultancies  (Davis,  2000).  The 
primary  users  of  the  PR  sector  have  been  corporate  and  governmental  clients.  As  a 
number  of  commentators  have  noted  the  fortunes  of  the  PR  sector  and  the 
Conservative  Party  in  the  1980s  were  closely  linked  (Miller  &  Dinan,  2000;  Franklin, 
1994;  Philo,  1995).  The  Conservative  Party  became  reliant  on  PR  firms  for  both  the 
selling  of  privatisation  policies  and  election  support,  as  well  as  for  legitimation  and 
the  management  of  public  opinion  in  the  face  of  a  number  of  crises.  These  included 
the  decline  in  the  manufacturing  sector  and  rises  in  unemployment  (Philo,  1995),  the 
Falklands  conflict  (Glasgow  Media  Group,  1985),  counter-insurgency  campaigns  in 
Northern  Ireland  (Miller,  1994),  and  the  1984/5  Miner's  Strike  (Jones,  1986). 
Research  commissioned  by  the  Institute  of  Public  Relations  (IPR)  in  1994  showed 
that  professional  public  relations  continues  to  be  dominated  by  corporate  and 
governmental  clients.  Only  9  percent  of  PRPs  work  for  non-profit  organisations  (more 
than  half  of  which  are  business  trade  bodies).  No  Unions  and  oppositional  political 
groups  featured  in  the  IPR  survey.  Of  consultancy  work  which  comprises  47  percent 
of  the  total,  the  vast  ma  ority  (over  90  percent)  is  commissioned  by  corporate  clients 
seeking  to  improve  their  consumer,  corporate,  financial,  trade  and  government 
relations.  Oppositional  groups  who  wish  to  contest  the  agenda  with  powerful 
31 government  or  corporate  sources  are  likely  to  find  themselves  out-resourced  in  the  PR 
battle  both  in  terms  of  manpower  and  financial  clout.  As  Davis  (2000)  notes  this 
confers  significant  advantages  to  the  better  resourced  side: 
More  PR  resources  mean  more  PR  contacts,  greater  output  of  information 
subsidies,  multiple  modes  of  communication,  and  continuous  media 
operations.  Even  though  smaller  organisations  are  increasingly  drawn  to  using 
PR  consultancies  and  employing  PRPs  most  continue  to  be  effectively 
excluded  by  the  high  costs  ... 
In  effect  the  'costs  of  market  entry'  into  the 
professional  PR  world  once  again  restrict  full  participation  by  smaller 
opposition  organisations.  These  extreme  differences  in  economic  resources 
mean  well-resourced  organisations  can  inundate  the  media  and  set  the  agenda 
while  the  attempts  of  resource-poor  organisations  become  quickly 
marginalised.  (Davis,  2000:  48) 
In  Northern  Ireland  Miller  (1994)  notes  the  disparity  in  PR  resources  between 
Sinn  Fein,  with  five  voluntary  press  staff  and  a  budget  of  f  7000,  competing  against  a 
government  information  service  employing  145  PR  staff  and  equipped  with  a  budget 
of  f,  20  million.  Davis  (1998)  noted  that  public  service  trade  unions  striving  to  prevent 
government  cuts  and  privatisations  were  comprehensively  and  consistently  out- 
resourced  by  both  corporations  and  government  departments  during  the  1980s.  For 
instance,  Jones  (1986)  in  his  study  of  press  coverage  of  the  1984/5  Miner's  strike 
noted  that  during  the  conflict  the  National  Coal  Board  spent  f4.5  million  on 
advertising  and  increased  its  press  staff  from  6  to  25. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  recent  changes  in  the  economic  structure  of  the 
media  industry  are  making  journalists  more  dependent  on  the  output  of  professional 
PR.  The  deregulation  of  media  industries  in  the  1980s  together  with  the  introduction 
of  new  technologies  and  the  introduction  of  competition  into  public  service 
broadcasting  have  all  contributed  to  a  media  environment  under  tremendous  pressure 
to  cut  costs.  Tunstall  (1996)  argues  that  such  pressures  have  led  to  a  fall  in  the  level  of 
investigative  j  ournalism  and  an  increased  dependency  on  news  sources.  Tunstall  cites 
evidence  that  journalists  now  have  to  produce  three  times  as  much  copy  as  in  the 
1960s,  with  no  equivalent  increase  in  resources.  Such  strictures,  he  maintains,  have 
led  journalists  to  become  less  investigative  and  increasingly  reliant  on  PRPs  to 
32 provide  them  with  'information  subsidies'  (Sigal,  1973;  Gandy,  1980;  Fishman,  1980; 
Herman  &  Chomsky,  1988).  Institutional  sources  are  keen  to  subsidise  the  costs  of 
news  gathering  by  employing  PRPs  to  manage  the  flow  and  presentation  of 
information  because  this  serves  to  reinforce  their  position  as  primary  sources  and 
makes  it  more  difficult  for  under-resourced  oppositional  sources  to  compete: 
In  effect,  the  large  bureaucracies  of  the  powerful  subsidise  the  mass  media 
and  gain  special  access  by  their  contribution  to  reducing  the  media's  costs  of 
acquiring  the  raw  materials  of,  and  producing  news.  The  large  entities  that 
provide  this  subsidy  become  'routine'  news  sources  and  have  privileged  access 
to  the  gates.  Non-routine  sources  must  struggle  for  access,  and  may  be  ignored 
by  the  arbitrary  actions  of  the  gatekeepers.  (Herman  &  Chomsky,  1988:  22) 
Changes  in  the  relationship  between  j  ournalists  and  sources  are  difficult  to 
estimate  not  least  because  it  is  in  the  interests  of  both  parties,  that  the  terms  of 
relationship  remain  as  veiled  as  possible.  However  according  to  Davis  'it  is  evident 
that  both  sources  and  j  ournalists  have  become  transformed  in  their  relations  by  what, 
in  effect,  amounts  to  a  massive  transfer  of  news-gathering  resources,  away  from 
'independent'  journalists  and  towards  partisan  sources'  (2000:  44).  Although  this  can 
clearly  be  seen  in  the  rise  to  prominence  of  a  certain  type  of  PRP  the  'spin  doctor', 
these  are  'just  one  aspect  of  a  general  transition  that  has  seen  the  erosion  of  the  lines 
that  traditionally  separated  the  participants  in  the  media  production  process'  (2000: 
45). 
Despite  the  advantages  enjoyed  by  powerful  institutional  sources  oppositional 
sources  have  also  sought  to  use  PR  strategies  to  get  their  message  across. 
Environmental  organisations  and  NGOs  have  invested  in  PR  facilities  (Lowe  & 
Goyder,  1983;  Anderson,  1991;  Hansen,  1993)  as  have  pressure  groups  and  trade 
associations  involved  in  the  criminal  justice  area  (Ericson  et.  al.,  199  1;  Schlesinger  & 
Tumbler,  1994),  gay  and  lesbian  advocacy  groups  (Miller  &  Williams,  1993),  and 
paramilitaries  in  Northern  Ireland  (Miller,  1994).  Charities  and  the  voluntary  sector 
have  also  increased  their  use  of  PR.  Deacon  (1996)  in  a  survey  of  voluntary  sector 
found  that  31  percent  of  organisations  employed  press  officers,  43  percent  used  the 
services  of  external  PR  agencies  and  56  percent  monitored  the  media.  In  organisations 
with  annual  budgets  in  excess  of  f250,000  the  figures  increased  to  57  percent,  81 
33 percent,  and  78  percent.  Research  by  Davis  (1998)  found  that  two-thirds  of  unions 
had  at  least  one  part-time  press  officer,  a  quarter  used  PR  consultancies  and  57 
percent  used  other  agencies  to  monitor  the  media.  A  number  of  charities  including  the 
National  Children's  Home,  St.  John's  Ambulance  and  the  Royal  British  Legion  have 
all  won  IPR  awards  in  the  1990s  for  the  strength  of  their  PR  campaigns  (Davis,  2000). 
Other  organisations  such  as  the  Terence  Higgins  Trust  (Miller  &  Williams,  1993),  and 
Friends  of  the  Earth  (Anderson,  1993)  have  through  careful  and  skilful  use  of  PR 
techniques  improved  their  credibility  and  accessibility  as  news  sources.  Whilst 
powerful  institutional  sources  do  possess  privileged  access,  there  may  be  times  when 
oppositional  groups  are  able  to  contest  and  even  overturn  elite  dominance.  For 
instance,  this  may  be  possible  when  the  political  centre  is  divided. 
Pressure,  Intimidation,  Censorship  and  the  Law 
If  the  use  of  public  relations,  with  its  attendant  benefits  for  compliant  j  ournalists,  can 
be  seen  as  the  'sweet  stuff  then  the  obverse,  the  'fear  stuff  is  the  application  of 
pressure  or  'flak'  to  j  oumalists  and  news  organisations.  Chomsky  &  Herman  (198  8) 
point  to  the  use  of  letters,  petitions,  lawsuits,  legislation,  speeches  and  threats  by  state 
and  corporate  actors  to  try  to  pressurise  and  intimidate  media  outlets.  This  pressure 
can  be  applied  directly  by,  for  instance,  threatening  not  to  renew  a  broadcaster's 
franchise,  or  can  be  more  indirect  by  appeals  to  constituents  such  as  stockholders, 
directors  and  advertisers.  The  funding  and  use  of  think  tanks  is  another  method  for 
creating  pressure.  In  America  right-wing  pressure  groups  such  as  Freedom  House,  and 
Accuracy  in  Media  (AIM),  have  been  consistent  in  their  criticism  of  the  media  for  its 
'persistent  liberal  bias'  and  failure  to  represent  the  interests  of  business  favourably. 
Chomsky  &  Herman  suggest  that  the  function  of  such  groups  are  'to  harass  the  media 
and  put  pressure  on  them  to  follow  the  corporate  agenda  and  a  hard-line,  right-wing 
foreign  policy'  (1988:  27).  For  instance,  when  the  Reagan  administration  was 
criticised  in  the  media  for  supporting  the  'dirty  wars'  in  Central  America  in  1980s, 
Freedom  House  produced  a  report  denouncing  the  imbalance  of  coverage  in  the 
media. 
In  the  UK  Philo  has  noted  that  during  the  1980s  the  Conservative  party 
frequently  pressurised  the  BBC  because  of  what  it  considered  unfavourable  coverage. 
Criticism  of  government  policy  by  the  Corporation  and  the  prominence  given  to  the 
34 problems  of  unemployment,  poverty  and  Northern  Ireland  angered  the  Tory  party  who 
strongly  criticised  the  institution.  The  party  with  the  help  of  Lord  Chalfont,  set  up  its 
own  Media  Monitoring  Unit  which  in  its  reports  echoed  the  complaints  of  AIM  in  the 
US,  that  the  BBC  was  'persistently  biased  in  favour  of  the  Left'  (cited  in  Philo  1995: 
202).  The  reports  rated  every  programme  viewed  with  classification  of  possible  bias. 
Programmes  such  as  Panorama  and  World  in  Action  were  singled  out  for  particular 
criticism.  An  episode  of  World  in  Action  examining  the  impact  of  unemployment  was 
classified  as  'attacking  the  Right  and  promoting  the  Left'  (cited  in  Philo,  1995;  202). 
During  the  Falklands  war  the  Conservative  party  was  also  very  critical  of  the 
BBC.  A  Panorama  programme  which  featured  Labour  and  Conservative  opposition 
to  the  was  branded  by  one  Tory  MP  as  an  'odious  subversive  travesty',  and  the 
Corporation  was  forced  to  admit  that  'it  was  not  neutral'  in  the  conflict  (Glasgow 
Media  Group,  1985:  127).  At  the  time  of  the  Gulf  War  the  BBC  also  adopted  a 
cautious  approach.  In  a  report  on  the  allied  bombing  of  the  Al-Amiraya  bunker  in 
which  hundreds  of  civilians  were  killed  it  was  repeatedly  stressed  that  the  causalities 
could  well  have  been  Iraqi  propaganda.  Philo  and  McLaughlin  commenting  on  this 
noted  that: 
In  the  period  of  the  war  both  the  BBC  and  ITN  were  afraid  of  being  accused  by 
British  politicians  of  showing  'Iraqi  propaganda'.  Such  propaganda  might 
include  anything  that  gained  sympathy  for  the  Iraqi  population.  Consequently 
in  the  early  days  of  the  war,  pictures  of  civilian  casualties  provided  by  the 
Iraqis  were  accompanied  by  heavy  qualifications  suggesting  that  they  might 
not  be  authentic.  These  qualifications  reduced  the  emotional  impact  of  the 
pictures  and  protected  the  broadcasters  against  future  criticism.  (1995:  152) 
Broadcasting  was  also  attacked  repeatedly  over  its  coverage  of  Northern 
Ireland.  The  documentary  Death  on  the  Rock  which  dealt  with  the  killing  of  three 
unarmed  IRA  personnel  in  Gibraltar  and  the  disinformation  campaign  intended  to 
justify  the  action,  greatly  angered  the  Tory  Party,  and  it  was  widely  suspected  that  the 
decision  by  Thames  TV  to  show  the  documentary  was  an  important  factor  in  its 
franchise  not  being  renewed.  As  Miller  notes  in  his  examination  of  government 
information  control  during  the  conflict,  intimidation  was  often  backed  by  the  full  use 
of  the  State's  legal  powers: 
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controls  on  media  practice.  This  is  done,  both  by  the  use  of  the  law  and  by  the 
routine  use  of  government  intimidation  of  the  media.  In  the  former  case,  the 
number  and  severity  of  powers  available  to  circumscribe  the  media  have 
steadily  increased  since  the  1970s.  they  include  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism 
act,  the  Emergency  Provisions  Act,  The  Official  Secrets  Act  and  the  Police 
and  Criminal  Evidence  Act,  which  have  all  been  passed  and/or  tightened  since 
the  1970s  (0  Maolain  1989).  In  particular  the  1989  revision  of  the  PTA  allows 
the  police  to  demand  access  to  any  j  ournalistic  material  should  they  believe  it 
is  likely  to  have  'substantial  value'  in  a  terrorist  investigation.  The  1989 
official  secrets  Act  further  narrowed  the  sphere  of  debate  by  making  it  illegal 
for  anyone  associated  with  intelligence  or  security  matters  to  speak  or  be 
reported  in  the  media.  No  public-interest  defence  is  permissible.  (1994  :  47) 
The  Conservative  government  also  resorted  to  direct  censorship  in  the  conflict, 
with  the  introduction  of  the  broadcasting  ban  in  October  1988,  which  prevented  the 
transmission  of  statements  from  the  members  or  supporters  of  eleven  Irish  political 
and  military  organisations.  Miller  notes  that  this  was  'the  first,  and  so  far,  the  only  use 
of  this  power  since  the  beginning  of  British  broadcasting  history  directly  and  overtly 
to  rule  out  a  whole  class  of  political  viewpoints'  (1994:  48) 
Media  executives  have  stated  that  the  struggle  between  broadcasters  and  the 
Conservative  government  during  the  1980s  did  take  its  toll.  The  former  Assistant 
Director-General  of  the  BBC  Alan  Protheroe  commenting  on  the  atmosphere  created 
by  government  pressure  referred  to  fortnightly  'ritual  crucifixions'  when  he  would  be 
dragged  across  the  coals  by  the  Board  of  Governors  (World  in  Action;  28  February 
1988,  cited  in  Philo,  1995:  206).  A  producer  who  had  spent  more  than  twenty  years  in 
the  BBC  claimed  that: 
The  Conservatives  used  a  kind  of  salami-cutting  technique  by  attacking  the 
BBC  day  after  day  and  constantly  put  the  management  into  a  defensive 
posture  .... 
We  were  self-censoring  as  a  result  of  our  superiors  constantly  saying 
ccan  you  rest  it  for  a  while?  '  (cited  in  Philo,  1995;  206) 
36 The  Conservative  Party  also  strengthened  its  position  vis-a-vis  the  BBC  by 
appointing  members  of  the  Board  of  Governors  who  were  sympathetic  to  their 
position.  These  included  Malcolm  McAlpine  whose  company  had  donated  more  than 
000,000  to  the  Conservative  party,  and  Stuart  Young  brother  of  the  David  Young,  a 
cabinet  minister.  However  these  attempts  to  intimidate  the  Corporation  were 
contested.  When  the  Conservative  Home  Secretary  asked  the  BBC  to  ban  a 
programme  in  its  Real  Lives  series  dealing  with  a  Loyalist  and  Republican 
representative  in  Northern  Ireland  the  ban  was  confirmed  by  the  Board  of  Governors. 
However  this  led  to  strikes  at  the  BBC  and  ITN  and  the  programme  was  eventually 
shown. 
New  Technology 
The  last  two  decades  have  seen  the  emergence  of  host  of  new  communicative 
technologies  such  as  mobile  phones,  satellite  and  digital  television,  and  the  internet. 
All  of  these  have  affected  the  practices  of  journalism  in  different  ways.  The 
emergence  of  cable  and  satellite  channels  devoted  to  news,  together  with  pressures  to 
cut  costs  have  meant  that  journalists  are  having  to  service  more  media  outlets.  This 
inevitably  means  that  they  are  likely  to  have  less  time  available  to  research 
background  and  provide  context.  The  arrival  of  the  global  24  hour  rolling  news 
channels  at  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  also  coincided  with  the  arrival  of  satellite 
technology  allowing  correspondents  to  report  in  real  time  from  any  part  of  the  globe. 
Barnett  suggests  that  the  ability  to  'be  there'  instantaneously  in  breaking  news  events 
can  push  coverage  towards  the  dramatic  at  the  expense  of  a  deeper  understanding: 
In  foreign  reporting  mobile  satellite  technology  guarantees  that  no  part  of  the 
world  is  inaccessible  to  TV  cameras,  but  that  reporting  is  instantaneous.  The 
result  can  often  be  dramatic,  live  pictures  which  provide  little  hard  news  and 
obscure  the  absence  of  any  informed  or  critical  reflection,  as  in  the  Gulf  War 
(Barnett,  1998:  80). 
As  Eldridge  noted  the  emergence  of  CNN  during  the  Gulf  War  and  in  particular  the 
live  reports  on  the  Scud  missile  attacks  on  Israel  on  the  first  night  of  the  war  pushed 
drama  in  news  to  new  levels: 
37 These  CNN  reports  had  a  raw  quality  about  them.  They  were  unfiltered 
happenings.  We  can  see  on  reporter  know  another  over  as  the  sirens  wail  out 
in  Dharan  and  they  instinctively  duck  to  avoid  the  anticipated  missile.  At 
times,  because  of  the  noise  or  because  their  voices  are  muffled  by  gas  masks 
we  can  barely  hear  what  they  say.  But  what  kind  of  knowledge  is  this?  It  was 
fairly  described  by  one  critic  on  BBC2's  Late  Show  as  'immediacy  without 
understanding,  drama  without  information'  (22  January  199  1).  And  Jonathon 
Alter,  media  critic  for  Newsweek  said  that  is had  come  to  be  regarded  as 
'good  television'  in  that  it  had  the  quality  of  cinema-verite-  something  real 
that's  going  on.  (Glasgow  University  Media  Group,  1993:  11) 
The  last  decade  has  also  seen  a  huge  increase  in  the  amount  of  agency  news 
available  instantly  to  news  rooms  via  live  feeds.  The  former  head  of  news  gathering  at 
the  BBC  executive  Chris  Cramer  noted  back  in  1995  that  the  amount  of  agency 
material  pumped  into  the  Corporation's  newsroom  was  enormous: 
The  sheer  volume  of  news  pictures  flooding  in  through  our  front  doors  these 
days  is  almost  impossible  to  handle.  I  10  feeds  a  day  at  the  BBC,  six  or  seven 
hundred  a  week  and  growing  all  the  time.  The  choice  of  agencies  and  other 
picture  sources  is  already  a  headache  for  most  of  our  newsroom  and  news 
managers  ...  the  picture  flood  as  I  call  it  is  a  real  tribute  to  the  three 
international  news  agencies...  but  it  can  cloud  our  judgement.  (Address  to 
Montreaux.  International  Television  Symposium,  13  June  1995,  cited  in 
Patterson,  1996:  147) 
In  recent  years  the  news  agencies  have  moved  from  the  provision  of  raw 
footage  to  providing  news  packages  involving  full  narration  as  well  as  pictures.  These 
are  an  increasingly  attractive  option  to  broadcasters  under  pressure  to  cut  costs,  and 
there  is  a  danger  that  such  pressures  are  forcing  newsrooms  to  become  increasingly 
reliant  on  agency  material  The  BBC's  Chris  Cramer  has  denied  that  the  Corporation 
in  moving  in  this  direction  and  argued  that  major  broadcasters  such  as  the  BBC  only 
'buy  agency  material  as  fire  insurance'  (Broadcast,  30/6/1994).  However  others  have 
suggested  that  having  so  many  easily  accessible  news  feeds  is  encouraging  bad  habits 
38 in  j  ournalism.  For  instance  Williams  Points  to  how  much  j  oumalism  training  is 
structured  around  accessing  such  news  services  and  suggests  that  this  encourages  a 
passive  and  uncritical  approach: 
New  technology  has  made  the  process  of  finding  out  a  more  sedentary  affair. 
Rather  than  telling  j  ournalists  to  get  out  there  and  'find  out  about  the  patch'  by 
talking  to  people,  the  teaching  newsrooms  of  today  are  wired  up  to  an  array  of 
information  services  that  pump  in  material;  while  being  linked  to  local  media 
of  one  kind  or  another  that  put  across  their  own  news  and  information 
services.  The  result  is  that  passivity  and  spoon-feeding  are  almost  built  into 
the  process  of  education.  (1999:  274) 
Cultural  Contextsl  Value  Systems 
Another  approach  to  studying  how  news  production  has  been  to  focus  on  how 
journalists  select  what  is  newsworthy  based  on  the  cultural  context  of  a  society.  This 
is  particularly  noticeable  in  the  work  of  news  agencies  who  have  to  cater  to  many 
different  markets  and  require  an  in-depth  knowledge  of  what  is  popular  in  each.  The 
former  head  of  Worldwide  Television  News  has  commented  that: 
A  lot  of  the  news  stories  are  of  interest  to  regions.  The  world  breaks  down  into 
the  same  kind  of  news  affiliations  as  a  country  or  city  ... 
In  a  town  like  New 
York  you've  got  all  the  different  newspapers  appealing  to  different  agendas. 
The  same  thing  happens  in  global  ternis.  The  Scandinavians  like  certain  kinds 
of  stories  and  the  Italians  go  for  certain  others  which  are  based  on  their  history 
and  culture  and  the  things  that  are  topical  in  their  own  societies.  (cited  in 
Patterson,  1996:  352) 
Hoggart  in  his  introduction  to  Bad  News  talked  of  the  'cultural  air  we  breathe, 
the  whole  ideological  atmosphere  of  society'  which  delineates  what  can  and  cannot  be 
said.  This  can  be  thought  of  as  a  kind  of  para-idology,  the  unquestioned  and  unnoticed 
background  assumptions  through  which  news  is  gathered  and  framed.  Gans  (1979) 
has  put  forward  a  list  for  American  journalism  which  include  ethnocentrism,  altruistic 
39 democracy,  responsible  capitalism,  small  town  pastorialism,  individualism  and 
moderation  as  core  unquestioned  values.  Golding  and  Murdock  suggest  that 
journalists  have  a  conception  of  'what  is  acceptable  in  their  society'  and  that  this  is 
influenced  by  both  class  and  organisational  factors: 
Other  policies  current  in  different  newsrooms,  some  explicit,  others  more 
covert  but  generally  recognised  could  similarly  be  traced  to  journalists3  sense 
of  what  was  acceptable  in  their  society.  Not  that  this  sense  was  based  on  a 
sampling  of  national  opinion.  The  sample  such  as  it  was,  came  filtered  both 
through  the  journalists'  personal  experiences  as  members  of  a  particular 
educated  elite  and  through  their  occupational  experience  of  working  in 
broadcasting  organisations  whose  major  constituencies,  government, 
politicians,  and  interest  groups  had  clear  ideas  not  so  much  of  what  public 
opinion  was  as  what  it  ought  to  be  (Golding  &  Elliot,  1980:  69) 
This  approach  also  helps  to  explain  the  use  of  generalised  images  and  stereotypes 
such  as  'predatory  stockbrokers'  or  'hard  drinking  factory  workers'  which  transcend 
structures  of  ownership  or  patterns  of  work  relationships.  Journalists  are  drawing  on  a 
set  of  stereotypes  and  culturally  given  assumptions  which  they  have  in  part  created. 
However  this  can  be  a  problem  especially  in  relation  to  foreign  news  where 
sometimes  such  reporting  can  reinforce  stereotypes.  Golding  and  Elliot  point  out 
broadcasters  draw  on  cliches  and  stereotypes  from  their  own  culture  when  reporting 
on  the  developing  world: 
In  European  media,  stereotypes  of  life  and  customs  in  foreign  parts  play  a 
large  part  in  the  treatment  of  stories  from  the  Third  World.  Excitable  mobs  of 
Latin  Americans,  exotic  primitives  in  Africa,  incomprehensible  mystics  in  the 
East  continue  to  populate  news  bulletins  not  because  of  any  malicious  intent  to 
perpetrate  pernicious  myths  but  in  an  innocent  attempt  to  render  usable  and 
comprehensible  the  range  of  data  which  is  the  raw  material  of  news  (1980: 
74). 
'Innocent'  or  not  the  consequences  of  using  stereotypes  because  they  are 
culturally  recognisable  can  be  damaging.  Philo  in  a  discussion  of  research  examining 
40 public  attitudes  to  the  developing  world  pointed  to  television  coverage  of  the  1994 
Rwandan  genocide  where  rather  than  sketching  out  the  complex  social  and  political 
factors  behind  the  atrocities  j  oumalists  fell  back  on  cliches  like  'tribal  passions', 
interspersing  such  comments,  with  'shots  of  Africans  dancing  in  grass  skirts  at  a 
border  post'  (2002:  176).  As  the  Channel  Four  correspondent  Lindsey  Hilsum.  pointed 
out  journalists  found  it  difficult  to  understand  the  political  roots  of  the  genocide 
because  of  their  own  preconceptions  about  Africa,  and  so  fell  back  on  stereotypes. 
However  as  Philo  notes  this  is  likely  to  raise  audience  understanding  of  the 
developing  world.  When  the  author  explained  to  a  focus  group  that  Hutu  military 
regime  had  also  killed  foreigners  and  university  staff,  one  viewer  commented  that  'oh 
you  don't  think  of  them  as  having  universities'  (cited  in  Philo,  2002:  176).  By 
drawing  on  culturally  recognisable  stereotypes  journalists  risk  reinforcing  viewers' 
ignorance  and  prejudices  rather  than  actually  helping  the  public  understand  the  world 
better. 
Journalism  Training  and  Critical  Skills 
In  a  review  of  the  development  of  journalism  education  in  Britain,  Williams  notes  the 
enduring  tension  between  the  need  to  impart  the  vocational  skills  of  the  profession 
and  the  pressure  to  confirm  to  the  'traditional  groves  of  academe'  (1999:  274).  When 
the  first  j  ournalism  courses  were  introduced  in  the  early  1970s  established  j  ournalists 
were  suspicious  of  the  idea  that  universities  could  provide  an  alternative  education 
comparable  to  what  they  would  learn  'on  the  job'.  As  the  author  notes  this  was  still 
the  era  of  the  'dirty  overcoat  and  the  nose  for  news'  (1999:  273).  Academics  were 
also  suspicious  of  the  new  discipline  doubting  whether  it  had  the  necessary  academic 
credentials.  Since  the  1970s  Williams  observes  that  journalism  training  has  become 
more  sPecialised  and  more  tied  into  the  use  of  new  technology  and  the  'mechanics  of 
production'.  The  author  also  notes  that  the  orientation  of  many  would-be  journalists 
has  shifted  from  a  socially  conscious  focus  towards  one  geared  more  to  seeking  'fame 
and  fortune'.  He  argues  that  this  is  partly  a  consequence  of  a  the  increasing  insecurity 
and  casualisation  of  the  profession  together  with  the  move  towards  a  more 
consumerist  culture  where  being  famous  carries  an  especially  high  premium,  but  also 
because  the  content  of  journalism  studies  courses  is  'unlikely  to  stimulate  critical 
awareness  of  key  social  issues'  (1999:  274). 
41 Williams  also  claims  that  journalism  studies  courses  are  unable  to  provide 
aspiring  reporters  with  the  necessary  critical  skills  required  to  evaluate  the  veracity  of 
information.  This  he  suggests  is  a  function  of  the  two  dominant  epistemological 
approaches  inherent  in  contemporary  journalism  studies  courses,  the  journalistic  and 
the  postmodern.  Since  the  1980s  courses  have  moved  away  from  teaching  the 
traditional  sociology  of  the  media  and  moved  over  to  teaching  a  cultural  studies 
approach  informed  increasing  by  a  postmodern  perspective.  However  the  postmodem 
approach  which  eschews  the  use  of  empirical  evidence  and  advocates  a  relativist  and 
subjective  attitude  towards  truth  claims,  is  unable  to  critically  evaluate  the 
information  that  j  ournalists  encounter  when  researching  stories  or  talking  to  sources. 
Williams  maintains  that  the  traditional  j  ournalistic  approach  with  its  largely  uncritical 
reliance  on  information  provided  by  sources  is  little  better  suited  to  the  task. 
Journalists,  Williams  suggests,  are  'encouraged  to  replicate  the  opinions  and 
interpretations  of  their  informers,  without  the  means  or  methods  to  verify  the  truth  of 
what  they  have  been  told',  and  since  this  is  'done  in  the  name  of  objectivity  the 
central  totem  of  the  profession,  they  cannot  be  told  to  scrutinise  the  sources  to  the 
degree  they  should  be  scrutinised'  (1999:  276).  The  upshot  of  this  is  that  j  ournalists 
tend  to  end  up  providing  a  'highly  selective  reproduction  of  the  dominant  view' 
without  critical  reflection  of  evaluation  (1999:  277).  To  foster  a  more  critical  and 
informed  j  ournalism  Williams  suggests  that  the  j  ournalism  studies  curriculum  needs 
to  be  greatly  expanded: 
It  is  clear  that  j  ournalists  need  to  know  about  how  society  works  in  order  to 
report  on  and  make  sense  of  events.  Thus  they  require  knowledge  of  crime, 
work  and  employment,  the  global  economy,  agri-business,  ecology  and  the 
environment,  migration  and  race,  contemporary  politics,  war  and  conflict,  the 
developing  world  and  many  other  elements  of  'social  studies'.  In  order  to 
understand,  contextualise  and  make  sense  of  the  range  of  claims  and 
interpretations  in  the  nitty-gritty  daily  routines  of  journalism,  knowledge  and 
understanding  of  key  social  issues  are  essential  (1999:  278) 
Others  have  put  forward  a  different  set  of  disciplines  that  could  be  integrated  into 
journalism  studies  courses.  For  instance  Brian  Winston  (1966)  has  suggested  that 
media  law,  history  and  ethics  together  with  political  theory,  should  be  core  elements 
42 of  j  ournalism.  training.  Boulding  (1966)  has  stressed  the  importance  of  j  ournalists 
being  trained  to  understand  and  evaluate  information  in  databases  and  libraries  and 
other  reference  sources  which  can  then  be  utilised  in  developing  stories,  whilst 
Medsger  (1996)  in  line  with  Williams  has  stressed  that  the  'unique  public  service 
ethos'  of  journalism  should  be  an  integral  aspect  of  training. 
This  review  has  illustrated  the  complex  matrix  of  factors  which  shape  the  contours  of 
news  coverage.  I  now  want  to  move  on  in  the  next  chapter  to  a  review  of  the  various 
perspectives  on  the  history  of  the  conflict. 
43 Chapter  2  Histories  of  the  Conflict 
A  nation  is  a  group  ofpeople  united  by  a  mistaken  view  about  the  past  and  a  hatred  of 
their  neighbours 
Ernest  Renan  (cited  in  Shlaim,  2004) 
Zionist  Roots  and  the  First  Wave  of  Jewish  Immigration  into  Palestine 
The  American  historian  Howard  Sachar  (1977)  traces  the  contemporary  emergence  of 
Zionist  thought  to  the  European  Rabbis,  Judah  Alkalai  and  Zvi  Hirsh  Kalischer,  who 
from  the  1830s  onwards  stressed  the  need  for  Jews  to  return  to  the  Holy  Land  as  a 
necessary  prelude  to  the  Redemption  and  the  second  coming  of  the  Messiah.  Sachar 
argues  that  such  messianic  exhortations  did  not  immediately  or  widely  take  root 
amongst  European  Jews.  However  he  suggests  that  by  the  1870s  societies  generally 
known  as  Chovevei  Zion-  'Lovers  of  Zion'  had  formed  across  Russia,  which  viewed 
Palestine  as  a  site  for  national  renewal  and  a  refuge  from  anti-Semitism. 
In  1881  following  the  assassination  of  Tsar  Alexander  11  large  numbers  of 
Jews  were  killed  in  a  series  of  Russian  pogroms.  By  1914  up  to  two  million  Jews  had 
fled  Russia  to  escape  persecution.  The  vast  majority  sought  sanctuary  in  the  United 
States  but  25,000  arrived  in  Palestine  in  two  waves  of  immigration  in  1882-4  and 
1890-1.  At  the  time  the  Jewish  population  in  Palestine  was  small.  The  official 
Ottoman  census  of  1878  had  put  the  total  at  15,011  living  amongst  a  combined 
Muslim/Christian  population  of  447,454  (McCarthy,  1990).  Relations  between  the 
new  Jewish  immigrants  and  the  native  population  were  mixed.  Jewish  settlements 
were  built  on  land  that  was  purchased  from  absentee  effendi  landlords.  Often  the 
locals  who  had  tended  the  land  were  evicted  with  the  help  of  Turkish  police  and  this 
led  to  resentment  and  violence.  Some  Zionists  such  as  Ahad  Aham  were  very  critical 
of  the  way  the  settlers  gained  control  of  the  land  and  treated  the  local  population.  In 
1891  he  argued  that  the  settlers  'treat  the  Arabs  with  hostility  and  cruelty  and, 
unscrupulously  deprive  them  of  their  rights,  insult  them  without  cause  and  even  boast 
of  such  deeds;  and  none  opposes  this  despicable  and  dangerous  inclination.  '  (1923: 
107,  cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  24).  There  was  also  evidence  that  the  two  groups  were  able 
to  accommodate  each  other  because  the  settlers  also  brought  benefits.  They  provided 
employment  opportunities,  access  to  medical  care,  the  loan  of  modem  equipment,  and 
44 a  market  for  produce.  Sachar  reports  that  in  the  1890s  the  agricultural  settlement  of 
Zichron  Ya'akov  employed  more  than  a  thousand  Arabs  working  for  200  Jews.  The 
former  Guardian  Middle  East  correspondent  David  Hirst  (1977)  argues  that  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  brought  a  new  more  militant  type  of  settler  to 
Palestine,  inspired  by  the  ideas  of  Theodor  Herzl  and  determined  to  'redeem  the  land' 
and  'conquer  labour'.  The  Jewish  National  Fund,  set  up  to  manage  Jewish  land 
purchases,  decreed  in  1901  that  all  land  it  purchased  could  never  be  resold  or  leased  to 
gentiles,  and  settlers  began  to  boycott  Arab  labour  (Hirst,  1977;  Shafir,  1999). 
Theodor  Herzl  and  the  Emergence  of  Political  Zionism 
Theodor  Herzl,  who  is  commonly  regarded  as  the  father  of  political  Zionism,  was  a 
Jewish  Austro-Hungarian  j  ournalist  and  playwright.  He  had  been  deeply  affected  by 
the  virulent  anti-Semitism  sweeping  across  Europe,  and  as  a  journalist  for  the  Vienna 
newspaper  Neue  Freie  Presse  had  covered  the  notorious  Dreyfus  trial  in  Paris,  where 
a  Jewish  officer  was  falsely  charged  with  passing  secrets  to  the  Germans.  Herzl  felt 
that  a  central  issue  for  Jews  was  their  dispersal  across  the  Diaspora  and  their  existence 
as  a  minority  in  each  country  they  inhabited.  This,  Herzl  argued,  led  to  a  dependence 
on  the  host  culture  and  a  suppression  of  self-determination.  Furthermore  Herzl 
believed  that  widespread  anti-Semitism  meant  that  complete  assimilation  into 
European  society  was  an  impossibility  for  most  Jews.  His  solution  as  laid  out  in 
1896's  Der  Judenstaat  or  The  Jewish  State  was  for  Jews  to  create  their  own  state,  in 
which  they  would  constitute  a  majority  and  be  able  to  exercise  national  self- 
determination.  In  contrast  to  the  'practical  Zionism'  of  the  Jewish  settlers  who  began 
to  arrive  in  Palestine  from  1882,  Herzl  adopted  a  political  orientation,  cultivating  links 
with  prominent  Imperial  statesmen  in  an  attempt  to  gain  a  charter  for  Jewish  land 
settlement. 
Herzl  had  two  potential  locations  in  mind  for  the  prospective  Jewish  state, 
Argentina  and  Palestine.  His  diaries  show  that  he  was  greatly  influenced  by  the 
British  imperialist  Cecil  Rhodes,  and  in  particular  the  manner  in  which  Rhodes  had 
gained  control  of  Mashonaland  and  Matabeleland  from  its  inhabitants  (Hirst,  1977). 
In  his  diaries  he  suggests  that  the  settlers  should  follow  Rhodes'  example  and  'gently' 
expropriate  the  native  population's  land  and  'try  to  spirit  the  penniless  population 
across  the  border  by  procuring  employment  for  it  in  the  transit  countries,  while 
45 denying  it  any  employment  in  our  own  country'  but  that  'the  process  of  expropriation 
and  the  removal  of  the  poor  must  be  carried  out  discreetly  and  circumspectly'  (1960: 
88,  cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  18).  In  order  to  further  this  aim  Herzl  sought  out  an  imperial 
sponsor  prepared  to  grant  a  settlement  charter.  He  canvassed  Germany's  Kaiser,  the 
Ottoman  Sultan  and  Britain's  Joseph  Chamberlain  stressing  to  each  the  benefits  that  a 
Jewish  state  and  Jewish  capital  could  bring.  In  1901  Herz1  travelled  to  Constantinople 
and  met  the  Sultan.  Herzl  offered  Jewish  capital  to  re-finance  the  Ottoman  public  debt 
in  a  failed  attempt  to  gain  a  charter  for  the  establishment  of  a  Jewish  Ottoman 
Colonisation  Association  in  Palestine.  Bohm  (193  5)  claims  that  the  third  article  of  the 
proposed  charter  would  have  given  the  Jewish  administration  the  right  to  deport  the 
native  population  from  Palestine.  Herzl  then  switched  his  attention  to  lobbying  British 
politicians.  Hirst  (1977)  suggests  that  Herzl  linked  Zionist  ambitions  to  British 
imperial  interests,  and  tried  to  play  on  the  anti-Semitism  of  certain  British  politicians 
by  arguing  that  a  Jewish  homeland  would  lessen  the  flow  of  Jewish  refugees  fleeing 
pogroms,  into  Britain.  Herzl  lobbied  Lord  Rothschild  for  the  creation  of  Jewish 
colonies  in  Cyprus, 
'  the  Sinai  Peninsula  and  Egyptian  Palestine,  but  the  plans  met  with 
resistance  from  the  Egyptian  authorities.  In  April  1903  Joseph  Chamberlain  suggested 
to  Herzl  that  the  Zionists  should  consider  Uganda  as  a  homeland.  The  proposal 
received  a  mixed  reception  from  Zionists  and  was  firmly  rejected  by  the  Zionist 
Congress  in  1905  which  ruled  that  colonisation  should  be  confined  to  Palestine  and  its 
immediate  vicinity.  Herzl  died  in  1904,  and  the  task  of  forwarding  political  Zionism 
passed  to  Chaim  Weizmann. 
The  Second  Wave  of  Jewish  Immigration  into  Palestine 
1904  saw  the  beginning  of  another  wave  of  Jewish  immigration  into  Palestine,  again 
in  response  to  Russian  pogroms.  The  Israeli  historian  Ahron  Bregman  estimates 
35,000  arrived,  and  argues  that  these  settlers  were  different  from  the  previous 
immigrants  in  that  they  sought  to  exclude  Arab  labour  and  were  'driven  by  a  fierce 
sense  of  mission  and  bent  on  redeeming  the  land'  (2003:  11).  The  Israeli  sociologist 
Gershon  Shafir  argues  that  the  struggle  for  the  'conquest  of  labour'  transformed 
Jewish  workers  into  'militant  nationalists'  who  'sought  to  establish  a  homogenous 
Jewish  society'  (1999:  8  8)  Some  Zionists  began  to  stress  the  importance  of  armed 
force  in  creating  the  Jewish  homeland.  Israel  Zangwill,  who  had  coined  the  Zionist 
46 slogan  'a  land  without  people  for  a  people  without  land',  informed  a  meeting  of 
Zionists  in  Manchester  in  1905  that  '[We]  must  be  prepared  either  to  drive  out  by  the 
sword  the  [Arab]  tribes  in  possession  as  our  forefathers  did  or  to  grapple  with  the 
problem  of  a  large  alien  population'  (Zwangill  cited  in  Morris,  2001:  140). 
The  Palestinians,  as  a  subject  population  under  Ottoman  rule,  were  initially 
deferential  in  their  protests.  Repeatedly  during  the  1890s  members  of  the  Palestinian 
elite  unsuccessfully  petitioned  their  imperial  overlords  in  Constantinople  to  limit 
Jewish  immigration.  The  late  nineteenth  century  was  a  period  of  growing  pan-Arab 
awareness  which  had  seen  a  renaissance,  in  the  appreciation  of  Arab  literature  and 
culture.  Ovendale  argues  that  both  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  the  spread  of  Zionism 
were  seen  as  a  threat  to  Arab  development.  He  suggests  that  'between  1909  and  1914 
nationalist  opposition  in  Palestine  to  Zionism  grew:  there  were  fears  that  if  the  Jews 
conquered  Palestine  the  territorial  unity  of  the  Arab  world  would  be  shattered  and  the 
Arab  cause  weakened.  '  (1999:  12).  By  1914  the  Muslim  intellectual  Rashid  Rida 
argued  that  the  Palestinians  had  a  choice.  They  could  either  come  to  an 
accommodation  with  the  Zionists  in  which  the  Zionists,  in  return  for  concessions, 
would  put  a  limit  on  their  ambitions  or  they  could  oppose  them  with  arms: 
It  is  incumbent  upon  the  leaders  of  the  Arabs-  the  local  population  -to  do  one 
of  two  things.  Either  they  must  reach  an  agreement  with  the  leaders  of  the 
Zionists  to  settle  the  differences  between  the  interests  of  both  parties  ...  orthey 
must  gather  all  their  forces  to  oppose  the  Zionists  in  every  way,  first  by 
forming  societies  and  companies,  and  finally  by  forming  armed  gangs  which 
oppose  them  by  force.  (Rida  cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  32-33) 
The  Balfour  Declaration  and  the  British  Mandate 
During  the  First  World  War  the  dissolution  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  widely 
anticipated  and  the  Entente  Powers  began  negotiating  over  contending  territorial 
ambitions.  In  1916  negotiations  between  Britain,  France  and  Russia  (later  to  include 
Italy)  led  to  the  secretive  Sykes-Picot  agreement  which  sought  to  establish  'spheres  of 
influence'  for  the  European  Powers  within  the  region.  However  the  agreement  also 
accepted  the  realities  of  emergent  Arab  nationalism,  and  specified  the  recognition  of 
47 4  an  independent  Arab  State'  or  'confederation  of  Arab  States'  within  the  region. 
British  assurances  of  Arab  independence  after  the  defeat  of  the  Axis  Powers  (which 
had  been  pledged  as  a  reward  for  Arab  support  during  the  First  World  War)  can  be 
found  in  the  correspondence  between  Sir  Henry  McMahon,  British  High 
Commissioner  in  Egypt  and  Sharif  Husain,  Emir  of  Mecca,  who  was  recognised  as 
the  Keeper  of  Islam's  most  holy  places.  3  However  these  pledges  by  European  Powers 
to  strive  for  the  recognition  of  Arab  independence  conflicted  with  British  assurances 
given,  at  the  time,  to  Zionist  leaders  that  Britain  would  seek  the  establishment  of  a 
Jewish  homeland  in  Palestine.  Zionist  leaders  established  close  links  with  prominent 
British  politicians  including  Lloyd  George,  Arthur  Balfour,  Herbert  Samuel  and  Mark 
Sykes.  In  1915  Samuel  in  a  memorandum  entitled  the  Future  of  Palestine  proposed 
'the  British  annexation  of  Palestine  [where]  we  might  plant  three  or  four  million 
European  Jews'  (Weisgal,  1944:  13  1,  cited  in  United  Nations,  1990).  British  support 
for  a  Jewish  homeland  was  made  explicit  in  the  Balfour  Declaration  of  November 
1917: 
His  Majesty's  Goverm-nent  view  with  favour  the  establishment  in  Palestine  of 
a  national  home  for  the  Jewish  people,  and  will  use  their  best  endeavours  to 
facilitate  the  achievement  of  this  object,  it  being  clearly  understood  that 
nothing  shall  be  done  which  may  prejudice  the  civil  and  religious  rights  of 
existing  non-Jewish  communities  in  Palestine  or  the  rights  and  political  status 
enjoyed  by  Jews  in  any  other  country 
The  'non-Jewish  communities',  which  comprised  the  89  per  cent  of  the 
population  who  were  Muslim  and  Christian,  were  angered  by  the  declaration.  4  They 
noted  that  it  only  spoke  of  their  'civil  and  religious  rights'  making  no  mention  of 
political  rights.  Conversely  for  the  Zionists  the  declaration  was  regarded  as  a  triumph. 
The  Israeli  historian  Avi  Shlaim,  paraphrasing  Chaim  Weizmann,  argues  that  it 
'handed  the  Jews  a  golden  key  to  unlock  the  doors  of  Palestine  and  make  themselves 
the  masters  of  the  country'  (2000:  7).  The  legality  of  the  Balfour  Declaration  has 
since  been  questioned  by  some  legal  experts  (Linowitz,  1957;  Cattan,  1973). 
After  the  First  World  War  Britain,  Great  Britain  was  assigned  control  of 
Palestine,  through  the  Mandates  system  governing  the  dismemberment  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  In  1921  the  British  divided  the  area  in  two  with  the  sector  east  of 
48 the  Jordan  River  becoming  Transjordan  and  the  area  west  of  the  river  the  Palestinian 
mandate. 
The  indigenous  population  of  mandated  Palestine  feared  mass  Jewish 
immigration  would  lead  to  the  further  colonisation  of  their  country  followed  by  their 
own  subjugation.  This  view  was  shared  by  some  prominent  British  politicians  such  as 
Lord  Curzon  who  on  26  January  1919,  commented  to  Lord  Balfour:  'I  feel  tolerably 
sure  therefore  that  while  Weizmann  may  say  one  thing  to  you,  or  while  you  may  mean 
one  thing  by  a  national  home,  he  is  out  for  something  quite  different.  He  contemplates 
a  Jewish  State,  a  Jewish  nation,  a  subordinate  population  of  Arabs,  etc.  ruled  by  Jews; 
the  Jews  in  possession  of  the  fat  of  the  land,  and  directing  the  Administration  ...  He  is 
trying  to  effect  this  behind  the  screen  and  under  the  shelter  of  British  trusteeship.  ' 
(British  Government,  Foreign  Office,  1919a,  cited  in  Ingrams,  1972:  58).  Some 
members  of  the  British  establishment  believed  that  by  supporting  the  Jewish  National 
5  home  they  were  directly  violating  the  terms  of  the  mandate.  Others  seemed  less 
concerned  about  the  opinions  of  the  Arab  population.  Chaim  Weizmann  claimed  that 
a  British  official  had  told  him  that  in  Palestine  'there  are  a  few  hundred  thousand 
negroes  but  that  is  a  matter  of  no  significance'  (Heller,  1985  cited  in  Chomsky,  1992: 
435) 
Between  1919  and  1926  the  Jewish  presence  in  Palestine  swelled  with  the 
arrival  of  a  further  90,000  immigrants  (Bregman,  2003).  The  community  also  became 
increasingly  militarised,  with  the  creation  of  what  Shlaim  describes  as  an  'iron  wall' 
of  impregnable  strength  designed  to  protect  Jewish  settlements  from  Arab  attacks. 
The  concept  of  the  'iron  wall'  had  first  been  deployed  by  Vladimar  Jabotinsky,  the 
leader  of  the  Revisionist  movement.  6  Jabotinsky  was  convinced  that  the  indigenous 
Arabs  would  not  accept  the  Zionist  project  voluntarily  and  advocated  the  creation  of 
an  'iron  wall'  that  the  local  population  would  be  unable  to  breach: 
If  you  wish  to  colonise  a  land  in  which  people  are  already  living,  you  must 
provide  a  garrison  for  the  land,  or  find  a  benefactor  who  will  maintain  the 
garrison  on  your  behalf.  Zionism  is  a  colonising  adventure  and  therefore  it 
stands  or  falls  by  the  question  of  armed  forces.  (Jabotinsky  cited  in  Masalha, 
1992:  45) 
49 The  Zionists  also  substantially  increased  their  land  holdings.  Agricultural  land 
was  purchased  from  absentee  Arab  landlords  and  the  peasants  who  tended  and  lived 
on  them,  were  evicted.  The  1919  American  King-Crane  Commission,  which  had  been 
sent  to  Palestine  to  assess  local  opinion,  reported  in  their  discussions  with  Jewish 
representatives,  that  'the  Zionists  looked  forward  to  a  practically  complete 
dispossession  of  the  present  non-Jewish  inhabitants  of  Palestine,  by  various  forms  of 
purchase'  (British  Government,  1947:  3,  cited  in  Laqueur  &  Rubin,  1984:  29)  The 
Zionists  also  increasingly  boycotted  Arab  labour.  The  British  Hope  Simpson 
Commission  had  criticized  the  Zionist  Keren  ha-Yesod  employment  agreements  as 
discriminatory  and  pointed  to  Article  seven  which  stipulated  that  'The  settler  hereby 
undertakes  that  ... 
if  and  whenever  he  may  be  obliged  to  hire  help,  he  will  hire  Jewish 
workmen  only'  and  Article  eleven  which  stated  that  'the  settler  undertakes  ...  not  to 
hire  any  outside  labour  except  Jewish  labourers"  (British  Government,  Cmd.  3686: 
52-3,  cited  in  United  Nations,  1990).  The  tensions  created  by  this  labour  exclusivism 
the  Commission  reported,  constituted  'a  constant  and  increasing  source  of  danger  to 
the  country.  '  (British  Government,  Cmd.  3686:  55,  cited  in  United  Nations,  1990). 
Throughout  the  1920s  Arab  hostility  to  the  Zionist  project  manifested  itself  in 
increasingly  prolonged  outbreaks  of  violence.  In  1921  Arabs  attacked  Jews  at  Jaffa 
during  a  May  Day  parade  and  the  violence  spread  to  other  towns  and  the  countryside. 
By  the  time  the  British  army  brought  the  situation  under  control  nearly  200  Jews  and 
120  Arabs  were  dead  or  wounded.  Britain  set  up  a  commission  of  inquiry  to 
investigate  the  violence.  The  Haycraft  Commission  reported  that  the  violence  was 
spontaneous  and  anti-Zionist  rather  than  anti-Jewish.  The  report  blamed  the  Arabs  for 
the  violence,  but  also  pointed  to  Arab  fears  that  the  mass  influx  of  Jewish  immigrants 
would  lead  to  their  subjugation.  General  William  Congreve,  the  commander  of 
British  forces  in  the  Middle  East  criticized  Herbert  Samuel's  policy  of  trying  to 
establish  a  Jewish  National  home  in  Palestine  in  the  face  of  the  opposition  from  most 
of  the  population  (Ovendale,  1999).  Shortly  afterwards  the  Arabs  sent  a  petition  to  the 
League  of  Nations  asking  for  democratic  elections  and  independence  for  Palestine 
(Segev,  2001).  In  1922  the  British  government  published  a  White  Paper  which  was 
intended  to  mollify  Arab  fears.  It  denied  that  the  Balfour  Declaration  paved  the  way 
for  a  Jewish  State,  and  that  the  Arab  population,  culture  and  language  would  be 
subordinated.  It  also  proposed  a  legislative  council  made  up  of  Jewish,  Muslim  and 
Christian  representatives,  a  suggestion  that  was  rejected  by  the  Arabs.  Hirst  (1977) 
50 alleges  that  a  large  proportion  (likely  to  give  Jewish  representatives  a  majority)  of  the 
council  would  have  been  directly  appointed  by  Britain,  and  that  the  Palestinians 
feared  that  Zionist  policies  might  be  legitimized  under  a  constitutional  fagade. 
The  1920s  and  1930s  saw  more  violent  disturbances  followed  on  each 
occasion  by  Commissions  of  Enquiry  dispatched  by  Britain  to  examine  causes.  After 
1921  there  was  a  period  of  relative  calm  before  the  next  major  outbreak  of  violence  in 
1929.  The  flashpoint  for  the  1929  violence  was  a  dispute  over  sovereignty  of  an  area 
containing  important  Jewish  and  Muslim  religious  sites.  Tension  had  been  brewing 
for  some  months  over  this  issue,  fermented  by  inflammatory  rhetoric  in  the  Arab  and 
Hebrew  press.  In  late  August  1929  a  group  of  armed  Arabs  attacked  Jewish 
worshippers  in  Jerusalem  and  in  a  week  of  rioting  and  violence  113  Jews  and  116 
Arabs  were  killed.  In  Hebron  more  than  sixty  members  of  a  long  standing  community 
of  non-Zionist  religious  Jews  were  killed.  In  response  the  British  set  up  the  Shaw 
Commission  of  Enquiry,  which  concluded  that  the  trigger  for  the  violence  was  Jewish 
demonstrations  at  the  Wailing  Wall  but  that  the  underlying  causes  were  economic  and 
political  grievances  against  the  Mandate.  An  Arab  delegation  including  the  Mufti  of 
Jerusalem  met  with  British  officials  in  London  requesting  a  prohibition  on  the  sale  of 
lands  from  Arabs  to  non-Arabs,  an  end  to  Jewish  immigration  and  the  formation  of  a 
national  parliament.  The  Hope  Simpson  Commission  dispatched  by  Britain  shortly 
afterwards  highlighted  the  problem  of  a  growing  population  of  landless  Arabs  and 
recommended  controls  on  Jewish  immigration  and  land  purchase.  These 
recommendations  were  carried  through  in  the  1930  Passfield  white  paper.  However, 
these  developments  were  regarded  as  a  serious  setback  by  Zionists  who  managed 
through  lobbying  to  reverse  the  terms  of  the  white  paper. 
Sporadic  violence  ignited  into  a  full  scale  Arab  rebellion  in  the  years  between 
1936  and  1939.  Part  of  the  revolt  involved  peaceful  resistance,  including  a  nationwide 
six  month  strike  and  widespread  non  payment  of  taxes.  It  also  involved  extensive 
violence  in  which  Palestinians,  formed  into  bands  and  destroyed  crops  and  trees, 
mined  roads  and  sabotaged  infrastructure  and  oil  pipelines.  They  attacked  and  killed 
Jews,  and  also  targeted  Arabs  who  failed  to  offer  support  or  who  were  suspected  of 
collaboration.  The  British  historian  Martin  Gilbert  claims  that  during  this  period  'most 
acts  of  Arab  terror  were  met  with,  often  within  a  few  hours,  by  equally  savage  acts  of 
reprisal  by  the  Revisionists'  military  arm,  the  Irgun'  (1999:  92).  The  Arabs  demanded 
democratic  elections  and  an  end  to  immigration.  The  British  dispatched  another 
51 commission  of  enquiry  which  in  1937  stated  that  the  Mandate  was  unworkable  and 
recommended  partition.  The  Peel  Commission  proposed  that  the  north-west  part  of 
Palestine  accounting  for  20%  of  the  country  though  containing  its  most  fertile  land 
would  become  a  Jewish  state,  the  remaining  80%  would  become  an  Arab  state  linked 
to  TransJordan.  Jerusalem,  Bethlehem  and  a  corridor  to  the  sea  would  remain  under 
British  control.  The  proposal  received  a  mixed  reception  amongst  Jews.  One  group 
centred  around  Jabotinsky's  revisionists  argued  that  a  Jewish  State  should  only  be  set 
up  in  the  whole  of  Palestine  and  TransJordan.  Another  which  included  Weizmann  and 
David  Ben-Gurion,  argued  that  this  was  a  historic  opportunity  to  create  the  Jewish 
state.  The  Israeli  historian  Simha  Flapan  suggests  that  Ben-Gurion  accepted  the  plan 
as  a  stepping  stone  to  Zionist  control  of  all  of  Palestine,  and  points  to  comments  he 
made  before  the  Zionist  executive  in  193  7  that:  'after  the  formation  of  a  large  army  in 
the  wake  of  the  establishment  of  the  [Jewish]  state,  we  shall  abolish  partition  and 
expand  to  the  whole  of  the  Palestine'  (Ben-Gurion  cited  in  Flapan,  1987:  22)  The 
Israeli  historian  and  Ha'aretz  columnist  Tom  Segev  (2001)  suggests  for  Ben-Gurion 
the  proposal  (inherent  in  the  Peel  recommendations)  for  the  'forced  transfer'  of  the 
Arab  inhabitants  out  of  the  proposed  Jewish  state,  and  the  creation  therefore  of  a 
'really  Jewish'  state  outweighed  all  the  drawbacks  of  the  proposal. 
The  Arabs  categorically  rejected  the  Partition  scheme  arguing  that  all  of 
Palestine  was  part  of  the  Arabian  homeland  and  it  should  not  be  broken  up.  The 
partition  plans  were  never  carried  through  and  the  rebellion  continued  until  the  British 
finally  quelled  it.  The  rudimentary  weapons  of  the  Arab  guerillas,  were  overwhelmed 
by  vastly  superior  British  military  power.  Hirst  (1977)  claims  that  during  this  period 
British  forces  took  part  in  extensive  acts  of  revenge  and  'collective  punishment'.  In 
retaliation  for  attacks  they  descended  on  Arab  villages  undertook  summary  executions 
and  destroyed  possessions  and  dwellings.  Segev  (2001)  claims  that  torture  was  also 
employed  by  the  British  authorities.  The  rebellion  had  cost  the  lives  of  10  1  Britons 
and  463  Jews  (The  Times,  21  July  1938,  cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  93).  Palestinian  losses 
were  harder  to  gauge  but  Palestinian  historian  Walid  Khalidi  estimates  upwards  of 
5,000  killed  and  approximately  14,000  injured.  (Hirst,  1977). 
The  reasons  for  these  increasingly  serious  outbreak  of  hostility  between  the 
communities  are  contested.  Some  Israelis  argue  that  the  Zionist  project  was 
essentially  beneficial  to  the  Arabs  of  Palestine,  and  it  was  only  Arab  intransigence  and 
xenophobia  which  prevented  mutual  accommodation.  Cohn-Sherbok  (2001),  for 
52 instance,  stresses  the  legal  basis  for  settlement  in  the  Balfour  Declaration  which  was 
incorporated  into  the  Mandate,  and  points  to  the  Arab  rejection  of  partition  in  1937. 
He  argues  that  Arab  violence  directed  against  the  Jews  was  'incomprehensible'  and 
that  the  Arabs  were  never  prepared  to  compromise:  'Throughout  this  period  the  Arab 
community  was  unwilling  to  negotiate  over  any  of  the  issues  facing  those  living  in  the 
Holy  Land.  Jews,  on  the  other  hand,  continually  sought  to  find  a  solution  to  the 
problems  confronting  the  native  population  while  retaining  their  conviction  that  a 
Jewish  national  home  must  be  established.  '  (2001:  179).  Sachar  (1977)  argues  that  the 
Zionist  enterprise  developed  the  country,  improved  the  material  living  standards  of 
the  Arab  population  and  provided  employment  opportunities.  The  attacks  on  Jews, 
Sachar  argues  were  the  result  of  incitement  by  xenophobic  leaders  such  as  the  Mufti 
of  Jerusalem  and  agitation  by  fascist  infiltration  from  Italy  and  Germany.  Joan  Peters 
(1984)  has  claimed  that  the  Zionist  project  was  so  beneficial  to  the  Arab  population 
that  large  numbers  were  drawn  in  from  outside  Palestine.  She  attributes  the  large  rise 
in  the  Arab  population  during  the  Mandatory  period  to  illegal  immigration  from  other 
Arab  countries  and  argues  that  because  of  this  the  Jewish  population  in  1948  had  as 
least  as  much  right  to  the  land  as  the  Arab  'newcomers'.  However  a  number  of  British 
and  Israeli  reviewers  have  denounced  Peters  thesis  as  an  academic  fraud,  and  most 
demographers  attribute  the  Arab  population  rise  to  decreased  mortality  rates,  due  to 
improvements  in  sanitation  and  infrastructure.  7  Others  provide  different  explanations 
for  the  revolt.  Hirst  points  to  economic  resentment  generated  by  peasant  land 
evictions  and  the  boycott  of  Arab  labour: 
Driven  from  the  land  the  peasants  flocked  to  the  rapidly  growing  cities  in 
search  of  work.  Many  of  them  ended  up  as  labourers  building  houses  for  the 
immigrants  they  loathed  and  feared.  They  lived  in  squalor.  In  old  Haifa  there 
were  I1  000  crammed  into  hovels  built  of  petrol-tins,  which  had  neither  water- 
supply  or  rudimentary  sanitation.  Other,  without  families,  slept  in  the  open. 
Such  conditions  contrasted  humiliatingly  with  the  handsome  dwellings  the 
peasants  were  putting  up  for  the  well-to-do  newcomers,  or  even  with  the 
Jewish  working  men's  quarters  furnished  by  Jewish  building  societies.  They 
earned  half  or  just  a  quarter  the  wage  of  their  Jewish  counterparts  and  Hebrew 
Labour  exclusivism  was  gradually  depriving  them  of  even  that.  (1977:  75) 
53 Some  Israelis  academics  such  as  Gershon  Shafir  (1999)  have  characterized 
twentieth  century  Zionist  settlement  as  similar  to  a  form  of  European  colonialism-  the 
4pure  settlement  colony'  model  which  was  imposed  on  societies  in  North  America  and 
Australia.  This  model  'established  an  economy  based  on  white  labour  which  together 
with  the  forced  removal  or  the  destruction  of  the  native  population  allowed  the  settlers 
to  regain  the  sense  of  cultural  and  ethnic  homogeneity  that  is  identified  with  a 
European  concept  of  nationality'  (Shafir,  1999:  84).  Segev  argues  that 
"'disappearing"  the  Arabs  lay  at  the  heart  of  the  Zionist  dream  and  was  also  a 
necessary  condition  of  its  realization'  (2001:  405).  He  also  maintains  that  prominent 
Zionists  such  as  David  Ben-Gurion  believed  that  the  Arab  revolt  was  a  nationalist 
struggle  designed  to  prevent  their  dispossession: 
The  rebellion  cast  the  Arabs  in  a  new  light.  Instead  of  a  'wild  and  fractured 
mob,  aspiring  to  robbery  and  looting,  '  Ben-Gurion  said,  they  emerged  as  an 
organized  and  disciplined  community,  demonstrating  its  national  will  with 
political  maturity  and  a  capacity  for  self-evaluation.  '  Were  he  an  Arab  he 
wrote,  he  would  also  rebel,  with  even  greater  intensity  and  with  greater 
bitterness  and  despair.  Few  Zionist  understood  the  Arab  feeling,  and  Ben- 
Gurion  found  it  necessary  to  wam  them:  the  rebellion  was  not  just  terror  he 
said,  he  said;  terror  was  a  means  to  an  end.  Nor  was  it  just  politics,  Nashashibi 
against  the  Mufti.  The  Arabs  had  launched  a  national  war.  They  were  battling 
the  expropriation  of  their  homeland.  While  their  movement  may  have  been 
primitive,  Ben  Gurion  said,  it  did  not  lack  devotion,  idealism  and  self- 
sacrifice.  (2001:  370-1) 
In  the  wake  of  the  revolt  the  British  dispatched  a  further  commission  of 
enquiry,  the  result  of  which  was  the  1939  MacDonald  White  Paper.  It  proposed  that 
75,000  Jewish  immigrants  be  admitted  over  the  next  five  years,  after  which  any 
further  immigration  would  require  Arab  consent.  The  White  Paper  also  proposed  that 
lands  sales  be  strictly  regulated  and  that  an  independent  Palestine  state  should  come 
about  within  ten  years.  The  Zionists  saw  the  white  paper  as  a  betrayal  that  seriously 
threatened  the  creation  of  the  Jewish  state,  especially  in  light  of  the  increased 
persecution  of  Jews  throughout  Europe.  The  response  was  three  pronged.  One 
element  involved  maintaining  a  flow  of  illegal  Jewish  immigration  into  Palestine. 
54 Gilbert  (1999)  claims  that  many  of  these  Jews  were  trying  to  escape  persecution  in 
Nazi  Germany,  and  other  parts  of  Europe.  Another  which  gathered  pace  from  1945 
onwards,  saw  Zionist  paramilitary  groups  launch  attacks  on  the  British  using 
sabotage,  bombings  and  assassinations.  The  third  involved  switching  imperial 
sponsors  from  Britain  to  the  United  States.  Zionists  forged  close  links  with  American 
political  leaders  and  used  the  Jewish  vote  to  pressurize  for  policies  that  supported  the 
continuation  of  immigration  and  the  establishment  of  the  Jewish  state  in  Palestine. 
American  Politics  and  the  Settlement  of  the  Holocaust  Survivors 
In  May  1942  Zionists  meeting  in  New  York,  for  the  American  Zionist 
Conference  issued  the  Biltmore  Resolution  demanding  the  creation  of  a  'Jewish 
commonwealth'  in  mandatory  Palestine  and  began  to  pressurize  American  political 
leaders  to  support  its  terms.  In  1941  Zionists  had  formed  the  American  Palestine 
Committee.  It  included  within  its  membership  two  thirds  of  the  Senate,  200  members 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  and  the  leaders  of  the  two  main  political  parties  and 
labour  organizations  (Ovendale,  1999).  Unsuccessful  resolutions  were  put  before  the 
House  of  Representatives  and  the  Senate  demanding  free  Jewish  entry  into  Palestine 
and  its  reconstitution  as  a  Jewish  commonwealth.  Zionist  representatives  also  directly 
lobbied  the  two  major  political  parties.  The  1944  presidential  election  was  a  very 
close  contest  and  because  of  this,  Ovendale  (1999)  suggests  Zionist  political  leverage 
was  considerable.  America's  4,500,000  Jews  were  concentrated  in  three  key  states 
(New  York,  Pennsylvania  and  Illinois)  which  could  swing  the  election.  The 
Republican  Party  adopted  a  platform  calling  for  unrestricted  Jewish  immigration  into 
Palestine,  no  restrictions  on  land  ownership  and  the  conversion  of  Palestine  into  a  free 
and  independent  Jewish  commonwealth.  Roosevelt  was  under  pressure  to  match  this 
and  in  a  private  letter  to  Zionist  leaders  promised  if  re-elected  to  seek  the 
'establishment  of  Palestine  as  a  free  and  democratic  Jewish  commonwealth' 
(Ovendale,  1999:  87). 
The  politics  surrounding  the  settlement  of  Jewish  refugees  at  the  end  of  the 
Second  World  War,  are  still  highly  contentious.  The  debate  concerns  whether  the 
Holocaust  survivors  wished  to  settle  in  Palestine  voluntarily,  or  were  left  with  little 
option  because  other  potential  refuges  such  as  the  United  States  were  closed  to  them, 
with  at  least  the  tacit  support  of  Zionist  leaders.  The  debate  remains  emotive  because 
55 tens  of  thousands  of  Holocaust  survivors  died  in  displaced  persons  camps  in  Europe  at 
the  end  of  the  war,  whilst  US  congressional  legislation  gave  priority  to  accepting 
refugees  from  the  Russian  occupied  states  including  many  Nazi  sympathizers  and  SS 
troopers  (Chomsky,  1999)  At  the  time  Zionist  leaders  stressed  the  vital  importance  of 
Palestine  as  a  sanctuary  for  the  Jewish  refugees  in  Europe  who  had  survived  the  Nazi 
Holocaust.  It  was  argued  that  only  Palestine  could  provide  a  haven  where  Jewish 
refugees  could  rebuild  their  lives  and  avoid  future  anti-Semitism: 
They  (the  Holocaust  survivors)  want  to  regain  their  human  dignity,  their 
homeland,  they  want  a  reunion  with  their  kin  in  Palestine  after  having  lost 
their  dearest  relations.  To  them  the  countries  of  their  birth  are  a  graveyard  of 
their  people.  They  do  not  wish  to  return  and  they  cannot.  They  want  to  go 
back  to  their  national  home,  and  they  use  Dunkirk  boats.  (Ben-Gurion,  cited  in 
Gilbert,  1999:  147) 
Gilbert  points  to  attempts  by  Holocaust  survivors  aboard  ships  such  as  the 
E-xodus  to  reach  Palestine  as  proof  that  most  of  the  refugees  were  desperate  to  get 
there.  The  Israeli  historian  Yehuda  Bauer  (1970)  agues  that  most  refugees  were  keen 
to  settle  in  Palestine,  citing  a  1946  Hebrew  investigative  commission  that  reported 
that  96.8  per  cent  of  Jewish  refugees  languishing  in  European  displaced  person  camps 
at  the  end  of  the  war  wanted  to  settle  in  Palestine.  Avi  Shlaim  argues  that  'few  people 
disputed  the  right  of  the  Jews  to  a  home  after  the  trauma'  of  the  Holocaust  and  that 
the  moral  case  for  it  became  'unassailable'  (2000:  23-4).  Other  Israeli  historians 
suggest  a  different  picture.  Segev  argues  that: 
There  is...  no  basis  for  the  frequent  assertion  that  the  state  was  established  as  a 
result  of  the  Holocaust.  Clearly  the  shock,  horror  and  sense  of  guilt  felt  by 
many  generated  profound  sympathy  for  the  Jews  in  general  and  the  Zionist 
movement  in  particular.  The  sympathy  helped  the  Zionists  advance  their 
diplomatic  campaign  and  their  propaganda,  and  shaped  their  strategy  to  focus 
effort  on  the  survivors,  those  Jews  in  displaced-persons  camps  demanding 
they  be  sent  to  Palestine.  All  the  survivors  were  Zionists,  the  Jewish  agency 
claimed,  and  they  all  wanted  to  come  to  Palestine.  The  assertion  was  not  true. 
The  displaced  were  given  the  choice  of  returning  to  their  homes  in  Eastern 
56 Europe  or  settling  in  Palestine.  Few  were  able  or  willing  to  return  to  countries 
then  in  the  grip  of  various  degrees  of  hunger,  anti-Semitism  or  communism, 
and  they  were  never  given  the  option  of  choosing  between  Palestine  and,  say 
the  United  States.  In  effect  their  options  were  narrowed  to  Palestine  or  the  DP 
camps  (2001:  491) 
Others  such  as  Feingold,  (1970)  and  Shonfeld  (1977)  have  been  very  critical 
of  the  conduct  of  the  Zionist  movement  in  Palestine  and  America  at  the  end  of  the 
Second  World  War.  They  argue  that  the  Zionist  movement  should  have  mobilized  to 
pressure  the  US  administration  to  take  in  the  Holocaust  survivors,  which  would  have 
saved  the  lives  of  many  Jews  who  died  in  displaced  persons  camps  in  Europe.  Segev 
argues  that  the  Ben-Gurion  and  the  Labour  leadership  in  Palestine  saw  the  Nazi 
ascension  in  the  1930s  as  potentially  'a  fertile  force  for  Zionism'  because  it  created 
the  potential  for  mass  Jewish  immigration  into  Palestine  (1993:  18).  He  alleges  that 
during  the  1930s  and  1940s  the  Labour  leadership  entered  into  haavara  agreements 
with  the  Nazis  whereby  Jews  were  permitted  to  emigrate  to  Palestine  with  limited 
quantities  of  capital.  He  claims  that  Ben-Gurion's  political  rivals  in  the  Revisionist 
movement  opposed  these  agreements,  and  argued  that  rather  than  negotiate  with 
Germany  it  should  be  boycotted.  Segev  also  suggests  that  after  the  Kristallnacht 
pogroms  Ben-Gurion  was  concerned  that  the  'human  conscience'  might  cause  others 
countries  to  open  their  doors  to  Jewish  refugees,  a  move  which  he  saw  as  a  threat  to 
Zionism. 
If  I  knew  that  it  was  possible  to  save  all  the  children  of  Germany  by 
transporting  them  to  England,  but  only  half  of  them  by  transporting  them  to 
Palestine,  I  would  choose  the  second  -  because  we  face  not  only  the  reckoning 
of  those  children,  but  the  historical  reckoning  of  the  Jewish  people  (Ben- 
Gurion,  cited  in  Segev,  1993:  28) 
The  view  that  Jewish  refugees  were  used  as  political  leverage  to  create  the 
Jewish  state  in  Palestine,  was  also  shared  by  some  prominent  British  and  US  State 
Department  officials  8.  who  feared  the  effects  on  stability  in  Palestine  and  potential 
Russian  penetration.  9  Roosevelt's  successor,  Harry  Truman  decided  to  press  on  with  a 
policy  supporting  the  settlement  of  Jewish  refugees  in  Palestine.  Ovendale  (1999) 
57 suggests  that  this  was  primarily  because  of  the  1945  New  York  election,  in  which  the 
Jewish  vote  might  be  decisive.  The  American  State  Department  official  William  Eddy 
claims  that  Truman  had  informed  American  ambassadors  to  the  Arab  world  that  'I  am 
sorry,  gentlemen,  but  I  have  to  answer  to  hundreds  of  thousands  who  are  anxious  for 
the  success  of  Zionism;  I  do  not  have  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Arabs  among  my 
constituents'  (1954:  36). 
The  End  of  the  Mandate 
In  Palestine  Zionist  paramilitary  groups  were  gradually  wearing  down  British 
morale.  Towards  the  end  of  the  Arab  revolt  the  Jewish  community  had  launched 
attacks  against  the  Arabs.  In  July  193  8  more  than  100  Arabs  were  killed  when  six 
bombs  were  planted  in  Arab  public  places.  The  last  of  these,  detonated  in  the  Arab 
Melon  market  in  Haifa,  killed  53  Arabs  and  a  Jew  (Palestine  Post,  26  July  1938,  cited 
in  Hirst,  1977:  ).  Towards  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  such  tactics  were  turned 
on  the  British  mandatory  authority.  Roads,  bridges,  trains  and  patrol  boats  were 
destroyed.  British  army  barracks  were  attacked  and  banks  and  armouries  were  looted. 
On  a  single  day  in  1946  Zionist  paramilitary  forces  launched  16  separate  attacks  on 
the  British  army  destroying  many  annoured  vehicles  and  leaving  80  dead  and 
wounded  (Hirst  1977).  Lord  Moyne  was  assassinated  by  the  Stem  Gang,  British 
officers  were  captured,  flogged  and  killed  and  in  the  most  spectacular  attack  of  all,  the 
centre  of  British  mandatory  power  in  Palestine  the  King  David  Hotel  was  destroyed 
by  500  lbs  of  explosives  leaving  88  dead  including  15  Jews.  Funding  for  the  attacks 
was  provided  by  sympathetic  sources  in  the  United  States.  The  Hollywood 
scriptwriter  Ben  Hecht  produced  an  article  for  the  New  York  Herald  Tribune  entitled 
'Letter  to  the  Terrorists  of  Palestine'  in  which  he  wrote  'every  time  you  blow  up  a 
British  arsenal,  or  wreck  a  British  jail,  or  send  a  British  railway  train  sky  high,  or  rob 
a  British  bank,  or  let  go  with  your  guns  and  bombs  at  the  British  betrayers  and 
invaders  of  your  homeland,  the  Jews  of  America  make  a  little  holiday  in  their 
hearts 
... 
Brave  friends  we  are  working  to  help  you.  We  are  raising  funds  for  you.  '  (15 
May  1947,  cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  119).  The  violence  became  so  widespread  that  that  by 
early  1947  all  non-essential  British  civilians  and  military  families  were  evacuated 
from  Palestine.  Weakened  by  the  Second  World  War,  and  demoralized  by  the 
58 attritional  warfare,  the  British  were  unwilling  to  sacrifice  more  lives  and  money  in 
Palestine.  Gilbert  (1999)  suggests  they  were  also  wary  of  alienating  Arab  opinion 
because  they  were  concerned  to  protect  their  oil  interests  in  the  region.  In  February 
1947  the  British  decided  to  end  the  Mandate  and  hand  the  question  of  Palestine  to  the 
United  Nations. 
The  United  Nations  Debates  The  Future  of  Palestine 
The  UN  dispatched  a  Special  Committee  to  the  region  which  recommended  partition. 
Attention  then  switched  to  the  diplomatic  manoeuvring  at  the  United  Nations  in  New 
York.  Arab  representatives,  called  before  the  UN,  questioned  whether  the  Mandate 
was  ever  legal  and  whether  the  UN  had  the  legal  right  to  decide  on  the  sovereignty  of 
Palestine.  They  wished  to  see  the  issue  referred  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice, 
and  ultimately  they  argued  it  was  the  people  of  Palestine  who  should  decide  on  the 
fate  of  the  country  rather  than  an  outside  body.  '  0  Zionist  representatives  were 
sympathetic  to  the  partition  plan  being  debated  by  member  states  and  lobbied  to 
maximise  the  area  that  might  be  allotted  to  a  Jewish  State.  On  the  29  November  1947 
the  Partition  Plan  was  carried  by  a  single  vote  after  a  last  minute  change  of  policy  by 
several  nations,  with  a  number  complaining  over  the  political  and  economic  pressure 
that  had  been  exerted  on  them.  '  1  Resolution  181  recommended  the  division  of 
Palestine,  with  the  Jewish  State  allotted  5,700  square  miles  including  the  fertile 
coastal  areas,  whilst  the  Arabs  State  was  allotted  4,300  square  miles  comprised  mostly 
of  the  hilly  areas.  The  proposed  settlement  would  mean  that  each  state  would  have  a 
majority  of  its  own  population  although  many  Jews  would  fall  into  the  Arab  state  and 
vice-versa.  Jerusalem  and  Bethlehem  were  to  become  a  separate  area  under  UN 
control. 
For  the  Arabs  the  partition  plan  was  a  major  blow.  They  believed  that  it  was 
unfair  that  the  Jewish  immigrants,  most  of  whom  had  been  in  Palestine  less  than  thirty 
years,  and  who  owned  less  than  10%  of  the  land  should  be  given  more  than  half  of 
Palestine  including  the  best  arable  land.  The  reaction  of  Zionists  is  disputed.  Some 
historians  such  as  Bregman  (2003)  argue  that  the  partition  resolution  was  seen  as  a 
triumph  because  it  allowed  for  the  creation  of  a  Jewish  State  in  an  area  three  times 
that  recommended  by  the  Peel  plan  ten  years  earlier.  Shlaim  claims  that  the  reaction 
59 was  more  ambivalent.  He  suggests  that  it  was  accepted  by  most  Zionist  leaders  with  a 
'heavy  heart'  because  they  'did  not  like  the  idea  of  an  independent  Palestinian  state, 
they  were  disappointed  with  the  exclusion  of  Jerusalem,  and  they  had  grave  doubts 
about  the  viability  of  the  State  within  the  UN  borders'  (2000:  25).  He  notes  that  it  was 
dismissed  out  of  hand  by  Jewish  paramilitary  groups  who  demanded  all  of  Palestine 
for  the  Jewish  state.  Gilbert  suggests  that  the  Zionist  leadership  realised  that  war  was 
inevitable  and  that  Ben-Gurion  'contemplated  the  possibility  if  fighting  to  extend  the 
area  allotted  to  the  Jews'  (1999:  149).  Gilbert  cites  orders  from  Ben  Gurion  that 
Jewish  forces  should  'safeguard  the  entire  Yishuv  [Jewish  community  in  Palestine] 
and  settlements  (wherever  they  may  be),  to  conquer  the  whole  country  or  most  of  it, 
and  to  maintain  its  occupation  until  the  attainment  of  an  authoritative  political 
settlement'  (Ben-Gurion  cited  in  Gilbert,  1999:  149).  Hirst  (1977)  suggests  that  the 
partition  plan  was  accepted  by  the  Zionists  because  they  anticipated  they  would 
quickly  be  able  to  militarily  overwhelm  the  Arabs,  and  unilaterally  expand  the  borders 
of  the  Jewish  state.  He  points  to  comments  made  at  the  time  by  the  commander  of 
British  forces  in  Palestine,  General  J.  C.  Darcy  who  stated  that  'if  you  were  to 
withdraw  British  troops,  the  Haganah  [Jewish  fighting  forces]  would  take  over  all 
Palestine  tomorrow'  and  'could  hold  it  against  the  entire  Arab  world.  '  (Crum,  1947: 
220,  cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  134) 
The  Unofficial  War 
The  UN  partition  plan  did  not  solve  the  problems  in  Palestine.  The  Arab 
Higher  Committee  rejected  it  outright  and  called  a  three  day  strike.  The  Mufti  of 
Jerusalem  announced  aj  ihad  or  holy  war  for  Jerusalem.  Fighting  between  the  two 
communities  broke  out  in  early  December  1947  and  the  situation  quickly  deteriorated 
into  a  civil  war.  The  British,  unwilling  and  unable  to  restore  order,  announced  they 
would  terminate  the  Mandate  on  May  15  1948.  In  the  first  stage  of  the  conflict  lasting 
up  until  Israel's  declaration  of  Independence  on  May  14  1948,  Jewish  forces  fought 
against  Arab  forces  marshalled  by  three  commanders.  Fawzi  el-Kawakji  led  the  Arab 
League,  Sir  John  Bagot  Glubb  and  his  45  British  officers  the  Transjordian  Arab 
Legion,  and  Abdul  Qader  al-Husseini  the  Mufti's  Arab  forces  in  Jerusalem  (Bregman, 
2003).  In  the  early  part  of  this  'unofficial  war'  the  Arab  forces  won  some  minor 
60 victories  and  for  a  time  al-Husseini's  forces  cut  the  road  between  Jerusalem  and  Tel- 
Aviv.  In  early  April  Zionist  forces  launched  a  major  offensive  codenamed  Plan  Dalet. 
According  to  Avi  Shlaim  the  aim  of  Plan  Dalet  was  'to  secure  all  the  areas  allocated 
to  the  Israeli  state  under  the  LN  partition  resolution  as  well  as  Jewish  settlements 
outside  these  areas  and  corridors  leading  to  them'  (2000:  3  1).  Arab  towns  and  cities 
were  captured  and  their  populations  removed  so  as  'to  clear  the  interior  of  the  country 
of  hostile  and  potentially  hostile  Arab  elements'  in  anticipation  of  an  attack  by  the 
combined  armies  of  the  neighbouring  Arab  states  (2000:  3  1).  The  operation  involved 
the  application  of  military  and  psychological  pressure  on  the  Arab  population,  who 
were  reluctant  to  leave  their  homes.  The  Haganah  together  with  paramilitary  forces 
sprung  surprise  attacks  on  towns  and  villages  launching  rockets,  mortars  and  the 
Davidka,  a  device  which  lobbed  601b  of  TNT  300  yards  into  densely  populated  areas 
(Hirst,  1977).  Psychological  pressure  was  also  exerted  by  spreading  rumours  via 
clandestine  Zionist  radio  stations  and  loudspeakers  mounted  on  army  vehicles,  that 
Jewish  forces  were  planning  to  bum  villages  and  kill  Arabs.  An  Israeli  reserve  officer 
recounts  that: 
An  uncontrolled  panic  spread  through  the  all  the  Arab  quarters,  the  Israelis 
brought  up  jeeps  with  loudspeakers  which  broadcast  recorded  'horror  sounds'. 
These  included  shrieks,  wails  and  the  anguished  moans  of  Arab  women,  the 
wail  of  sirens  and  the  clang  of  fire-alarm  bells,  interrupted  by  a  sepulchral 
voice  crying  out  in  Arabic:  'Save  your  souls,  all  ye  faithful:  The  Jews  are 
using  poison  gas  and  atomic  weapons.  Run  for  your  lives  in  the  name  of  Allah 
(Childers,  1976:  252,  cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  141) 
In  April  and  early  May  1948  a  number  Arab  towns  and  cities  fell  before  the 
Zionist  offensive  creating  many  refugees.  The  aims  of  Plan  Dalet  remain  highly 
contested  amongst  historians.  Some  such  as  Ilan  Pappe,  Norman  Finkelstein,  Nur 
Masalha,  Walid  Khalidi  and  David  Hirst  place  the  operation  in  the  context  of  long 
held  Zionist  plans  to  'transfer'  the  native  population  out  of  Palestine.  12  They  argue 
that  the  notion  of  transfer  had  been  inherent  in  Theodore  Herzl's  plans  for  Palestine 
some  fifty  years  earlier  (see  p.  45-46)  and  had  remained  an  integral  element  of  Labor 
and  Revisionist  strategy.  Proponents  of  this  perspective  also  point  to  the  writings  of 
Joseph  Weitz,  who  was  appointed  by  the  Jewish  Agency  to  head  'transfer 
61 committees'  which  encouraged  the  1948  exodus  by  various  fonns  of  intimidation.  In 
1940  he  confided  in  his  diary  that: 
Between  ourselves  it  must  be  clear  that  there  is  no  room  for  both  peoples 
together  in  this  country  ...  We  shall  not  achieve  our  goal  of  being  an 
independent  people  with  the  Arabs  in  this  small  country.  The  only  solution  is  a 
Palestine,  at  least  western  Palestine  [west  of  the  Jordan  river]  without  Arabs  ... 
And  there  is  no  other  way  than  to  transfer  the  Arabs  from  here  to  the 
neighbouring  countries,  to  transfer  all  of  them;  not  one  village,  not  one  tribe, 
should  be  left 
... 
Only  after  this  transfer  will  the  country  be  able  to  absorb  the 
millions  of  our  own  brethren.  There  is  no  other  way  out  (Davar,  29  September 
1967,  cited  in  Hirst  1977:  130) 
This  perspective,  is  contested  by  Israeli  historians  such  as  Benny  Morris  and 
Avi  Shlaim  who  contend  that  the  expulsions  were  'born  of  war  not  design',  being  part 
of  military  expediency  rather  than  political  planning.  For  these  historians  the 
expulsions  were  carried  out  as  part  of  a  military  strategy  that  was  spontaneous  and 
instigated  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  by  local  commanders.  Morris's  conclusions,  have  been 
subjected  to  a  detailed  critique  by  Finkelstein  (2000)  who  argues  that  the  evidence 
that  Morris  presents  show  the  expulsions  to  be  more  systematic  and  pre-meditated 
than  his  conclusions  suggest.  A  third  explanation,  that  the  Palestinians  left  voluntarily 
in  response  to  radio  broadcasts  from  their  leaders  was  propagated  by  some  Israeli 
historians  after  the  1948  war.  However  although  this  version  of  events  still  has  some 
currency  across  Israel's  political  spectrum  (Pappe,  1999),  it  has  become  discredited 
amongst  many  historians.  13 
The  First  Arab-Israeli  War 
On  May  14  1948  as  the  United  Nations  debated  a  truce  and  trusteeship 
arrangement  for  Palestine,  and  the  British  were  evacuating  their  troops,  David  Ben- 
Gurion  declared  the  birth  of  the  State  of  Israel  in  Tel-Aviv,  under  a  portrait  of 
Theodor  Herzl.  Eleven  minutes  later,  despite  objections  from  the  State  Department 
and  US  Diplomatic  staff,  America  became  the  first  country  to  recognize  the  new 
Israeli  state.  The  following  day  the  armies  of  five  Arab  nations  entered  Palestine  and 
62 engaged  Israeli  forces.  The  motives  of  the  various  Arab  armies  and  the  military 
balance  of  power  between  Jewish  and  Arab  forces  are  contested-  The  ex-Israeli  prime 
minister  Netanyahu  (2000)  argues  that  the  conflict  was  an  unequal  one  involving  a 
small  Jewish  force  pitted  against  a  larger  and  better  armed  monolithic  Arab  entity 
determined  to  destroy  the  Jewish  State  at  the  moment  of  its  creation.  Others  such  as 
Shlaim  (2000)  dispute  this  and  argue  that  Jewish  forces  significantly  outnumbered  the 
Arabs  during  all  stages  of  the  conflict,  and  during  the  final  decisive  phase  by  a  ratio  of 
nearly  two  to  one.  The  picture  of  a  monolithic  Arab  force  determined  to  destroy  Israel 
is  also  disputed.  Flapan  (1987)  suggests  that  the  primary  objective  of  King  Abdullah 
of  TransJordan,  (who  had  nominal  control  of  all  the  Arab  forces)  was  not  to  prevent 
the  emergence  of  a  Jewish  State  but  to  take  control  of  the  Arab  part  of  Palestine,  as 
part  of  a  secret  pact  that  he  had  made  with  Golda  Meir  in  November  1947.  Ovendale 
(1999)  further  suggests  that  the  other  Arab  States  involved  were  riven  by  competing 
territorial  and  political  ambitions,  in  contrast  to  the  Jewish  forces  who  mostly  fought 
with  a  united  front. 
In  the  first  stage  of  fighting  leading  up  to  the  truce  on  June  II  Israeli  forces 
consolidated  their  hold  on  a  number  of  mixed  Arab-Jewish  towns,  the  Eastern  and 
western  Galilee  and  parts  of  the  Negev.  Jerusalem  saw  fierce  fighting  between  Israeli 
and  TransJordanian  forces.  During  the  first  truce  the  Israelis  took  the  opportunity  to 
recruit  more  fighters  and  substantially  re-arm.  The  U.  N.  appointed  a  mediator,  the 
Swedish  Count  Bernadotte,  who  put  forward  a  proposal  for  ending  the  conflict.  It 
suggested  a  union  between  an  Arab  state  linked  to  TransJordan  and  a  Jewish  state. 
Jerusalem  would  be  part  of  the  Arab  state.  The  proposal  was  rejected  by  all  sides.  The 
Arabs  rejected  plans  to  prolong  the  truce  and  on  July  9  battle  recommenced.  In  nine 
days  of  fighting  leading  up  to  a  second  truce  the  Israelis  took  the  initiative  capturing 
the  Arab  towns  of  Nazareth,  Lydda  and  Ramleh.  During  this  second  truce  Israel 
mobilized  and  trained  more  fighters,  many  of  whom  were  newly  arrived  immigrants, 
and  arranged  the  shipment  of  more  weapons.  They  also  consolidated  their  hold  on  the 
occupied  territories  and  according  to  Bregman  razed  'Arab  villages  to  the  ground  so 
that  their  previous  inhabitants  who  took  what  they  believed  to  be  a  temporary  refuge 
elsewhere  would  have  nowhere  to  return  to.  '  (2003:  57).  During  the  second  truce 
Count  Bernadotte  put  forward  another  proposal  for  settling  the  conflict.  Territorially  it 
was  similar  to  his  previous  proposal,  although  Jerusalem  would  fall  under  United 
Nations  control,  and  the  Palestinians  would  decide  their  own  political  fate  in 
63 consultation  with  other  Arabs  states.  The  proposal  was  due  to  be  debated  by  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  on  21  September,  but  on  17  September  Count 
Bernadotte  was  assassinated  in  Jerusalem,  by  members  of  the  Stem  gang  under  orders 
from  a  triumvirate  that  included  Yitzak  Shamir,  who  later  became  Prime  Minister  of 
Israel  (Bregman,  2003).  During  this  second  truce  Ben-Gurion  proposed  to  the  Israeli 
cabinet  launching  a  major  offensive  to  capture  much  of  the  West  Bank,  but  failed  to 
gain  majority  approval  and  switched  his  attention  to  a  plan  to  push  Egyptian  forces 
back  across  the  Negev  into  Egypt.  At  this  time  Shlaim  (1999)  claims  that  Israel 
received  a  peace  proposal  from  the  Egyptian  government  offering  de  facto  recognition 
of  Israel  in  exchange  for  Egypt's  annexation  of  a  portion  of  land  in  the  Negev.  He 
argues  that  Ben-Gurion  ignored  Egypt's  proposals,  and  persuaded  the  cabinet  to 
authorize  a  series  of  military  offensives  designed  to  capture  the  Negev.  These  were 
highly  successful  with  the  Israeli  army  driving  the  Egyptians  out  of  the  Negev  and 
following  it  into  Egypt  proper.  Eventually  Britain  intervened  on  the  Egyptian  side 
under  the  terms  of  the  1936  Anglo-Egyptian  Treaty,  and  after  forceful  pressure  from 
President  Truman  Ben-Gurion  agreed  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  the  Sinai  and 
accept  a  new  truce. 
Post-War  Nepotiations:  Peace  Treaties,  Borders  and  Refugees 
The  war  ended  on  January  7  1949.  It  had  extracted  a  high  price  on  all  parties.  Israel 
had  lost  more  than  6,000  lives  or  one  percent  of  its  population.  It  had  however  made 
huge  territorial  gains.  UN  resolution  181  had  recommended  the  Jewish  state  be 
established  in  57%  of  mandatory  Palestine.  By  the  end  of  1948  the  Israeli  state  had 
control  of  78%. 
After  the  war  the  Israelis  engaged  in  immediate  nation  building.  Elections 
were  held  in  January  1949  based  on  a  system  of  proportional  party  lists.  The  Mapai 
party  won  the  most  seats  with  its  leader  Ben-Gurion  becoming  the  nation's  first  Prime 
Minister,  whilst  Chaim  Weizmann  was  installed  as  President.  The  Palestinian  view 
the  events  of  1948  as  so  traumatic  they  are  simply  known  as  Al  Nakba  or  'The 
Catastrophe'.  The  refugees  created  prior  to  the  start  of  the  'official  war'  on  May  15 
swelled  during  the  conflict.  The  Israeli  historian  Illan  Pappe,  claims  that  towards  the 
end  of  the  war  'several  massacres  were  committed  adding  an  incentive  to  the  flight  of 
64 the  population'  and  in  the  final  stages  of  the  conflict  'expulsion  was  even  more 
systematic'  (1999:  51-2).  The  war  ended  with  520,000  Palestinian  refugees  according 
to  Israel,  726,000  as  estimated  by  the  UN,  and  810,000  as  estimated  by  the  British 
government  (Gilbert,  1999).  The  150,000  Palestinians  who  were  left  in  the  new  Israeli 
state,  were  according  to  Bregman  regarded  by  Israel  as  a  'dangerous  and  not-to-be- 
trusted  potential  fifth  column'  and  were  therefore  placed  under  military  rule: 
The  military  government  operated  in  areas  where  Arabs  were  concentrated  and 
its  main  task  was  to  exercise  governmental  Policies  in  these  areas.  It  was  a 
most  powerful  body  hated  by  the  Arabs,  for  it  effectively  controlled  all 
spheres  of  their  lives  imposing  on  them  severe  restrictions:  it  banned  the  Arabs 
from  leaving  their  villages  and  travel  to  other  parts  of  the  country  without 
obtaining  special  permission;  it  detained  suspects  without  trial  and  it  also, 
frequently,  in  the  name  of  security,  closed  whole  areas,  thus  preventing  Arab 
peasants  access  to  their  fields  and  plantations  which  was  devastating  for  them 
for  they  were  dependant  on  their  crops  for  their  livelihood.  The  military 
govenunent  also  imposed  curfews  on  whole  villages  and  on  one  occasion, 
when  the  village  of  Kfar  Qassem,  unaware  of  the  curfew,  returned  to  their 
homes,  the  Israelis  opened  fire  killing  47.  (2003:  74) 
During  1949  Israel,  under  the  auspices  of  the  UN  negotiated  separate  armistice 
agreements  with  all  Arab  States  involved  in  the  conflict.  Jordan  moved  to  annex  the 
West  Bank  whilst  Egypt  moved  to  occupy  the  Gaza  Strip  but  unlike  Jordan  it  made  no 
effort  to  annex  the  territory.  The  name  Palestine  had  disappeared  from  the  map,  its 
territory  having  been  absorbed  into  the  Israeli  and  Jordanian  States.  In  late  April 
1949  Israel  met  with  delegations  from  Egypt,  Jordan,  Syria,  Lebanon  and  the  Arab 
Higher  Committee  in  Lausanne  to  try  and  hammer  out  a  peace  deal.  The  two  central 
sticking  points  were  borders  and  refugees.  The  Arab  delegation  wanted  to  see  borders 
based  on  the  1947  UN  partition  resolution,  that  they  had  previously  rejected.  The 
Israelis  argued  the  permanent  borders  should  be  based  on  the  ceasefire  lines  with  only 
minor  modifications.  No  agreement  was  reached.  On  December  11  1948  the  United 
Nations  General  Assembly  had  passed  Resolution  194  which  resolved  'that  the 
refugees  wishing  to  return  to  their  homes  and  live  at  peace  with  their  neighbours 
should  be  pen-nitted  to  do  so  at  the  earliest  practicable  date,  and  that  compensation 
65 should  be  paid  for  the  property  of  those  choosing  not  to  return  and  for  loss  of  or 
damage  to  property'  This  position  on  the  repatriation  of  refugees  Pappe  (1999) 
argues,  was  shared  by  the  UN,  Europe  and  the  US.  Israel  rejected  the  return  of 
refugees  and  the  payment  of  compensation,  arguing  that  the  Arab  states  had  created 
the  refugee  problem  by  attacking  Israel  and  they  should  therefore  settle  the  refugees 
in  their  own  countries: 
'We  did  not  want  the  war.  Tel  Aviv  did  not  attack  Jaffa.  It  was  Jaffa  which 
attacked  Tel  Aviv  and  this  will  not  occur  again.  Jaffa  will  be  a  Jewish  town. 
The  repatriation  of  the  Arabs  is  not  justice,  but  folly.  Those  who  declared  war 
against  us  will  have  to  bear  the  result  after  they  have  been  defeated.  '  (David 
Ben-Gurion  cited  in  Gabbay,  1959:  109) 
From  June  1949  onwards  Pappe  argues  that  Israeli  leaders  were  committed  to 
c  creating  a  fait  accompli  that  would  render  repatriation  impossible'  (1999:  5  2).  In  that 
month  Joseph  Weitz  wrote  in  a  memorandum  that  there  was  a  consensus  among 
Israeli  leaders  that  the  best  way  to  deal  with  the  abandoned  Palestinian  villages  was 
by  'destruction,  renovation  and  settlement  by  Jews'  (Weitz  cited  in  Pappe,  1999:  52). 
This  plan  which  Pappe  claims  Israel  carried  out  'to  the  letter'  required  the  State  'to 
demolish  what  was  left  of  abandoned  Palestinian  villages,  almost  350  in  all,  so  that 
the  term  repatriation  itself,  would  become  meaningless'  (1999:  52).  Pappe  suggests 
that  for  Israelis  the  subject  of  the  Palestinian  refugees  raises  difficult  questions  about 
the  nature  of  the  Israeli  State: 
Israelis  -  leaders  and  people  alike  -  have  a  genuine  psychological  problem  when 
faced  with  the  refugee  issue.  This  is  indeed  for  them  the  'original  sin'.  It  puts  a 
huge  question  mark  over  the  Israeli  self-image  of  moral  superiority  and  human 
sensitivity.  It  ridicules  Israel's  oxymorons,  such  as  the  'purity  of  arms'  or 
misnomers,  such  as  the  'Israeli  Defence  Forces',  and  raises  doubts  over  the 
religious  notion  of  the  'chosen  people'  and  the  political  pretension  of  being  the 
only  democracy  in  the  Middle  East  which  should  be  wholeheartedly  supported 
by  the  West.  In  the  past  it  has  produced  a  series  of  repressions  and  self  denials 
as  well  as  the  promotion  of  unrealistic  political  solutions  ... 
It  was  accompanied 
66 by  an  intellectual  struggle  against  the  Palestinians,  epitomised  by  the  official 
Israeli  fabrication  of  the  history  of  the  land  and  the  conflict  (1999:  5  8) 
Although  the  Armistice  agreements  had  ended  the  military  conflict,  there 
were  no  formal  peace  treaties  signed  between  Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbours,  setting 
the  scene  for  further  sporadic  clashes.  This  failure  to  negotiate  comprehensive  peace 
treaties  is  a  contentious  issue.  Sachar  for  instance,  blames  Arab  intransigence, 
claiming  that  Israel  repeatedly  attempted  to  make  peace  but  its  efforts  were  rebuffed 
by  Arab  States:  '[The]  Arab  purpose  was  single  minded  and  all-absorptive.  It  was 
flatly  committed  to  the  destruction  of  Israel  as  an  independent  state'  (1977:  43  0) 
Some  historians  claim  the  opposite.  Shlaim  argues  that  'the  files  of  the  Israeli  Foreign 
Ministry 
... 
burst  at  the  seams  with  evidence  of  Arab  peace  feelers  and  Arab  readiness 
to  negotiate  with  Israel  from  September  1948  on'  (2000:  49). 
In  the  years  after  1948  the  Arab  world  instituted  an  economic  boycott  against 
Israel,  shut  its  borders  and  refused  its  aircraft  permission  to  use  their  airspace.  This 
period  also  saw  a  radical  demographic  shift  in  the  Jewish  population  throughout  the 
Middle  East.  In  the  nine  years  following  the  1948  war  567,000  Jews  left  Muslim 
countries  and  most  settled  in  Israel,  so  that  the  population  swelled  from  1,174,000  in 
1949  to  1  .  873,000  in  1956  (Ovendale,  1999).  Sachar  (1977)  claims  that  in  many  of 
these  societies,  particularly  Iraq  and  Egypt  the  Jewish  population  had  'prospered 
mightily',  but  argues  that  in  the  1940s  they  were  subject  to  increasing  levels  of 
harassment  and  persecution.  He  claims  that  in  Libya  anti-Jewish  riots  in  1945  had  left 
several  hundred  dead  or  wounded,  and  in  Syria  the  Jewish  population  saw  its  property 
and  employment  rights  curtailed.  Gilbert  (1999)  maintains  that  Israeli  officials  were 
instrumental  in  facilitating  these  population  transfers  from  Muslim  countries,  known 
in  Israel  as  'the  ingathering  of  the  exiles',  because  there  was  a  shortage  of  manpower 
in  Israel  after  1948.  It  has  been  claimed  that  the  methods  employed  were 
controversial.  Gilbert  (1999)  and  Hirst  (1977)  write  that  in  Iraq,  Jewish  agents  planted 
bombs  in  synagogues  and  Jewish  businesses  in  an  attempt  to  stimulate  immigration  to 
Israel. 
Despite  the  stabilization  of  the  political  and  military  situation  following  the 
1948  war  clashes  along  the  armistice  lines  were  a  constant  source  of  friction  between 
Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbours.  Displaced  Palestinians  in  Arab  states  began  to  engage 
in  what  was  known  as  'infiltration'.  Shlaim  alleges  that  '90  per  cent  or  more  of  all 
67 infiltrations  were  motivated  by  social  and  economic  concerns'  involving  persons 
crossing  the  ceasefire  lines  to  retrieve  property,  see  relatives  or  tend  their  land'  (2000: 
82).  Many  of  refugees  had  been  separated  from  their  homes  and  land  and  so  had  no 
employment  and  went  hungry.  The  other  ten  percent  involved  acts  of  sabotage  and 
violence  directed  against  Israelis.  Shlaim  claims  that  the  Israelis  adopted  a  'free  fire' 
policy  towards  infiltrators  which  encouraged  the  Arabs  to  organise  into  groups  and 
respond  in  kind.  The  British  Major  John  Glubb  argued  that  'the  original  infiltrator 
were  han-nless  and  unarmed  seeking  lost  property  or  relatives.  Yet  Jewish  terrorism 
[i.  e.  shoot  to  kill  and  reprisals  raids]  made  the  infiltrator  into  a  gunman  (cited  in 
Morris,  1997:  5  1).  Between  the  end  of  the  1948  war  and  the  1956  Suez  war,  the 
Israeli  authorities  estimated  that  294  civilians  had  been  killed  by  infiltrators  from 
Jordan,  Lebanon  and  Egypt  (Morris,  1997:  97-8).  Shlaim  claims  that  in  this  period 
between  2,700  and  5,000  infiltrators  were  killed  by  'trigger  happy'  Israeli  soldiers 
'the  great  majority  of  them  unarmed'  (2000:  82).  Some  Israeli  historians  argue  that 
Arab  leaders  encouraged  infiltration  as  an  attempt  to  weaken  and  destroy  the  Israeli 
State.  In  contrast  Shlaim  claims  that  'there  is  strong  evidence  from  Arab,  British, 
American,  UN  and  even  Israeli  sources  to  suggest  that  for  the  first  six  years  after  the 
war,  the  Arab  governments  were  opposed  to  infiltration  and  tried  to  curb  it'.  (2000: 
84).  Israel  adopted  a  policy  of  reprisals  directed  against  villages  in  Gaza  and  Jordan 
. 
Shlaim  claims  that  'all  of  these  raids  were  aimed  at  civilian  targets'  and  'greatly 
inflamed  Arab  hatred  of  Israel  and  met  with  mounting  criticism  from  the  international 
community'  (2000:  83).  A  specialist  reprisal  brigade,  unit  101  was  created,  under  the 
command  of  Ariel  Sharon.  It  first  major  operation  involved  an  attack  on  the  village  of 
Quibya  in  1953,  following  the  killing  of  an  Israeli  mother  and  two  children  by  a  hand 
grenade  in  Yahuda.  Unit  10  1  reduced  Quibya  'to  a  pile  of  rubble:  forty  five  houses 
had  been  blown  up  and  sixty-nine  civilians,  two-thirds  of  them  women  and  children' 
were  killed  (2000:  9  1).  A  UN  report  found  that  'the  inhabitants  had  been  forced  by 
heavy  fire  to  stay  inside,  until  their  homes  were  blown  up  over  them.  '  (2000:  9  1) 
Shlaim  also  claims  that  such  acts  were  also  carried  out  against  Arab  villages  within 
the  State  of  Israel: 
Periodic  search  operations  were  also  mounted  in  Arab  villages  inside  Israel  to 
weed  out  infiltrators.  From  time  to  time  the  soldiers  who  carried  out  these 
operations  committed  atrocities,  among  them  gang  rape,  murder  and  on  one 
68 occasion,  the  dumping  of  120  infiltrators  in  the  Arava  desert  without  water.  The 
atrocities  were  committed  not  in  the  heat  of  battle  but  for  the  most  part  against 
innocent  civilians,  including  women  and  children.  Coping  with  day  to  day 
security  had  a  brutalising  effect  on  the  IDF.  Soldiers  in  an  army  which  prided 
itself  on  the  precept  of  "the  purity  of  arms"  showed  growing  disregard  for 
human  lives  and  carried  out  some  barbaric  acts  that  can  only  be  described  as 
war  crimes.  (2000:  83) 
It  was  against  this  backdrop  of  border  tensions  that  Israel  became  involved  in 
a  broader  struggle  between  Britain,  France  and  Egypt  over  control  of  the  Suez  Canal. 
1956:  The  Suez  Conflict 
In  Egypt  following  a  bloodless  coup  in  1952,  Gamal  Abd  al-Nassar  and  his  'free 
officers'  took  power  and  turned  the  state  into  a  Republic.  In  1954  Nasser  became 
President  and  began  a  leftist  programme  of  poverty  reduction  and  agrarian  reform.  He 
also  attempted  to  make  himself  the  champion  of  a  pan-Arabic  renaissance,  and  the 
leader  of  the  de-cololonisation  movement  across  the  Middle  East  and  Africa. 
Ovendale  (1999)  suggests  that  the  European  colonial  powers  feared  the  effects  of 
Nasser's  Arab  nationalism  on  their  oil  interests  and  geo-strategic  control  of  the 
Middle  East  and  Africa.  France  was  also  hostile  because  his  support  for  Algerians 
fighting  for  independence.  In  July  1956  Nasser  nationalised  the  Suez  Canal  after  the 
US  and  Britain  refused  to  fund  the  Aswan  Dam  Project,  which  Nasser  saw  as  a  means 
to  develop  Egypt  as  a  modem  nation.  Britain  and  France  who  were  shareholders  in  the 
Canal  decided  Nasser  had  to  be  removed  from  power.  Israel  also  wanted  to  see  Nasser 
deposed  and  on  23  October  1956  British,  French  and  Israeli  representatives  met  in 
Paris  to  devise  a  military  plan  (Shlaim,  2000). 
On  29  October  1956  the  IDF  launched  an  attack  on  Egyptian  force  in  the 
Sinai  peninsula.  The  next  day  Britain  and  France  issued  an  ultimatum  to  Egypt  and 
Israel  to  withdraw  their  force  to  a  distance  of  ten  miles  from  the  Suez  Canal.  Israel 
complied,  Egypt  reftised  and  the  following  day  Britain  and  France  began  an  aerial 
bombardment  of  the  Egyptian  airfields.  Israel  quickly  secured  an  overwhelming 
military  victory  capturing  Gaza  on  the  2  November  and  the  whole  Sinai  peninsula 
69 three  days  later.  On  November  7  Ben-Gurion  delivered  a  speech  to  the  Knesset  where 
'he  hinted  that  Israel  planned  to  annex  the  entire  Sinai  peninsula  as  well  as  the  Straits 
of  Tiran'  (Shlaim  2000:  179).  However  under  strong  pressure  from  the  USA  and 
USSR  and  threats  of  United  Nations  sanctions  Israel  was  eventually  forced  to 
withdraw  from  all  of  the  Sinai  after  six  months.  Some  aspects  of  the  war  remain 
controversial.  A  report  in  Israeli  daily  Ma'ariv  claimed  that  during  the  war,  273 
Egyptian  prisoners  of  war  had  been  killed  by  Israel's  890  Paratrooper  Battalion 
commanded  by  Rafael  Eitian,  who  was  one  of  the  architects  of  Israel's  1982  invasion 
of  Lebanon  (8  August  1995).  Israel's  motivations  have  been  the  subject  of  much 
controversy.  One  version  maintains  that  Israel  was  driven  to  attack  Egypt  for  three 
main  reasons.  Firstly  it  is  argued  the  Egyptian  leader  Nasser  was  planning  to  lead  a 
combined  Arab  force  (Egypt,  Jordan,  Syria)  in  an  attempt  to  destroy  Israel,  and  the 
Suez  conflict  was  necessary  as  a  pre-emptive  military  strike  to  prevent  this.  Sachar 
(1977)  points  to  belligerent  speeches  made  by  Arab  leaders  in  the  months  preceding 
the  war,  which  he  argues  were  proof  of  imminent  Arab  plans  to  destroy  Israel.  He  also 
suggests  that  Egypt's  acquisition  of  large  shipment  of  arms  from  Czechoslovakia  in 
1955  had  shifted  the  balance  of  power  against  Israel.  Sachar  also  claims  that  Israel 
wanted  to  break  Egypt's  blockade  of  the  Suez  Canal,  and  stop  Palestinian  guerrilla 
attacks  on  Israel.  This  perspective  on  Israeli  motivations  sees  the  attack  on  Egypt  as 
defensive  in  orientation  and  concerned  only  with  strengthening  the  country's  security 
situation. 
Other  historians  have  pointed  to  other  reasons  for  the  attack.  Shlaim  (2000) 
argues  that  Israel's  military  establishment  led  by  Ben-Gurion  and  Moeshe  Dayan 
were  determined  to  goad  Nasser  into  a  war  by  carrying  out  provocative  raids  against 
Egyptian  forces,  despite  Egyptian  attempts  to  curb  infiltration.  The  most  serious  of 
these  raids  occurred  in  February  1955  when  an  Israeli  unit  led  by  Ariel  Sharon 
attacked  the  Egyptian  army  headquarters  on  the  outskirts  of  Gaza  killing  37  Egyptian 
soldiers.  Hirst  claims  that  Egypt  had  consistently  tried  to  avoid  military  confrontation 
with  Israel,  and  had  only  'unleashed  thefedayeen  [Palestinian  guerrillas]  under 
pressure  from  his  own  public  opinion  in  the  wake  of  further  provocations  from  Israel' 
(1977:  200).  Both  Hirst  (1977)  and  Shlaim  argue  that  there  was  no  credible  evidence 
that  Nasser  was  planning  a  war  with  Israel,  nor  that  that  the  balance  of  power  had 
shifted  in  Egypt  favour.  They  suggest  that  the  war  was  undertaken  to  expand  the 
borders  of  Israel  and  overthrow  Nasser's  regime.  Shlaim  maintains  that  Israel  hoped 
70 to  absorb  the  whole  of  the  Sinai  peninsula,  the  West  Bank  and  part  of  the  Lebanon. 
He  argues  that  Ben-Gurion  'exposed  an  appetite  for  territorial  expansion  at  the 
expense  of  the  Arabs  and  expansion  in  every  possible  direction:  north,  east  and  south' 
as  well  as  'a  cavalier  attitude  to  toward  the  independence,  sovereignty  and  territorial 
integrity  of  the  neighbouring  Arab  states'  (2000:  178) 
1967:  The  Six-Dav  War 
During  the  1960s  the  Middle  East  became  a  site  of  cold  war  rivalry  between  America 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  both  of  whom  were  supplying  the  region's  states  with  weapons. 
In  spring  1967  the  Soviet  Union  misinformed  the  Syrian  government  that  Israel  was 
massing  troops  on  its  northern  border  in  preparation  for  an  attack  on  Syria.  No  such 
troop  movements  had  actually  taken  place.  However  the  previous  year  had  seen  a 
number  of  border  clashes  between  the  two  nations  and  tensions  had  been  running 
high.  Israel  had  threatened  publicly  to  overthrow  the  Syrian  regime  unless  it  stopped 
Palestinian  guerrilla  attacks  launched  from  Syrian  territory.  Syria  alarmed  by  the 
Soviet  reports,  turned  to  Egypt  with  whom  it  had  a  mutual  defence  pact.  Egypt  then 
sent  a  number  of  troops  into  the  Sinai,  bordering  Israel  and  asked  the  United  Nations 
troops  who  formed  a  buffer  between  the  two  countries  to  evacuate  their  positions.  The 
Egyptians  troops  then  moved  into  Sharm  al-Shaykh  and  proclaimed  a  blockade  of  the 
Israeli  port  of  Eliat,  which  was  accessible  only  through  Egyptian  waters.  Two  weeks 
later  at  7:  45  a.  m.  on  5  June  1967  Israel  launched  an  aerial  attack  on  Egyptian  airfields 
destroying  298  warplanes,  the  bulk  of  the  Egyptian  airforce,  in  a  single  day.  Israeli 
ground  forces  also  launched  an  almost  simultaneous  land  invasion  of  Egyptian 
territory,  forcing  their  way  to  the  Suez  Canal  and  capturing  the  Sinai  peninsula  in  two 
days.  At  noon  on  5  June,  as  part  of  a  defence  pact  with  Egypt,  Syrian,  Jordanian  and 
Iraqi  forces  attacked  targets  inside  Israel.  Within  two  hours  the  air  forces  of  all  three 
were  destroyed  by  the  Israeli  airforce,  as  well  as  an  Iraqi  military  base  near  the 
Jordanian  border.  Jordanian  land  forces  also  intervened  in  support  of  Egypt.  Jordanian 
artillery  shelled  Israeli  towns  and  its  troops  entered  Arab  East  Jerusalem  and  occupied 
Government  House.  Israel  then  drove  the  Jordanian  army  out  of  the  West  Bank  and 
East  Jerusalem,  occupying  them  both  by  7  June.  The  following  day  Israeli  warplanes 
attacked  the  American  spy  ship,  the  USS  Liberty,  with  cannon,  missiles  and  napalm, 
71 killing  34  US  service  personnel  and  injuring  171.14  On  9  June  Israel  attacked  Syria, 
despite  strong  UN  pressure,  and  occupied  the  Golan  Heights.  There  have  been 
allegations  in  the  Israeli  press  that  about  a  thousand  unresisting  Egyptian  soldiers,  as 
well  as  many  Palestinian  refugees  were  killed  by  the  Israeli  army  (Ha'aretz,  17 
August  1995).  The  war  was  an  overwhelming  military  success  for  Israel.  In  six  days  it 
destroyed  three  Arab  armies  and  made  large  territorial  gains,  capturing  the  Sinai 
Peninsula,  the  Golan  Heights,  the  West  Bank,  Gaza  Strip  and  Arab  East  Jerusalem. 
The  reasons  behind  Israel's  decision  to  launch  the  six  day  war  are  disputed. 
The  official  Israeli  cabinet  documents  stated  that  the  'Government  [of  Israel] 
ascertained  that  the  armies  of  Egypt,  Syria  and  Jordan  are  deployed  for  immediate 
multi-front  aggression,  threatening  the  very  existence  of  the  state'  (cited  in 
Finkelstein,  1995:  130).  Sachar  points  to  Nasser's  decision  to  replace  United  Nations 
peacekeeping  troops  in  the  Sinai  with  Egyptian  troops,  and  military  preparations  by 
other  Arab  nations  as  evidence  that  'the  garrot  ...  was  rapidly  tightening  around  Israel' 
(1977:  632).  He  also  points  to  Israeli  motivations  to  stop  Syrian  shelling  of  Israeli 
settlements  in  the  DMZ  (demilitarised  zone)  between  Israel  and  Syria,  and  guerrilla 
raids  into  Israeli  territory.  Another  justification  given  for  Israel's  attack  was  that 
Egypt's  decision  to  blockade  of  the  Straits  of  Tiran  which  prevented  access  to  the 
Israeli  port  of  Eliat,  was  according  to  the  Israeli  Foreign  Minister  Abba  Eban,  an 
'attempt  at  strangulation'  which  constituted  an  'act  of  war'  (Eban,  1992  :334,  cited  in 
Finkelstein,  1995:  137). 
Some  other  historians  have  questioned  these  explanations  and  pointed  to  an 
alternative  set  of  motivations.  The  twin  assertions  that  the  Arab  states  were  planning 
an  imminent  attack  and  that  they  had  the  military  strength  to  threaten  Israel's 
existence  are  disputed.  Finkelstein  claims  that  an  'exhaustive  US  intelligence  at  the 
end  of  the  month  [May  1967]  could  find  no  evidence  that  Egypt  was  planning  to 
attack'  (1999:  134).  Menachem  Begin  and  Yitzak  Rabin  later  argued  that  the  Arab 
states  had  not  been  planning  an  attack  and  that  the  Israeli  government  had  been  well 
aware  of  this  at  the  time.  15  The  claim  that  the  combined  Arab  armies  posed  a  mortal 
threat  to  the  state  of  Israel  is  also  disputed.  The  CIA  produced  a  report  in  May  1967 
predicting  (British  intelligence  had  reached  the  identical  conclusion),  that  Israel 
would  win  a  war  against  one  or  all  of  the  Arab  states  combined,  whoever  attacked 
first,  in  about  a  week  (Finkelstein,  1999).  Menachem  Begin  and  Ezer  Weizmann  have 
also  argued  that  Israel's  existence  was  never  threatened.  16  Five  years  after  the  war,  in 
72 an  Israeli  newspaper  article,  one  of  the  chief  military  planners  of  the  campaign 
General  Matitiahu  Peled,  was  dismissive  of  the  Arab  threat  in  1967: 
There  is  no  reason  to  hide  the  fact  that  since  1949  no  one  dared,  or  more 
precisely,  no  one  was  able  to  threaten  the  very  existence  of  Israel.  In  spite  of 
that,  we  have  continued  to  foster  a  sense  of  our  own  inferiority,  as  if  we  were  a 
weak  and  insignificant  people,  which,  in  the  midst  of  an  anguished  struggle  for 
its  existence,  could  be  exterminated  at  any  moment  ... 
it  is  notorious  that  the 
Arab  leaders  themselves,  thoroughly  aware  of  their  own  impotence,  did  not 
believe  in  their  own  threats  ...  I  am  sure  that  our  General  Staff  never  told  the 
government  that  the  Egyptian  military  threat  represented  any  threat  to  Israel  or 
that  we  were  unable  to  crush  Nasser's  army,  which  with  unheard  of 
foolishness,  had  exposed  itself  to  the  devastating  might  of  our  army  ... 
To 
claim  that  the  Egyptian  forces  concentrated  on  our  borders  were  capable  of 
threatening  Israel's  existence  not  only  insults  the  intelligence  of  anyone 
capable  of  analysing  this  kind  of  situation,  but  is  an  insult  to  the  Zahal  [the 
Israeli  army]  (Maariv,  24  March  1972,  cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  211) 
Other  posited  explanations  for  Israel's  decision  to  attack  it  Arab  neighbours 
include  a  desire  to  safeguard  the  deterrent  image  of  the  IDF.  Shlaim  (2000)  suggests 
that  the  Egyptian  blockade  represented  a  threat  to  Israel's  'iron  wall'  of  militarised 
strength.  Others  suggest  different  motivations.  Neff  claims  that  on  the  eve  of  the  1967 
War  the  CIA  had  identified  three  Israeli  objectives:  'the  destruction  of  the  centre  of 
power  of  the  radical  Arab  socialist  movements'  [i.  e.  Nasser's  regime],  'the  destruction 
of  the  arms  of  the  radical  Arabs',  and  the  'destruction  of  both  Jordan  and  Syria  as 
modem  States'  (Neff,  1984:  230,  cited  in  Finkelstein,  1999:  143).  Hirst  (1977)  argues 
that  Israeli  military  planners  had  been  preparing  the  attack  since  they  were  forced  to 
leave  the  Sinai  in  1956,  and  cites  comments  from  General  Bums,  the  chief  of  staff  of 
UNTSO  in  the  early  1960s  that  Israel  would  probably  seek  to  go  to  war  again  soon  to 
break  the  Arab  economic  blockade  and  overcome  its  economic  difficulties.  Another 
explanation  that  has  been  cited  as  a  motivation  for  Israel's  decision  to  go  to  war 
involved  a  desire  to  expand  the  boundaries  of  Israel.  Proponents  of  this  view,  point  to 
comments  made  by  the  Israeli  commander  Yigal  Allon  shortly  before  the  1967  war 
that  'in  the  case  of  a  new  war'  Israel  must  seek  as  a  central  aim  'the  territorial 
73 fulfilment  of  the  land  of  Israel.  '  (cited  in  Finkelstein,  1999:  143).  There  is  evidence 
since  the  1950s  in  the  writings  of  David  Ben-Gurion  and  other  Israeli  leaders  that 
there  had  been  a  desire  to  expand  Israel  to  incorporate  all  of  Jerusalem  and  the  West 
Bank.  The  Israeli  historian  Benny  Morris  notes: 
A  strong  expansionist  current  ran  through  both  Zionist  ideology  and  Israeli 
society.  There  was  a  general  feeling  shared  by  prominent  figures  as  Dayan  and 
Ben-Gurion,  that  the  territorial  gains  of  the  1948  war  had  fallen  short  of  the 
envisioned  promised  land.  Bechiya  Le  Dorot-  literally  a  cause  for  lamentation  for 
future  generations-  was  how  Ben-Gurion  described  the  failure  to  conquer  Arab 
East  Jerusalem;  leading  groups  in  Israeli  society  regarded  the  Jordanian 
controlled  West  Bank  with  the  same  feeling.  (Morris,  1989:  410-411,  cited  in 
Finkelstein,  1999:  221) 
The  conflict  triggered  a  second  mass  exodus  of  Palestinians,  many  of  whom 
became  refugees  for  a  second  time,  as  they  had  sought  refuge  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  after  having  to  abandon  their  homes  in  1948-9.  Nur  Masalha,  senior  lecturer  at 
the  Holy  Land  Research  Project  at  the  University  of  Surrey,  argues  that  'there  is  no 
evidence  to  suggest  that  there  were  wholesale  or  blanket  expulsion  orders  adopted  or 
carried  out  by  the  Israeli  army  in  June  1967,  although  the  policy  of  selective  eviction, 
demolition  and  encouragement  of  'transfer'  continued  for  several  weeks  after  the 
Israeli  army  occupied  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip.  '  (Masalha,  1999:  100).  Masalha 
maintains  that  in  1967  'evictions  and  demolitions  were  evident  in  numerous 
geographical  locations  in  the  West  Bank'  and  that  'young  men  from  several  cities  and 
refugee  camps  were  also  targeted  for  deportation'  (1999:  10  1).  Peter  Dodd  and  Halim 
Barakat  in  their  study  of  the  1967  exodus,  River  without  Bridges  provide  similar 
explanations  for  the  exodus: 
The  exodus  was  a  response  to  the  severe  situational  pressures  existing  at  the 
time.  The  situational  pressures  were  generated  by  the  aerial  attacks  upon  a 
defenceless  country,  including  the  extensive  use  of  napalm,  the  occupation  of 
the  West  Bank  villages  by  the  Israeli  army,  and  the  actions  of  the  occupying 
forces.  Certainly  the  most  dramatic  of  these  was  the  eviction  of  civilians,  and 
the  deliberate  destruction  of  a  number  of  villages  [Imwas,  Yalu,  Bayt  Nuba, 
74 Bayt  Marsam,  Bayt  Awa,  Habla,  al-Buý  and  Jiftlik].  Other  action,  such  as 
threats  and  the  mass  detention  of  male  civilians,  also  created  situational 
pressures  (Dodd  &  Barakat,  1969:  54  cited  in  Masalha,  1999:  96) 
William  Wilson  Harris  (1980),  who  reached  similar  conclusions  himself  in  his 
analysis  of  the  exodus,  estimates  that  250,000  residents  of  the  West  Bank,  70,000 
residents  of  the  Gaza  strip  and  90,000  residents  of  the  Golan  Heights  were  forced  to 
flee  their  homes  during  1967.  The  displaced  residents  of  the  West  Bank  were 
prevented  from  returning  to  the  area  by  harsh  measures.  Testimony  in  the  Israeli 
press,  from  a  unnamed  soldier  serving  in  the  5  th  Reserve  Division  on  the  Jordan  River, 
details  the  fate  of  displaced  Palestinians  attempting  to  return  to  their  homes: 
We  fired  such  shots  every  night  on  men,  women  and  children.  Even  during 
moonlit  nights  when  we  could  identify  the  people,  that  is distinguish  between 
men,  women  and  children.  In  the  mornings  we  searched  the  area  and,  by 
explicit  order  from  the  officer  on  the  spot,  shot  the  living,  including  those  who 
hid  or  were  wounded,  again  including  the  women  and  children"  (Haolam  Haze 
10  October  1967  cited  in  Masalha,  1999:  99) 
There  were  reports  that  after  the  war  Israel  began  destroying  Palestinian 
homes  in  the  newly  occupied  territories.  The  American  historian  Alfred  Lilienthal 
claims  that  'according  to  UN  figures,  the  Israelis  destroyed  during  the  period  between 
II  June  1967  and  15  November  1969  some  7,554  Palestinian  Arab  homes  in  the 
territories  seized  during  that  war;  this  figure  excluded  35  villages  in  the  occupied 
Golan  Heights  that  were  razed  to  the  ground.  In  the  two  years  between  September 
1969  and  1971  the  figure  was  estimated  to  have  reached  16,312  homes.  '  (1978:  160) 
On  19  June  1967  Israeli  leaders  formulated  an  offer  to  hand  back  the  Golan 
Heights,  the  Sinai  and  the  Gaza  Strip  in  return  for  demilitarisation  agreements,  peace 
treaties  and  assurance  of  navigation  rights  from  Egypt,  Syria  and  Jordan.  Bergman 
(2003)  suggests  that  the  decision,  taken  two  months  later,  by  Arab  leaders  meeting  in 
Khartoum  to  issue  the  famous  'three  noes'  to  peace,  recognition  and  negotiations  with 
Israel  led  to  the  Israeli  decision  taken  on  October  30  to  officially  withdraw  the  offer, 
and  harden  its  attitude.  Shlaim  (2000)  disagrees  arguing  that  there  was  no  evidence 
that  the  conditional  offer  of  withdrawal  was  ever  presented  to  the  Arab  states,  and  that 
75 the  offer  was  almost  immediately  killed  by  political  and  military  leaders  who  wanted 
to  retain  a  large  part  of  the  captured  territories,  and  began  in  mid-July  to  approve 
plans  for  constructing  settlements  on  the  occupied  Golan  Heights.  He  maintains  that 
the  'three  noes'  at  Khartoum  referred  to  'no  formal  peace  treaty,  but  not  a  rejection  of 
a  state  of  peace;  no  direct  negotiations,  but  not  a  refusal  to  talk  through  third  parties; 
and  no  dejure  recognition  of  Israel,  but  acceptance  of  its  existence  as  a  state'  (2000: 
258).  He  argues  the  conference  was  'a  victory  for  Arab  moderates  who  argued  for 
trying  to  obtain  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  by  political  rather  than  military 
means'  (2000:  258).  There  have  also  been  claims  that  Israel  turned  down  a  peace 
treaty  with  Egypt  and  Jordan  at  the  conference.  17 
Shlaim  claims  that  there  was  no  Israeli  debate  about  handing  back  East 
Jerusalem,  but  that  Israeli  leaders  were  split  on  how  much  of  the  West  Bank  they 
wanted  to  retain.  He  suggests  outright  annexation  was  favoured  by  only  a  few, 
because  it  would  mean  absorbing  large  numbers  of  Arabs  into  the  Jewish  state.  Most 
favoured  one  of  two  options.  The  'Allon  Plan'  proposed  limited  autonomy  for 
Palestinians  in  part  the  West  Bank  (Israel  would  still  own  the  land  and  control 
security  in  the  autonomy  area),  with  Israel  taking  control  of  a  large  strip  of  the  Jordan 
Valley,  much  of  the  area  around  Jerusalem  and  the  Judean  desert.  These  parts  of  the 
West  Bank  would  then  be  colonised  with  Jewish  settlements  and  army  bases.  The 
second  option  involved  handing  back  to  Jordan  part  of  the  West  Bank  with  Israel 
keeping  approximately  a  third  of  the  area.  Neither  proposal  was  acceptable  to  King 
Hussein  or  the  Palestinians. 
Resolution  242  and  the  War  of  Attrition 
The  1967  war  was  followed  by  UN  Security  Council  unanimously  adopting  resolution 
242,  which  has  become  the  framework  document  for  successive  attempts  to  resolve 
the  conflict.  The  resolution  called  for  the  'withdrawal  of  Israeli  an-ned  forces  from 
territories  occupied  in  the  recent  conflict'  in  line  with  the  principle  'emphasise[d]'  in 
the  preambular  paragraph  of  the  'inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by 
war'.  It  also  'emphasised'  the  'need  to  work  for  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  which 
every  State  in  the  area  can  live  in  security'  as  well  as  a  'just  settlement  of  the  refugee 
problem'  and  the  establishment  of  navigation  rights.  Egypt  and  Jordan  agreed  to 
76 resolution  242  whilst  Syria  rejected  it.  The  Palestinians  also  rejected  it  on  the  grounds 
that  it  only  spoke  of  their  plight  as  a  refugee  problem,  making  no  mention  of  their 
rights  to  self-determination  and  national  sovereignty.  Israel  accepted  the  resolution  in 
1970.  The  meaning  of  the  withdrawal  clause  has  been  contested.  Israel  has  argued  that 
because  the  definite  article  'the'  was  not  included  in  the  English  version  of  the 
resolution  ffrorn  territories  occupied'  rather  than  'from  the  territories  occupied')  it 
means  that  the  scope  of  withdrawal  was  left  vague  and  that  Israel  did  not  have  to 
withdraw  from  all  the  territories  it  occupied  in  the  conflict.  Israel  has  also  argued  that 
many  of  the  nations  who  endorsed  the  resolution  including  the  United  States,  United 
Kingdom,  USSR  and  Brazil  agreed  that  Israel  did  not  have  to  withdraw  from  all  the 
territories  (Israeli  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  1999).  Finkelstein  (2001)  disputes  this. 
He  points  to  statements  made  by  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  President  that 
'there  is  virtual  unanimity  in  upholding  the  principle  that  conquest  of  territory  by  war 
is  inadmissible  in  our  time  under  the  Charter'  (U.  N.  General  Assembly  1967a,  cited  in 
Finkelstein,  2001:  145).  This  affirmation,  the  President  continued  was  'made  in 
virtually  all  statements'  and  that  'virtually  all  speakers  laid  down  the  corollary  that 
withdrawal  of  forces  to  their  original  position  is  expected.  '  (U.  N.  General  Assembly 
1967a,  cited  in  Finkelstein,  2001:  145).  The  debates  at  the  UN  Security  Council, 
Finkelstein  argues,  were  similarly  unambiguous  with  virtually  all  representatives 
stressing  both  the  inadmissibility  clause  and  the  need  for  a  complete  Israeli 
withdrawal.  18He  also  argues  that  the  American  position  was  for  a  full  Israeli 
withdrawal.  19 
Having  failed  to  secure  an  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  occupied  territories 
Egypt  fought  the  'war  of  attrition'  against  Israel  between  1967  and  1970.  Shlaim 
argues  President  Nasser's  immediate  purpose  was  to  'prevent  the  conversion  of  the 
Suez  Canal  into  a  de  facto  border,  while  his  ultimate  goal  was  to  force  Israel  to 
withdraw  to  the  prewar  border'  (2000:  289).  Egypt  bombed  Israeli  troop 
concentrations  in  the  occupied  Sinai  and  Palestinian  guerrillas  launched  cross  border 
attacks  against  Israel.  Israel  then  attacked  military  and  civilian  targets  within  Egypt 
and  Jordan.  Numerous  Egyptian  coastal  towns  and  cities  were  heavily  damaged  by 
Israeli  air  attacks.  The  Israeli  commander  Ezer  Weizman  recalled  the  fate  of  an 
Egyptian  border  city  Ismailia  which  the  Israeli  army  bombarded  'incessantly, 
devastating  it  from  the  air  as  well  as  with  land-based  artillery'  so  that  aerial 
photographs  'showed  its  western  portions  resembling  the  cities  at  the  end  of  World 
77 War  11'  (Weizman  cited  in  Gilbert,  1999:  410).  Moeshe  Dayan  was  later  to  claim  that 
Israeli  attacks  during  the  war  of  attrition  had  created  one  and  a  half  million  Egyptian 
refugees  as  well  as  emptying  the  entire  Jordan  Valley  of  its  inhabitants  (Al  Hamishar, 
10  May  1978).  The  war  was  finally  brought  to  a  halt  in  August  1970  when  both  sides 
agreed  to  a  US  sponsored  ceasefire.  Morris  (1992)  estimates  that  in  the  three  years  of 
conflict,  367  Israeli  soldiers  and  more  than  10,000  Egyptian  soldiers  and  civilians 
were  killed. 
Settlement  Building,  Economic  Integration  and  the  Occupation 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  1967  war  Israel  established  settlements  on  the  newly  captured 
territories  and  placed  the  Palestinian  residents  under  military  rule.  Two  major  reasons 
were  given  for  the  creation  of  settlements.  One  stressed  their  security  value: 
There  was  also  a  strategic  justification  for  not  wanting  to  give  up  the  occupied 
West  Bank  and  that  was  that  it  turned  Israel's  'narrow  waist'  into  something 
wider.  Before  seizing  the  West  Bank  Israel's  width  at  some  parts  measured 
scarcely  nine  miles  from  the  Jordan  bulge  to  the  Mediterranean,  and  by 
clinging  to  the  occupied  territories  west  of  the  Jordan  river  Israel  made  it  more 
difficult  for  a  potential  Arab  invasion  force  coming  from  the  east  to  cut  in  two. 
(Bregman,  2003:  126-7) 
Some  Israelis  were  dismissive  of  the  security  argument  alleging  it  was  a 
pretext  to  satisfy  international  public  opinion.  One  official  writing  in  the  Israeli  press 
claimed  that  'we  have  to  use  the  pretext  of  security  needs  and  the  authority  of  the 
military  governor  as  there  is  no  way  of  driving  out  the  Arabs  from  their  land  so  long 
as  they  refuse  to  go  and  accept  our  compensation'  (Haaretz,  23  November  1969, 
cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  24  1).  A  second  strand  of  thought  justified  settlement  building  and 
retention  of  the  occupied  territories,  on  the  basis  of  divine  rights.  Victory  in  the  six 
day  war  was  seen  by  many  religious  Jews  as  a  sign  of  support  from  God  and  evidence 
that  the  messianic  era  was  at  hand,  leading  to  a  surge  in  support  for  religious 
nationalism.  A  number  of  new  parties  and  organisations  were  formed  who  advocated 
permanent  control  and  settlement  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip,  because,  it  was 
78 argued,  these  areas  were  a  central  component  of  the  biblical  land  of  Israel.  Harold 
Fisch,  the  former  rector  of  Israel's  Bar-Ilan  University,  argues  that  God  promised 
Abraham  the  land  of  Israel  as  an  eternal  possession,  and  this  provides  justification  for 
sovereignty  over  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip: 
The  covenant  between  the  people  of  Israel  and  its  God,  which  includes  the 
promised  land  as  an  integral  part,  is  an  important  objective  within  the  entire 
scheme  of  creation.  It  is  from  this  fact  that  the  linkage  between  the  people  of 
Israel  and  its  land  is  rooted-in  the  transcendental  will  of  God  who  created  all  in 
his  honor  (Fisch,  1982:  189) 
These  arguments  are  echoed  in  more  contemporary  comments.  In  a  recent 
interview  in  the  Observer,  Ariel  Sharon,  the  Israeli  Prime  Minister,  was  quoted  as 
saying  'Israel  is  the  promised  land-  promised  to  Jews  and  no-one  else'  (13  July  2003). 
The  viewpoint  has  also  gained  ground  in  the  U.  S.  via  the  Christian  fundamentalist 
movement,  who  are  key  supporters  of  George  W  Bush  and  the  Republicans.  A  BBC 
programme  interviewed  the  pastor  of  a  major  church  in  Texas  who  explained  his  view 
that: 
Well  you  understand  that  the  Jewish  state  was  something  that's  born  in  the 
mind  of  God  and  we  are  a  people  who  believe  the  scripture  and  the  scripture 
says  very  clearly  that  God  created  Israel,  that  God  is  the  protector  and  defender 
of  Israel.  If  God  created  Israel,  if  God  defends  Israel,  is  it  not  logical  to  say 
that  those  who  fight  with  Israel  are  fighting  with  God?  (BBC  Radio  4,  A  Lobby 
to  be  Reckoned  With,  7  May  2002) 
Other  arguments  for  Israel's  rights  to  keep  and  settle  the  lands  captured  in 
1967  included  the  position  that  since  the  land  has  changed  sovereignty  many  times 
over  the  last  two  thousand  years,  the  Jews  have  as  much  claim,  as  any  others  who  had 
controlled  it  since  they  were  exiled.  20  Some  Israelis  have  argued  that  since  the  Arabs 
rejected  partition  in  1947  they  have  given  up  their  rights  to  a  share  of  mandatory 
Palestine.  Others  point  to  the  legal  status  of  the  Balfour  Declaration  or  argue  that 
since  Israel  won  the  territories  in  a  'war  of  self-defense'  they  have  a  right  to  keep 
79 them.  Benjamin  Netanyahu  argues  that  to  prevent  Jews  from  building  settlements  in 
the  occupied  territories  is  a  form  of  apartheid: 
Careful  manipulation  of  the  media  by  the  Arabs  has  left  many  Westerners  with 
the  indelible  impression  that  Arab  paupers  are  being  kicked  off  their  hovels  in 
droves  to  make  way  for  Jewish  suburbs  in  the  'densely  populated  West 
Bank.  '...  For  what  is  manifestly  occurring  is  that  the  West,  which  so  sharply 
condemned  anti-black  apartheid  in  South  Africa,  is  being  used  by  the  Arabs  as 
an  enforcer  of  anti-Jewish  apartheid  that  pertains  in  the  Arab's  own  countries. 
(2000:  189-192) 
In  a  review  of  Israel's  settlement  building  programs  Israel  Shahak  and  Norton 
Mezvinsky  (1999)  note  that  until  1974,  Moeshe  Dayan  oversaw  settlement  activity. 
His  policy  was  to  limit  settlements  primarily  to  Hebron,  Northern  Sinai  and  the  Jordan 
Valley,  as  part  of  a  bargain  he  made  with  the  Palestinian  feudal  notables  who 
controlled  the  villages.  After  1974  Shahak  and  Mezvinsky  argue  that  religious  settler 
groups,  primarily  Gush  Emunim,  and  their  political  allies  in  the  Knesset  came  to  the 
fore  in  determining  settlement  policy,  with  the  support  of  both  Labor  and  particularly 
the  Likud  party.  In  1973  Israel  introduced  the  Galili  Plan  which  Shafir  suggests 
transformed  the  Alon  plan's  'militaryftontier  to  a  combination  of  a  messianic  frontier 
and  a  suburban  ftontier'  (1999:  92)  Some  commentators  have  pointed  to  the  extreme 
ideological  views  of  many  religious  settlers  which  justify  attacks  on  Palestinians  and 
attempts  to  expel  them  from  the  occupied  territories  in  what  is  seen  as  a  process  of 
4purification'  or  'sanctification'  of  the  land 
.21 
Hirst  has  suggested  that  even  prior  to 
1974,  the  creation  of  settlements  was  at  the  expense  of  Palestinians: 
Sometimes  it  was  necessary  to  uproot  an  entire  village-  though  not  necessarily 
all  at  once.  For  years  the  impoverished  inhabitants  of  Beit  Askariyah  watched 
in  impotent  dismay  as  the  great  cantonments  of  the  Kfar  Etzion  settlement 
went  up  around  them,  relentlessly  encroaching  on  their  agricultural  and 
grazing  land  before  swallowing  up  their  homes  too.  In  January  1972,  the  army 
expelled  6,000  bedouins  from  Rafah  in  north-east  Sinai.  It  demolished  their 
houses,  poisoned  their  wells,  and  kept  them  at  bay  with  a  barbed  wire  fence. 
The  Bedouins  were  eventually  employed  as  night  watchmen  or  labourers-  on 
80 their  own  property  and  in  the  service  of  those  who  had  taken  it  from  them. 
(1977:  242) 
In  1981  the  Likud  administration  introduced  the  Drobless  Plan.  Shafir 
suggests  that  its  purpose  was  to  'scatter  Jewish  settlements  among  Arab  towns  and 
villages  in  order  to  ensure  that  no  homogenous  Palestinian  inhabited  area,  the 
potential  core  of  a  Palestinian  state  would  remain'  (1999:  92).  In  a  more  recent  study 
Amnesty  International  (I  999c)  examined  how  settlement  building  and  Palestinian 
house  demolitions  and  are  'inextricably  linked  with  Israeli  policy  to  control  and 
colonize  areas  of  the  West  Bank',  a  policy  that  has  been  'energetically  followed  for 
over  30  years  by  all  administrations  from  1967  until  the  present  time.  '  The  process  of 
colonisation  the  report  continues  depends  'not  just  on  finding  land  that  is  physically 
'suitable'.  but  on  alienating  it  from  the  Palestinians,  defending  it  against  Palestinian 
use,  and  ensuring  through  such  processes  as  registration  and  leasing  that  Palestinians 
are  disqualified  from  having  any  future  benefit  from  that  land'.  Amnesty  International 
argue  that  the  damage  to  the  'tight  knit  pattern  of  Palestinian  villages'  has  been 
pervasive.  Settlement  building  is  prohibited  by  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention,  article 
49  of  which  stipulates  that  'the  occupying  power  shall  not  deport  or  transfer  parts  of 
its  own  population  into  the  territory  it  occupies'.  The  Israeli  government  has  disputed 
this,  arguing  that  the  area  is  'administered'  rather  than  'occupied'  and  that  article  49 
of  the  Conventions  has  'no  bearing'  on  the  Israeli  settlements  because  the  Convention 
was  intended  to  cover  forced  transfers  during  the  second  world  war,  whilst  'the 
movement  of  individuals  to  these  areas  is  entirely  voluntary,  while  the  settlements 
themselves  are  not  intended  to  displace  Arab  inhabitants,  nor  do  they  do  so  in 
practice'  (Israeli  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  1996).  The  practice  has,  however,  been 
repeatedly  condemned  by  the  European  Union  and  United  Nations  who  have  deemed 
the  settlements  illegal  and  in  need  of  removal  in  multiple  resolutions.  The  practice 
was  recently  condemned  in  United  Nations  resolution  55/132  by  152  votes  to  four 
(Israel,  United  States,  Micronesia,  Marshall  Islands) 
In  Jerusalem,  Israel  initiated  a  policy  of  'Judaization'  in  an  attempt  to  change 
the  demographic,  physical,  cultural,  legal  and  economic  status  of  the  city.  It 
appropriated  Arab  land  in  the  city  and  demolished  Arab  housing.  In  the  Jewish 
Quarter  prior  to  1948,  approximately  20%  of  the  property  was  Jewish  owned.  After 
1967,  Hirst  suggests  that  Israelis  'relentlessly  forced  out  the  5,500  [Arab]  inhabitants 
81 who  lived  there'  (1977:  23  5).  The  demolitions  and  evictions  occurred  all  over  the  city, 
with  the  victims  of  land  expropriations  receiving  either  inadequate  levels  of 
compensation  or  sometimes  none.  Moves  to  change  the  legal  and  demographic 
structure  of  Jerusalem  have  drawn  criticism  from  the  international  community.  In 
1999  the  United  Nations  condemned  such  actions  by  139  votes  to  one  (Israel).  22  Hirst 
also  notes  that  Arab  culture  was  suppressed  or  denigrated  especially  in  schools.  23  The 
Israeli  state  quickly  moved  to  integrate  the  Arabs  living  in  the  occupied  territories  into 
the  Israeli  economy.  Some  historians  such  as  Sachar  suggest  that  for  Palestinians  this 
was  a  generally  beneficial  process  creating  'unprecedented  affluence'  as  part  of  a 
'comparatively  painless'  occupation  (1977:  688-9).  Other  Israelis  were  critical  of  this 
process  arguing  that  Israel  was  instituting  colonial  policies  in  which  a  powerful  Israeli 
minority  was  exploiting  a  captive  Arab  population  for  the  benefit  of  its  cheap  labour 
and  its  role  as  a  market  for  Israeli  products: 
Better  men  than  I  have  enlarged  on  the  grim  paradox  that  threatens  the  Zionist 
vision,  the  social  and  moral  failure  of  that  vision,  which  are  to  be  expected 
from  the  transformation  of  the  Jews  into  employers,  managers  and  supervisors 
of  Arab  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water,  and  all  of  it  plus  the  slogan  of 
'Integration'...  There  is  an  inescapable  process  in  a  population  that  is divided 
into  two  peoples,  one  dominant,  the  other  dominated.  No!  The  State  of  Israel 
will  not  be  such  a  monstrosity.  (Ya'akov  Talmon  cited  in  Sachar,  1977:  713) 
There  has  also  been  commentary  in  the  Israeli  press  suggesting  the  conditions 
under  which  the  Palestinians  were  obliged  to  work  for  Israelis  were  exploitative  and 
humiliating.  Palestinians  with  jobs  in  Israel  were  not  legally  allowed  to  spend  the 
night  there  so  that  many  had  to  be  bussed  in  over  long  distances  from  the  occupied 
territories,  sometimes  extending  their  working  day  to  17  hours.  The  Israeli  magazine 
Haolam  Haze  reported  on  those  that  were  permitted  to  sleep  illegally  on  Israeli  farms: 
'Too  far  away  for  the  eye  to  see,  hidden  in  the  orchards,  there  are  the  sheep  pens  for 
the  servants,  of  a  sort  that  even  a  state  like  South  Africa  would  be  ashamed  of  (22 
December  1982,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  14  1).  In  a  Jerusalem  Post  interview,  the 
Israeli  j  ournalist  Aryeh  Rubinstein  asks  Amos  Hadar,  Secretary  General  of  the 
Moshav  [agricultural]  movement  whether  he  agrees  with  the  use  of  Arab  labour  'but 
only  on  condition  that  they  will  live  in  subhuman  conditions,  degraded,  and  not  under 
82 human  conditions,  more  or  less?  '  'Correct'  replies  Hadar  stressing  that  'there  is  a 
difficult  question  here'.  'There  is  no  choice  but  to  employ  Arabs'  but  they  must  be 
bussed  in  and  out  of  Israel  every  day.  'It  is  hard,  it  is  costly  it  is  problematic  from  an 
economic  standpoint  but  there  is  no  other  solution'  (26  December  1982,  cited  in 
Chomsky,  1999:  141)  There  has  also  been  criticism  of  Israeli  use  of  Arab  child 
labour.  Israel's  Arabic  language  communist  newspaper  Al-Ittihad  described  a  child 
labour  market  at  Jaffa: 
In  this  market  foremen  get  rich  by  exploiting  the  labour  of  children  and  young 
men  from  the  occupied  areas.  Every  morning  at  4.  a.  m.  cars  from  Gaza  and  the 
Strip  start  arriving  there,  bringing  dozens  of  Arab  workers  who  line  up  in  the 
street  in  a  long  queue.  A  little  later  at  4:  30  a.  m.  Arab  boys  who  work  in 
restaurants  in  the  town  begin  to  arrive.  These  boys  work  in  restaurants  for  a 
month  on  end,  including  Saturdays 
... 
Dozens,  indeed  hundreds  of  boys,  who 
should  be  at  school  come  from  Gaza  to  work  in  Israel.  The  cars  can  be  seen 
coming  and  going  from  earliest  dawn.  At  about  6.  a.  m.  Israeli  labour  brokers 
start  arriving  to  choose  'working  donkeys'  as  they  call  them.  They  take  great 
care  over  their  choice,  actually  feeling  the  'donkeys'  muscles.  (30  April  1973, 
cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  246) 
Militga  Occupation/Administration 
Israel  imposed  a  military  administration  on  the  occupied  territories,  which  seriously 
restricted  the  social  and  political  rights  of  its  residents.  According  to  the  United 
Nations  and  human  rights  groups,  it  also  involved  extensive  human  rights  violations. 
Israel  argued  that  the  policies  were  necessary  to  protect  the  state  from  attacks  by 
infiltrators  or  Palestinians  in  the  occupied  territory,  who  they  claimed  were 
susceptible  to  PLO  incitement.  Morris  suggests  that  that  severe  repression  coupled 
with  'massive  use'  of  informers  and  collaborators  by  the  Israeli  security  service  Shin 
Bet  meant  that  armed  activity  by  the  PLO  in  the  occupied  territories  was  'virtually 
eradicated'  by  1971  (1992:  279).  Some  commentators  such  as  Chomsky,  have 
suggested  that  the  imposition  of  such  policies  had  another  objective,  that  by  making 
life  difficult  for  the  Palestinians  in  the  occupied  territories,  they  would  emigrate  and 
83 allow  Israel  to  absorb  the  parts  of  the  occupied  territories  that  it  wanted,  without 
having  to  worry  about  a  large  Arab  population  that  would  'dilute'  the  Jewish 
character  of  the  Israeli  state.  Chomsky  points  to  the  official  government  records  of  a 
meeting  at  the  start  of  the  Israeli  occupation  in  September  1967,  when  Moeshe  Dayan 
urged  government  ministers  to  tell  the  Palestinian  residents  of  the  occupied  territories 
that  'we  have  no  solution,  that  you  shall  continue  to  live  like  dogs,  and  whoever  wants 
to  can  leave-and  we  will  see  where  this  process  leads...  In  five  years  we  may  have 
200,000  less  people-and  that  is  a  matter  of  enormous  importance'  (Beilin,  1985,  cited 
in  Chomsky,  1992:  434).  Professor  Ian  Lustick  suggests  that  Israel  also  wanted  to 
break  up  the  territorial  continuity  of  Israeli  Arab  villages  in  the  Galilee  and  points  to 
the  1976  Koenig  memorandum  in  which,  the  Israeli  Minister  of  the  Interior 
recommended  the  'coordination  of  a  smear  campaign  against  Rakah  activists  ...  the 
harassment  of  'all  negative  personalities  at  all  levels  and  at  all  institutions'  and  the 
employment  of  techniques  for  'encouraging  the  emigration  of  Arab  intellectuals,  and 
for  downgrading  the  effectiveness  of  Arab  university  student  organizations' 
(1980:  256).  It  is  widely  argued  that  the  policies  Israel  instituted,  breached 
international  law.  They  also  led  to  it  being  frequently  condemned  at  the  United 
Nations  General  Assembly  and  Security  Council  by  near  unanimous  votes.  24  These 
policies  included  the  systematic  torture  of  prisoners  25 
, 
imprisonment  without  trial26, 
collective  punishmentS27,  theft  of  natural  resources,  curfews  and  searches  28 
, 
house 
demolitions  and  deportations.  The  practices  have  also  attracted  criticism  from  human 
rights  groups: 
Amnesty  International  has  for  many  years  documented  and  condemned 
violations  of  international  human  rights  and  humanitarian  law  by  Israel 
directed  against  the  Palestinian  population  of  the  Occupied  Territories.  They 
include  unlawful  killings;  torture  and  ill-treatment;  arbitrary  detention;  unfair 
trials;  collective  punishments  such  as  punitive  closures  of  areas  and  destruction 
of  homes;  extensive  and  wanton  destruction  of  property;  deportations;  and 
discriminatory  treatment  as  compared  to  Israeli  settlers.  Most  of  these 
violations  are  grave  breaches  of  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention  and  are 
therefore  war  crimes.  Many  have  also  been  committed  in  a  widespread  and 
systematic  manner,  and  in  pursuit  of  government  policy;  such  violations  meet 
84 the  definition  of  crimes  against  humanity  under  international  law.  (Amnesty 
International,  2002) 
Palestinian  Nationalism  and  the  Rise  of  the  Opposition  Movements 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  1948  the  refugees  who  were  displaced  had  begun  to  formulate 
a  vision  of  'the  return'.  Initially  it  was  hoped  the  hoped  the  United  Nations  or  the 
Arab  States  themselves  would  help  the  refugees  achieve  this  objective.  However  as 
the  years  passed  the  lack  of  concrete  progress  began  to  frustrate  the  refugees  and  they 
became  increasingly  disillusioned  by  the  leaders  of  the  Arab  States.  By  1964  Yasser 
Arafat  had  established  a  small  guerrilla  organisation,  which  was  granted  a  secure  base 
by  Syria's  radical  Baathist  regime.  Fatah's  philosophy  from  the  outset  was  to  mobilise 
popular  Arab  support  behind  guerrilla  operations  of  increasing  scale  and  intensity 
conducted  against  Israel.  Prior  to  the  1967  war  Hirst  (1977)  alleges  that  Egypt,  Jordan 
and  Lebanon  had  all  tried  to  prevent  guerrilla  incursions  into  Israel,  but  that  after  the 
war  this  became  more  difficult  as  popular  support  for  guerrilla  operations  increased. 
By  February  1968  Fatah  members  had  taken  control  of  the  National  Council  of  the 
PLO  and  Arafat  became  Chairman.  The  aftermath  of  the  war  also  saw  the  formation 
of  Dr  George  Habash's  PFLP  (Popular  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  Palestine)  began  to 
build  a  strong  base  of  support  in  the  refugee  camps  of  the  Gaza  Strip. 
In  March  1968  Israeli  forces  launched  an  attack  on  the  Karameh  refugee  camp 
in  Jordan.  Israel  claimed  the  attack  was  in  retaliation  for  attacks  7  which  had  killed  six 
people  and  wounded  44.  Fifteen  thousand  troops  backed  by  tanks  attacked  the  camp. 
Rather  than  retreat  to  the  hills  the  guerrilla  forces  stayed  and  fought  and  suffered  huge 
losses.  Half  the  Palestinian  guerrillas,  150  in  all  were  killed,  together  with  128 
members  of  the  Jordanian  army  and  29  Israeli  soldiers  (Hirst,  1977).  Although  the 
guerrillas  had  lost  many  fighters  it  was  considered  a  significant  victory  because  the 
Israelis  had  suffered  unusually  high  casualties  and  met  fierce  resistance.  The  battle  of 
Karameh  led  to  an  influx  of  volunteers  from  across  the  Arab  world  to  join  the 
guerrilla  movements.  In  the  years  after  1967,  as  well  as  engaging  in  a  guerrilla  war, 
the  Palestinians  began  to  formulate  a  vision  of  what  a  future  Palestinian  entity  would 
look  like.  The  result  of  this  was  the  vision  of  the  'Democratic  State  of  Palestine'.  The 
brainchild  of  the  PLO  planner  and  negotiator  Nabil  Shaath,  the  Democratic  State  of 
85 Palestine  would  involve  the  dismantling  of  the  Israeli  state  and  its  replacement  with  a 
non-sectarian  binational  Palestine  in  which  Christian,  Moslem  and  Jew  would  live 
together  in  equality.  (Hirst,  1977)  The  new  entity  would  it  was  claimed  include  the 
Jews  already  residing  there  and  the  Palestinians  who  had  been  displaced  in  1948  and 
1967.  These  proposals  were  not  immediately  or  universally  accepted  by  Palestinians. 
Hirst  (1977)  suggests  that  some  saw  them  as  capitulation  to  the  enemy  or  at  best 
premature  considering  that  Israel  was  still  militarily  dominant.  Others  feared  that  the 
more  technologically  advanced  Jews  would  dominate  them,  whilst  some  considered  it 
a  tactical  propaganda  move  aimed  at  international  opinion.  The  concept  was  a 
complete  non-starter  for  almost  all  Israelis.  Israel  had  been  constructed  out  of 
Palestine  with  huge  military  and  diplomatic  effort  as  a  state  for  the  Jewish  people  and 
there  was  no  desire  to  dilute  its  Jewish  character.  Furthermore  Israelis  were  fearful  of 
the  extreme  anti-Jewish  rhetoric  emanating  from  its  Arab  neighbours  and  worried  that 
any  returning  refugees  might  want  to  take  revenge  for  being  displaced  from  their 
lands. 
In  the  two  years  after  the  1967  war  the  forces  of  Fatah  and  the  other  guerrilla 
movements  had  gone  from  300  to  more  than  30,000  and  substantial  funding  was 
coming  in  from  the  Arab  world.  The  number  of  operations  also  increased 
dramatically.  Fatah  records  claim  that  98  per  cent  of  these  occurred  outside  the  State 
of  Israel  with  two  thirds  of  them  occurring  in  the  West  Bank.  Fatah  regularly  insisted 
that  the  army  and  'Zionist  institutions'  were  its  real  targets,  not  civilians  especially 
women  and  children,  and  if  these  were  attacked  it  was  in  response  to  attacks  on 
Palestinian  civilians,  and  was  selectively  done.  However  Hirst  (1977)  points  out  that 
although  the  'great  bulk'  of  attacks  were  aimed  at  military  targets,  civilians  were 
unquestionably  targeted.  Bombs  were  planted  in  supermarkets  in  Jerusalem  and  bus 
stops  in  Tel  Aviv  and  rockets  were  fired  on  settlements  in  Kiryat  Shmoneh  and  Eilat. 
Whilst  Fatah  confined  its  actions  to  historic  Palestine,  the  PFLP  did  not.  It  attacked 
targets  all  over  the  world.  It  hijacked  foreign  airliners.  It  firebombed  branches  of 
Marks  and  Spencers  because  of  their  fandraising  for  Israel.  It  blew  up  an  Arab  oil 
pipeline  because  the  extraction  was  by  an  American  oil  company  on  behalf  of  a 
'feudal'  Arab  monarchy.  The  main  purpose  of  these  actions  George  Habash 
maintained,  was  publicity: 
86 When  we  hijack  a  plane  it  had  more  effect  than  if  we  killed  a  hundred  Israelis 
in  battle.  For  decades  world  public  opinion  has  been  neither  for  nor  against  the 
Palestinians.  It  simply  ignored  us.  At  least  the  world  is  talking  about  us  now 
(Der  Stern,  19  September  1970,  cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  304) 
However  the  opposition  movements  were  to  suffer  a  major  blow  in  1970.  The 
PLO  had  formed  a  state-within-a-state  in  Jordan,  openly  threatening  the  rule  of  the 
Hashemite  monarchy.  Following  an  assassination  attempt  on  King  Hussein  and  a 
series  of  hijackings  carried  out  by  the  PFLP,  the  King  set  his  army  upon  the  guerrillas. 
In  ten  days  of  bloody  struggle  thousands  of  guerrillas  were  killed,  and  within  a  year 
most  of  the  fighters  and  political  elements  of  the  Palestinian  movement  were  expelled 
and  ended  up  in  Lebanon.  'Black  September'  as  it  became  known  amongst 
Palestinians  produced  an  organisation  bearing  the  same  name.  Its  most  well  known 
operation  was  the  taking  of  Israeli  athletes  as  hostages  at  the  1972  Munich  Olympics. 
Eight  black  September  members  took  eleven  Israeli  athletes  hostage  at  the  Olympic 
village  in  Munich  demanding  the  release  of  200  Palestinians  imprisoned  in  Israel.  In 
the  German  rescue  operation  four  of  the  Palestinian  hijackers  and  all  eleven  Israeli 
hostages  were  killed.  Three  days  later  Israel  launched  attacks  on  Syria  and  Lebanon. 
There  were  reports  that  up  to  500  people,  mostly  civilians,  were  killed  in  nine  separate 
simultaneous  Israeli  air  attacks  (Al-Nahar  Arab  Report,  18  September  1972,  cited  in 
Hirst,  1977:  251) 
The  Phantoms  and  Skyhawks  swooped  on  the  suburban  Damascus  resort  of  al- 
Hama;  the  bombs  fell  indiscriminately  on  Palestinians  in  their  hillside 
dwellings  and  on  Syrians,  in  their  cars  or  strolling  by  the  river  Barada  on  their 
weekend  outing.  Survivors  recounted  how  they  were  machine-gunned  as  they 
ran  for  cover  (Hirst,  1977:  25  1) 
In  1973  there  were  further  hijackings  by  Arab  groups.  In  that  year  Israel  had 
also  shot  down  a  Libyan  airliner  which  had  strayed  over  the  occupied  Sinai  peninsula, 
killing  all  106  passengers.  Later,  Black  September  militants  took  over  the  Saudi 
Embassy  in  the  Sudanese  capital  demanding  the  release  of  Palestinian  militants  held 
in  Jordanian  jails.  The  authorities  refused  and  a  Jordanian  together  with  an  American 
and  a  Belgian  diplomat  were  killed.  There  followed,  in  quick  succession,  hijackings 
87 of  Japanese,  American,  and  Dutch  airliners.  The  worst  loss  of  life  occurred  at  Rome 
airport  in  December  1973  when  Palestinian  militants  killed  34,  mainly  American, 
civilians.  Eleven  months  later  a  British  Airways  VC  10  was  hijacked  by  the  Martyr 
Abu  Mahmud  Group,  who  called  on  the  British  Government  to  'declare  its 
responsibility  for  the  greatest  crime  in  history,  which  was  the  establishment  of  the 
Zionist  entity,  and  foreswear  the  accursed  Balfour  Declaration,  which  brought 
tragedies  and  calamities  to  our  region'  (cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  321-2).  In  the  wake  of 
this  hijacking  Yasser  Arafat,  very  publicly  attempted  to  rein  in  the  militants  by 
arresting  a  number  and  amending  the  PLO  criminal  code  to  make  hijacking  that 
resulted  in  loss  of  life  a  capital  offence. 
The  early  1970s  had  also  seen  the  PLO  begin  to  make  diplomatic  headway  at 
the  United  Nations  in  its  quest  for  institutional  legitimacy  and  support  for  Palestinian 
nationalism.  In  1970  a  General  Assembly  resolution  was  passed  recognising  the  need 
for  Palestinian  self-determination.  General  Assembly  resolution  2649  'condemn[ed]s 
those  Governments  that  deny  the  right  to  self-determination  of  Peoples  recognised  as 
being  entitled  to  it,  especially  of  the  peoples  of  southern  Africa  and  Palestine'  In  1974 
UN  resolution  3246  was  passed  which  again  stressed  the  need  for  Palestinian  self- 
determination  but  also  added  as  a  corollary  that  it  was  legitimate  to  'struggle  for 
liberation  from  colonial  and  foreign  domination  and  alien  subjugation  by  all  available 
means,  including  armed  struggle'.  In  November  1974  the  UN  adopted  resolution  3236 
which  for  established  UN  support  for  the  creation  of  a  Palestinian  state:  'The  General 
Assembly....  reaffirms  the  inalienable  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  in  Palestine, 
including  (a)  the  right  to  self-determination  without  external  interference  (b)  the  right 
to  national  independence  and  sovereignty'. 
Many  Israelis  especially  on  the  right  disputed  the  whole  notion  of  Palestinian 
nationalism  arguing  that  it  was  a  post  1967  invention  created  by  the  Arab  states  in 
order  to  wage  a  surrogate  war  against  Israel.  In  1969  the  Israeli  prime  minister  Golda 
Meir  stated  that  'It  was  not  as  though  there  was  a  Palestinian  people  in  Palestine 
considering  itself  as  a  Palestinian  people  and  we  came  and  threw  them  out  and  took 
their  country  away  from  them.  They  did  not  exist'  (Sunday  Times,  15  June  1969,  cited 
in  Shlaim,  2000:  311).  Similarly  Netanyahu  has  argued  that  both  Palestinian 
Nationalism  and  Palestinian  refugees  are  post-  1967  fabrications: 
88 Indeed,  most  Palestinian  Arabs  have  homes.  Many  of  them,  in  fact,  live  as  full 
citizens  in  Eastern  Palestine-today  called  the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan. 
Similarly,  most  of  the  Arabs  of  Judea-Samaria  are  not  homeless  refugees;  they 
live  in  the  same  homes  they  occupied  before  the  establishment  of  Israel.  The 
number  of  actual  refugees  is  close  to  nil  (2000:  156-8) 
This  is  disputed  by  multilateral  bodies  such  as  the  United  Nations,  who  have 
explicitly  recognised  in  many  resolutions  the  existence  of  a  distinct  Palestinian 
people,  their  rights  to  national  self-determination,  and  the  existence  of  over  three  and 
a  half  million  refugees. 
1973  The  October  War 
The  War  of  Attrition  had  failed  to  secure  the  return  of  the  occupied  Sinai  for  Egypt 
but  had  instead  left  many  of  the  Suez  coastal  cities  devastated  by  Israeli  raids.  Shlaim 
claims  that  in  the  early  1970s  Egypt  made  numerous  attempts  to  regain  the  occupied 
Sinai  through  diplomacy  but  her  peace  overtures  were  rejected  by  Israel.  29  Shlaim 
suggests  Israel's  'diplomacy  of  attrition'  together  with  its  openly  annexation  plans  for 
the  Sinai  left  Sadat  with  no  diplomatic  option  and  made  war  inevitable. 
On  6  October  1973  Egyptian  and  Syrian  forces  attacked  Israeli  troop  concentrations  in 
the  occupied  Sinai  Peninsula  and  Golan  Heights.  The  Arab  armies  achieve  early 
successes  with  the  Egyptian  army  crossing  the  Suez  Canal  and  advancing  into  the 
Sinai,  and  the  Syrian  army  forcing  back  the  Israelis  on  the  Golan  Heights.  Eventually 
the  Israeli  army  turned  the  tables  and  regained  the  territorial  losses  it  initially 
sustained.  The  war  cost  the  lives  of  2,832  Jews  and  8,528  Arabs  (Shlaim,  2000)  There 
have  been  suggestions  that  the  conflict  nearly  precipitated  both  a  nuclear  exchange 
between  the  superpowers  and  an  Israeli  nuclear  strike  on  Egypt.  30 
The  nature  of  the  attack  and  the  motivations  of  Syria  and  Egypt  are  contested. 
Netanyahu  argues  that  the  Arab  forces  had  'enormous  advantages'  over  the  Israelis, 
and  the  Israeli  army  had  fought  a  'pulverizing  battle  to  keep  the  front  from  collapsing 
in  the  face  of  overwhelming  numbers'  (2000:  282).  He  claims  that  'Israel's  army  was 
able,  albeit  by  a  hair's  breadth,  to  prevent  defeat  in  the  face  of  a  surprise  attack'  and 
that  having  'so  little  to  show  for  an  onslaught  stacked  so  decisively  in  their  favour' 
89 was  what  brought  Sadat  to  negotiating  table  to  sign  a  peace  treaty  with  Israel  at  Camp 
David  in  1979  (2000:  282).  In  contrast,  Shlaim  suggests  that  the  Egyptian/Syrian 
attack  was  a  limited  venture  designed  to  bring  Israel  to  the  negotiating  table  and  force 
a  political  settlement  in  which  the  lands  captured  in  1967  would  be  returned.  In  an 
exact  reversal  of  Netanyahu's  thesis,  Finkelstein  (1999)  argues  that  it  was  Israel  who 
finally  agreed  to  come  to  the  negotiating  table  at  Camp  David  after  Egypt  and  Syria 
demonstrated  that  they  possessed  a  'military  option'. 
Following  the  Yom  Kippur  war  the  Arab  world  led  by  Saudi  Arabia  instituted 
an  oil  embargo  on  the  West  leading  to  a  sharp  rise  in  oil  prices,  which  it  is  argued 
precipitated  a  major  global  recession.  This  again  had  the  effect  of  focusing 
international  attention  on  the  need  to  resolve  the  conflict,  or  at  least  to  neutralise  some 
of  its  more  dangerous  elements. 
Conflict  in  Lebanon 
Having  been  forced  out  of  Jordan  in  1970,  the  PLO  relocated  to  Lebanon  from  where 
it  fought  a  guerrilla  war  against  the  Israeli  state,  attacking  both  military  and  civilian 
targets.  Sachar  (1977)  lists  numerous  deadly  attacks  by  Palestinian  infiltrators  on 
Israelis  and  argues  that  during  the  mid  1970s  the  'violence  continued  almost  without 
respite'  (1977:  8  10).  Netanyahu  notes  that  the  PLO  were  using  Lebanon  as  a  base 
from  which  to  fire  Katyusha  missiles  across  the  border  into  Israel,  which  he  maintains 
had  a  very  damaging  effect  on  the  lives  of  those  in  Israel's  northern  settlements: 
The  PLO  used  the  territory  of  its  de  facto  state  to  shell  Israeli  cities  and  towns. 
For  years,  the  entire  population  of  the  northern  border  towns  and  villages  were 
regularly  driven  into  underground  bomb  shelters  by  barrages  of  PLO  launched 
Katyusha  missiles,  the  little  brothers  of  the  Scud  missiles  that  Iraq  launched 
against  Israel  in  1991.  By  1982,  the  population  levels  Kiryat  Shemona  and 
Nahariya  had  fallen  ominously;  factories,  schools  and  beaches  were  being 
closed  repeatedly  to  avoid  mass  casualties  during  the  shellings;  and  fear  of 
economic  ruin  and  depopulation  had  spread.  (2000:  218-19) 
90 During  this  period  Israel  bombed  PLO  positions,  Lebanese  villages  and 
Palestinian  refugee  camps.  The  Israeli  military  analyst  Ze'ev  Schiff  justified  attacks 
on  civilians  on  the  basis  that  guerrillas  used  the  villages  and  refugee  camps  for 
shelter: 
In  south  Lebanon  we  struck  the  civilian  population  consciously  because  they 
deserved  it 
...  the  importance  of  [Mordechai]  Gur's  [Israeli  chief  of  staffl 
remarks  is  the  admission  that  the  Israeli  army  has  always  struck  civilian 
populations,  purposely  and  consciously  ...  the  army,  he  said,  has  never 
distinguished  civilian  [from  military]  targets..  [but]  purposely  attacked  civilian 
targets  even  when  Israeli  settlements  had  not  been  struck  (Haaretz,  15  May 
1978,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  181) 
The  Israeli  Foreign  Minister  Abba  Eban  argued  that  'there  was  a  rational 
prospect  ultimately  fulfilled  that  affected  populations  would  exert  pressure  for  the 
cessation  of  hostilities'  (Jerusalem  Post,  16  August  198  1,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999: 
182)  The  Lebanese  villagers  though  were  unarmed  and  could  do  little  to  stop  the 
armed  guerrillas,  and  the  Lebanese  army  was  too  weak  to  remove  the  Palestinians, 
who  had  virtually  formed  a  state-within-a-state.  Official  government  casualty 
statistics  suggest  that  the  scale  of  Israeli  raids  was  disproportionate  to  the  Palestinian 
attacks.  The  Israeli  authorities  estimated  that  106  Israeli  civilians  were  killed  in 
attacks  by  Palestinian  guerrillas  on  Israel's  northern  border  in  the  period  between 
1967  and  the  1982  Israeli  invasion,  at  a  rate  of  approximately  seven  a  year  (Haaretz, 
22  June  1982,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  74).  The  American  j  ournalist  Judith  Coburn 
reported  that  diplomats  in  Beirut  and  UN  officials  estimated  3500  Lebanese  citizens 
killed  between  1967  and  1975  and  at  least  twice  as  many  Palestinian  civilians,  giving 
a  rate  of  more  than  a  thousand  per  year.  Touring  Southern  Lebanon  in  the  mid  1970s 
Coburn  found  many  villages  'attacked  almost  daily  in  recent  months  ... 
by  airplane, 
artillery,  tanks  and  gunboats'  with  the  Israelis  employing  'shells,  bombs, 
phosphorous,  incendiary  bombs,  CBUs  [cluster  bombs]  and  napalm'  against  Lebanese 
villages  and  refugee  camps  as  part  of  what  she  claimed  was  a  'scorched  earth'  policy 
to  remove  the  population  and  create  a  de-militarised  zone.  (New  Times,  7  March  1975, 
cited  in  Chomsky,  1977:  190).  By  1977  it  was  estimated  that  300,000  Lebanese 
91 Muslims  had  been  turned  into  refugees  by  the  Israeli  attacks  (New  York  Times,  2 
October  1977,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  191) 
The  PLO  continued  its  diplomatic  offensive  at  the  United  Nations.  In 
November  1974,  the  United  Nations  officially  granted  the  PLO  observer  status  and 
later  that  month  Yasser  Arafat  addressed  the  UN  General  Assembly  for  the  first  time, 
giving  his  'gun  and  olive  branch'  address.  The  leadership  of  the  PLO  argued  for  the 
ending  of  the  armed  struggle,  in  return  for  the  creation  of  a  mini  Palestinian  state  in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  and  a  settlement  of  the  refugee  issue.  This  move  was 
not  accepted  by  all  factions  within  the  organisation,  the  PFLP  leading  the  rejectionist 
wing  which  was  against  the  concept  of  the  mini-state  and  recognising  the  legitimacy 
of  the  Israeli  state.  These  moves  did  not  impress  the  Israelis.  Israel's  Foreign  Minister 
claimed  that  'the  voice  of  Arafat  was,  and  remains  the  voice  of  indiscriminate  terror, 
the  voice  of  the  gun,  with  nothing  in  it  of  the  olive  branch  of  peace'  (cited  in  Hirst, 
1977:  335).  The  call  for  the  creation  of  a  Palestinian  mini  state  between  Israel  and 
Jordan  was  similarly  dismissed  as  a  platform  from  which  the  PLO  would  attempt  to 
destroy  Israel.  The  Israeli  daily  Yediot  Aharonot  argued  that  'no  reasonable 
person  ...  can  ask  us  to  hand  over  these  regions  to  the  PLO,  unless  it  expects  Israel  to 
commit  suicide'  (14  November  1974,  cited  in  Hirst,  1977:  336) 
In  the  mid  1970s  both  sides  as  well  as  Syria  became  involved  in  the  Lebanese 
civil  war.  The  relative  stability  which  had  prevailed  in  the  country  after  the  1943 
power  sharing  National  Pact  broke  down  in  the  mid  1970s,  culminating  in  the  all  out 
civil  war  of  1975-6.  To  simplify  greatly,  the  conflict  concerned  two  rival  groupings, 
the  right-wing  Christian-Maronite-Phalangist  alliance  backed  by  Israel,  which  was 
economically  dominant  in  the  country,  and  the  predominately  poor  majority  leftist 
Muslim-Lebanese-Palestinian  grouping.  In  mid  1976  with  the  leftist  Muslim  coalition 
gaining  the  upper  hand  in  the  conflict,  the  Syrians  intervened  on  the  side  of  the 
Christians  occupying  most  of  Lebanon  apart  from  a  southern  strip  bordering  Israel. 
The  intervention  of  the  Syrian  army  at  the  behest  of  the  Christians  (and  with  the  tacit 
support  of  Israel)  brought  a  truce  and  relative  calm  to  all  but  Southern  Lebanon.  The 
18  months  of  civil  war  had  devastated  Beirut,  which  became  partitioned,  and  killed 
tens  of  thousands  of  Palestinians  and  Lebanese.  In  April  1976  Israel  and  Syria  reached 
a  secret  agreement  with  American  mediation,  splitting  the  area  into  'spheres  of 
influence'.  Syria  agreed  to  keep  its  troops  north  of  the  Litani  River  and  not  to  install 
surface  to  air  missiles  there,  recognising  Southern  Lebanon  as  Israel's  security  buffer. 
92 In  the  mid  1970s  Israel  began  supplying  the  two  major  Christian  Maronite 
militias,  the  Phlangists  and  Chamouns  with  weapons.  Jonathan  Randal  (1983),  the 
former  senior  foreign  correspondent  of  the  Washington  Post  suggests  was 
strategically  useful  for  Israel  because  it  tied  down  two  of  Israel's  enemies,  the  Syrians 
and  Palestinians,  both  of  whom  had  come  into  conflict  with  the  Christians  by  1977. 
Israel  was  also  backing  General  Haddad's  South  Lebanon  Army  which  was  acting  as 
its  proxy  force  in  South  Lebanon.  Randal  (1983)  notes  that  this  was  controversial 
because  Haddad's  forces  had  been  involved  in  serious  abuses  including  many 
instances  of  large  scale  killings  of  civilians  and  involvement  in  the  unlawful  deaths  of 
UN  personnel.  In  1978  Israel  mounted  a  large  scale  invasion  of  Southern  Lebanon 
claiming  that  it  was  in  response  to  a  Palestinian  attack  in  Israel  which  had  left  37 
Israelis  and  nine  Palestinians  dead.  The  scale  and  effects  of  the  invasion  are  disputed. 
Gilbert  claims  that  'several  dozen  PLO  soldiers  were  killed  or  captured'  and  'all  PLO 
installations  were  systematically  destroyed'  (1999:  490).  Randal  claims  it  was 
civilians  rather  than  guerrillas  who  bore  the  brunt  of  the  attack: 
The  destruction  was  a  scale  well  known  in  Vietnam.  Aping  the  prodigal  use  of 
American  firepower  in  Indochina,  the  Israelis  sought  to  keep  their  own 
casualties  to  a  minimum-  and  succeeded.  But  they  failed  to  wipe  out  the 
Palestinian  commandoes,  who  had  plenty  of  time  to  scamper  to  safety  north  of 
the  Litani  River.  Piling  mattresses,  clothes  and  families  in  taxis  and 
overloaded  pickup  trucks,  more  than  two  hundred  thousand  Lebanese  also  fled 
north  out  of  harm's  way.  They  became  exiles  in  their  own  country,  squatters 
seizing  unoccupied  apartments,  the  source  of  yet  more  tension  in  West  Beirut. 
The  Israelis  did  succeed  in  massive  killing:  almost  all  the  victims  were 
Lebanese  civilians-some  one  thousand  according  to  the  International 
Committee  of  the  Red  Cross.  More  than  six  thousand  homes  were  badly 
damaged  or  destroyed.  Half  a  dozen  villages  were  all  but  levelled  in  a  frenzy 
of  violence  in  which  Israeli  troops  committed  atrocities  (1983:  209) 
After  three  months  under  pressure  from  the  United  Nations,  who  condemned 
the  attack,  the  IDF  withdrew  from  southern  Lebanon  replaced  by  a  United  Nations 
force.  Most  of  the  positions  abandoned  by  the  IDF  were  taken  by  the  SLA.  In  January 
1979  Ezer  Weizman,  the  Israeli  Defence  Secretary  announced  a  controversial  pre- 
93 emptive  policy  against  Palestinian  guerrillas  in  Southern  Lebanon.  He  declared  that 
Israel  would  not  only  strike  in  retaliation  but  'at  any  time  and  any  place  that  Israel 
deemed  desirable'  (cited  in  Randal,  1983:  220).  In  1981  hostilities  escalated  in 
Lebanon.  On  July  17  Israel  launched  a  major  bombing  raid  on  Southern  Lebanon 
hitting  refugee  camps,  ports,  Lebanon's  main  oil  refinery  and  all  but  one  of  the 
bridges  over  the  Litani  and  Zahrani  rivers  (Randal,  1983).  The  Israelis  claimed  that 
the  raids  were  necessary  to  deal  with  a  PLO  arms  build-up  in  Southern  Lebanon.  The 
Palestinians  held  fire  for  three  days  and  then  began  shelling  and  rocketing  Northern 
Israel.  On  July  17  Israel  bombed  the  Fakhani  district  in  West  Beirut,  home  to  the  PLO 
offices.  More  than  one  hundred  and  twenty  Palestinian  and  Lebanese  civilians  were 
killed  leading  to  international  condemnation  of  the  raid.  The  Palestinians  then 
launched  artillery  attacks  on  twenty  eight  Israeli  towns  and  settlements  damaging 
crops  and  orchards,  whilst  tens  of  thousands  of  Israelis  were  temporarily  forced  to  flee 
their  homes  in  northern  Israel  (Randal,  1983).  In  the  wake  of  this  exchange  both  sides 
agreed  to  an  American  brokered  ceasefire. 
Diplomacy  and  the  Camp  David  Accords 
During  this  period  a  number  of  attempts  were  made  by  the  Palestinians  to  push  for  a 
peace  settlement.  Palestinian  representatives  put  forward  a  United  Nations  Security 
Council  resolution  in  January  1976  which  called  for  a  two  state  solution  on  the  1967 
borders  'with  appropriate  arrangements  ....  to  guarantee  ....  the  sovereignty,  territorial 
integrity  and  political  independence  of  all  states  in  the  area  and  their  right  to  live  in 
peace  within  secure  and  recognised  boundaries.  '  (UN  Security  Council  Resolution 
S/1  1940).  The  resolution  received  nine  votes  in  favour  including  France  and  the 
Soviet  Union  but  was  blocked  by  a  single  vote  against  from  the  United  States. 
Chomsky  (1999)  points  to  PLO  acceptance  of  the  Soviet-American  peace  plan  of 
October  1977,  the  Soviet  peace  plan  of  1981  and  the  Saudi  1982  peace  plan  as  well  as 
a  number  of  public  statements  by  PLO  representatives  in  the  late  1970s  that  the 
Palestinians  were  proposing  to  end  the  armed  struggle  in  exchange  for  the  creation  of 
a  mini-state  in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank 
.31 
He  notes  that  all  such  overtures  were 
rejected  by  Israel.  Some  Israelis  such  as  Benjamin  Netanyahu  have  dismissed  all 
Palestinian  peace  overtures  as  part  of  an  attempt  to  force  Israel  to  accept  a  PLO 
94 'Trojan  horse'  whose  purpose  is  to  destroy  the  Israeli  state.  He  argues  that  after  the 
1973  war  the  Palestinians  realised  they  couldn't  destroy  Israel  with  a  'frontal  military 
assault'  but  were  planning  'an  interim  phase  in  which  Israel  would  be  reduced  to 
dimensions  that  made  it  more  convenient  for  the  coup  de  grace'.  This  would  be 
achieved  in  two  phases  'first  create  a  Palestinian  state  on  any  territory  vacated  by 
Israel'  and  'second  mobilize  from  that  state  a  general  Arab  military  assault  to  destroy 
a  shrunken  and  indefensible  Israel'  (2000:  239).  Netanyahu  claims  that  the  Arabs 
have  been  deceiving  the  Western  nations  with  a  moderate  front: 
For  the  PLO  is  a  Pan-Arab  Trojan  Horse,  a  gift  that  the  Arabs  have  been  trying 
to  coax  the  Arabs  into  accepting  for  over  twenty  years,  so  that  the  West  in  turn 
can  force  Israel  to  let  it  in  at  the  gates.  The  Arabs  paint  their  gift  up  prettily 
with  legitimacy  with  the  pathos  of  its  plight,  with  expressions  for  the 
cherished  ideas  of  freedom,  justice,  and  peace.  Yet  no  matter  how  it  is  dressed 
up  to  conceal  the  fact,  the  ultimate  aim  of  the  gift  remains:  to  be  allowed 
within  Israel's  defensive  wall,  to  be  parked  on  the  hills  overlooking  Tel-Aviv, 
where  it  can  perfon-n  its  grisly  task.  Every  inch  of  Western  acceptance  -the 
cover  stories  the  banquets,  the  observer  status,  the  embassies,  and  any  territory 
the  PLO  has  been  able  to  get  its  hands  on-it  uses  to  push  ever  closer  to  its  goal. 
(2000:  256) 
In  March  1978,350  Israeli  reservists  sent  a  letter  to  Begin  which  accused  the 
government  of  preferring  to  build  settlements  and  create  a  'Greater  Israel'  rather  than 
make  peace  with  the  Arab  world.  This  was  partly  in  response  to  Prime  Minister 
Begin's  decision  to  support  the  creation  of  a  number  of  new  Gush  Emunim 
settlements  deep  in  the  occupied  territories.  The  letter  marked  the  creation  of  the 
Peace  Now  movement  which  in  September  1978  organised  a  mass  rally  of  100,000 
Israelis  in  Tel-Aviv,  the  largest  political  demonstration  in  the  state's  history.  The 
European  Economic  Community  also  pushed  for  a  solution  to  the  conflict  during 
1979.  Leaders  of  the  EEC  meeting  in  Venice  in  June  1979  issued  statements 
supportive  of  Palestinian  statehood,  and  the  president-elect  of  the  European 
Commission  Gaston  Thom  travelled  to  the  Middle  East  and  met  Yasser  Arafat.  The 
PLO  was  recognised  by  Ireland  and  Austria  and  Giscard  d'Estaing  recommended  the 
group  be  accepted  as  a  partner  in  peace  negotiations.  The  Europeans  also  attempted  to 
95 widen  242  to  include  Palestinian  self-determination.  Ovendale  (1999)  claims  that  the 
United  States  made  it  clear  that  it  would  veto  any  European  resolution  in  the  Security 
Council  which  supported  Palestinian  rights. 
In  March  1979  Israel  signed  a  peace  agreement  with  Egypt  in  Washington,  on 
terms  very  simi  ar  to  the  ones  rejected  by  Israel  in  1972.  The  progress  to  the  final 
settlement  had  been  long  and  tortuous  involving  diplomacy  stretching  over  several 
continents  and  many  years.  Israel  agreed  to  hand  back  the  Sinai  peninsula  in  exchange 
for  a  comprehensive  peace  treaty,  and  demilitarisation  of  most  of  the  Sinai.  Both 
parties  had  compromised.  Israelis  agreed  to  remove  the  settlements  and  airfields, 
Egypt  dropped  the  issue  of  Jerusalem,  and  the  two  sides  agreed  on  only  a  vague 
autonomy  plan  for  the  Palestinians  that  would  be  implemented  in  stages  over  a 
number  of  years.  The  two  signatories  took  a  great  deal  of  criticism  over  the 
conclusion  of  the  peace  treaty.  Begin  was  attacked  by  the  right  and  religious  parties 
for  returning  the  Sinai,  while  Sadat  was  criticised  for  breaking  with  Arab  unity,  by 
signing  a  peace  treaty  with  Israel  without  having  achieved  a  deal  on  Jerusalem, 
Palestinian  statehood  or  a  full  Israeli  withdrawal  from  Arab  territory.  Finkelstein 
(2001)  suggests  that  the  Israeli  government  agreed  to  peace  with  Egypt  because  it 
would  neutralise  the  most  powerful  Arab  military  force  threatening  it,  and 
subsequently  allow  it  to  break  the  nexus  of  the  Palestinian  national  movement  in 
Lebanon.  On  30  July  1980  the  Israeli  government  formally  annexed  all  of  Jerusalem, 
and  the  following  year  the  Golan  Heights  were  annexed  in  violation  of  the  Israel- 
Egypt  peace  agreement  and  resolution  242.  Both  annexations  drew  immediate 
condemnation  from  the  UN  Security  Council  (Resolutions  478  and  497)  who  declared 
the  annexations  illegal,  and  demanded  their  rescission.  The  plans  for  Palestinian 
autonomy  were  not  developed.  Shlaim  suggests  that  the  Begin  administration 
deliberately  sabotaged  the  autonomy  negotiations  and  expanded  expropriations  of 
Palestinian  land  and  settlement  building,  because  it  wanted  to  retain  control  over  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip: 
Begin  managed  the  autonomy  talks  in  such  a  way  that  nothing  could  possibly 
be  achieved.  The  first  sign  was  Begin's  appointment  of  Dr.  Yosef  Burg,  the 
minister  of  the  interior,  to  head  Israel's  six-man  negotiating  team.  Burg  was 
the  leader  of  the  National  Religious  Party,  which  saw  Israel's  right  to  Judea 
96 and  Samaria  as  embedded  in  Scripture  and  supported  the  settlement  activities 
of  Gush  Emunim.  (2000:  381-2) 
The  Invasion  of  Lebanon  1982 
On  6  June  1982  Israel  invaded  Lebanon  and  attacked  PLO  forces.  It  also  engaged  the 
Syrian  army  in  its  drive  towards  Beirut.  In  the  early  days  of  the  conflict  the  Economist 
correspondent  G.  H.  Jansen  reported  that  the  Israeli  policy  was  to  surround  towns  and 
cities  'so  swiftly  that  civilian  inhabitants  were  trapped  inside,  and  then  to  pound  them 
from  land,  sea  and  air.  After  a  couple  of  days  there  would  be  a  timid  probing  attack:  if 
there  was  resistance  the  pounding  would  resume'  (Middle  East  International,  2  July 
1982,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  219).  By  the  time  an  American  sponsored  cease-fire 
came  into  effect  on  11  June  the  Israeli  army  had  reached  the  southern  outskirts  of 
Beirut.  Shlaim  (2000)  suggests  that  Israel  was  expecting  their  Christian  allies  in 
Lebanon,  led  by  Bashir  Gemayel,  to  attack  the  PLO  forces  who  by  this  time,  were 
trapped  in  West  Beirut.  However  Gemayel  was  reluctant  to  take  on  the  Palestinians 
and  the  Israelis  did  not  want  to  get  involved  in  potentially  costly  street  fighting.  By  13 
June  the  Israelis  had  surrounded  Beirut  and  for  the  next  two  months  they  laid  siege  to 
the  city  and  bombarded  it  with  heavy  weaponry.  The  Israeli  commander  Ariel  Sharon 
who  led  the  Israeli  attack  claimed  that  'no  army  in  the  history  of  modem  warfare  ever 
took  such  pains  to  prevent  civilian  casualties  as  did  the  Israeli  Defence  Forces'  and 
that  the  'Jewish  doctrine"  of  tohar  haneshek  (purity  of  arms)  was  adhered  to 
4  scrupulously'  with  the  Israeli  army  'attacking  only  predetermined  PLO  Positions  and 
in  bombing  and  shelling  buildings  only  when  they  served  as  PLO  strongholds'  (New 
York  Times,  29  August  1982,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  243-4).  Gilbert  (1999)  also 
stressed  that  the  Israelis  concentrated  their  attacks  on  PLO  strongholds,  although  he 
notes  that  on  one  occasion  a  hospital  was  seriously  damaged.  Others  reports  from 
journalists  in  Beirut  suggested  that  the  Israeli  attacks  were  indiscriminate.  The 
Independent  journalist  Robert  Fisk  claimed  the  Israelis  were  employing  'time-on 
target  salvoes'  which  'laid  50  shells  at  a  time'  across  residential  areas  'slaughtering 
everyone  within  a  500  yard  radius  of  the  explosions'  (2001:  284).  He  also  claimed 
that  the  Israelis  used  cluster  bombs,  and  phosphorous  bombs,  which  were  designed  to 
create  fires  and  cause  untreatable  bums.  The  Israeli  daily  Ha'aretz  reported  that 
97 vacuum  bombs,  which  ignite  aviation  fuel  in  such  a  way  as  to  create  immense 
pressure  and  literally  implode  large  buildings,  were  also  dropped  on  residential  areas 
(I  I  August  1982).  A  Canadian  surgeon  Chris  Giannou  who  had  been  working  in  a 
Palestinian  hospital  testified  before  the  US  Congress  that  he  had  witnessed  the  'total, 
utter  devastation  of  residential  areas,  and  the  blind,  savage,  indiscriminate  destruction 
of  refugee  camps  by  simultaneous  shelling  and  carpet  bombing  from  aircraft, 
gunboats,  tanks  and  artillery'.  He  testified  that  cluster  bombs  and  phosphorous  bombs 
had  been  used  widely  in  residential  areas  and  that  he  had  seen  'savage  and 
indiscriminate  beatings'  of  prisoners,  which  were  sometimes  fatal  as  well  as  frequent 
use  of  torture.  32  The  bombing  intensified  during  July  and  August  and  Hirsh  Goodman 
reported  it  continued  even  after  an  agreement  in  principle  for  the  PLO  to  leave  had 
been  reached  (Jerusalem  Post,  I  October  1982,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  241).  In  July 
supplies  of  food,  water,  medicines  and  fuel  were  cut  to  the  city.  By  August  4  Elaine 
Carey  reported  that  eight  of  the  nine  orphanages  in  Beirut  had  been  destroyed  by 
cluster  and  phosphorous  bombs,  despite  clear  markings  and  Israeli  assurances  that 
they  would  be  spared  (Christian  Science  Monitor,  4  August  1982,  cited  in  Chomsky, 
1999:  225).  On  August  12  the  bombing  reached  a  peak.  The  American  journalist 
Charles  Powers  argued  that: 
To  many  the  siege  of  Beirut  seemed  gratuitous  brutality 
... 
The  arsenal  of 
weapons  unleashed  in  a  way  that  has  not  been  seen  since  the  Vietnam  war, 
clearly  horrified  those  who  saw  the  results  firsthand  and  through  film  and 
news  reports  at  a  distance.  The  use  of  cluster  bombs  and  white  phosphorous 
shells,  a  vicious  weapon  was  widespread  ... 
In  the  last  hours  of  the  last  air 
attack  on  Beirut,  Israeli  planes  carpet  bombed  Borg  el  Brajne  [a  refugee 
camp].  There  were  no  fighting  men  left  there  only  the  damaged  homes  of 
Palestinian  families,  who  once  again  would  have  to  leave  and  find  another 
place  to  live.  (Los  Angeles  Times,  29  August  1982,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999: 
242) 
Eventually  at  the  end  of  August  the  PLO  forces  were  evacuated  from  Beirut  to 
Tunis.  Outside  Beirut  there  were  reports  of  widespread  destruction  of  refugee  camps 
and  Lebanese  villages.  In  Sidon,  Fisk  claims  over  2000  Lebanese  civilians  were  killed 
in  air  attacks  he  describes  as  'the  most  ferocious  ever  delivered  upon  a  Lebanese  city' 
98 (2000:  204).  The  head  of  the  UN  refugee  agency  that  administered  the  camps  Olof 
Rydbeck  said  that  32  years  of  work  had  been  'wiped  out'  with  'practically  all  of  the 
schools,  clinics  and  installations  of  the  agency  in  ruins.  '(New  York  Times,  19  August 
1982,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  223).  The  scale  of  civilian  and  PLO  casualties  during 
the  war  are  contested.  Gilbert  (1999)  claims  that  460  Lebanese  civilians  and  6000 
PLO  fighters  were  killed.  The  Lebanese  police  estimated  19,085  killed  though  to 
August  with  6775  killed  in  Beirut,  84  per  cent  of  them  civilians  (Christian  Science 
Monitor,  21  December  1982,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  221).  The  United  Nations 
estimated  13,500  houses  severely  damaged  in  West  Beirut,  thousands  more  in  other 
parts  of  the  country,  not  taking  into  account  damage  to  the  refugee  camps  which  were 
towns  themselves  (Christian  Science  Monitor  18  November  1982,  cited  in  Chomsky, 
1999:  223).  There  were  also  reports  that  all  the  teenage  and  adult  Lebanese  and 
Palestinian  males,  were  taken  to  camps  where  they  were  humiliated  and  tortured.  33 
Chomsky  cites  testimony  from  the  IDF  Lieutenant  Colonel  Dov  Yirmiah  which 
appeared  in  the  Israeli  daily  Yediot  A  hronot  on  the  fate  of  Palestinian  and  Lebanese 
detainees: 
He  tells  story  after  story  of  prisoners  savagely  and  endlessly  beaten  in 
captivity,  of  torture  and  humiliation  of  prisoners,  and  of  the  many  who  died  of 
beatings  and  thirst  in  Israeli  prisons  or  concentration  camps  in  Lebanon 
.... 
The 
long  and  repeated  interrogations  were  accompanied  by  constant  beatings,  or 
attacks  by  dogs  on  leashes,  or  the  use  of  air  rifles  that  cause  intense  pain  but 
do  not  kill...  New  loads  of  clubs  had  to  be  brought  into  the  camps  to  replace 
those  broken  under  interrogation.  The  torturers  were  'experts  in  their  work,  ' 
the  prisoners  report,  and  knew  how  to  make  blows  most  painful,  including 
blows  to  the  genitals,  until  the  prisoners  confessed  that  they  were  'terrorists' 
(8  November  1982,  cited  in  1999:  240) 
Other  reports  in  the  Israeli  press  claimed  that  members  of  the  Israel's  proxy 
militia  the  South  Lebanon  Army  were  allowed  in  the  camps  to  torture  prisoners  and 
that  some  gang  raped  women  and  attempted  to  force  them  to  have  sex  with  dogs 
(Koteret  Rashit,  16  March  1983,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  236).  After  the  PLO  had 
agreed  to  leave  Lebanon  one  of  the  war's  most  notorious  incidents  occurred  at  the 
refugee  camps  at  Shatila  and  Sabra.  After  the  departure  of  the  PLO  from  Lebanon,  the 
99 Israeli  forces  sealed  off  the  Sabra  and  Shatila  refugee  camps  on  September  16  and 
allowed  in  between  100  and  130  Phalangist  and  Haddadist  troops.  Ariel  Sharon 
claimed  that  the  camps  contained  2,000  well  armed  Palestinian  fighters  and  the 
Christian  forces  had  been  sent  in  to  clear  them  out.  However  Edward  Walsh  argues 
that  'no  one  has  publicly  explained  how  the  Israelis  expected  100  to  130  Phalangists 
to  defeat  such  a  force  of  Palestinians'  (Washington  Post  26  December  1982,  cited  in 
Chomsky,  1999:  369),  and  in  a  visit  to  the  camp  a  few  days  before  the  killings 
journalists  reported  finding  no  military  presence  (Time,  4  October  1982,  cited  in 
Chomsky,  1999:  369).  Once  in  the  camps  the  Phalangist  forces  raped  and  killed  many 
of  the  camps  inhabitants  who  were  primarily  women,  children  and  the  elderly.  The 
death  toll  is  disputed.  The  official  Israeli  Kahan  Commission  estimated  7-800  killed, 
the  Lebanese  authorities  pit  the  figure  at  approximately  2,000,  whilst  the  Israeli 
j  ournalist  Amnon  Kapeliouk  (1984)  citing  evidence  from  the  International  Committee 
of  the  Red  Cross  estimated  3-3,500.  Responsibility  for  the  killings  have  also  been 
partly  attributed  to  the  United  States  who  gave  explicit  assurances  that  the  Muslim 
civilian  population  of  West  Beirut  would  be  protected  as  part  of  the  PLO  deal  to 
evacuate  Beirut  (Ovendale,  1999).  The  massacres  were  condemned  by  the  United 
Nations  by  147  votes  to  two  (Israel,  United  States),  and  international  lawyers  in 
Belgium  have  since  attempted  to  indict  the  Israel  commanders  Ariel  Sharon  and 
Amos  Yaron  for  war  crimes. 
The  Lebanon  war  appeared  to  split  Israeli  society.  Some  questioned  whether 
the  scale  of  death  and  destruction  inflicted  on  Southern  Lebanon  was  proportionate  to 
the  threat  posed  by  Palestinian  militants.  In  1983  a  debate  on  Zionism  was  held  at  Tel- 
Aviv  University  where  Aluf  Hareven  of  the  Van  Leer  Institute  commented: 
According  to  the  figures  provided  by  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  Yosef  Burg, 
in  1980,10  Jews  were  killed  by  terrorists  and  in  1981-  8.  In  contrast  we  have 
killed  about  a  thousand  terrorists  in  1982,  and  caused  the  loss  of  life  of 
thousands  of  inhabitants  of  an  enemy  country.  If  so,  it  results  that  for  every  6- 
8  Jews  sacrificed,  we  kill  in  return  thousands  of  Gentiles.  This  is  undoubtedly, 
a  spectacular  situation,  an  uncommon  success  of  Zionism.  I  might  even  dare  to 
say-exaggerated.  (Migvan,  OctoberNovember  1982,  cited  in  Chomsky  1999: 
74) 
100 The  massacres  at  Sabra  and  Shatila  also  led  to  the  largest  protests  in  Israel's 
history.  On  the  September  25  1982  more  than  400,000  Israelis  joined  a  Peace  Now 
demonstration  in  Tel-Aviv.  Others  suggested  that  a  large  part  of  the  population  was 
unconcerned  if  not  approving  of  the  events  at  the  refugee  camps: 
In  the  matter  of  Sabra  and  Shatila-  a  large  part  of  the  community,  perhaps  the 
majority,  is  not  at  all  troubled  by  the  massacre  itself.  Killing  of  Arabs  in 
general,  and  Palestinians  in  particular,  is  quite  popular,  or  at  least  'doesn't 
bother  anyone'  in  the  words  of  youth  these  days.  Ever  since  the  massacre  I 
have  been  surprised  to  hear  from  educated,  enlightened  people,  'the 
conscience  of  Tel  Aviv',  the  view  that  the  massacre  itself,  as  a  step  towards 
removing  the  remaining  Palestinians  from  Lebanon  is  not  terrible.  It  is  just  too 
bad  that  we  were  in  the  neighbourhood  (Haaretz,  19  November  1982,  cited  in 
Chomsky,  1999:  395) 
Israel's  motives  for  launching  the  attack  are  contested.  Mitchell  Bard  (2003), 
the  director  of  the  American-Israeli  Cooperative  Institute,  points  to  three  reasons  for 
Israel's  decision  to  attack  Lebanon.  Firstly  he  claims  that  the  PLO  were  repeatedly 
breaching  the  ceasefire  negotiated  by  the  Americans  in  July  1981  and  attacking 
Israelis  across  the  Lebanese  border.  Secondly  he  alleges  that  15-18,000  PLO  members 
were  encamped  in  Southern  Lebanon  and  were  equipping  themselves  with  a  huge 
arsenal  including  rockets,  surface  to  air  missiles,  mortars,  tanks  and  enough  weapons 
to  arm  five  brigades.  He  suggests  that  Israeli  strikes  and  commando  raids  could  not 
prevent  the  emergence  of  this  'PLO  army'.  Finally  Bard  points  to  the  attempt  on  the 
life  of  the  Israeli  ambassador  to  London  Shlomo  Argov  by  the  Abu  Nidal  group.  All 
34 
of  these  explanations  have  been  disputed 
. 
Shlaim  suggests  that  Israel  had  two 
objectives,  to  create  a  new  political  order  in  Lebanon  and  to  'destroy  the  PLO's 
military  infrastructure  in  Lebanon  and  to  undermine  it  as  a  political  organisation' 
(2000:  396).  Former  IDF  education  officer  Mordechai  Bar-on  argued  that  'there  is  no 
doubt  that  the  [war's]  central  aim  was  to  deal  a  crushing  blow  to  the  national 
aspirations  of  the  Palestinians  and  to  their  very  existence  as  a  nation  endeavouring  to 
define  itself  and  gain  the  right  to  self-determination'  (New  Outlook,  October  1982, 
cited  in  Chomsky  1999:  203).  With  the  PLO  infrastructure  destroyed  and  the  refugees 
101 dispersed,  some  commentators  suggest  that  the  organisation  might  revert  to  hijacking 
and  therefore  undermine  its  growing  political  status: 
If  the  PLO  were  now  thrown  out  of  Lebanon-or,  better  yet,  reduced  to  mad 
dog  terrorism  that  would  destroy  its  growing  political  and  diplomatic 
legitimacy-then  Israel  stood  a  better  chance  of  annexing  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  strip  still  thoroughly  loyal  to  Arafat's  leadership  despite  his  many  errors. 
(Randal,  1983:  250) 
Shlaim  (2000)  suggests  that  another  aspect  of  Sharon's  'big  plan'  was  to  install 
Israel's  Christian  ally  Bashir  Gemayel  in  power  in  Lebanon,  and  force  the  Palestinian 
refugees  out  of  Lebanon  to  Jordan,  leading  to  the  overthrow  of  the  Hashemite 
monarchy  and  its  conversion  to  a  Palestinian  state,  thereby  weakening  international 
pressure  on  Israel  to  vacate  the  West  Bank  and  allowing  Israel  to  annex  the  territory. 
Neither  of  the  larger  geo-strategic  aims  were  achieved.  Bashir  Gemayel  was 
assassinated  shortly  after  the  war  whilst  the  Hashemite  monarchy  remained  intact  in 
Jordan. 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  Sabra  and  Shatila  killings,  American  marines  returned 
to  Lebanon  as  part  of  a  multinational  force.  They  however  soon  came  into  conflict 
with  Shia  and  Druze  forces  opposed  to  Israel's  occupation  of  Southern  Lebanon. 
When  US  warships  shelled  Druze  positions,  it  appeared  that  the  US  had  entered  the 
civil  war  in  support  of  the  Christian-Israeli  alliance.  On  23  October  a  suicide  bomber 
killed  256  American  and  58  French  troops  leading  to  the  withdrawal  of  American  and 
European  forces.  A  Shiite  group  with  links  to  Iran  later  claimed  responsibility  for  the 
attack.  Ovendale  (1999)  claims  that  after  the  1982  war  Israel  and  the  United  States 
strengthened  their  political  and  military  ties,  by  embarking  on  joint  weapons  projects. 
In  1986  the  Israeli  nuclear  technician  Mordechai  Vanunu  revealed  to  a  Sunday  Times 
interview  the  existence  of  Israel's  substantial  nuclear  arsenal,  revelations  which  were 
to  earn  the  Israeli  an  18  year  prison  term.  Recent  newspaper  reports  suggest  that  the 
Israeli  nuclear  arsenal  has  increased  to  approximately  200  warheads,  many  of  which 
are  fitted  to  American  supplied  Harpoon  cruise  missiles  capable  of  hitting  any  of 
Israel's  Arab  neighbours  (Observer,  October  12  2003). 
In  the  mid  1980s  further  attempts  were  also  made  to  find  a  negotiated  solution 
to  the  conflict.  In  February  1985  Yasser  Arafat  and  King  Hussein  of  Jordan  issued  the 
102 Amman  Declaration  which  proposed  Palestinian  self-determination  within  a 
Palestinian-Jordanian  confederation.  The  composition  of  the  negotiating  team  proved 
a  problem  with  Israel  refusing  to  negotiate  with  any  PLO  members.  Margaret 
Thatcher  attempted  to  push  the  plan  and  proposed  a  peace  conference  to  include  PLO 
members.  However  the  plans  were  derailed  by  a  series  of  events.  Firstly  Abu  Nidal, 
backed  by  Syria,  threatened  to  assassinate  any  PLO  members  who  accepted 
Thatcher's  invitation.  Then  on  25  September  1985  three  Israelis  were  killed  on  a  boat 
in  Larnaca.  The  Israeli  government  blamed  the  PLO.  The  PLO  claimed  the  three  were 
Mossad  agents.  Israel  then  dispatched  a  number  of  American  made  F-  16  fighters  to 
bomb  the  PLO  headquarters  in  Tunis.  In  the  attack,  58  Palestinians  and  15  Tunisians 
were  killed.  The  attack  was  supported  by  US  but  condemned  by  the  European 
Community  and  United  Nations.  Soon  afterwards  a  small  Palestinian  group,  the 
Palestine  Liberation  Front  hijacked  the  Achille  Lauro  and  killed  an  elderly  Jewish 
passenger  before  surrendering.  Following  the  hijacking  the  US  pressurised  Britain  to 
cancel  a  scheduled  meeting  between  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  PLO  members.  Britain 
then  insisted  that  the  PLO  members  sign  a  statement  denouncing  all  fon-ns  of  political 
violence.  The  PLO  members  refused,  arguing  that  this  would  cover  armed  resistance 
to  the  Israeli  occupation  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip,  and  the  meeting  was 
cancelled.  Soon  afterwards  King  Hussein  of  Jordan  announced  the  end  of  his 
collaboration  with  the  PLO  leadership  blaming  Arafat's  refusal  to  accept  resolutions 
242  and  338.  In  the  wake  of  this  rupture  between  the  PLO  and  Jordan,  King  Hussein 
and  Shimon  Peres  kept  close  diplomatic  links  and  considered  ways  of  restarting  peace 
talks  whilst  excluding  any  members  of  the  PLO  from  negotiations  (Shlaim,  2000). 
Israel's  pursuance  of  the  'Jordanian  option'  Shlaim  suggests  was  blocked  by  the 
Israeli  premier  Yitzak  Shamir  who  was  opposed  to  any  international  conference 
which  might  involve  pressure  from  outside  mediators. 
1987:  The  First  Intifada 
On  December  9  1987,  following  the  death  of  four  Gazans  the  previous  day,  in  a  road 
traffic  incident  Palestinians  from  the  Jebalya  refugee  camp  began  throwing  stones  at 
an  Israeli  army  compound.  Within  days  unrest  spread  to  the  West  Bank.  Unarmed 
Palestinian  men,  women,  and  children  attacked  Israeli  soldiers  and  armoured 
103 personnel  carriers.  Benny  Morris  claims  that  the  Intifada  was  'not  an  armed  rebellion 
but  a  massive,  persistent  campaign  of  civil  resistance,  with  strikes  and  commercial 
shutdowns  accompanied  by  violent  (though  unarmed)  demonstrations  against  the 
occupying  forces'  (1992:  561).  The  factors  behind  the  Intifada,  which  was  to  last  six 
years  until  it  was  called  off  by  the  Palestinian  leadership  in  the  wake  of  the  Oslo 
agreements,  are  contested.  Netanyahu  has  argued  that  the  Israeli  administration  in  the 
occupied  territories  had  instituted  a  'liberal  policy  aimed  at  radically  improving  the 
lives  of  the  Palestinians'  and  that  material  and  educational  prosperity  had  gone  hand 
in  hand  with  political  rights  including  'a  press  consisting  of  newspapers  representing 
various  factions  (some  openly  sympathetic  to  the  PLO)  and  the  right  to  directly  appeal 
all  decisions  to  the  democratic  court  system'  (2000:  176).  He  argues  that  the  impetus 
for  the  Intifada  was  'virulent  PLO  agitation'  that  led  the  population  in  the  occupied 
territories  to  adopt  'ever  more  extreme  and  implacable  positions'  (2000:  177).  He  also 
claims  that  the  PLO  had  forced  children  out  of  their  schools  to  take  part  in 
confrontations  with  Israeli  forces.  Gilbert  blames  Jordan  for  not  integrating  the 
Palestinians  living  in  the  West  Bank  into  Jordanian  society  before  1967,  and  argues 
that  the  impetus  for  the  Intifada  came  from  a  'bitter  hard  core  of  extremists  who  were 
prepared  to  face  Israeli  bullets  in  order  to  defy  the  occupiers  and  assert  their  national 
identity'  (1999:  525)  Some  Israelis  blamed  outside  agitation  for  the  Intifada.  Yitzak 
Rabin  accused  Iran  and  Syria  of  fermenting  unrest.  Others  have  questioned  whether 
Israeli  policy  in  the  occupied  territories  was  really  liberal  and  suggest  that  the  Intifada 
was  the  result  of  severe  and  persistent  human  rights  abuses.  A  report  by  the  Israeli 
Committee  for  Solidarity  with  Bir  Zeit  (the  West  Bank  University  periodically  closed 
by  the  Israeli  authorities)  described  the  Israeli  administration  in  the  occupied 
territories  as  an  'attempt  to  revive  an  old  well-known  colonial  method  in  a  new 
'original'  Israeli  form'  in  order  to  create  'an  Israeli  Bantustan,  which  imposes  on  the 
Palestinians  the  role  of  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water  for  Israeli  society'.  To 
achieve  this  the  report  claimed  that  there  was  widespread  and  violent  suppression  of 
all  forms  of  political  activity,  and  that  'quislings  from  the  Village  Leagues'  together 
with  settler  groups  inflicted  'humiliation,  harassment  and  terror'  on  the  local 
population.  35  The  United  Nations  also  produced  a  number  of  reports  in  the  mid  1980s 
which  were  critical  of  Israeli  human  rights  abuses  in  the  occupied  territories  and 
pointed  to  widespread  acts  of  violence  committed  against  Palestinians  by  armed 
104 settlers.  36  Israel  Shahak,  argues  that  such  abuses  were  the  main  factor  behind  the 
Intifada  and  cites  examples  from  the  Israeli  press: 
In  fact,  before  the  Intifada,  the  daily  oppression,  humiliations,  land 
confiscations  and  arbitrariness  of  the  Israeli  regime  were  steadily  increasing. 
This  increase,  duly  recorded  by  the  Hebrew  press,  was  the  chief  reason  for  the 
outbreak  of  the  Intifada.  Readers  of  Israel's  Hebrew-language  press  are  aware 
of  how  outrageously  the  Israeli  armed  forces  were  behaving  before  the 
Intifada.  On  June  19,1987,  Eyal  Ehrlich  reported  in  an  article  in  Haaretz 
headlined,  'An  occupier  against  his  will,  '  the  testimony  of  a  young  Israeli 
soldier  assigned  to  serve  in  the  border  guards.  Whenever  a  Palestinian  is 
accosted  to  show  his  I.  D.,  the  soldier  wrote,  its  checking  is  always 
accompanied  by  'a  slap,  a  punch.  a  kick.  '  'The  border  guards  usually  enjoy 
beating  the  Arabs,  '  the  account  continues.  They  derive  pleasure  from 
it 
...  Sometimes  I  feel  like  a  Nazi  when  I  watch  my  friends  in  action.  I  try  hard 
to  stay  away  from  one  of  my  commanders  ...  He  always  behaves  very  badly 
toward  the  locals:  with  violence,  beatings,  and  the  like 
...  The  soldiers  spit  in 
the  faces  of  the  Arabs,  or  they  kick  them  in  the  testicles.  And  there  is  always 
that  slap  in  the  face.  '  An  article  in  Hadashot  of  July  7,1987  by  Menahem 
Shizaf  was  headlined,  'Border  guards  order  the  Arabs  to  masturbate  and  to 
lick  the  floor.  '  It  described  the  treatment  meted  out  to  Palestinian  workers 
from  the  occupied  territories  who  were  found  spending  the  night  in  shacks  in 
Israel  rather  than  returning  to  their  homes.  (Washington  Report  on  Middle  East 
Affairs,  March  1991) 
The  Israeli  Minister  of  Defence  Yitzak  Rabin  explained  that  the  Israeli 
response  to  the  Intifada  would  consist  of  'force,  might,  beatings'  (New  York  Times,  23 
January  1988,  cited  in  the  New  York  Review  ofBooks,  17  March  1988),  whilst  Prime 
Minister  Shamir  was  reported  in  the  Israeli  publication  Hadashot  as  warning  those 
protesting  the  occupation  that  they  would  be  crushed  'like  grasshoppers'  with  their 
heads  'smashed  against  the  boulders  and  walls'  and  that  'we  say  to  them  from  the 
heights  of  this  mountain  and  from  the  perspective  of  thousands  of  years  of  history  that 
they  are  like  grasshoppers  compared  to  us'  (6  January  1988,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999: 
482).  By  February  1988  the  Intifada  became  formalised  with  the  establishment  of  the 
105 United  National  Leadership  of  the  Uprising.  The  organisation  encouraged  strikes 
amongst  those  who  worked  in  Israel  and  attacks  on  the  Israeli  administrative 
structure.  Taxes  were  withheld,  those  who  worked  as  administrators  and  tax  collectors 
resigned  and  Israeli  goods  were  boycotted  (Ovendale,  1999).  Roadblocks  were  set  up 
to  keep  out  the  Israeli  army  and  Palestinians  tried  to  create  an  alternative  system  of 
local  self-government  independent  of  the  military  authority. 
In  February  1988  the  United  States  attempted  to  put  forward  a  peace  plan 
based  on  Palestinian  autonomy  in  the  occupied  territories.  The  plan  was  rejected  by 
Israel,  and  the  PLO  who  noted  it  made  no  mention  of  statehood.  In  April  Abu  Jihad, 
the  PLO  second  in  command  was  assassinated  by  Israel  in  Tunis.  The  Tunisian 
government  complained  to  the  United  Nations  Security  Council.  The  Israeli  daily 
Ma'ariv  later  reported  that  the  future  Prime  Minister  Ehud  Barak  had  directed  the 
assassination  from  a  navy  ship  off  Tunis  (4  July  1988).  In  July  King  Hussein  of 
Jordan  announced  that  his  country  was  severing  its  links  with  the  West  Bank 
effectively  killing  the  'Jordanian  option'  that  had  long  been  favoured  by  the  US  and 
some  Israeli  leaders.  In  September  Yasser  Arafat  told  the  European  Parliament  in 
Strasbourg,  that  the  PLO  would  accept  Israel's  right  to  security  if  Israel  recognised  a 
Palestinian  mini-state.  In  November  the  Palestinian  National  Council  meeting  in 
Algiers  agreed  to  recognise  Israel,  as  well  as  all  UN  resolutions  dating  back  to  1947 
and  to  foreswear  its  claim  to  all  of  mandatory  Palestine.  It  also  proclaimed  the 
establishment  of  the  state  of  Palestine  with  East  Jerusalem  as  its  capital.  The  Israeli 
Prime  Minister,  Shamir,  dismissed  the  resolutions  as  a  'deceptive  propaganda 
exercise,  intended  to  create  the  impression  of  moderation  and  of  achievements  for 
those  carrying  out  violent  acts  in  the  territories  of  Judea  and  Samaria'  (cited  in 
Shlaim,  2000:  466).  Yasser  Arafat  wanted  to  appeal  to  the  UN  General  Assembly, 
but  despite  being  recognised  by  more  than  sixty  nations  the  United  States  refused  him 
an  entry  visa  (Ovendale,  1999).  The  General  Assembly  then  voted  to  hold  its  plenary 
session  in  Geneva,  and  Arafat  under  strong  pressure  from  the  American  Secretary  of 
State,  George  Shultz,  announced  that  the  PLO  accepted  resolutions  242  and  338,  as 
well  as  Israel's  right  to  exist  and  renounced  'terrorism'. 
Meanwhile  Israel's  response  to  the  Intifada  was  attracting  widespread 
international  criticism.  By  January  1989  the  US  State  Department  reported  that  the 
unrest  had  claimed  the  lives  of  eleven  Israelis  and  366  Palestinians.  Some  on  the 
106 Israeli  right  argued  that  the  criticism  of  Israel  and  media  coverage  of  the  Intifada  was 
biased  and  unfair,  and  that  the  Israeli  response  was  restrained  and  proportionate: 
Ignoring  the  Arab  reign  of  terror  in  the  Palestinian  streets,  the  media  created 
for  themselves  nightly  instalments  of  a  popular  romance  drama:  heroic 
underdog  in  search  of  self-determination  taking  on  a  terrifying  Israeli 
tyrant  ... 
Since  viewers  were  being  told  this  was  an  'army  of  occupation'-  that 
is,  it  had  no  right  to  be  there  in  the  first  place-  the  media  managed  to  transform 
even  the  most  necessary  aspects  of  maintaining  law  and  order  into 
unforgivable  crimes.  Utterly  lost  from  the  images  on  the  screen  was  the 
organised  nature  of  the  rioting,  the  internecine  violence,  and  the  terrorised 
lives  of  the  innocent  Arabs  (and  Jews)  who  were  ground  under  the  intifada's 
heel.  Similarly  lost  were  the  restrictive  firing  orders  that  stayed  the  hand  of 
every  Israeli  soldier,  and  the  swift  trial  of  the  208  Israelis  who  in  any  way 
disobeyed  these  orders-  as  against  the  tens  of  thousands  of  Israeli  soldiers  and 
reservists  who  followed  the  regulations  with  impeccable  restraint.  (2000:  18  1- 
2) 
The  United  Nations,  NGOs,  human  rights  groups  and  some  Israeli  soldiers 
disputed  this.  In  December  1988  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  passed  a 
resolution  by  106  to  2  (Israel,  United  States)  which  condemned  the  conduct  of  the 
IDF  and  settlers  during  the  Intifada.  The  resolution 
Declare[d]  once  more  that  Israel's  grave  breaches  of  that  Convention  are  war 
crimes  and  an  affront  to  humanity'.  Amongst  many  criticisms  the  resolution 
4  strongly  condemned'  the  'implementation  of  an  44iron-fist"  policy  against  the 
Palestinian  people  ...  the  escalation  of  Israeli  brutality  since  the  beginning  of 
the  uprising  ...  the  Ill-treatment  and  torture  of  children  and  minors  under 
detention  and/or  imprisonment  ...  the  killing  and  wounding  of  defenceless 
demonstrators  ...  the  breaking  of  bones  and  limbs  of  thousands  of  civilians  ...  the 
usage  of  toxic  gas,  which  resulted,  inter  alia,  in  the  killing  of  many 
Palestinians'  (United  Nations,  1988). 
107 Israel  was  particularly  criticised  for  its  treatment  of  children  during  the 
Intifada.  A  thousand  page  Save  the  Children  study  documented  the  'indiscriminate 
beating,  teargassing,  and  shooting  of  children.  '  The  report  found  that  the  average  age 
of  the  victims  was  ten  years  old  and  that  the  majority  of  those  who  were  shot  were  not 
participating  in  stone  throwing.  The  report  also  alleged  that  in  80%  of  cases  where 
children  were  shot  the  Israeli  army  prevented  the  victims  from  receiving  medical 
attention.  The  report  concluded  that  more  than  50,000  children  required  medical 
attention  for  injuries  including  gun  shot  wounds,  tear  gas  inhalation  and  multiple 
fractures  (report  cited  in  Finkelstein,  1996:  47).  The  August  198  9  bulletin  f  rom 
the  Israeli  League  for  Human  and  Civil  Rights  was  entitled  'Deliberate  Murder'  and 
reported  on  the  targeting  of  Palestinian  children  in  leadership  roles.  It  found  that  the 
Israeli  army  and  snipers  from  'special  units'  had  'carefully  chosen'  the  children  who 
were  shot  in  the  head  or  heart  and  died  instantaneously  (report  cited  in  Finkelstein, 
1996:  47).  Others  reports  from  Israelis  human  rights  groups  and  articles  in  the  Israeli 
press  also  allege  that  torture,  including  severe  beating  and  electric  shocks  were  used 
extensively  against  detainees  including  children.  37 
The  Intifada  also  saw  the  birth  of  Hamas,  the  Islamic  opposition  movement 
formed  by  Sheik  Yassin  in  February  1988.  The  organisation  which  emerged  out  of  the 
Muslim  Brotherhood,  stressed  a  return  to  conservative  Islamic  values  and  provided  a 
network  of  health,  and  social  services  for  Palestinians  in  the  occupied  territories.  For 
many  years  the  organisation  received  extensive  funding  from  Israel  (Shlaim,  2000; 
Chomsky,  1999;  Mishal  &  Sela.  2000).  Shlaim  claims  that  this  was  done  'in  the  hope 
of  weakening  the  secular  nationalism  of  the  PLO'  (2000:  459)  Chomsky  (1999) 
suggests  such  a  weakening  would  be  beneficial  to  Israel  because  it  would  allow  them 
to  evade  a  political  solution  to  the  conflict  which  might  involve  returning  the 
occupied  territories.  The  Hamas  charter  issued  in  August  1988  argued  that  all  of 
Palestine  belonged  to  the  Muslim  nation  as  a  religious  endowment  and  that  it  was 
each  Muslim's  duty  to  engage  in  jihad  (a  religious  war)  to  'liberate'  Palestine.  The 
degree  to  which  its  intentions  match  its  rhetoric  is  disputed.  Most  Israelis  regard  the 
organisation  as  fundamentalist  and  uncompromising,  dedicated  to  killing  Jews  and 
destroying  the  Israeli  state.  Two  Israeli  academics,  Shaul  Mishal  and  Avraharn  Sela, 
suggest  that  the  organisation  is  more  complex  and  pragmatic  than  this.  They  suggest 
that  Hamas  utilizes  'controlled  violence'  as  a  'means  rather  than  an  end'  to  mobilize 
political  support  and  is  'cognizant  of  power  relations  and  political  feasibility'  (2000: 
108 viii).  Mishal  and  Sela  argue  that  its  main  purpose  has  been  to  establish  itself  as  the 
major  force  in  Palestinian  political  life  and  that  in  the  future  it  'may  find  that  it  can 
accept  a  workable  fon-nula  of  coexistence  with  Israel  in  place  of  armed  struggle" 
(2000:  ix).  In  1989  the  groups'  founder  Sheik  Yassin  was  arrested  by  Israel,  and  in  the 
occupied  territories  the  Israelis  increased  their  use  of  deportations  and  curfews  in  an 
attempt  to  suppress  the  Intifada.  They  also  outlawed  the  committees  administering  the 
uprising.  This  was  a  problem  for  Palestinians  as  they  saw  the  committees  as  the 
nucleus  of  the  self-governing  institutions  they  hoped  to  build  once  the  occupation 
ended. 
In  1989  Yitzak  Shamir  put  forward  an  initiative  which  proposed  elections  and 
expanded  Palestinian  autonomy  in  exchange  for  the  ending  of  the  Intifada.  Shamir  set 
down  certain  preconditions,  there  would  be  no  Palestinian  state,  no  PLO  involvement 
(even  if  its  representatives  triumphed  in  the  elections)  and  no  participation  in  the 
elections  for  the  inhabitants  of  East  Jerusalem.  The  plans  were  eventually  derailed  by 
members  of  Shamir's  own  cabinet,  principly  Ariel  Sharon,  David  Levy,  and  Yitzhak 
Moda'i  who  argued  that  Israel  was  giving  too  much  away,  and  was  adopting  too 
liberal  an  attitude  to  the  Intifada  (Shlaim,  2000).  Egypt  and  the  United  States  then  put 
forward  their  own  peace  initiatives.  These  precipitated  a  split  in  what  was  then  a 
National  Unity  government  in  Israel  ,  which  led  to  its  downfall.  One  part  of  the 
government,  the  Labour  Alignment,  unsuccessfully  urged  Shamir  to  accept  the 
American  initiative,  whilst  some  members  of  the  right  wing  Likud  party,  felt  Israel 
was  making  too  many  concessions  and  not  cracking  down  sufficiently  hard  on  the 
Intifada.  For  six  weeks  the  Labor  party's  Shimon  Peres  tried  unsuccessfully  to  form  a 
new  coalition,  and  eventually  Yitzak  Shamir  formed  one  in  which  his  Likud  part 
linked  up  with  ultranationalist  and  religious  parties.  This  new  coalition  which  Shlaim 
(2000)  claims  was  the  most  right  wing  and  hardline  (in  its  attitudes  to  the  Arabs)  in 
Israel's  history,  immediately  announced  that  it  would  end  the  Intifada,  create  new 
settlements  and  expand  existing  ones.  It  also  insisted  there  would  be  no  Palestinian 
state,  no  negotiation  with  the  PLO  and  no  sharing  of  Jerusalem. 
The  Intifada  which  continued  to  smoulder  during  this  period,  was  re-ignited  in 
October  1990  when  Israeli  troops  killed  21  Palestinians  on  the  Temple  Mount  in 
Jerusalem.  The  Israelis  claimed  they  had  responded  to  acts  of  stone  throwing  directed 
at  Israeli  worshippers.  The  Palestinians  claimed  that  the  stone  throwing  only  began 
after  the  Israelis  started  shooting.  The  United  Nations  Security  Council  condemned 
109 the  killings,  but  Israel  managed  to  prevent  the  United  Nations  from  acting  on 
Palestinian  demands  to  replace  the  Israeli  military  government  in  the  occupied 
territories  with  a  UN  force  (Ovendale,  1999). 
In  August  1990  the  Iraq  war  intervened  when  Saddam  Hussein  invaded 
Kuwait  and  occupied  the  country.  Five  months  later  an  American  led  coalition 
attacked  Iraq  forcing  its  withdrawal  from  Kuwait.  Both  the  Palestinians  in  the 
occupied  territories  and  the  PLO  leadership  allied  themselves  with  Saddarn 
Hussein  because  of  the  Iraqi  dictator's  attempt  to  make  a  'linkage'  between 
Iraqi  withdrawal  from  Kuwait  and  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  occupied 
territories,  and  because  he  struck  at  the  Israeli  state  with  scud  missiles.  In 
doing  so  the  Palestinian  leadership  effectively  lost  much  of  the  political  capital 
it  had  built  up  over  many  years,  whilst  Israel  benefited  internationally  by  not 
responding  to  the  Iraqi  attacks.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  war  the  US  moved  to 
bring  Israel  and  its  Arab  adversaries  together  in  an  international  Peace 
conference. 
The  Beginning  of  the  Oslo  Process 
In  Madrid  at  the  end  of  October  1991  an  Israeli  delegation  met  Palestinian  and 
other  representatives  from  Israel's  'confrontation  states'  (Syria,  Jordan,  Lebanon). 
Although  the  Palestinian  representatives  were  pro-PLO,  they  were  not  publicly  stated 
as  being  members  of  the  organisation,  as  this  would  have  landed  them  in  jail  under 
Israeli  law.  The  Americans  who  set  up  the  conference  insisted  that  it  be  based  around 
UN  Resolutions  242  and  338  and  the  principle  of  'land  for  peace'.  This  premise  was 
accepted  by  the  Palestinians  but  rejected  by  the  Israelis  (Shlaim,  2000).  In  the  run  up 
to  the  conference  the  Likud  administration  announced  a  new  wave  of  settlement 
building  designed  to  double  the  settler  population  in  the  occupied  territories  in  four 
years.  Little  progress  was  made  in  negotiations  either  at  Madrid  or  in  the  five  rounds 
of  bilateral  talks  which  took  place  in  Washington.  Shlaim  argues  that  an  'immense 
gap'  separated  the  parties: 
110 The  Palestinians  started  with  the  assumption  that  they  were  a  people  with 
national  rights  and  that  the  interim  arrangements  under  discussion  were  the 
precursor  to  independence  and  should  be  shaped  accordingly.  The  Israeli 
government  started  with  the  assumption  that  the  Palestinians  were  the 
inhabitants  of  the  territories  with  no  national  rights  of  any  kind  and  certainly 
no  rights  to  independence,  not  even  after  the  end  of  the  transitional  period. 
(2000:  493) 
In  June  1992  the  Israeli  population  went  to  the  polls  to  elect  a  new 
administration.  The  Likud  party  pledged  to  continue  the  peace  process  whilst 
retaining  all  the  occupied  territories  and  expanding  settlement  building.  The  Labor 
party  vowed  to  conclude  a  deal  on  Palestinian  autonomy,  allow  residents  of  East 
Jerusalem  in  take  part  in  negotiations  and  freeze  the  construction  of  the  'political 
settlements'  deep  in  the  occupied  territory.  Labor  won  the  election  under  Yitzak 
Rabin  in  a  major  political  swing  which  ended  fifteen  years  of  Likud  rule.  In  an  Israeli 
newspaper  interview  just  after  his  election  defeat  Shamir  declared  that  'I  would  have 
carried  on  autonomy  talks  for  ten  years,  and  meanwhile  we  would  have  reached  half  a 
million  people  in  Judea  and  Samaria'  (Maariv,  26  June  1992) 
Over  the  next  20  months  Israeli  and  Palestinians  sympathetic  to  but  not 
members  of  the  PLO,  engaged  in  10  rounds  of  negotiations  in  Washington  that 
produced  no  tangible  results.  In  the  middle  of  those  negotiations  Rabin  deported  416 
Hamas  activists  to  Lebanon  following  the  killing  of  an  Israeli  border  policeman.  This 
move,  which  was  condemned  by  the  UN  as  a  breach  of  international  law,  was 
intended  to  curb  Hamas's  influence  but  actually  had  the  opposite  effect.  Mishal  and 
Sela  argue  that  the  deportations  were  a  'milestone  in  Hamas's  decision  to  use  car 
bombs  and  suicide  attacks  as  a  major  modus  operandi  against  Israel',  because  they 
came  into  contact  with  Hezbollah  guerrillas  who  provided  training  in  such  techniques. 
(2000:  65-6),  They  note  that  Hamas  first  used  suicide  attacks  shortly  after  the  return 
of  the  deportees  to  the  occupied  territories.  38 
III The  Declaration  of  PrinciDles 
While  the  official  negotiations  continued  the  Israelis  decided  to  open  up  a  second  and 
secret  channel  of  diplomacy  in  Oslo.  For  the  first  time  they  agreed  to  negotiate  with  a 
section  of  the  PLO.  These  talks  bypassed  the  bulk  of  the  PLO  and  Fatah,  with 
negotiations  directed  only  towards  Yasser  Arafat  and  a  few  close  associates.  In 
September  1993  the  Declaration  of  Principles  between  the  Palestinians  and  Israel  was 
finally  brought  into  the  open  and  signed  by  both  parties  on  the  White  House  lawn. 
The  Declaration  was  an  agenda  for  negotiations  which  stipulated  that  within  four 
months  of  signing  the  agreement  Israel  had  to  withdraw  completely  from  Gaza  and 
Jericho,  with  a  Palestinian  police  force  taking  over  internal  security  in  those  areas, 
though  Israel  would  still  maintain  overall  responsibility  for  external  security  and 
foreign  affairs.  Elsewhere  in  the  West  Bank  Palestinians  were  to  take  control  of  five 
spheres:  education,  health,  social  welfare,  direct  taxation  and  tourism.  Within  nine 
months  elections  were  to  be  held  for  a  Palestinian  Authority  which  was  to  assume 
responsibilities  for  those  municipal  affairs.  Final  status  negotiations  were  scheduled  to 
start  within  two  years  and  were  due  to  be  completed  within  five  years.  All  of  the  most 
serious  issues  affecting  the  two  parties  including  possible  Palestinian  statehood, 
borders,  refugees,  settlements  and  Jerusalem  were  postponed  to  the  final  settlement 
talks.  The  PLO  agreed  to  accept  UN  resolutions  242  and  338,  end  the  armed  struggle 
against  Israel  and  amend  the  parts  of  the  Palestinian  National  Charter  which  called  the 
destruction  of  the  Israeli  state.  Israel  agreed  to  recognise  the  PLO  as  the  representative 
of  the  Palestinian  people.  The  Declaration  of  Principles  brought  to  an  end  to  the  first 
Intifada  which  according  to  the  Ahe  Israeli  human  rights  group  B'Tselem  had  seen 
160  Israelis  and  1,162  Palestinians  killed  (B'Tselem,  2003a). 
The  treaty  met  with  opposition  on  both  Israeli  and  Palestinian  sides.  Likud  and 
the  right  wing  nationalist  and  religious  parties  denounced  the  agreement  as  a  betrayal 
of  the  settlers  in  the  occupied  territories,  an  end  to  Biblical  Greater  Israel,  and  a 
mortal  threat  to  the  security  of  the  State.  They  argued  that  the  occupied  territories 
could  not  be  ceded  by  politicians  as  they  had  been  eternally  promised  to  the  Jews  by 
God.  Binyamin  Netanyahu,  the  Likud  leader  completely  rejected  the  accord  and 
pledged  to  cancel  it  if  he  became  Prime  Minister.  He  compared  the  agreement  to  the 
112 appeasement  of  Hitler  and  told  Peres,  'You  are  even  worse  than  Chamberlain.  He 
imperilled  the  safety  of  another  people,  but  you  are  doing  it  to  your  own  people' 
(cited  in  Shlaim,  2000:  521).  The  accord  was  eventually  approved  by  the  Knesset  by  a 
margin  of  61  votes  to  50.  Israeli  public  opinion  on  the  accords  was  generally 
favourable  with  65%  saying  they  approved  of  the  agreement  and  only  13%  declaring 
themselves  'very  much  against'  it  (Shlaim,  2000).  In  an  analysis  of  Palestinian 
reaction  to  the  Oslo  Accords,  Mouin  Rabbani  identified  four  distinct  positions  and 
argued  that  'contrary  to  most  press  reports  the  fault  line 
....  within  the  Palestinian  body 
politic  is  not  an  ideological  one  separating  peace-loving  moderates  from  violent 
extremists'  but  rather  one  which  revolves  'primarily  around  issues  of  substance  and 
procedure'  (Middle  East  International,  24  September  1993).  He  claimed  that  only  a 
few  Palestinians  were  'enthusiastic  supporters',  with  a  majority  whom  he 
characterised  as  'optimistic  and  desperate  in  equal  measure'  had  serious  doubts  but 
were  prepared  to  give  the  agreement  a  chance.  He  suggested  that  this  large  group 
could  quickly  turn  against  the  agreement  if  the  human  rights  situation  did  not 
improve,  and  the  settlement  activity  and  occupation  continued.  The  third  group,  he 
identified,  comprised  senior  political  and  cultural  figures  39  such  as  Edward  Said,  who 
although  supporting  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the  conflict,  nevertheless  regarded  the 
accords  as  a  'deeply  flawed'  and  'potentially  fatal  to  Palestinian  national  aspirations'. 
They  objected  to  Arafat  signing  the  document  without  public  debate  or  consultations 
and  believed  it  was  a  bad  deal.  They  pointed  out  the  Palestinians  were  agreeing  to  end 
the  Intifada  and  renounce  their  rights  to  78  per  cent  of  historic  Palestine  without  any 
guarantee  of  statehood,  agreement  to  remove  settlements  (or  even  stop  settlement 
building),  and  any  commitments  to  improve  the  human  rights  situation,  or  to  resolve 
the  refugee  issue  and  status  of  Jerusalem.  For  this  group  the  agreement  undermined 
the  internationally  recognised  rights  of  Palestinians  and  'foreshadows  permanent 
dispossession  of  the  majority  of  Palestinians'  as  well  as  creating  the  potential 
conditions  for  a  civil  war.  The  fourth  position  that  Rabbani  identifies  is  that  of  the 
rejectionists  who  comprise  both  the  radical  Islamic  and  secular  movements  such  as 
Harnas  and  the  PFLP,  and  their  supporters  in  the  occupied  territories.  These  groups, 
argues  Rabbani,  regarded  the  agreement  as  a  'textbook  case  of  Bantustanisation'  in 
which  the  principal  Palestinian  weapon  the  Intifada  was  being  liquidated  so  that 
Palestinians  could  become  the  joint  administrators  of  the  occupation,  in  a  weak 
subservient  statelet  or  series  of  statelets.  Rabbani  suggests  that  had  the  agreement 
113 involved  moves  towards  real  statehood  and  been  reached  in  'conformity  with  the 
Palestinian  national  consensus  and  properly  ratified'  then  much  of  the  rejectionist 
camp  with  the  exception  of  Islamic  Jihad  and  sections  of  Hamas  and  the  PFLP  would 
at  least  have  tacitly  accepted  the  deal. 
The  1993  Declaration  of  Principles  was  followed  in  February  1994  by  the 
signing  of  the  new  set  of  documents  in  Cairo.  The  IDF  agreed  to  redeploy  its  forces 
from  urban  centres  to  rural  areas  allowing  it  to  maintain  control  of  overall  security 
and  land  crossings.  On  25  February  Dr  Baruch  Goldstein,  an  American  born  settler 
and  member  of  the  Kach  party  opened  fire  with  an  IDF  issued  Galil  assault  rifle  on 
Muslim  worshipers  at  the  Tomb  of  the  Patriarchs  in  Hebron  killing  29  people  before 
he  himself  was  killed.  Rachelle  Marshall,  aj  oumalist  and  member  of  the  Jewish 
Peace  Union,  writes  that  the  killings  were  followed  by  five  week  round  the  clock 
curfew  imposed  on  more  than  a  million  Palestinians,  during  which  the  IDF  killed  a 
further  76  Palestinians,  mostly  stone  throwing  youths  (Washington  Report  on  Middle 
East  Affairs,  June,  1994).  The  Israeli  journalist  Danny  Rubenstein  was  later  to  argue 
that  the  Hebron  killings  'directly  and  immediately  created  the  chain  of  suicide 
bombings  and  the  appalling  upward  spiral  composed  of  Israeli  responses  and 
Palestinian  counter-responses'  (Haaretz,  28  September  1998).  In  the  wake  of  these 
events  Israeli  government  under  pressure  from  the  Palestinians  and  sections  of  Israeli 
public  opinion  moved  to  outlaw  the  overtly  racist  party  Kach,  but  refused  Palestinian 
demands  to  remove  the  few  hundred  heavily  armed  and  guarded  settlers  who  lived 
among  more  than  100,000  Palestinian  Hebronites.  The  Israeli  government  also 
reftised  PLO  requests  to  put  the  issue  of  settlements  on  the  negotiating  table,  arguing 
that  under  the  Declaration  of  Principles  it  was  not  obliged  to  do  so  until  the  third  year 
of  the  interim  period.  Hamas  vowed  revenge  for  the  Hebron  killings,  and  shortly 
before  the  signing  of  the  next  stage  of  the  interim  agreements  in  Cairo  in  May  1994  it 
carried  out  a  car  bombing  in  Afula  which  killed  eight,  and  the  first  ever  suicide 
bombing  in  Israel  which  killed  five  people.  Suicide  bombings  involved  individuals 
strapping  explosives,  nails,  and  ball  bearing  to  their  bodies  which  were  then  detonated 
in  densely  packed  areas  such  as  markets  or  buses.  This  new  and  indiscriminate 
weapon  left  those  who  survived  permanently  scarred  or  disabled,  and  significantly 
intensified  security  fears  amongst  Israelis.  A  report  from  a  BBC]  News  bulletin 
describes  the  aftermath  of  a  suicide  attack  on  a  crowded  Israeli  market: 
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people  in  the  heart  of  the  crowded  market.  It  was  just  after  one  o'clock  and  the 
market  was  full  of  shoppers.  Streams  of  ambulances  came  to  carry  away  the 
dead  and  the  injured.  It  was  a  place  of  appalling  suffering  ...  Those  who 
escaped  injury  were  led  away  from  the  devastation  and  others  arrived 
desperate  to  see  if  their  friends  and  relatives  had  escaped  the  carnage.  (BBC  I 
Evening  News,  30  July  1997) 
Some  Palestinians  have  tried  to  justify  such  attacks  by  arguing  that  they  are  in 
response  to  the  killing  of  Palestinian  civilians  by  Israelis.  Others  have  argued  that  they 
are  resisting  an  illegal  occupation,  or  that  it  is  the  only  effective  weapon  against  a 
much  more  powerful  adversary.  Dr  Eyad  EI-Sarraj,  a  psychiatrist  and  winner  of  the 
1998  Martin  Ennals  human  rights  award,  has  noted  that  most  suicide  bombers  had 
suffered  a  severe  trauma  when  young,  'often  the  torture  of  a  close  relative'  and  that 
'children  grow  up  wanting  to  take  revenge  for  their  trauma.  Torture  is  an  integral  part 
of  that  cycle  of  violence'  (Guardian,  24  January  2003).  Whatever  the  motivations  or 
factors  behind  suicide  bombings  Human  Rights  groups  have  unequivocally 
condemned  such  attacks  and  demanded  that  those  involved  in  planning  attacks  be 
brought  to  justice.  In  a  report  entitled  Without  Distinction:  Attacks  on  civilians  by 
Palestinian  armed  groups,  Amnesty  International,  argue  that  indiscriminate  attacks  on 
civilians  cannot  be  justified  whatever  the  circumstances  or  provocations: 
The  obligation  to  protect  civilians  is  absolute  and  cannot  be  set  aside  because 
Israel  has  failed  to  respect  its  obligations.  The  attacks  against  civilians  by 
Palestinian  armed  groups  are  widespread,  systematic  and  in  pursuit  of  an 
explicit  policy  to  attack  civilians.  They  therefore  constitute  crimes  against 
humanity  under  international  law.  They  may  also  constitute  war  crimes, 
depending  on  the  legal  characterisation  of  the  hostilities  and  interpretation  of 
the  status  of  Palestinian  armed  groups  and  fighters  under  international 
humanitarian  law.  (Amnesty  International,  2002) 
115 The  Cairo  Agreement  and  slo  11 
The  agreement  signed  in  Cairo  on  4  May  1994  concluded  the  Gaza  and  Jericho  phase 
of  the  redeployment  and  set  the  terms  for  expanding  Palestinian  autonomy  in  the  West 
Bank.  These  had  three  stages.  Firstly  the  Palestinian  National  Authority  was  to  take 
charge  of  a  number  of  municipal  functions  secondly  the  IDF  would  withdraw  from 
population  centres  and  finally  there  would  be  Palestinian  elections  for  a  new 
authority.  However  Palestinian  negotiators  were  disappointed  with  the  new 
agreement.  They  had  hoped  that  Israel  would  replace  the  complex  system  of  military 
ordinances  and  occupation  laws,  with  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention  and 
international  law  within  the  occupied  territories,  but  this  was  not  forthcoming 
(Shlaim,  2000).  The  United  Nations  Commission  on  Human  Rights  continued  to  be 
critical  of  Israeli  human  rights  abuses  in  the  occupied  territories.  In  1994  it  issued  a 
resolution  'condemning'  settler  and  IDF  killings,  torture,  imprisonment  without  trial, 
house  demolitions  and  land  expropriations,  curfews,  collective  punishments, 
restrictions  on  movement  and  settlement  building  (United  Nations,  1994). 
The  construction  of  illegal  Jewish  settlements  had  accelerated  following  the 
election  of  the  Rabin  administration  in  1992.  Between  1992  and  1995  the  settler 
population  in  the  occupied  territories  (excluding  East  Jerusalem)  rose  from  74,800  to 
136,000  (Foundationfor  Middle  East  Peace,  1997).  Palestinians  believed  that 
increased  settlement  building  and  expropriations  of  Palestinian  land  was  a  violation  of 
the  spirit  if  not  the  letter  of  the  Oslo  Accords,  and  would  ultimately  prejudice  the 
possibility  of  a  viable  Palestinian  state.  The  American  historian  and  Middle  East 
commentator,  Geoffrey  Aronson  argued  that  'there  is  no  missing  the  fact  that  Rabin's 
settlement  drive  is  aimed  at  putting  the  future  of  the  city  [Jerusalem]  and  its  West 
Bank  environs  beyond  the  reach  of  diplornacy.  '  (Report  on  Israeli  Settlement  in  the 
Occupied  Territory,  May  1995)  He  also  cited  statements  from  the  Israeli  commentator 
Ze'ev  Schiff  that  'when  we  come  to  the  final  stage  [of  negotiations]  nothing  will  be 
left  [in  Jerusalem]  for  the  Palestinians  to  negotiate,  apart  from  the  Islamic  holy 
places.  '  Rabin's  administration  also  embarked  on  a  process  of  building  bypass  roads 
linking  settlements  which  could  only  be  used  by  Jewish  settlers  and  the  IDF.  This 
plan,  Israel  Shahak  (1995)  claimed  was  originally  conceived  by  Ariel  Sharon  in  1977 
but  was  finally  implemented  by  Rabin  directly  after  the  Declaration  of  Principles.  He 
argued  that  its  purpose  was  to  create  a  matrix  of  control  whereby  all  the  Arab 
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blocks  so  that  the  Israeli  army  will  be  able  to  control  the  discontinuous  cantons  'from 
outside'.  Tel-Aviv  University  professor  Tanya  Reinhart,  argued  that  Rabin's  policies 
'resemble[d]  the  beginning  of  Apartheid  rather  than  its  end'  and  were  4almost 
identical'  to  the  South  African  Bantustan  model  (Haaretz,  27  May  1994).  The 
construction  of  the  bypass  road  network  also  allowed  the  Israeli  government  to 
enforce  closures  on  the  Palestinian  areas  which  restricted  Palestinian  movement  and 
access  to  employment.  Israel  justified  such  measures  by  arguing  that  it  was  necessary 
to  prevent  attacks  by  Palestinian  militants  against  Israelis.  It  did  however  have  very 
serious  effects  on  the  Palestinian  economy.  The  Israeli  journalist  Nadav  Ha'etzni 
reported  that  by  May  1995  that  curfews  and  closures  had  'devastated  the  Palestinian 
economy  and  destroyed  100,000  families  in  Gaza  alone'  (Maariv,  5  May  1995,  cited 
in  Chomsky,  1999:  548).  The  deteriorating  economic  situation  for  Palestinians  was 
compounded  by  Israeli  moves  to  achieve  'separation'  by  replacing  Palestinian 
workers  with  migrant  labour  from  Thailand,  the  Philippines,  Romania  and  other  parts 
of  Eastern  Europe.  Such  factors  Shlaim  suggests  'actually  worsened  the  situation  in 
the  occupied  territories  and  confounded  Palestinian  aspirations  for  a  state  of  their 
own.  '  (2000:  530).  Furthermore  there  was  no  halt  to  the  bloodshed  on  both  sides. 
Between  the  signing  of  the  Declaration  of  Principles  in  September  1993  and  the  end 
of  1994,93  Israelis  and  194  Palestinians  were  killed  in  violent  incidents  (B'Tselem, 
2003) 
In  late  September  1995  Yasser  Arafat  and  Yitzak  Rabin  concluded  the  next 
stage  of  the  interim  agreement  under  which  the  West  Bank  was  divided  into  three 
areas.  Area  A,  (3  per  cent  of  the  West  Bank  incorporating  Nablus,  Jenin,  Tulkarem, 
Qalqilya,  Ramallah,  Bethlehem  and  subsequently,  in  January  1997,80  per  cent  of 
Hebron)  would  have  its  civilian  administration  and  internal  security  controlled  by  the 
Palestinian  Authority.  Area  B  (23  per  cent  of  the  West  Bank  comprising  440  villages 
and  surrounding  lands)  was  to  have  certain  municipal  functions  administered  by  the 
Palestinian  Authority  whilst  security  would  be  dealt  with  by  joint  Palestinian-Israeli 
patrols.  Area  C  (comprising  74  per  cent  of  the  West  Bank,  including  all  of  the  145 
settlements  and  the  new  Jewish  neighbourhoods  in  and  around  East  Jerusalem)  would 
remain  under  complete  Israeli  control. 
117 On  November  4  1995  Yitzak  Rabin  was  assassinated  by  a  25  year  old  settler, 
Yigal  Amir.  After  the  killing  the  unrepentant  Amir  accused  Rabin  of  selling  out  the 
settlers  and  preparing  to  give  away  the  occupied  territories  to  the  Palestinians.  Rabin 
was  succeeded  as  Prime  Minister  by  Shimon  Peres  who  pledged  to  maintain  the 
momentum  of  the  peace  process.  No  Israelis  had  been  killed  in  suicide  attacks  since 
the  August  21  bombing  in  Jerusalem  which  had  killed  three  Israelis  and  an  American. 
Mishal  and  Sela  (2000)  suggest  that  both  Hamas  and  Islamic  Jihad  were  under 
pressure  from  both  the  Palestinian  Authority  and  Israel,  and  did  not  want  to 
antagonise  Palestinian  public  opinion  by  precipitating  a  halt  to  the  scheduled  Israeli 
redeployments.  Mishal  and  Sela  also  note  that  militant  groups  had  been  pushing  for 
ýa  conditional  cease-fire  with  Israel  to  stop  the  bloodshed  of  innocents  on  both  sides' 
(2000:  7  1).  In  early  1996  Peres  ordered  the  killing  of  Yahya  Ayyash,  a  Hamas  leader 
who  had  previously  masterminded  several  suicide  attacks  which  had  killed 
approximately  60  Israelis.  Shlaim  claims  that  the  Israeli  media  had  exaggerated  his 
status  presenting  him  as  'public  enemy  number  one'  whilst  'omitting  to  mention  that 
the  attacks  he  organized  came  as  a  response  to  the  [Hebron]  massacre.  '  (2000:  556) 
The  assassination  of  Ayyash  using  a  booby  trapped  phone  led  to  Hamas  vowing 
revenge  and  there  followed  six  suicide  bombings  in  February  and  March  1996  which 
left  62  Israelis  dead  (Israeli  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  1999).  Peres's  popularity 
declined  under  attacks  from  the  right,  and  he  moved  to  suspend  talks  with  the  newly 
elected  Palestinian  Authority  and  closed  the  borders  to  all  workers  from  the  occupied 
territories. 
Shortly  afterwards  Peres  launched  a  major  offensive  against  Hezbollah 
guerrillas  in  Southern  Lebanon.  Israel  had  been  fighting  a  long  guerrilla  war  against 
Hezbollah  militants.  Hezbollah  claimed  they  were  trying  to  end  the  illegal  Israeli 
occupation  of  Southern  Lebanon,  which  had  been  ongoing  since  1978,  in  violation  of 
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United  Security  Council  resolution  425 
. 
Israel  claimed  that  Hezbollah  were  intent  on 
the  destruction  of  the  Israeli  state.  Casualty  statistics  suggest  that  Palestinian  and 
Lebanese  civilians  had  suffered  disproportionately  in  the  conflict.  In  the  period 
between  1985  and  1996  the  Israeli  army  estimate  that  Hezbollah  guerrilla  and  rocket 
attacks  had  killed  six  Israeli  civilians  (Israeli  Defence  Force,  2003).  In  a  single 
operation  in  1993  Amnesty  International  (I  996a)  reported  that  Israel  killed  118 
Lebanese  civilians  and  that  300,000  people  were  displaced.  The  journalist  and  former 
chief  inspector  of  the  US  Information  Agency,  Richard  Curtiss  argues  that  after  this 
118 operation,  unwritten  rules  of  engagement  were  crafted  by  the  US  State  Department's 
Warren  Christopher  with  both  sides  agreeing  to  confine  attacks  to  combatants  in 
South  Lebanon  (Washington  Report  on  Middle  East  Affairs,  May/June  1996).  On 
April  11  1996  Peres  launched  Operation  'Grapes  of  Wrath'.  This  was  claimed  to  be  in 
retaliation  for  rocket  strikes  on  Israeli  settlements  which  had  injured  34  civilians,  and 
other  attacks  which  had  killed  eight  members  of  the  IDF  in  Southern  Lebanon. 
Hezbollah's  view  was  that  they  had  a  right  to  resist  the  Israeli  troops  illegally 
occupying  Southern  Lebanon,  and  that  the  rockets  fired  on  Israeli  settlements  were 
retaliation  for  the  killing  by  Israel  of  three  Lebanese  civilians.  The  attack  involved 
more  than  a  thousand  air  sorties  and  16,000  shells  against  less  than  500  Hezbollah 
fighters  (Haaretz,  21  May  1996).  Curtiss  claims  that  many  of  attacks  were  'targeted 
at  electric  power  plants  and  relay  stations,  bridges,  and  other  parts  of  Lebanon's  war- 
battered  basic  infrastructure'  (Washington  Report  on  Middle  East  Affairs,  May/June 
1996).  The  Israeli  journalist  Avi  Shavit  alleges  that  400,000  civilians  were  forced  to 
flee  their  homes  in  eight  hours,  after  which  the  Israeli  airforce  treated  the  abandoned 
properties  as  military  targets  and  shelled  them  (Haaretz,  21  May  1996).  On  18  April 
Israel  bombed  the  United  Nations  Compound  at  Qana,  killing  106  refugees  who  had 
sought  sanctuary  there.  Israel  stated  that  the  bombing  which  involved  anti-personnel 
munitions  was  a  mistake  and  that  the  real  target  was  an  area  nearby  where  Hezbollah 
militants  had  been  operating.  Both  a  UN  (1996)  and  Amnesty  (I  996b)  report  found 
that  the  attack  on  the  UN  compound  was  unlikely  to  have  been  accidental,  and  also 
condemned  Israeli  missile  attacks  on  ambulances  and  residential  areas  which  killed 
many  civilians.  Shlaim  suggests  that  the  operation  was  an  attempt  by  Shimon  Peres  to 
revive  his  flagging  political  fortunes  and  recast  himself  'as  the  hard  man  of  Israeli 
politics  ahead  of  the  crucial  general  elections'  (2000:  560).  However  it  did  nothing  to 
revive  his  political  fortunes  and  the  following  month  he  was  beaten  in  the  General 
election  by  the  Likud  candidate  Ben  amin  Netanyahu.  i 
The  Netanvahu.  Administration 
Netanyahu's  attitude  towards  the  peace  process  before  his  election  had  been 
one  of  undisguised  antipathy.  He  had  campaigned  publicly  against  its  implementation 
in  speeches  and  in  print,  and  had  been  accused  by  Rabin's  widow  of  inciting  his 
119 assassination  by  making  inflammatory  public  speeches,  which  likened  Rabin  to  an  SS 
officer.  His  coalition  included  the  far  right  and  settler  groups  who  called  for  the 
forced  deportation  of  all  Palestinians  from  the  occupied  territories.  Netanyahu's 
central  argument  was  that  the  peace  process  had  illustrated  Israel's  weakness,  reduced 
the  deterrent  power  of  the  IDF  and  damaged  the  nation's  security.  He  argued  that 
Israel  had  adhered  to  the  Oslo  formula  whilst  the  Palestinians  had  failed  to  keep  their 
side  of  the  bargain,  by  failing  to  dismantle  militant  organisations,  collect  their 
weapons  or  extradite  their  members  to  Israel.  Netanyahu's  alternative  was  to 
renegotiate  the  redeployments  that  had  been  agreed  in  principle.  He  argued  that  these 
threatened  Israel's  security  and  that  'whatever  the  officials  of  the  previous  Labor 
administration  had  whispered  in  Palestinian  ears  was  irrelevant'  (Netanyahu,  2000: 
343).  He  was  also  against  full  statehood  for  the  Palestinians,  arguing  that  Israel  had  to 
control  the  exit  and  entry  points  to  the  Palestinian  entity  as  well  as  its  airspace,  much 
of  the  Jordan  valley  and  the  West  Bank  water  supply.  He  also  argued  that  Arab 
nations  should  resettle  the  Palestinian  refugees.  Shlaim  claims  that  as  soon  as  he  took 
power  Netanyahu  began  to  renege  on  Israel's  Oslo  obligations: 
Serious  deterioration  occurred  in  Israel's  relations  with  the  Palestinians  as  a 
result  of  Netanyahu's  backtracking.  He  adopted  a  'work-to-rule'  approach 
designed  to  undermine  the  Oslo  process.  There  was  no  Israeli  pullout  from 
Hebron,  no  'opening  of  the  safe  passage'  route  from  Gaza  to  the  West  Bank, 
and  no  discussion  of  the  further  West  bank  redeployment  that  Israel  had 
pledged  to  carry  out  in  early  September.  Instead  Palestinian  homes  without  an 
Israeli  permit  were  demolished  in  east  Jerusalem,  and  plans  were  approved  for 
the  construction  of  new  Israeli  settlements.  The  quality  of  life  for  the 
Palestinians  deteriorated  progressively,  and  hopes  for  a  better  future  were  all 
but  extinguished  (2000:  576) 
In  October  1996  serious  violence  erupted  in  Jerusalem  when  Netanyahu 
ordered  the  blasting  open  an  archaeological  tunnel  close  to  the  al-Aksa  Mosque.  This 
was  taken  by  Palestinians  as  a  statement  of  sovereignty  over  Islamic  holy  sites  and 
triggered  disturbances  in  which  15  Israeli  soldiers  and  80  Palestinians  were  killed,  and 
a  further  1500  Palestinians  wounded.  Under  pressure  from  the  Americans  Netanyahu 
agreed  to  the  delayed  redeployment  of  Israeli  troops  from  Hebron  in  January  1997  by 
120 signing  the  Hebron  protocol,  which  also  committed  Israel  to  three  further 
redeployments  in  the  West  bank  over  the  next  18  months.  Under  the  agreement 
Hebron  was  split  into  Jewish  and  Arab  zones.  The  Jewish  zone  reserved  for  the  450 
settlers  constituted  20%  of  the  city,  including  its  best  commercial  areas.  The 
remaining  80%  of  the  city  was  reserved  for  the  130,000  Palestinian  Hebronites  who 
were  subject  to  frequent  curfews  and  restrictions  on  movement. 
After  the  signing  of  the  Hebron  protocol  Netanyahu  approved  a  number  of 
new  settlements.  In  February  1997  he  announced  plans  for  6,500  new  dwellings  for 
30,000  settlers  at  Jabal  Ghneim  (Har  Homa)  on  the  outskirts  of  annexed  East 
Jerusalem.  Har  Homa  would  complete  the  chain  of  concentric  settlements  around 
Jerusalem  and  cut  off  Arab  East  Jerusalem  from  the  rest  of  the  West  Bank.  The  move 
was  met  with  anger  from  Palestinians  and  condemned  by  the  United  Nations  (1997) 
General  Assembly  by  130  votes  to  two  (Israel,  United  States).  Palestinians  were 
unhappy  with  more  expropriation  of  their  land  and  called  a  general  strike  in  protest. 
The  US  twice  vetoed  Security  Council  resolutions  condemning  the  project,  whilst  the 
General  Assembly  passed  further  resolutions  calling  for  a  halt  to  the  Har  Homa 
project,  the  removal  of  settlements  in  the  occupied  territories,  and  the  application  of 
the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention  within  the  territories.  None  of  these  moves  stopped  the 
construction  of  the  new  settlements.  In  June  1997  the  Israeli  journalist  Jay  Bushinsky 
reported  that  Netanyahu  had  outlined  his  'Allon  plus'  plan  for  a  possible  settlement 
with  the  Palestinians.  The  plan  involved  Israel  annexing  approximately  60%  of  the 
West  Bank  that  would  include  Greater  Jerusalem,  the  hills  east  of  Jerusalem,  the 
Jordan  valley,  the  settlements  and  all  the  bypass  roads  connecting  them,  plus 
permanent  Israeli  control  of  the  West  Bank  water  supply  (Jerusalem  Post,  5  June 
1997).  The  proposals  were  met  with  dismay  by  Palestinian  leaders  who  accused  Israel 
of  violating  the  Oslo  Accords  and  trying  to  destroy  the  peace  process. 
Although  the  conflict  between  Palestinian  fighters  and  the  IDF  and  settlers  in 
the  occupied  territories  continued  to  claim  more  lives,  there  were  no  suicide  attacks  in 
Israel  between  March  1996  and  March  1997.  Between  March  21  1997  and  September 
4  1997  militants  carried  out  three  suicide  attacks  killing  24  Israelis.  Hamas 
representatives  argued  that  the  attacks  were  the  only  way  to  stop  the  expropriation  of 
more  Palestinian  land  for  settlement  building  and  the  'Judaization'  of  the  Holy  places. 
On  September  23  1997  the  Hamas  leadership  sent  a  letter  to  Netanyahu,  delivered  by 
King  Hussein  of  Jordan,  in  which  Hamas  suggested  setting  up  an  indirect  dialogue 
121 with  the  Israeli  government,  that  would  be  mediated  by  King  Hussein.  The  purpose  of 
the  dialogue  would  be  achieve  a  cessation  of  violence  as  well  as  a  'discussion  of  all 
matters'  (Ha'aretz,  9  October  1997,  cited  in  Sela  &  Avraham,  2000:  72).  Two  days 
later  Netanyahu  ordered  the  killing  of  the  head  of  Hamas's  Political  Bureau,  Khalid 
Mash'al  in  Jordan.  The  attempted  assassination  by  two  Mossad  agents  was  botched 
and  Mash'al's  bodyguard  captured  the  two  assassins  who  were  later  traded  for  the 
imprisoned  Hamas  spiritual  leader  Sheikh  Ahmed  Yassin.  The  attempted  killing 
soured  relations  with  King  Hussein,  Israel's  closest  ally  in  the  Arab  world  and  ended 
any  opportunity  for  a  cease-fire.  The  release  of  Yassin  followed  by  his  return  to  Gaza 
strengthened  Hamas's  support. 
In  March  1998  1,500  reservists  included  twelve  retired  major-generals  called 
on  Netanyahu  to  stop  settlement  building  and  try  to  end  the  conflict  and  normalise 
relations.  (Shlaim,  2000).  However  Netanyahu  cancelled  the  scheduled  Israeli 
redeployments,  citing  security  concerns.  Despite  efforts  by  both  Britain  and  the  US  to 
revive  the  process  it  ground  to  a  halt.  Both  sides  in  the  conflict  accused  the  other  of 
bad  faith  in  reneging  on  their  Oslo  obligations.  Netanyahu  reiterated  his  claims  that 
the  PLO  had  failed  to  disarm  or  arrest  militant  groups,  prevent  attacks  against  Israelis, 
and  amend  the  PLO  charter.  Others  contested  this.  Tanya  Reinhart  writing  in  the 
Israeli  publication  Tikkun  claimed  that  Arafat  had  taken  strong  action  against  Hamas 
and  that  this  was  recognised  by  Israel's  security  services: 
Arafat's  security  services  carried  out  this  job  [maintaining  Israeli  security] 
faithfully,  by  assassinating  Hamas  terrorists  (disguised  as  "accidents"),  and 
arresting  Hamas  political  leaders 
... 
Ample  information  was  published  in  the 
Israeli  media  regarding  these  activities,  and  'security  sources'  were  full  of 
praises  for  Arafat's  achievements.  For  example,  Ami  Ayalon,  then  head  of  the 
Israeli  secret  service  (Shabak),  announced,  in  a  government  meeting  on  April 
5,1998  that  "Arafat  is  doing  his  job-he  is  fighting  terror  and  puts  all  his 
weight  against  the  Hamas"  (Haaretz,  April  6  1998).  The  rate  of  success  of  the 
Israeli  security  services  in  containing  terror  was  never  higher  than  that  of 
Arafat;  in  fact,  it  was  probably  much  lower.  (March/April  2002) 
In  a  1998  report,  the  Israeli  peace  group  Gush  Shalom  (1998)  blamed  the 
Netanyahu  administration  for  the  breakdown  in  the  peace  process  and  accused  the 
122 government  of  19  separate  violations  of  the  Oslo  Accords  including  settlement  and 
bypass  road  building,  use  of  closures,  failure  to  release  Palestinian  prisoners,  torture 
and  other  human  rights  abuses,  and  failure  to  undertake  scheduled  military 
withdrawals  and  move  towards  final  status  negotiations.  During  this  period  support 
for  militant  organisations  such  as  Islamic  Rhad  and  Hamas  grew  whilst  the  PLO  and 
particularly  Yasser  Arafat  lost  popularity.  Partly  this  was  because  of  corruption 
scandals  that  engulfed  the  PLO  leadership  which  was  accused  of  nepotism  and 
siphoning  off  funds  meant  for  the  Palestinian  Authority.  It  was  also  because  of 
Arafat's  autocratic  style  and  the  serious  human  rights  abuses  committed  by  the 
Palestinian  security  forces  who  were  using  torture  and  engaging  in  extra-judicial 
killings  against  opponents  of  the  Oslo  process.  There  was  also  widespread  anger  that 
Arafat  had  failed  to  stop  settlement  building.  Geoffrey  Aronson  claimed  that  Arafat 
and  the  other  PLO  'outsiders'  (those  from  outside  the  occupied  territories)  failed  to 
appreciate  the  significance  of  the  settlements: 
PA  chairman  Yasser  Arafat  is  briefed  infrequently  on  Israel's  settlement 
policy,  and  his  response  is  generally  stunned  silence  as  he  looks  at  the  maps 
depicting  the  dimensions  of  the  enterprise.  Palestinian  Authority  negotiators 
Mahmoud  Abbas  (Abu  Mazen)  and  Ahmad  Quray  (Abu  Ala)  have  never  been 
on  a4  settlement  tour.  '  If  one  is  to  judge  by  their  negotiating  priorities,  they 
have  no  concept  of  the  role  of  settlements  in  the  history  of  Israel's  policies  in 
the  occupied  territories,  nor  do  they  believe  that  such  an  understanding  is 
required.  (Report  on  Israeli  Settlement  in  the  Occupied  Territories, 
July/August  1998) 
In  October  1998  Israel  and  Palestinian  negotiators  met  at  Wye  River 
Plantation  to  negotiate  on  the  next  phase  of  the  Oslo  process.  This  brings  to  an  end  the 
historical  review  of  the  conflict,  which  has  illustrated  the  extraordinary  range  of 
viewpoints  on  the  history  of  the  conflict.  In  the  next  chapter  I  will  examine  how 
journalists  have  drawn  from  these  perspectives  in  their  reporting  of  the  conflict. 
123 Chapter  3  Content  Analysis  of  the  Wye  Accords 
Introduction 
This  content  analysis  examines  how  television  news  covered  the  Wye  Peace  summit 
which  took  place  in  America  in  October  1998.  The  summit  which  involved  Israeli  and 
Palestinian  delegations  meeting  in  an  attempt  to  further  the  Oslo  peace  process,  was 
presided  over  by  the  American  president  Bill  Clinton.  It  was  widely  accepted  by  all 
parties  that  the  peace  process,  which  had  been  inaugurated  five  years  previously  by 
Yitzak  Rabin  and  Yasser  Arafat  signing  the  Declaration  of  Principles  on  the  White 
House  lawn,  was  encountering  some  problems.  The  process  had  ground  to  a  halt,  with 
Israel  refusing  to  carry  out  the  troop  withdrawals  scheduled  in  the  previous 
agreements.  The  reasons  for  the  breakdown  were  contested.  The  Netanyahu 
government  argued  that  the  Palestinians  had  failed  to  adhere  to  their  commitments 
under  the  Oslo  agreements  by  not  curbing  incitement,  preventing  attacks  against 
Israelis  or  arresting  Palestinians  suspected  of  involvement  in  attacks.  Some  prominent 
Israelis  disputed  this.  For  instance  Ami  Ayalon,  the  head  of  the  Israeli  secret  service 
(Shabak)  had  praised  Arafat  for  his  attempts  to  rein  in  Hamas  activists  (Ha'aretz, 
April  6  1998).  Far  right  parties  and  religious  settler  groups  who  were  part  of 
Netanyahu's  coalition  government  favoured  withdrawing  from  the  peace  process 
completely.  They  argued  that  the  occupied  territories  were  part  of  biblical  Israel, 
promised  to  the  Jews  by  God,  and  should  not  be  returned  to  the  Palestinians  in 
exchange  for  peace.  Palestinians  were  sceptical  of  the  Israeli  government's 
commitment  to  the  peace  process  and  noted  that  Binyamin  Netanyahu  had  been  a 
vocal  critic  of  the  Oslo  process  and  its  'land  for  peace'  formula.  They  pointed  to 
increased  expropriations  of  Palestinian  land,  the  demolition  of  thousands  of 
Palestinian  homes,  and  the  creation  of  more  illegal  Israeli  settlements.  They  were  also 
angered  that  Israel  had  created  a  grid  of  military  checkpoints  and  bypass  roads  across 
the  occupied  territories,  which  severely  limited  their  freedom  of  movement,  and 
which  had  been  likened  to  South  Africa's  pass  laws  (cited  in  Philo  &  Berry,  2004). 
Many  Palestinians  believed  that  the  peace  process  was  being  manipulated  to  allow 
Israel  to  take  more  and  more  occupied  land,  and  feared  that  Yasser  Arafat's 
Palestinian  Authority  could  not  be  relied  on  to  negotiate  an  equitable  settlement. 
The  purpose  of  the  content  analysis  is  to  examine  the  range  of  explanations 
offered  to  viewers  during  reporting  of  the  peace  conference.  These  explanations, 
124 which  were  contested  by  the  opposing  parties,  related  to  various  different  aspects  of 
the  conflict,  and  the  moves  towards  a  settlement.  Some  explanations  referred  to  the 
historical  origins  of  the  conflict.  Others  focused  on  why  the  peace  process  had  ground 
to  a  halt  and  who  was  to  blame.  There  were  also  the  differing  perspectives  on  the 
issues  which  separated  the  parties,  like  settlements  and  the  status  of  Jerusalem,  as  well 
as  the  factors  which  led  some  parties  to  oppose  the  peace  process.  The  purpose  is  to 
ascertain  whether  certain  perspectives  and  explanations  were  highlighted  in  coverage 
and  whether  others  were  marginalized.  It  thus  looked  at  questions  of  representation, 
access  and  power. 
Methodolggy 
In  October  2002  Stephen  Bates  reported  that  the  Israeli  state  had  commissioned  two 
of  America's  most  renowned  public  relationships  professionals  in  order  to  try  and 
improve  Israel's  public  image  and  counter  what  was  argued  was  a  bias  against  Israel 
in  the  British  media  (Guardian  12  October  2002).  Bates  cited  comments  by  Gidon 
Meir,  the  Israeli  foreign  ministry's  deputy  director  for  public  affairs,  who  described 
the  Palestinian  public  relations  strategy  as  a  'strategic  threat'.  Meir  argued  that  the 
'Palestinians  understand  that  one  of  the  most  important  weapons  in  this  conflict  is  a 
camera  ...  In  some  places  we  are  winning  and  in  others  we  are  losing  and  are  engaged 
in  damage  control'.  Meir  is  emphasizing  the  importance  of  the  mass  media  as  a  site  in 
the  struggle  for  public  legitimacy.  The  winning  of  public  consent  in  democratic 
societies  is  vital  for  the  exercise  of  power  and  this  is  no  less  true  in  an  international 
context.  The  ability  to  engineer  that  consent  is  partly  dependent  on  the  capacity  to 
make  sure  that  a  particular  perspective  or  ideology  becomes  widely  accepted.  The 
mass  media  then  serve  as  a  site  of  conflict  where  various  groups  struggle  to  make  sure 
that  their  perspective  predominates  whilst  that  of  the  their  rivals  is  marginalized. 
However  this  struggle  does  not  take  place  on  a  level  playing  field.  Some  groups 
because  of  their  place  in  the  institutional  structure  of  British  political  life,  or  ability  to 
access  public  relations  resources  have  inbuilt  advantages  in  making  sure  their 
perspective  is  heard.  The  methodology  employed  here,  Thematic  Analysis,  examines 
how  competing  viewpoints  are  covered  (or  excluded)  by  journalists  in  controversial 
areas  of  coverage.  The  methodology  has  been  developed  by  the  Glasgow  Media 
Group  and  applied  to  a  number  of  different  areas  of  news  coverage  such  as  industrial 
125 news,  war  reporting  and  coverage  of  public  health  issues.  In  the  mid  1970s  the  group 
examined  the  coverage  of  British  industrial  news  and  in  particular  focused  on  the 
differing  explanations  put  forward  for  Britain's  declining  industrial  performance. 
Whilst  business  leaders  and  the  Conservative  party  blamed  the  decline  on  the  power 
of  unions  and  the  prevalence  of  strike  action,  the  trade  unions  pointed  to  low  levels  of 
investment  in  plant  and  machinery  which  meant  that  workers  in  competing  countries 
were  using  more  modem  and  efficient  equipment.  The  group  examined  the  published 
evidence  which  supported  both  positions  and  then  examined  which  perspectives  were 
highlighted  or  downplayed  in  television  news  coverage.  The  group  found  that  while 
there  was  much  coverage  which  blamed  the  decline  on  strike  action  and  the  behaviour 
of  trade  unions,  there  was  none  which  linked  it  to  low  levels  of  investment  or 
management  failings.  They  also  suggested  that  once  the  explanation  that  'strikes  were 
to  blame'  became  established  in  the  news  this  then  set  the  pattern  and  structure  for 
further  reporting.  Journalists  would  visit  factories  and  interview  workers  about  strikes, 
but  not  interview  or  question  management  about  investment  decisions.  Thus  the 
pattern  of  coverage  could  implicitly  assume  the  explanation  that  strikes  were  the 
culprit  without  actually  having  to  state  it  explicitly. 
In  the  previous  chapters  I  reviewed  how  the  historical  record  of  the  conflict 
has  been  contested  by  Israelis  and  Palestinians.  The  purpose  of  this  exercise  was  to 
lay  out  the  range  of  views  which  exist  on  the  conflict.  In  the  content  analysis,  I  want 
to  examine  how  journalists  have  utilised  elements  of  history  of  the  conflict  to 
contextualise  their  coverage,  and  explain  events.  I  begun  by  transcribing  all  news 
coverage  of  the  Wye  Accords  on  all  five  terrestrial  channels.  In  total  44  bulletins  were 
transcribed  over  six  viewing  days  yielding  1417  lines  of  text.  I  then  calculated  the 
amount  of  space  give  to  different  subject  areas.  The  most  prominent  area  of  coverage 
dealt  with  the  latest  progress  of  negotiations  and  discussion  of  America's  role  in 
brokering  the  conference,  accounting  for  nearly  half  the  coverage.  This  was  followed 
by  an  examination  of  the  range  of  explanations  offered  to  viewers  in  relation  to 
various  aspects  of  the  conflict.  Some  explanations  related  to  the  history  and  origins  of 
the  conflict,  others  concerned  the  issues  under  discussion  at  the  summit  and  a  third 
category  dealt  with  the  final  status  issues,  such  as  Jerusalem,  which  were  at  the  heart 
of  the  conflict.  This  was  followed  by  an  analysis  of  howjournalists  evaluated  the 
health  of  the  peace  process  and  discussed  those  who  opposed  the  process.  Finally  I 
examined  the  access  given  to  the  Palestinian  and  Israeli  sources,  the  quantity  of  space 
126 given  to  reported  statements  from  both  sides  and  the  language  used  by  j  ournalists  in 
talking  about  the  conflict. 
Whilst  discussing  the  coverage  I  also  reference  audience  research  which 
examined  public  understanding  of  the  conflict.  This  research  involved  both 
questionnaire  and  focus  group  methods.  The  focus  groups  consisted  of  seven  to  eight 
people  on  average,  who  were  brought  together  by  a  mediator  to  discuss  various 
aspects  of  the  conflict.  In  total  100  people  were  involved  in  the  focus  groups  who 
were  selected  on  the  basis  of  income,  age  and  gender.  The  questionnaire  part  of  the 
study  involved  more  than  700  students  from  Britain,  America  and  Germany 
answering  questions  about  various  aspects  of  the  conflict.  This  research  can  be  found 
in  Philo  and  Berry  (2004). 
Theme  1:  Progress  of  talks/Movement  of  dignitaries/Discussion  of  America's  role  in 
the  Peace  Process 
This  was  by  far  the  largest  single  aspect  of  the  coverage  accounting  for  53  percent  of 
the  total  (753  lines  out  of  1417).  Within  this  category  was  grouped  all  news  coverage 
that  dealt  with  the  movement  of  important  dignitaries,  the  progress  of  peace 
negotiations  and  discussion  of  America's  role  in  brokering  the  conference.  Any 
references  to  the  issues  being  discussed  or  the  history  or  causes  of  the  conflict  were 
not  included  within  this  category.  Much  of  the  coverage  consisted  of  updates  on  the 
progress  of  talks,  with  extensive  description  of  the  latest  developments.  However 
these  reports  on  the  progress  of  the  talks  were  rarely  accompanied  by  any  in  depth 
discussion  of  what  was  being  negotiated  or  the  factors  underpinning  the  conflict.  Here 
for  example  is  a  news  bulletin  from  ITN  reproduced  in  its  entirety: 
Newscaster:  The  West  Bank  Peace  talks  in  America  are  on  the  brink  of 
collapse  tonight  with  the  Israelis  saying  they  have  their  engines  running  and 
are  ready  to  pull  out.  The  negotiations  have  gone  on  longer  than  scheduled. 
President  Clinton  has  been  trying  to  nudge  the  two  sides  together.  King 
Hussein  of  Jordan  left  his  sick  bed  to  help. 
127 Journalist:  The  talks  in  this  secluded  mansion  outside  Washington  were 
supposed  to  last  two  days.  That  was  seven  days  ago.  In  that  time  the 
Palestinian  and  Israeli  leadership  have  been  deadlocked  unable  to  get  the 
peace  process  that  began  in  Oslo  five  years  ago  back  on  schedule.  King 
Hussein  of  Jordan  has  come  from  his  sick  bed  in  a  Minnesota  cancer  clinic  to 
try  and  achieve  a  breakthrough,  so  far  to  no  avail.  President  Clinton  has  made 
repeated  visits  to  negotiate  with  the  leaders  separately  and  together  but  he  too 
cannot  bridge  the  gap.  Perhaps  the  most  striking  thing  about  these  talks  is  the 
amount  of  time  the  President  has  invested  personally  he  has  been  here  six  days 
out  of  seven.  It  means  that  if  they  succeed  they  will  be  seen  as  a  considerable 
personal  triumph  but  if  they  fail  a  serious  setback  for  the  prestige  of  American 
diplomacy.  And  with  the  Israelis  today  threatening  to  pack  up  and  go  home 
failure  seems  the  most  likely  outcome.  The  State  Department  spokesman  was 
today  brutally  realistic. 
US  State  Department  Spokesman:  We  can't  hold  people  here  against  their  will 
and  we  can't  make  them  make  the  tough  choices.  This  is  their  security 
interests  that  are  at  stake,  for  both  the  Palestinians  and  the  Israelis,  their  future 
that  is  at  stake  and  they  have  to  make  those  decisions. 
Journalist:  President  Clinton  is  deciding  now  whether  to  make  another  visit  to 
the  talks  this  evening.  After  seven  days  patience  is  running  short.  There  may 
not  be  much  time  left.  (ITV,  Evening  News,  21  October  1998) 
Television  news  because  of  its  format  puts  a  premium  on  the  latest  updates 
and  breaking  news.  However  this  emphasis  on  immediacy  can  marginalize 
explanations  that  are  necessary  if  viewers  are  to  understand  stories.  There  is  nothing 
in  the  above  broadcast,  except  the  brief  comment  from  an  official  US  source  that 
4  security  interests...  are  at  stake'  that  gives  the  viewing  audience  any  clues  as  to  what 
was  actually  under  discussion  at  the  talks  or  what  the  conflict  is  about.  Here  is  another 
report  this  time  from  an  early  evening  news  bulletin  on  BBC  1: 
Newscaster:  King  Hussein  of  Jordan  has  flown  from  his  hospital  bed  to  join 
President  Clinton's  attempt  to  cajole  the  Middle  East  talks  to  some  sort  of 
128 agreement.  The  talks  in  Maryland  have  entered  their  sixth  day  with  no  sign  of 
a  breakthrough.  Meanwhile  the  armed  wing  of  the  militant  Islamic  movement 
Hamas,  has  said  that  it  carried  out  the  grenade  attack  which  brought  the  talks 
to  the  brink  of  collapse.  And  our  Washington  correspondent  Stephen  Sackur  is 
at  the  talks  in  Maryland.  Stephen,  King  Hussein  is  clearly  very  ill  why  is  his 
intervention  considered  necessary? 
Journalist:  The  Americans  believe  that  King  Hussein  could  make  the 
difference  between  success  and  failure  in  this  six  day  long  summit.  They 
believe  that  he  is  the  one  man  who  has  the  ear  of  both  Benjamin  Netanyahu, 
the  Israeli  prime  minister,  and  Yasser  Arafat  the  Palestinian  leader.  And  in 
particular  King  Hussein  is  going  to  express  fears,  also  expressed  by  President 
Clinton  that  if  no  deal  is  done  here  in  Maryland  then  the  whole  Middle  East 
could  go  into  a  series  of  conflicts  and  turmoil  which  would  be  very  bad  for  the 
Palestinians,  bad  for  the  Israelis  and  bad  for  neighbours  like  King  Hussein  of 
Jordan.  So  its  going  to  be  a  clear  message  a  simple  message  to  both  sides  that 
a  deal  must  be  done  and  it  must  be  done  now. 
Newscaster:  Is  yesterday's  grenade  attack  still  having  an  effect  on  the  talks? 
Journalist:  In  a  sense  not  so  much.  The  Israelis  yesterday  in  the  immediate 
aftermath  of  that  attack  in  Beersheba  in  Israel  said  that  they  would  talk  about 
nothing  in  these  negotiations  except  security.  They  suspended  all  other  talks. 
Well  today  their  position  has  shifted  and  I  understand  that  is because  of 
substantial  American  pressure.  The  Americans  were  frustrated  that  the  Israelis 
were  allowing  that  terror  attack  to  shift  the  whole  nature  of  these  talks  there 
were  serious  words  between  President  Clinton  and  Benjamin  Netanyahu  about 
that  last  night.  And  now  all  of  the  committees  are  doing  their  work  I've  just 
spoken  to  the  State  department  spokesman  who  says  that  very  hard  bargaining 
is  taking  place  and  it  does  look  as  though  in  the  words  of  the  Americans  we 
are  reaching  the  end  game  in  this  long  summit.  (BBC  1,  Early  Evening  News 
20  October  1998) 
129 In  this  example  there  is  a  very  brief  mention  that  the  Israeli  delegation  'would  talk 
about  nothing  in  these  negotiations  except  security'  but  little  information  about  the 
issues  at  the  talks.  The  pronounced  emphasis  on  the  latest  events  and  the  role  of 
important  dignitaries,  tends  to  crowd  out  explanations  for  the  conflict  which  might 
help  viewers  understand  the  motivations  and  positions  of  the  Israelis  and  Palestinians. 
As  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  chapter  dealing  with  production  factors,  this 
appears  partly  to  be  a  function  of  the  pressure  to  produce  dramatic  bulletins  which 
will  maximise  audiences.  The  former  BBC  correspondent  Tim  Llewelyn  has  spoken 
of  the  'intense  competitiveness'  between  news  channels.  News  editors,  he  suggests, 
4  want  stuff  that  has  immediate  impact,  they  don't  want  somebody  explaining 
anything  ...  the  competition,  the  bang  bang  aspect,  the  drama  of  news  has  overridden 
everything  else'  (Interview,  16  April  2004).  In  the  above  news  bulletins  there  seems 
to  be  an  attempt  by  j  ournalists  to  inject  drama  into  the  proceedings  at  the  expense  of 
producing  more  analytical  coverage.  Journalists'  talk  of  the  Israelis  with  their 
4engines  running  ...  ready  to  pull  out',  the  arrival  of  the  cancer-striken  King  Hussein 
from  his  'sick  bed'.  the  'striking'  personal  commitment  of  Bill  Clinton  and  the  danger 
that  'the  whole  Middle  East  could  go  into  a  series  of  conflicts  and  turmoil'  is 
dramatic.  However  other  areas  of  coverage  appeared  to  suggest  that  what  was  being 
debated  at  the  Summit  was  not  as  significant  as  the  reports  above  indicated.  For 
instance  an  ITV  correspondent  later  reported  that  an  Israeli  source  had  told  him  that 
'what  has  been  negotiated  over  the  past  week  are  simply  peanuts  compared  to  the 
major  issues  that  have  yet  to  emerge  in  a  final  agreement'  (ITV,  lunchtime  news,  23 
October  1998).  The  essential  point  is  that  by  devoting  more  than  half  of  all  coverage 
to  latest  developments,  or  descriptive  accounts  of  America's  role  in  negotiations  this 
leaves  less  space  to  provide  analysis  of  the  conflict.  As  will  be  seen,  vital  aspects  of 
the  dispute,  necessary  for  a  coherent  understanding  of  the  conflict  were  barely 
mentioned. 
The  role  of  the  United  States  received  a  great  deal  of  attention  in  reporting. 
Comments  about  American  diplomacy  and  in  particular  President  Clinton's  role 
accounted  for  23  percent  of  all  coverage  (328  lines  out  of  1417).  All  comments 
regarding  the  role  of  the  United  States  were  extremely  positive,  arguing  that  President 
Clinton  had  expended  a  great  deal  of  effort  in  attempting  to  bring  peace  to  the  Middle 
East  and  that  if  the  summit  failed  it  would  be  a  'serious  setback'  for  American 
diplomacy: 
130 President  Clinton  wants  a  Middle  East  peace  agreement  very  badly  perhaps 
more  than  the  Israelis  and  the  Palestinians  themselves.  His  extraordinary 
investment  of  time  and  prestige  in  this  summit  continued  today,  he  went  to 
Maryland  with  a  familiar  message.  (BBC  I  Early  Evening  News,  22  October 
1998) 
It  took  20  hours  of  non-stop  talks  away  from  the  TV  cameras  to  clinch  the 
deal.  President  Clinton  pressured  Benjamin  Netanyahu  and  Yasser  Arafat 
through  a  series  of  last  minute  problems.  Just  after  3am  local  time  the  deal  was 
done.  The  Palestinians  get  more  West  Bank  land  the  Israelis  receive  new 
security  commitments,  the  Americans  will  oversee  the  deal.  (BBC  I  Early 
Evening  News,  23  October  1998) 
President  Clinton  has  made  repeated  visits  to  negotiate  with  the  leaders 
separately  and  together  but  he  too  cannot  bridge  the  gap.  Perhaps  the  most 
striking  thing  about  these  talks  is  the  amount  of  time  the  President  has 
invested  personally  he  has  been  here  six  days  out  of  seven.  It  means  that  if 
they  succeed  they  will  be  seen  as  a  considerable  personal  triumph  but  if  they 
fail  a  serious  setback  for  the  prestige  of  American  diplomacy.  (ITV  Evening 
News,  21  October  1998) 
Well  it  is  a  big  deal  for  President  Clinton  and  I  would  argue  that  President 
Clinton  needed  this  deal  at  this  particular  time  more  than  either  Mr  Arafat  or 
more  than  Mr  Netanyahu  as  well.  He  had  invested  so  much  time  and  prestige 
in  this  summit  and  in  the  effort  to  get  this  interim  deal  together  that  it  would 
have  a  terrible  blow  to  his  prestige  and  his  international  credibility  if  he  failed. 
There  was  a  blazing  row  today  I  understand  between  the  Israeli  Prime  Minister 
and  Bill  Clinton  and  it  looked  as  though  at  the  very  last  minute  the  Israelis 
might  withdraw  from  the  deal  because  of  a  row  over  an  Israeli  spy  in  an 
American  jail.  But  Bill  Clinton  stood  his  ground  he  got  through  that  and  he 
won  a  standing  ovation  tonight  from  all  sides  for  his  effort  to  make  this  work. 
(BBC2  Newsnight,  23  October  1998) 
131 The  clear  message  of  the  coverage  appears  to  be  that  President  Clinton  is  acting  a 
peace  broker,  attempting  to  'bridge  the  gap'  between  two  bitter  enemies.  The 
president  is  portrayed  as  having  put  an  'extraordinary  investment  of  time  and  prestige' 
into  the  peace  process,  having  'stood  his  ground'  in  the  face  of  Israeli  demands  and 
4won  a  standing  ovation  tonight  from  all  sides  for  his  effort  to  make  this  work'.  In  one 
exchange  between  a  BBC  news  anchor  and  a  foreign  correspondent  it  was  suggested 
that  American  pressure  on  Israel  had  been  so  great  that  it  might  threaten  the 
relationship  between  the  two  countries: 
Correspondent:  The  Israelis  say  those  security  proposals  are  simply  not 
enough  and  that  the  Palestinians  are  breaking  promises,  in  this  case  you've  got 
the  Palestinians  and  Americans  on  one  side  and  the  Israelis  on  the  other.  It 
may  be  a  situation  in  which  the  Israelis  feel  they  have  no  option  but  to  walk 
out. 
News  Anchor:  And  could  we  be  looking  here,  briefly  Stephen,  at  the 
breakdown  of  a  relationship  between  the  United  States  and  Israel. 
Correspondent:  Its  to  early  to  say  that  Peter,  but  I've  just  had  James  Rubin,  the 
state  department  spokesman,  say  that  this  is  a  key  moment  in  the  history  of  the 
Middle  East  peace  process.  (BBC  I  evening  news,  21  October  1998) 
For  Newsnight's  David  Sales  the  prerequisite  for  any  further  moves  towards  a 
peaceful  solution  was  even  more  American  involvement: 
It  will  take  a  miracle  for  a  permanently  reluctant  Netanyahu  and  a  much 
weakened  Arafat  to  bring  about  any  final  agreement  on  schedule  given  the 
blood,  sweat,  tears,  and  brinkmanship  that  have  plagued  even  this  week's 
modest  interim  deal.  The  absolute  must  for  any  success  will  be  for  Mr  Clinton 
to  get  down  there  in  the  trenches  as  he  has  done  this  past  week.  Without  him 
nothing.  (BBC2,  Newsnight  23  October  1998) 
However  a  rather  different  image  of  the  Clinton  administration's  position  in 
the  conflict  appeared  in  the  Israeli  press  some  time  before  the  summit.  Under  the  title 
132 'The  Jews  who  run  Clinton's  Court'  Maariv  columnist  Avinoam  Bar-Yosef,  spoke  of 
the  'enormous  Jewish  influence'  within  the  Clinton  administration  manifested  in  the 
high  proportion  of  Jews  employed  in  the  most  senior  and  sensitive  positions  within 
the  government  (2  September  1994).  Bar-Yosef  noted  that  'in  the  National  Security 
Council,  7  out  of  II  top  staffers  are  Jews'  whom  Clinton  had  placed  'in  the  most 
sensitive  junctions  in  the  U.  S.  security  and  foreign  policy  administrations'.  He  further 
maintained  that  'the  situation  is  not  much  different  in  the  president's  office,  which  is 
full  of  warm  [pro-Israel]  Jews'  and  the  State  Department  which  has  a  'a  long  list  of 
senior  Jewish  officials'  including  many  members  of  the  pro-Israel  lobby.  Bar-Yosef 
also  noted  that  two  members  of  the  pro-Israel  lobby,  Dennis  Ross  and  Martin  Idnyk 
headed  the  Clinton  administration's  Middle  East  policy  team.  Martin  Idnyk  was 
previously  a  media  consultant  to  the  far  right  Israeli  prime  ministers  Menachem  Begin 
and  Yitzak  Shamir.  He  later  became  director  of  research  for  the  leading  pro-Israel 
pressure  group,  the  American  Israel  Public  Affairs  Committee  (AIPAC).  AIPAC 
consistently  features  in  Fortune  magazine's  list  of  America's  most  influential  lobby 
groups  and  it's  website  states  that  'the  US  must  stand  by  its  loyal  ally,  Israel,  and  not 
subscribe  to  an  unprincipled  policy  of  'even-handedness"  in  its  dealings  with  the 
Israel-Palestine  conflict  (AIPAC,  2004).  It  has  been  suggested  that  AIPAC  and  the 
wider  pro-Israel  lobby  create  such  political  pressure  that  it  is  very  difficult  for 
American  administrations  to  take  an  objective  stance  on  the  conflict: 
AIPAC  has  a  lot  of  influence  on  foreign  policy.  They  work  very  hard  to  make 
sure  that  America  endorses  pretty  much  Israel's  view  of  the  world  and  the 
Middle  East.  They  do  partly  by  convincing,  partly  by  implied  threats.  AIPAC 
does  not  raise  money  for  candidates  but  there  are  Jewish  PACs  (Political 
Action  Committees)  that  raise  campaign  funds  for  candidates.  Four  or  five 
times  over  the  last  twenty  years,  these  PACs  have  gone  after  members  of 
Congress  who  voted  in  ways  that  AIPAC  didn't  like.  They  have  flooded  their 
opponents  with  money  and  enabled  them  to  beat  the  incumbents.  Sent  a 
message  that  if  you  really  want  to  go  against  AIPAC,  you'd  better  know  where 
your  next  dollar  is  coming  from.  So  that,  as  I've  been  told  by  a  number  of 
congressional  aides  over  the  last  few  years,  if  the  congressman  doesn't  vote 
against  Arafat,  they'll  pay  a  price.  If  they  do  vote  against  Arafat,  there's  no 
price  to  be  paid.  There's  no  percentage  for  the  member  of  Congress  to  stand 
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punished.  (A  Lobby  to  Reckon  With,  BBC  Radio  4,7  May  2002,  cited  in  Philo 
&  Berry,  2004:  253) 
The  Clinton  administration  provided  more  than  three  billion  dollars  worth  of 
annual  aid  to  Israel.  Much  of  the  funding  was  spent  on  military  equipment,  which  was 
used  against  Palestinians.  Some  of  the  aid  was  also  used  for  building  illegal  Israeli 
settlements  in  the  occupied  territories  (Said,  1996).  The  Clinton  administration  had 
also  provided  diplomatic  support  for  successive  Israeli  governments'  illegal 
settlement  building  programs.  Palestinians  believed  that  the  creation  of  more 
settlements  was  undercutting  the  peace  process,  because  once  these  'facts  on  the 
ground',  as  some  Israeli  leaders  had  referred  to  the  settlement  blocks,  were 
established,  it  was  highly  unlikely  they  would  ever  be  returned  in  a  peace  agreement. 
The  United  Nations  had  repeatedly  criticized  Israel's  settlement  drive,  which  it 
described  as  an  'obstacle  to  peace'.  The  previous  year  when  the  Netanyahu 
government  began  construction  of  a  6,500  unit  settlement  block  in  occupied  East 
Jerusalem,  the  General  Assembly  had  condemned  the  move  by  130  votes  to  2  (Israel 
and  the  United  States).  When  the  issue  moved  to  the  Security  Council  the  Clinton 
administration  twice  vetoed  resolutions  condemning  the  settlement  activity.  It  was  not 
difficult  to  find  alternative  voices  which  questioned  what  Clinton  was  actually 
supporting  under  the  banner  of  the  Oslo  process,  even  in  the  Israeli  press.  A  week 
before  the  talks  began,  Edward  Said  wrote  of  the  'bankruptcy'  of  the  Oslo  process: 
If  the  last  few  years  have  proved  one  thing,  it  is  the  bankruptcy  of  the  vision 
proclaimed  by  Oslo,  and  of  the  leadership  that  engineered  the  whole  wretched 
thing.  It  left  huge  numbers  of  Palestinians  unrepresented,  impoverished  and 
forgotten;  it  allowed  Israel  to  expropriate  more  land  in  addition  to 
consolidating  its  hold  on  Jerusalem,  the  Golan  Heights,  and  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  settlements;  it  validated  the  notion  of  what  can  only  be  called  petty 
Palestinian  nationalism,  which  in  reality  was  little  more  than  a  few  wom-out 
slogans  and  the  survival  of  the  old  PLO  leadership  ...  Oslo,  in  my  view,  was  a 
clever  way  for  the  Labor  Party  to  create  a  series  of  Bantustans  in  which  the 
Palestinians  would  be  confined  and  dominated  by  Israel,  at  the  same  time 
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October  1998) 
Likewise  Robert  Fisk  writing  in  the  Independent  after  the  talks  was  very  critical  of 
what  had  been  agreed  and  America's  role  in  the  process: 
Oslo  and  Wye  destroyed  any  Palestinian  hope  for  a  just  peace.  Israel  was 
allowed  to  build  more  Jewish  settlements  on  Palestinian  land,  confiscate 
Palestinian  identity  papers,  demolish  Palestinian  homes.  And  Arafat  -  for 
perhaps  14  per  cent  of  the  land  of  'Palestine'  -  had  to  promise  to  protect  the 
Israelis  who  were  building  the  settlements,  confiscating  the  paper  and 
demolishing  the  homes.  And  they  called  it  peace.  (Independent,  16  December 
1998). 
The  views  presented  above  represent  a  very  different  view  of  the  American 
administration  than  that  presented  to  viewers.  Many  Palestinians  did  not  believe  that 
the  'absolute  must  for  any  success  [in  the  peace  process]  will  be  for  Mr  Clinton  to  get 
down  there  in  the  trenches'  (BBC2  Newsnight,  23  October  1998).  Instead  many 
believed  the  American  president  was  giving  unconditional  support  to  unilateral  Israeli 
moves  which  were  undermining  any  possibility  of  a  just  settlement. 
Theme  2:  Explanations  for  the  Conflict 
In  this  section  were  analysed  all  references  to  the  history  of  the  conflict  and  the 
various  factors  which  underpinned  the  dispute.  This  area  of  coverage  is  important 
because  it  provides  rationale  and  explanations  for  the  actions  and  motivations  of  the 
protagonists.  It  is  difficult  for  viewers  to  comprehend  why  the  dispute  has  been  so 
bitter,  bloody  and  protracted  without  some  information  regarding  the  history  of  the 
conflict  and  the  various  issues  which  still  separate  the  two  parties.  This  area  dealing 
with  explanations  is  also  the  most  controversial  aspect  of  reporting  because  it  involves 
a  great  deal  of  contested  history.  For  instance,  the  Israeli  and  Palestinian  perspectives 
on  issues  such  as  refugees  and  settlements  are  markedly  different.  Three  important 
areas  of  coverage  were  identified.  The  first  deals  with  the  origins  and  historical  roots 
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the  table  during  the  Wye  Summit  and  the  third  deals  with  the  issues  which  were 
postponed  to  the  final  status  negotiations.  These  final  status  issues,  such  as  the  future 
of  settlements,  Jerusalem,  and  Palestinian  refugees  are  at  the  heart  of  the  conflict  and 
it  is  very  difficult  to  understand  the  conflict  without  some  knowledge  of  them. 
The  Historical  Origins  of  the  Conflict 
There  were  no  attempts  in  the  coverage  to  outline  the  history  of  the  conflict  or  explain 
how  the  protagonists  had  become  involved  in  such  a  long  running  dispute.  Out  of 
1417  lines  of  coverage  only  4  or  0.28  percent  of  the  total  coverage  mentioned  any 
aspect  of  the  conflict's  history: 
And  this  morning  in  Israel  settlers  from  the  West  Bank  tried  blocking 
Palestinian  traffic  praying  for  the  talks  to  fail  and  urging  Benjamin  Netanyahu 
to  return  none  of  the  land  captured  in  1967  (Channel  5  Lunchtime  News,  22 
October  1998) 
In  East  Jerusalem  which  Israel  has  occupied  since  the  1967  war  Palestinians 
were  relieved  that  the  deadlock  has  been  broken.  (BBC I  Early  Evening  News, 
24  October  1998) 
The  Luz  family  live  in  the  settlement  of  Beit-El  on  land  Israel  captured  in  the 
1967  war  because  they  feel  this  is  the  heartland  of  the  Jewish  people  (BBC  I 
Evening  News,  24  October  1998) 
A  swap  of  more  Palestinian  land  occupied  by  Israel  since  1967  in  return  for 
tougher  Palestinian  measures  against  Islamic  terrorists.  (BBC2  Newsnight,  23 
October  1998) 
These  brief  allusions  to  the  six  day  war  offer  little  to  those  who  do  not  already  possess 
a  knowledge  of  the  conflict's  history.  All  of  the  major  issues  separating  the  two 
parties,  i.  e.  the  settlements,  Palestinian  statehood,  the  refugees,  the  military 
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to  key  moments  in  the  region's  history.  For  instance,  to  understand  the  refugee  issue 
requires  the  knowledge  that  the  refugee  problem  was  created  during  the  birth  of  the 
state  of  Israel  when  approximately  three  quarter  of  a  million  Palestinians  were 
displaced  from  their  homes  (Gilbert,  1999).  Despite  many  UN  resolutions  they  were 
never  allowed  to  return.  To  understand  the  military  occupation,  the  significance  of 
Jerusalem,  and  why  Israel  has  security  concerns  requires  knowledge  about  the  events 
of  1967  when  Israel  conquered  the  West  Bank,  Gaza  Strip,  Golan  Heights  and  East 
Jerusalem.  Israelis  and  Palestinians,  of  course,  offer  different  accounts  of  those  two 
pivotal  years,  but  without  any  knowledge  of  events  in  1948  and  1967  it  is  very 
difficult  to  understand  the  conflict.  However  with  a  little  historical  background  it 
becomes  easier  to  understand  the  significance  of  the  various  contentious  issues  and 
the  motivations  of  the  two  Parties. 
What  is  particularly  ironic  about  the  lack  of  historical  context  presented  to 
viewers,  is  that  many  of  the  BBC  reports  were  presented  by  its  chief  Middle  East 
correspondent,  Jeremy  Bowen,  who  has  written  extensively  about  how  the  present 
conflict  is  in  large  part  a  consequence  of  the  events  of  1967.  In  Six  Days:  How  the 
1967  War  Shaped  the  Middle  East  Bowen  argues  that  in  order  to  understand  why  the 
conflict  is  so  deep  seated  one  must  go  back  to  the  events  of  1967: 
The  six  day  war  swept  up  a  generation  of  Israelis  and  Arabs  whose  children 
still  cannot  live  peacefully  in  the  world  the  war  created.  Israelis  deserve 
peaceful,  safe  lives.  Palestinians  who  were  dispossessed  and  exiled  if  they 
became  refugees,  humiliated  and  abused  if  they  stayed,  deserve  justice. 
Israel's  overwhelming  victory  turned  into  a  curse.  It  has  never  been  able  to 
digest  the  land  it  swallowed  in  1967.  It  has  poured  money  in  colonising  the 
Occupied  Territories,  defying  international  law  and  splitting  its  own  people. 
Thirty  six  years  after  six  days  of  fighting  with  Jordan,  Egypt  and  Syria,  after 
thousands  more  deaths  and  the  failure  of  six  years  of  negotiations  Israelis  and 
Palestinians  are  still  fighting  over  the  future  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  It  is 
still  a  low  intensity  war.  But  if  another  full  blown  Middle  East  war  breaks  out, 
its  roots  will  live  in  those  six  days  in  1967.  The  Middle  East  will  have  no 
peace  until  Israelis  and  Palestinians,  as  equal  partners  settle  the  future  of  the 
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(Bowen,  2004:  3-4) 
An  obvious  question  arises-  if  the  journalist  recognises  so  clearly  the 
importance  of  knowing  about  key  moments  in  the  region's  history  as  a  prerequisite 
for  understanding  the  conflict  (and  how  to  resolve  it),  then  why  doesn't  he  provide 
any  information  about  those  pivotal  moments  when  he's  standing  in  front  of  a  camera 
as  a  BBC  correspondent?  Focus  group  work  suggests  that  the  lack  of  historical 
context  has  a  serious  impact  on  audiences'  ability  to  understand  the  conflict  and  the 
motivations  of  Israelis  and  Palestinians.  However  it  was  found  that  even  providing  a 
very  brief  potted  history  of  the  conflict  could  have  a  'dramatic  effect'  on  the 
understanding  of  viewers: 
The  majority  [of  focus  group  members]  also  had  no  knowledge  of  the  link 
between  the  wars  of  1948  and  1967  -  that  Palestinians  who  were  displaced 
from  what  became  Israel  in  1948  moved  to  areas  such  as  Gaza,  the  West  Bank 
of  the  Jordan  and  East  Jerusalem  and  were  then  subject  to  military  occupation 
after  1967.  In  the  focus  groups,  the  moderator  was  sometimes  asked  by  the 
participants  about  the  origins  of  the  conflict.  In  response  they  were  given  a 
very  brief  account  of  the  events  of  1948  and  1967,  based  on  the  work  of  the 
Israeli  historian  Avi  Shlaim  (2000),  and  sometimes  helped  by  the  comments  of 
journalists  who  were  present.  Although  the  account  given  was  extremely  brief 
it  could  have  a  very  dramatic  effect  on  the  understanding  of  group  members. 
(Philo  and  Berry,  2004:  213) 
The  lack  of  historical  context  is  a  particular  problem  for  Palestinians  because  their 
grievances  such  as  the  refugee  issue  and  the  military  occupation,  which  are  related  to 
particular  historical  events,  are  occasionally  named  but  never  properly  explained  so  as 
to  make  clear  their  importance.  Conversely,  as  will  be  seen,  the  major  issue  for 
Israelis,  their  personal  security,  received  extensive  coverage. 
138 Interim  Issues 
This  area  of  coverage  involved  what  was  actually  under  discussion  at  the  Wye 
Summit.  Understandably  j  ournalists  chose  to  focus  far  more  extensively  on  these 
interim  issues  than  on  the  more  intractable  and  important  final  status  issues,  which 
had  been  postponed  to  a  later  date.  The  discussion  of  interim  issues  accounted  for  15 
percent  of  total  coverage  (217  lines  out  of  1417). 
Land  and  Security 
One  of  the  ways  the  interim  issues  were  explained  was  to  group  two  main  issues,  the 
return  of  Palestinian  land  and  the  security  of  Israelis  together.  This  accounted  for  2.7 
percent  of  total  coverage  (39  lines  out  of  1417)  and  approximately  a  third  of  all 
coverage  of  interim  issues.  Journalists  employed  phrases  such  as  'land  and  security' 
or  'land  for  peace'  as  a  form  of  shorthand  for  the  central  focus  of  the  summit 
The  two  sides  have  been  talking  for  eight  days  trying  to  reach  a  deal  over  land 
and  security  in  the  West  Bank  (BBC  I  Evening  News,  22  October  1998) 
Negotiators  have  been  working  through  the  night  to  draw  up  a  new  deal  over 
land  and  security  issues  and  President  Clinton  is  expected  to  return  later  today 
to  add  his  weight  to  any  agreement  (ITV  Lunchtime  News,  22  October  1998) 
And  its  an  interim  deal  based  on  the  exchange  land  for  security  (Channel  4 
News,  23  October  1998) 
Back  in  America  President  Clinton  who  has  already  spent  57  hours  at  the  talks 
waits  in  Washington,  hoping  to  be  called  back  to  the  talks  if  the  two  sides  can 
conclude  a  deal  on  land  and  terrorism  (Channel  5  Lunchtime  News,  22 
October  1998) 
Journalists  are  expected  to  point  out  what  was  actually  being  debated  at  the 
summit  but  explanations  presented  in  this  format  are  not  very  informative  to  viewers 
139 who  lack  detailed  background  knowledge  of  the  conflict.  With  virtually  no  historical 
background  provided  in  coverage  it  maybe  difficult  for  viewers  to  understand  what 
'land'  in  this  context  means.  Is  it  Israeli  land  that  is  being  given  up  as  a  compromise 
for  peace?  or  is  it  land  that  was  conquered  by  Israel  and  is  being  returned  to  its  legal 
owners?  In  coverage  the  status  of  the  'land'  is  unclear.  Focus  group  research  suggests 
that  viewers'  understanding  of  the  territorial  dimensions  of  the  conflict  are  confused 
and  contradictory,  with  many  viewers  believing  that  the  conflict  involved  two  states 
fighting  over  a  coveted  piece  of  land,  as  in  a  border  dispute  (Philo  &  Berry,  2004). 
The  occupied  territories  are  regarded  under  international  law  as  Palestinian  territory, 
and  j  ournalists  could  have  made  this  clear  by  stating  that  Israel  was  returning  land  that 
it  had  captured  during  the  six  day  war  in  1967.  On  some  occasions  this  was  made 
clear.  For  instance  on  one  Channel  5  bulletin  (Lunchtime,  22  October  1998)  a 
journalist  reports  that  settlers  were  urging  the  Israeli  Prime  Minister  'to  return  none  of 
the  land  captured  in  1967'.  However  on  nearly  90  percent  of  occasions  (28/32 
references,  87.5  percent  of  the  total)  journalists  used  neutral  phrases  such  as  transfer, 
pullback,  withdrawal,  or  phrases  which  suggested  Israel  was  transferring  territory  it 
owned  such  as  'giving  up',  'giving  away',  or  'making  concessions'.  On  only  four 
occasions  out  of  32  was  it  made  clear  that  Israel  was  'returning'  or  'handing  back' 
territory. 
Israel's  Security 
The  single  issue  which  received  the  bulk  of  coverage  was  the  subject  of 
Israel's  security  presented  on  its  own.  In  total  this  accounted  for  9  percent  of  all 
coverage  (129  lines  out  of  1417)  and  approximately  60  percent  of  the  coverage  of  all 
interim  issues  (129  lines  out  of  217).  This  theme  became  particularly  pronounced 
after  a  grenade  attack  on  Israeli  soldiers  by  a  Palestinian  at  a  bus  station  in  Southern 
Israel  on  the  I  9th  October  1998,  which  was  frequently  cited  as  a  justification  for 
Israel's  hard  stance  on  security  issues  at  the  negotiations.  Security  was  often 
presented  as  the  central  issue  dividing  the  two  parties  and  the  'stumbling  block'  to  any 
further  progress: 
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Israel]  really  reinforced  the  need  for  Israel  to  get  strong  and  complete 
guarantees  both  in  word  and  deed  from  the  Palestinian  side  that  they  could 
control  terrorism  and  they  could  provide  security  on  the  West  Bank  (BBC  I 
Lunchtime  News,  19  October  98) 
What  you  have  now  is  an  Israeli  decision  to  talk  about  nothing  at  this  summit 
conference  except  security.  The  Palestinians  are  furious  about  that,  they  are 
saying  it's  a  form  of  blackmail  but  as  far  as  the  Israelis  are  concerned  they  are 
saying  look  no  troop  withdrawals  can  happen  no  meaningful  negotiations  can 
take  place  unless  we  feel  that  the  Palestinians  are  doing  all  within  their  power 
to  ensure  there  are  not  attacks  on  Israelis  and  according  to  the  Netanyahu 
government  the  Palestinians  simply  cannot  and  will  not  deliver  on  that 
security  pledge  (BBC  I  Evening  News,  19  October  98) 
It  is  perfectly  legitimate  to  highlight  the  security  concerns  of  Israelis.  However 
there  are  a  number  of  problems  with  this  coverage.  Firstly  without  any  information 
regarding  the  causes  of  the  conflict  it  may  be  difficult  for  viewers  without  a  deep 
knowledge  of  the  dispute  to  understand  why  Israel  has  security  concerns.  The  term 
needs  to  be  elaborated  to  make  more  explicit  its  meaning  or  meanings  for  audiences, 
because  for  Israelis  and  Palestinians  the  word  has  different  connotations.  The  Israeli 
government  argues  that  Israel  has  a  security  problem  because  the  Palestinian 
Authority  cannot  or  will  not  control  'terrorists'  intent  on  killing  Israelis.  This  was  the 
perspective  of  the  security  issue  provided  by  j  ournalists  especially  on  BBC,  as  in  the 
following  examples: 
Yes  even  before  this  bomb  attack  this  was  always  going  to  be  the  stumbling 
block  the  reluctance  of  Israel  to  pull  out  of  the  West  Bank,  the  13  percent  they 
are  negotiating  about  until  the  Palestinian  Authority  can  provide  guarantees 
that  they  can  control  the  terrorists  (BBC  lunchtime  news,  19  October  1998) 
Security  is  the  central  sticking  point.  Yesterday's  grenade  attack  at  a  bus  stop 
in  Beersheba  injured  64  Israelis  and  while  the  Palestinians  insist  it  was  an 
isolated  incident  to  the  Israelis  it  was  further  evidence  that  Yasser  Arafat 
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police  force  to  clampdown  on  Hamas  and  other  extremist  groups.  Mr.  Arafat 
says  he  gives  the  issue  100  percent  commitment  but  admits  he  cannot  promise 
100  percent  results.  The  talks  will  resume  later  today  the  Palestinians  say  it's 
time  for  the  Israelis  to  make  a  brave  decision  for  peace.  The  Israelis  will  once 
again  insist  that  their  people  must  be  safe  from  terrorist  attack  (BBC  1, 
Lunchtime  News,  20  October  1998) 
An  obvious  unanswered  question  arises  here:  why  are  Palestinians  risking 
their  lives  to  attack  Israelis?  Since  there  is  no  historical  background  provided  to 
viewers  it  may  be  difficult  for  them  to  understand  Palestinian  motivations.  Focus 
group  work  in  this  area  suggests  that  many  viewers  are  confused  about  the 
motivations  of  the  parties.  Whilst  most  participants  had  absorbed  the  message  that 
Israel-Palestine  was  a  place  of  bloodshed,  suffering  and  death,  far  fewer  participants 
were  able  to  provide  cogent  explanations  as  to  why  the  two  sides  were  fighting.  Some 
viewers  linked  this  lack  of  understanding  to  the  structure  of  television  news  and  a  lack 
of  explanation  in  this  area: 
First  speaker:  There's  too  many  gaps,  if  you  are  being  shown  a  partial  picture, 
you  are  obviously  not  being  shown  a  whole  picture  ...  they  are  showing  you 
what  they  want  you  to  see,  and  it  shows,  what  we  are  seeing  is  what  we  are 
being  fed. 
Second  speaker:  They  never  really  tell  you  the  in-depth  reasons  about  it-  'This 
guy  went  into  bomb  a  pizza  restaurant'-  why?  'The  Israelis  are  going  to 
attack'  -  why? 
First  speaker:  What  pushes  them  to  that  extreme?  (Low  income  male  group, 
London,  cited  in  Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  211-212) 
There  is  a  recognition  here  that  bombing  a  pizza  restaurant  is  an  'extreme' 
action  which  requires  some  kind  of  explanation.  People,  unless  they  are  mentally  ill, 
generally  don't  behave  in  such  ways  unless  they  have  some  motive.  Amnesty 
International,  for  instance,  have  repeatedly  stressed  that  Israeli  security  concerns  are  a 
consequence  of  human  rights  violations  carried  out  against  Palestinians  by  the  Israeli 
army  and  armed  settlers: 
142 Without  human  rights  there  can  be  no  genuine  security  and  no  sustainable 
peace.  Amnesty  International  requests  the  Commission  to  call  on  the  Israeli 
government  to  immediately  cease  violations  of  basic  human  rights  and  to 
apply  fully  United  Nation  human  rights  treaties,  as  well  as  the  Fourth  Geneva 
Convention  of  1949,  in  the  Occupied  Territories  (Amnesty  International, 
1999a) 
However  there  were  no  attempts  in  coverage  to  link  the  conditions  created  by 
the  occupation  to  Israel's  security  concerns  and  in  one  bulletin  a  BBC  I  journalist 
reports  that  the  Israeli  'government  here  rejects  emphatically  all  Palestinian 
suggestions  that  its  actions  provoke  attacks  like  this  morning's'  (BBC  1,  Evening 
News,  19  October  1998)  There  is  no  explanation  of  what  these  Israeli  actions  might 
be,  because  the  nature  of  the  occupation  and  its  social  consequences  for  Palestinians 
are  not  discussed  in  coverage.  One  aspect  of  the  occupation  which  has  been  linked  to 
Israeli  security  concerns  involves  the  extensive  use  of  torture  by  the  Israeli  security 
services: 
A  similar  cycle  of  humiliation  and  mistreatment  fomenting  hatred  has  been 
observed  by  the  Palestinian  psychiatrist  Dr  Eyad  el-Sarraj,  who  studied  suicide 
bombers.  'Most  of  them  had  suffered  serious  trauma  when  young,  often  that 
involved  close  relatives  being  tortured  by  the  Israelis.  '  he  said.  'Children  grow 
up  wanting  to  take  revenge  for  their  trauma.  Torture  is  an  integral  part  of  that 
cycle  of  violence.  More  oppression  is  making  people  more  violent,  in  the  way 
that  abused  children  become  abusive  fathers.  '  (Guardian,  24  January  2003) 
There  was  also  the  question  of  what  the  security  provisions  of  the  agreement 
would  actually  entail.  Journalists  here  spoke  of  arresting  'terrorists',  collecting 
weapons  held  by  Palestinians  and  instituting  a  'security  clampdown': 
The  specifics  of  a  Palestinian  crackdown  on  Islamic  militants  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  are  still  being  worked  out.  Imprisonment  of  radicals  and 
confiscation  of  illegal  weapons  and  key  components.  (BBC  1,  early  evening 
news,  22  October  1998) 
143 The  Palestinian  charter,  their  constitution,  will  abandon  its  demand  for  the 
destruction  of  Israel  and  the  CIA  will  help  with  a  new  security  clampdown  by 
the  Palestinians  involving  the  arrest  of  30  top  Arab  extremists  (ITV,  evening 
news,  23  October  1998) 
The  nib  of  the  agreement  is  that  the  Palestinians  will  curb  violent  extremism 
(Channel  4  news,  23  October  1998) 
However  human  rights  groups  and  some  print  j  ournalists  had  pointed  out  at 
the  time,  that  the  security  measures  were  rather  more  controversial  than  they  appeared 
in  the  television  news  coverage.  Robert  Fisk  noted  that  security  provisions  would 
mean  more  'prison,  hatred  and  (let's  not  be  squeamish)  torture'  (Independent,  24 
October  1998)  The  day  before  the  agreement  was  signed  on  the  22  October  1998 
Human  Rights  Watch  released  a  statement  in  Washington  which  urged  the  United 
States  and  Israel  not  to  pressure  the  Palestinian  Authority  to  -implement  the  security 
provisions  of  the  agreement  without  all  sides  making  a  clear  commitment  to  safeguard 
human  rights.  Hanny  Megally,  executive  director  of  Human  Rights  Watch's  Middle 
East  and  North  Africa  Division,  noted  that  the  'Palestinian  Authority's  human  rights 
record  is  already  deplorable,  '  and  that  the  'U.  S.  doesn't  condemn  these  violations  now 
--  will  the  U.  S.  condemn  violations  once  it  is  formally  part  of  the  process  that  creates 
them?  '  The  Israeli  human  rights  group  B'Tselem  published  a  report  a  month  after  the 
signing  of  the  Accords  titled  The  Human  Rights  Fruits  of  the  Wye  Memorandum 
noting  that  the  two  weeks  after  the  signing  the  fruits  are  already  apparent:  'mass 
arbitrary  arrests  by  both  the  Palestinian  Authority  and  Israel'.  The  report  further  noted 
that  'the  agreement  merely  pays  lip  service  to  human  rights,  with  no  intention  by  any 
of  the  parties  -  Israel,  the  Palestinian  National  Authority  or  the  United  States  -  to  hold 
the  sides  accountable  for  human  rights  violations.  '  The  television  news  coverage 
made  no  mention  of  the  fact  that  the  security  provisions  of  the  agreement  might  lead 
to  an  increase  in  human  rights  abuses  including  torture. 
It  was  also  argued  that  the  security  issue  was  that  it  was  being  used  as  a  way 
of  extending  military  control  over  Palestinians  and  undermining  any  prospect  of  land 
transfers  during  the  Oslo  process.  Prime  Minister  Netanyahu  had  consistently 
campaigned  against  the  'peace  process'  before  becoming  Prime  Minister  and  Avi 
144 Shlaim  has  argued  that  Netanyahu  by  increasing  house  demolitions  and  settlement 
building  whilst  cancelling  the  scheduled  IDF  redeployments  was  adopting  a  "work- 
to-rule'  approach  designed  to  undermine  the  Oslo  process'  (2000:  576).  Similarly, 
Professor  Ian  Lustick  has  argued  that  the  Netanyahu  government: 
favored  offering  lip-service  to  the  peace  process  in  deference  to  the  opinions 
of  the  majority  of  Israelis,  while  in  fact  using  a  'work-to-rule'  approach  to  the 
Oslo  Accords-treating  them  not  as  a  basis  for  an  evolving  partnership,  but  as 
an  array  of  legalist  and  public  relations  weapons  that  can  free  Israel  of  its 
commitments,  prevent  further  transfers  of  territory  to  Palestinian  control,  and 
delegitimize  Arafat  and  the  idea  of  a  Palestinian  state  in  the  mind  of  Israeli 
public  opinion.  (1997:  87) 
When  Palestinian  spokespersons  were  given  the  opportunity  to  speak  this 
scepticism  towards  negotiations  was  made  explicit: 
These  incidents  should  not  be  used  as  an  excuse  to  run  away  from  negotiations 
about  the  real  problems  in  this  area.  And  the  real  problem  is  the  fact  that  the 
Israelis  are  still  occupying  most  of  the  Palestinian  lands  and  the  Palestinians 
are  in  need  of  self-determination.  (BBC  I,  Lunchtime  news,  19  October  1998) 
From  my  experience  and  assessment  of  the  extremist  ideological  right  wing 
fundamentalist  stance  of  Netanyahu  and  the  settlers  and  his  cabinet  it  is  very 
clear  there  is  no  commitment  to  a  genuine  peace  and  that  the  process  is being 
manipulated  to  continue  Israeli  control  and  to  undermine  Palestinian  rights. 
(BBC  1,  Evening  News,  19  October  1998) 
The  Palestinian  people  are  certainly  much  more  sceptical  they  do  not  look  at 
this  as  a  serious  breakthrough  or  as  an  earth-shattering  agreement  it's  like 
pulling  teeth  and  there's  certainly  is  no  confidence  in  the  Israeli  government  or 
in  the  follow  up  steps  (Channel  4  News,  23  October  1998) 
However  when  journalists  provided  commentary  on  the  peace  negotiations 
they  reproduced  only  the  official  Israeli  perspective.  In  many  bulletins,  and 
145 particularly  on  BBC  1  which  featured  the  majority  of  explanations  for  the  conflict,  the 
Israeli  security  perspective  was  given  such  overwhelming  prominence  that  it 
overshadowed  all  other  questions  appearing  to  be  virtually  the  only  issue,  or  at  least  in 
the  words  of  the  BBC's  Stephen  Sackar  'the  key  issue'.  Here  are  some  exchanges 
between  journalists  illustrating  this: 
Newscaster:  But  Stephen  what  are  the  main  obstacles  to  peace? 
Journalist:  Well  I  just  mentioned  security  arrangements  Moira,  and  those  are 
the  key  issues  and  in  a  sense  the  key  obstacles.  It's  quite  clear  now  that  the 
Israelis  are  committed  to  pulling  back  from  a  further  13  percent  of  the  West 
bank  but  only  if  the  Palestinians  can  convince  them  that  they  are  able  to  offer 
new  written  cast-iron  security  commitments,  better  than  anything  they  have 
offered  in  the  past.  There  are  key  issues  like  the  Israelis  wanting  the 
extradition  of  more  than  30  Palestinian  Islamic  militants  to  Israel  for  trial.  For 
example  they  want  to  make  sure  that  illegal  weapons  held  by  Palestinians  in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  are  confiscated.  Those  are  specific  detailed  issues  the 
Israelis  want  the  Palestinians  to  deliver  and  they  want  American  intelligence 
to  be  involved  to  verify  Palestinian  compliance.  (BBC I,  Early  Evening  News, 
18  October  1998) 
Newscaster:  Joining  me  now  is  our  Washington  correspondent  Tom  Carver. 
Tom  its  early  morning  there,  I  know,  but  has  there  been  any  reaction  yet  to 
this  attack  in  Israel. 
Journalist:  Yes  officials  from  both  sides  have  said  that  they  will  not  leave  the 
negotiating  table  that  they  will  continue  to  stay  here  despite  the  attack.  A 
spokesman  for  Mr.  Netanyahu  said  that  it  really  reinforced  the  need  for  Israel 
to  get  strong  and  complete  guarantees  both  in  word  and  deed  from  the 
Palestinian  side  that  they  could  control  terrorism  and  they  could  provide 
security  on  the  West  Bank.  So  this  clearly  will  have  played  into  the  hands  of 
the  hard-liners  in  Netanyahu's  government  and  will  make  it  very  hard  for  him, 
I  think,  to  convince  his  hard-liners  back  home  that  he  can  get  those  sort  of 
guarantees  from  the  Palestinians. 
146 Newscaster:  And  it  is  those  security  issues  that  are  proving  the  most  difficult 
to  overcome  in  the  talks  is  it? 
Journalist-  Yes  even  before  this  bomb  attack  this  was  always  going  to  be  the 
stumbling  block  the  reluctance  of  Israel  to  pull  out  of  the  West  Bank,  the  13 
percent  that  they  are  negotiating  about  until  the  Palestinian  Authority  can 
provide  guarantees  that  they  can  control  the  terrorists  and  it  seems  that  this  is 
exactly  the  sort  of  thing  that  Israel  is  dreading  this  sort  of  attack.  And,  of 
course,  the  Palestinians  will  say  we  can  provide  the  security  but  we  must  also 
negotiate  about  other  things  about  Israel's  continued  occupation  of  the 
territories.  (BBC  I,  Lunchtime  news,  19  October  1998) 
In  one  of  the  above  examples  aj  ournalist  argues  that  'It's  quite  clear  now  that 
the  Israelis  are  committed  to  pulling  back  from  a  further  13  percent  of  the  West  bank' 
if  they  can  get  the  required  'security  guarantees'.  However  as  already  noted 
Palestinians  regarded  this  as  far  from  'clear'  which  is  why  Palestinian  spokespersons 
had  expressed  'no  confidence  in  the  Israeli  government  or  in  the  follow  up  steps'. 
Prime  Minister  Netanyahu  had  repeatedly  suspended  previous  scheduled  troop  re- 
deployments  and  six  weeks  after  Wye  again  cancelled  the  scheduled  troop 
redeployments  unless  the  Palestinians  fulfilled  five  conditions  most  of  which  were 
new  and  according  to  Avi  Shlaim  'designed  to  torpedo  the  peace  process  and  put  the 
responsibility  on  the  Palestinians'  (2000:  605).  However  there  was  no  attempt  by 
journalists  on  any  channel  to  articulate  the  Palestinian  position  that  the  arguments 
around  security  were  being  employed  as  an  excuse  to  avoid  land  transfers  and  extend 
Israeli  control  over  the  occupied  territories.  It  would  not  have  been  difficult  for 
journalists  to  provide  the  Palestinian  perspective  along  with  the  Israeli  viewpoint: 
Yes  officials  from  both  sides  have  said  that  they  will  not  leave  the  negotiating 
table  that  they  will  continue  to  stay  here  despite  the  attack.  A  spokesman  for 
Mr.  Netanyahu.  said  that  it  really  reinforced  the  need  for  Israel  to  get  strong 
and  complete  guarantees  both  in  word  and  deed  from  the  Palestinian  side  that 
they  could  control  terrorism  and  they  could  provide  security  on  the  West 
Bank.  However  Palestinians  argue  that  the  Israelis  government,  which  is 
147 composed  ofparties  opposed  to  the  peace  process,  are  using  arguments  about 
security  to  avoid  the  return  of  occupied  Palestinian  land  and  instead 
strengthen  their  hold  on  the  Palestinian  territories. 
One  reason  why  there  was  so  much  coverage  dealing  with  the  security 
provisions  of  the  agreement  was  that  j  oumalists  used  this  element  of  the  accords  as  a 
point  of  linkage  to  the  concerns  of  Israeli  settlers  living  in  the  occupied  territories. 
This  made  specific  connections  between  the  security  provisions  of  Wye  and  the 
dangers  faced  by  individual  settlers.  Here  are  some  exchanges  between  j  oumalists  and 
settlers: 
Journalist  Less  than  a  mile  away  rabbi  Benny  Alon,  one  of  the  leaders  of  the 
religious  right  in  Israel's  parliament  is  getting  ready  for  the  Jewish  Sabbath  at 
a  synagogue  in  an  otherwise  Palestinian  area  that  his  supporters  have  just  re- 
occupied.  Rabbi  Alon  says  the  right  will  try  to  bring  the  government  down 
because  he  believes  Benjamin,  BB,  Netanyahu  has  put  Israel  in  danger. 
Israeli  Settler:  BB  Netanyahu  established  in  this  summit  the  Palestinian  state 
and  by  this  he  risks  not  only  the  Jewish  revival  he  risks  the  Jewish  state  of 
Israel's  survival.  (BBC  1,  Evening  News,  23  October  1998) 
Journalist:  Mecaby  Luz  is  worried  about  his  children's  safety.  The  Luz  family 
live  in  the  settlement  of  Beit-El  on  land  Israel  captured  in  the  1967  war 
because  they  feel  this  is  the  heartland  of  the  Jewish  people.  Now  they're 
disgusted  that  the  prime  minister  they  voted  for  is  transferring  more  territory 
to  the  Palestinians. 
Israeli  Settler:  This  agreement  endangers  us  more  than  we  were  endangered 
before.  We're  worried  because  we've  seen  friends  of  ours  killed  and  the 
murders  run  away  it  takes  them  two  minutes  to  flee  into  the  autonomy  areas 
and  now  there's  going  to  be  more  of  these  areas  and  we  are  very  scared  and 
we  are  very  disappointed.  (BBC  1,  Evening  News,  24  October  1998) 
148 Journalist:  At  the  Israeli  West  Bank  settlement  of  Beit-El  hardline  settlers 
followed  the  news  on  car  radios  as  they  hurried  home  before  the  sabbath 
shutdown.  The  settlement  is  already  close  to  Palestinian  homes  and  maybe 
virtually  surrounded  by  Palestinian  territory  under  the  new  agreement.  Many 
of  the  settlers  are  bitterly  disappointed  and  planning  protest  action. 
Israeli  Settler:  We  believe  that  we  are  going  to  be  subject  to  firebombs  to  arms 
to  bombings  to  you  name  it.  (ITV  Evening  News,  23  October  1998) 
It  is  perfectly  legitimate  forjoumalists  to  highlight  the  security  concems  of 
Israeli  settlers  and  how  the  provisions  of  Wye  will  affect  them.  However  there  was 
little  attempt  to  show  or  discuss  how  the  security  provisions,  or  as  many  Palestinians 
saw  it  -  the  extension  of  military  rule,  had  affected  the  lives  of  ordinary  Palestinians. 
The  closest  any  broadcaster  came  to  this  was  this  single  brief  mention  in  one  BBC  I 
bulletin: 
Journalist:  At  the  Palestinian  house  restaurant  in  Ramallah,  one  of  the  biggest 
towns  controlled  by  Yasser  Arafat  on  the  West  Bank,  they  were  getting  ready 
for  a  birthday  party.  They  didn't  see  any  point  in  celebrating  the  peace  process 
though  when  Israel  still  controls  Palestinian  lives. 
Palestinian  civilian:  You  need  pennission  to  go  to  Jerusalem  first  of  all, 
Jerusalem  is  closed  always.  If  you  have  a  West  Bank  ID  there's  no  way  you 
can  get  in.  If  you  want  to  go  to  Nabulus  if  there's  a  closure  you  can't  even 
reach  Nabulus.  If  you  want  to  go  anywhere  you  can't,  it's  ridiculous  I  think 
it's  a  joke. 
This  was  a  very  important  facet  of  the  military  occupation  which  wasn't 
highlighted  anywhere  else  in  coverage.  The  reason  why  Israel  still  controls  Palestinian 
lives'  is  that  during  the  Oslo  process  Israel  had  built  a  matrix  of  military  checkpoints 
across  the  occupied  territories  which  meant  that  Palestinians  found  it  difficult  to  travel 
anywhere  in  the  West  Bank.  This  building  programme  which  had  drastically  altered 
the  geography  of  the  West  Bank  and  would  have  been  difficult  for  j  ournalists  to  miss. 
The  enforcement  by  Israel,  of  what  the  United  Nations  had  condemned  as  illegal 
149 closures  and  'flagrant  violations  of  international  law',  had  a  serious  impact  on  the 
Palestinian  economy  which  had  been  severely  damaged,  and  all  other  aspects  of  social 
life: 
During  years  of  waiting  for  promised  benefits,  Palestinians  have  seen  their 
standard  of  living  steadily  decline.  In  the  seven  years  between  the  signing  of 
the  Oslo  Accords  and  the  start  of  the  uprising  in  September  2000,  Israeli 
policies  --  including  border  controls,  retention  of  Palestinian  funds,  and 
restrictions  on  trade,  investment,  and  access  to  water  resources  --  resulted  in 
growing  trade  and  budget  deficits  for  the  Palestinians.  Unemployment  was 
hovering  at  50  percent,  poverty  rates  increased,  health  standards  deteriorated, 
and  any  sense  of  opportunity  among  Palestinian  youth  began  to  fade  (Yackley 
&  Zunes,  2002) 
This  was  the  only  time  that  i  ournalists  mentioned  the  social  impact  of  the 
demographic  changes  initiated  by  the  Israelis  during  the  peace  process. 
The  Military  Occupation 
In  total  mentions  of  the  occupation  accounted  for  15  lines  or  I  percent  of  coverage. 
On  each  occasion  the  issue  was  merely  named.  The  fact  that  it  was  military  in  nature 
and  had  serious  social  consequences  for  Palestinians  wasn't  mentioned: 
And,  of  course,  the  Palestinians  will  say  we  can  provide  the  security  but  we 
must  also  negotiate  about  other  things  about  Israel's  continued  occupation  of 
the  territories.  (BBC  1,  Lunchtime  News,  19  October  1998) 
In  East  Jerusalem  which  Israel  has  occupied  since  the  1967  war  Palestinians 
were  relieved  that  the  deadlock  has  been  broken.  (BBC  1,  Early  Evening  News, 
24  October  1998) 
He  comes  from  the  occupied  West  Bank  and  is  said  by  the  Israeli  authorities  to 
have  deliberately  targeted  soldiers.  (ITV,  Lunchtime  News,  19  October  1998) 
150 A  swap  of  more  Palestinian  land  occupied  by  Israel  since  1967  in  return  for 
tougher  Palestinian  measures  against  Islamic  terrorists.  (BBC2,  Newsnight,  23 
October  1998) 
However,  human  rights  groups  have  been  less  reticent  in  documenting  the  social 
consequences  of  living  under  the  military  occupation: 
Amnesty  International  has  for  many  years  documented  and  condemned 
violations  of  international  human  rights  and  humanitarian  law  by  Israel 
directed  against  the  Palestinian  population  of  the  Occupied  Territories.  They 
include  unlawful  killings;  torture  and  ill-treatment;  arbitrary  detention;  unfair 
trials;  collective  punishments  such  as  punitive  closures  of  areas  and 
destruction  of  homes;  extensive  and  wanton  destruction  of  property; 
deportations;  and  discriminatory  treatment  as  compared  to  Israeli  settlers. 
Most  of  these  violations  are  grave  breaches  of  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention 
and  are  therefore  war  crimes.  Many  have  also  been  committed  in  a  widespread 
and  systematic  manner,  and  in  pursuit  of  government  policy;  such  violations 
meet  the  definition  of  crimes  against  humanity  under  international  law. 
(Amnesty  International,  2002) 
If  the  nature  and  consequences  of  the  military  occupation  are  not  explained  by 
journalists  it  is  unlikely  that  viewers  will  be  aware  of  them.  Focus  group  work 
suggests  that  many  participants  did  not  understand  that  the  Palestinians  had  been 
subject  to  a  military  occupation  since  1967.  They  also  found  that  few  viewers  were 
aware  that  human  rights  abuses  were  a  part  of  the  occupation.  They  related  this 
ignorance  to  omissions  in  news  coverage: 
There  was  little  understanding  of  areas  such  as  human  rights-  only  two  people 
in  all  the  focus  groups  raised  these  as  an  issue.  Even  in  groups  that  tended  to 
be  sympathetic  with  the  Palestinians  (such  as  low-income  males  in  London) 
there  was  some  surprise  that  there  were  pass  laws  and  identity  cards  which 
restricted  movement.  There  was  no  almost  no  knowledge  of  the  large  number 
of  UN  resolutions  which  have  been  passed,  either  those  relation  to  the  legality 
151 of  the  occupation  or  those  relating  to  human  rights  abuses  in  the  occupied 
territories.  (Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  218) 
Coverage  of  the  interim  issues  was  dominated  by  the  issue  of  Israeli  security 
concerns,  which  was  the  only  aspect  of  the  agreement  which  was  explained  in  a 
detailed  manner.  Most  other  issues  like  the  land  issue  and  the  military  occupation 
were  named  without  being  explained.  Journalists  spoke  in  a  kind  of  shorthand  which 
assumed  a  level  of  background  knowledge,  which  focus  group  research  suggests  is 
lacking  in  most  viewers.  There  were  three  other  issues  referred  to: 
"  The  release  of  Palestinian  Prisoners  (0.8  percent  of  total  coverage,  II  lines) 
"  The  rewriting  of  PLO  charter  (0.3  percent  of  coverage,  4  lines) 
"  Economic  development  in  occupied  territories  -  land  links,  port,  airport  (0.1 
percent  of  coverage,  2  lines) 
Final  Status  Issues 
Coverage  of  final  status  issues  accounted  for  4  percent  of  coverage  (63  lines 
out  of  1417).  More  than  two  thirds  of  this  (42  lines  out  of  63)  dealt  with  Israeli 
settlements  and  settlers'  anger  and  concerns.  The  other  primary  issues  of  concern  to 
Palestinians:  statehood,  refugees,  water  and  Jerusalem  accounted  in  total  for  1.5 
percent  of  coverage  (21  lines  out  of  1417).  The  final  status  issues  were  only 
mentioned  in  the  final  two  days  coverage  of  the  talks,  when  j  ournalists  switched  their 
attention  to  the  issues  that  hadn't  been  part  of  the  negotiations.  Reporters  stressed  the 
limited  aspect  of  what  being  signed  at  Wye,  and  then  named  without  explaining  the 
final  status  issues  still  to  be  resolved. 
Settlements 
The  issue  of  Jewish  settlements  is  one  of  the  most  contentious  issues  in  the  conflict. 
There  are  a  number  of  different  ways  for  journalists  to  approach  the  issue  of 
152 settlements  and  their  significance  in  the  conflict.  Journalists  can  present  the  Israeli 
settler's  perspective  which  maintains  that  Israeli  Jews  have  a  right  to  construct 
settlements  anywhere  in  the  occupied  territories  because  the  land  was  given  to  them 
by  God.  The  Israeli  government  has  also  argued  that  the  settlement  blocks  close  to  the 
Green  Line  have  a  security  function  because  they  act  as  a  bulwark  preventing 
Palestinians  from  entering  Israel.  For  the  Israeli  government  and  settler  groups  the 
two  primary  issues  in  relation  to  the  settlement  question  are  whether  any  of  the 
settlements  will  have  to  be  removed  in  the  course  of  the  peace  process  and  the  safety 
of  Israelis  living  in  settlements,  who  have  come  into  conflict  with  Palestinians.  There 
is  also  the  question  of  the  political  muscle  of  settler  groups  who  have  a  powerful 
voice  within  Israeli  political  life,  and  formed  a  significant  part  of  Prime  Minister 
Netanyahu's  ruling  coalition.  They  have  been  strongly  opposed  to  the  peace  process 
and  any  return  of  Palestinian  land  captured  in  1967.  The  perspective  on  settlements 
held  by  Palestinians  and  the  international  community  is  at  odds  with  the  Israeli 
perspective.  Palestinians  see  settlements  as  a  form  of  colonisation  whereby  the  settler 
population  has  been  stealing  Palestinian  land  and  dispossessing  the  local  Population. 
The  settlements  close  to  the  Green  line  were  designed  to  have  a  strategic  function  in 
that  they  allowed  the  Israeli  state  to  gain  control  of  West  Bank  land  and  the  region's 
water  supply  (Shlaim,  2000).  This  is  a  serious  issue  for  Palestinians  because  their 
economy  is  largely  agricultural  and  so  access  to  water  is  vital.  Palestinians  also  point 
out  that  all  settlers  are  armed  with  automatic  weapons  and  mount  attacks  against  the 
Palestinian  population  who  are  not  legally  allowed  to  own  weapons.  A  report  by  the 
Israeli  human  rights  group  B'Tselem  argued  that  armed  intimidation  was  used  as  a 
tactic  to  force  Palestinians  off  their  land: 
Actions  initiated  by  settlers  against  Palestinians  and  their  property  are  carried 
out  by  individuals  or  organized  groups  to  intimidate,  deter,  or punish,  using 
firearms  and  ammunition  provided  to  them  by  the  IDF.  Such  action  may  be  a 
reprisal  operation  following  Palestinian  violence,  or  it  may  be  unrelated  to  any 
specific  previous  incident.  Among  the  settlers'  actions  against  Palestinians  are 
setting  up  roadblocks  to  disrupt  normal  Palestinian  life,  shooting  at  roof-top 
water  heaters  burning  cars,  smashing  windows,  destroying  crops  and 
uprooting  trees,  and  harassing  merchants  and  owners  of  stalls  in  the  market. 
Some  of  the  settlers'  violence  against  Palestinians  is  intended  to  force 
153 Palestinians  to  leave  their  homes  or  land,  so  that  the  perpetrators  can  take 
control  over  Palestinian  land.  (B'Tselem,  1998) 
The  friction  between  Palestinians  and  Israeli  settlers  has  worsened  during  the 
peace  process  because  of  the  large  rise  in  the  settler  population,  and  the  fact  that 
settlers  are  rarely  prosecuted  when  they  attack  or  kill  Palestinians  (Amnesty 
International,  200  1  a).  Between  the  start  of  the  peace  process  in  1991  and  the  Wye 
Accords  the  settler  population  in  the  occupied  territories  (excluding  East  Jerusalem) 
rose  by  80  percent  from  94,100  in  1991  to  169,400  in  1998 
. 
Running  concurrently 
with  this  rise  has  been  an  increasing  expropriation  of  West  Bank  land  for  settlement 
purposes.  It  is  widely  argued  that  the  settlements  are  illegal  under  international  law 
because  they  breach  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention,  article  49  of  which  stipulates  the 
occupying  power  shall  not  deport  or  transfer  parts  of  its  own  population  into  the 
territories  it  occupies.  '  The  United  Nations  has  been  extremely  critical  of  the 
settlement  program  in  the  occupied  territories  passing  annual  resolutions  that  have 
deemed  the  settlements  illegal  and  in  need  of  removal.  These  resolutions  have  been 
passed  with  large  majorities  at  the  General  Assembly  with  one  passed  ten  months 
prior  to  Wye  by  149  votes  to  2  (Israel,  United  States).  The  European  Parliament  has 
also  issued  statements  condemning  settlement  building.  41 
In  coverage  j  oumalists  highlighted  only  three  aspects  of  the  settlement  question: 
what  would  be  the  future  of  Israeli  settlements  in  the  occupied  territories,  the  security 
of  settlers  living  in  the  occupied  territories  and  settler  opposition  to  the  Wye  Accords: 
They  haven't  even  started  to  tackle  the  most  serious  issues  yet  those  include 
the  future  of  Jewish  settlements  like  this  one,  the  future  of  Jerusalem,  of 
Palestinian  refugees  and  the  shape  of  Israel's  final  borders.  (BBC  I  Evening 
News,  23  October  98) 
...  these  are  small  measures  of  Progress  compared  to  the  really  big  issues 
which  remain  to  be  addressed  in  any  kind  of  final  settlement.  That's  for 
example  the  fate  of  Jerusalem,  the  fate  of  the  Israeli  settlements  on  the  West 
Bank,  and  whether  or  not  the  Palestinians  get  a  state.  Those  are  the  ones  that 
they'll  really  have  to  try  for  (ITV  Early  Evening  News,  23  October  1998) 
154 I  was  just  at  an  Israeli  settlement  on  the  West  Bank  called  Betel,  they  run  the 
risk  of  being  virtually  isolated,  virtually  cut  off  under  this  agreement.  Not 
surprisingly  they  are  bitterly  against  it  (ITV  Early  Evening  News,  23  October 
1998) 
Jewish  settlers  mounted  protests  on  West  Bank  roads.  There  is  a  feeling  that 
Mr.  Netanyahu's  decision  to  pull  back  from  the  brink  of  a  walk  out  yesterday 
makes  an  agreement  and  a  13  percent  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  West  Bank 
more  likely  (BBC  I  Early  Evening  News,  22  October  1998) 
This  is  a  rather  incomplete  and  partial  treatment  of  the  settlement  issue.  There 
is  no  discussion  of  what  a  settlement  is  or  its  strategic  role  in  controlling  the  land  and 
water  resources  of  the  occupied  territories.  There  is  also  no  mention  of  the  fact  that 
settlers  are  heavily  armed  and  have  been  repeatedly  censured  by  the  United  Nations 
and  human  rights  groups  for  taking  land  and  attacking  Palestinians.  From  the 
coverage  it  could  appear  as  if  they  are  civilians  who  are  being  attacked  for  no  obvious 
reason.  Focus  group  work  suggests  that  some  viewers  had  internalised  this  view  of 
settlements  as  vulnerable  communities,  subject  to  violent  attacks  for  no  clearly 
discernable  reason  (Philo  &  Berry,  2004).  On  the  issue  of  the  legitimacy  of  the 
settlements  viewers  are  only  presented  with  the  settlers'  perspective: 
Jewish  settlers  who  held  prayer  demonstrations  believe  this  land  was  given  to 
them  by  God  and  their  homes  and  their  families  already  heavily  guarded  will 
be  in  danger  if  any  more  of  it  is  turned  over  to  the  Palestinians  (BBC  I 
Evening  News  23  October  1998) 
The  Luz  family  live  in  the  settlement  of  Beit-El  on  land  Israel  captured  in  the 
1967  war  because  they  feel  this  is  the  heartland  of  the  Jewish  people.  Now 
they're  disgusted  that  the  prime  minister  they  voted  for  is  transferring  more 
territory  to  the  Palestinians.  (BBC  I  Evening  News,  24  October  1998) 
Israel  will  stay  quiet  until  the  Jewish  Sabbath  ends  at  sunset  this  evening.  Only 
then  will  the  religious  nationalistic  right  start  the  campaign  which  it  promises 
will  bring  down  the  Netanyahu  government  to  try  to  stop  the  handover  to  the 
155 Palestinians  of  more  of  the  land  that  religious  Israelis  believe  God  gave  to  the 
Jews  (BBC  I  Early  Evening  News,  24  October  1998) 
There  is  no  attempt  to  balance  the  claim  of  divine  right  to  the  land  held  by 
settlers  with  the  view  that  most  governments  regard  the  settlements  as  being  illegal 
and  a  violation  of  the  Geneva  Convention.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  in  the  above 
example  that  the  journalist  presents  the  settlers'  perspective  that  they  'will  be  in 
danger  if  any  more  of  it  is  turned  over  to  the  Palestinians'.  In  another  broadcast  on 
ITV  a  reporter  states  that: 
At  the  Israeli  West  Bank  settlement  of  Beit-El  hardline  settlers  followed  the 
news  on  car  radios  as  they  hurried  home  before  the  Sabbath  shutdown.  The 
settlement  is  already  close  to  Palestinian  homes  and  maybe  virtually 
surrounded  by  Palestinian  territory  under  the  new  agreement.  Many  of  the 
settlers  are  bitterly  disappointed  and  planning  protest  action.  (ITV  Evening 
News,  23  October  1998) 
Palestinians  and  independent  human  rights  groups  have  argued  that  the  settlers 
are  putting  themselves  in  danger  not  because  of  an  agreement  to  hand  back  territory, 
but  because  they  have  been  forcing  Palestinians  off  their  land  and  constructing  illegal 
settlements.  However  this  perspective  is  absent.  The  above  example  from  ITV  is 
particularly  confused  arguing  that  the  settlements  'maybe  surrounded  by  Palestinian 
territory'  which  misses  the  obvious  point  that  the  settlements  were  actually  built  on 
what  the  international  community  regards  as  Palestinian  territory,  which  is  why  they 
are  so  bitterly  resented  by  Palestinians.  Out  of  the  42  lines  of  coverage  which  dealt 
with  the  settlement  issue  only  one  referenced  the  Palestinian  perspective  (though 
without  actually  interviewing  any  Palestinians): 
Israeli  peace  campaigners  went  to  help  Palestinians  on  the  West  Bank  with  the 
olive  harvest.  The  Palestinians  here  say  Jewish  settlers  are  trying  to  take  their 
land.  These  Israeli  leftists  believe  their  country  will  never  have  peace  until  the 
Palestinians  have  justice.  (BBC  I  Evening  News,  24  October  1998) 
156 There  is  no  indication  as  to  whether  the  Palestinian  claim  that  settlers  'are 
trying  to  take  their  land'  is  true,  it  is  reported  as  an  unsubstantiated  claim.  The 
journalist  then  tells  viewers  that  'these  Israeli  leftists  believe  their  country  will  never 
have  peace  until  the  Palestinians  have  justice',  but  it  is  far  from  obvious  to  viewers, 
who  lack  a  detailed  knowledge  of  the  conflict,  how  the  existence  of  settlements 
affects  Palestinian  'justice',  or  even  for  that  matter  what  'justice'  in  this  context 
means.  Without  providing  any  information  on  the  pivotal  role  of  settlements  in  the 
struggle  to  control  the  region's  land  and  water,  statements  such  as  these  are  unlikely 
to  be  comprehensible  to  most  viewers. 
Jerusalem 
Jerusalem  is  the  centre  of  the  religious,  cultural,  social  and  economic  existence  of 
Israelis  and  Palestinians.  The  city  has  particular  significance  to  the  Judean,  Christian 
and  Muslim  faiths  due  to  the  presence  of  important  holy  sites.  Israel  argues  the  city  is 
its  'eternal  and  undivided  capital'  because  of  its  religious  significance  and  the  fact 
that  the  city  has  always  had  a  significant  Jewish  population.  Palestinians  want  Arab 
East  Jerusalem  as  the  capital  of  any  prospective  Palestinian  state,  and  have  been 
angered  by  Israeli  moves  to  alter  the  demographic  composition  of  the  city.  Arab  East 
Jerusalem  has  been  under  military  occupation  since  1967  and  in  the  interim  period 
human  rights  groups  note  that  Israel  has  carried  out  sustained  illegal  settlement 
programs  and  has  been  expelling  Palestinians  and  destroying  their  homes  at  an 
increasing  rate.  According  to  Amnesty  International  the  purpose  of  these  practices  in 
East  Jerusalem  has  been  'to  transform  the  ethnic  character  of  the  annexed  area  from 
Arab  to  Jewish'  by  the  restriction  and  confiscation  of  residency  documents,  and  the 
destruction  of  Palestinian  homeS42  .  At  present  Amnesty  estimates  that  about  35 
perecnt  of  East  Jerusalem  has  been  confiscated,  more  than  90  percent  of  which  had 
been  owned  by  Palestinians  and  used  for  grazing  or  cultivation.  Of  the  current 
estimate  of  28,000  Palestinian  homes  in  East  Jerusalem,  Amnesty  reports  that 
approximately  12,000  or  43  percent  of  the  total  are  under  demolition  orders  from  the 
Israeli  authorities.  The  UN  has  also  been  heavily  critical  of  these  Israeli  Practices  in 
Arab  East  Jerusalem.  Ten  months  prior  to  the  Wye  Accords  a  UN  resolution 
condemning  the  expulsions  and  house  demolitions  was  passed  by  148  votes  to  one 
157 (Israel)  with  nine  abstentions.  It  has  also  passed  numerous  General  Assembly  and 
Security  Council  resolutions  asking  Governments  not  to  move  their  embassies  to 
Jerusalem  and  declaring  all  moves  by  Israel  to  alter  the  demographic  character  of  the 
city  as  invalid.  In  this  coverage,  the  future  of  Jerusalem  accounted  for  0.6  percent  of 
total  coverage  (9  lines  out  of  1417).  None  of  the  references  to  the  issue  extended 
beyond  a  single  sentence,  and  none  explained  the  significance  of  the  issue: 
The  big  issues,  the  future  of  Jerusalem  and  the  Palestinian  demand  for 
statehood  must  now  be  faced.  (BBC  1:  21:  00,23  October  98) 
And  the  really  tough  stuff  lies  ahead,  the  so  called  permanent  status  issues 
which  should  by  rights  be  decided  within  the  next  six  months,  can  Jerusalem 
be  shared?  The  Palestinians  want  a  part  of  it  as  their  capital.  (BBC2:  22:  30,23 
October  98) 
..  these  are  small  measures  of  progress  compared  to  the  really  big  issues  which 
remain  to  be  addressed  in  any  kind  of  final  settlement.  That's  for  example  the 
fate  of  Jerusalem,  the  fate  of  the  Israeli  settlements  on  the  West  Bank  (ITV: 
17:  45,23  October  98) 
There  is  an  acknowledgement  by  j  ournalists  that  the  future  of  Jerusalem  is  a 
'big  issue'  but  no  explanations  as  to  why.  This  is  significant  because  another  major 
Palestinian  grievance  that  is  driving  the  conflict  is  left  unexamined.  Focus  group 
research  suggests  that  most  viewers  who  rely  on  television  news  as  their  main  source 
of  information  are  very  confused  about  what  the  two  sides  are  fighting  over  (Philo  & 
Berry,  2004).  Some  viewers  believed  that  the  conflict  involved  neighbours  who 
couldn't  get  along,  or  fanatics  who  harboured  inexplicable  and  irrational  hatreds.  This 
is  to  be  expected,  if  there  is  little  explanation  of  the  political  and  territorial  dimensions 
of  the  dispute. 
158 Palestinian  Refugees 
The  fate  of  Palestinian  refugees  is  one  of  the  most  intractable  issues  separating  the 
two  sides.  It  is  so  important  that  many  on  both  sides  regard  it  as  a  'deal  breaker'  with 
the  potential  to  scupper  any  attempts  to  reach  a  final  settlement.  The  bulk  of  the 
refugees  were  created  in  1948  when  approximately  750,000  Palestinians  were 
displaced  during  the  creation  of  the  Israeli  state  (Gilbert,  1999).  A  further  320,000 
Palestinian  refugees  (and  90,000  Syrian  refugees)  were  created  in  1967  when  Israel 
invaded  the  West  Bank,  Gaza  Strip  and  Golan  Heights  (Harris,  1980).  The  refugees 
and  their  descendents  now  number  more  than  five  million  according  to  the  United 
Nations  Relief  and  Works  Agency  for  Palestinian  Refugees  (UNRWA)  and  are 
concentrated  primarily  in  the  occupied  territories,  Jordan,  Lebanon  and  Syria,  with 
1.2  million  living  permanently  in  very  poor  social  conditions  in  refugee  camps.  A 
report  published  in  the  British  Medical  Journal  by  the  British  charity  Medical  Aid  for 
Palestinians  catalogued  the  severe  health  problems  experienced  by  people  living  in 
camps  including  infectious  diseases  linked  to  poor  sanitation;  mental  health  problems 
associated  with  displacement  and  with  experiencing  prolonged  bombardment; 
intellectual  and  physical  disability  among  children;  poor  health  among  pregnant 
women  and  infants;  and  chronic  diseases  such  as  diabetes.  (17  March  1999). 
All  Israeli  political  parties  (excluding  the  Arab  and  Communist  parties)  are 
opposed  to  the  return  of  Palestinian  refugees  to  Israel  because  they  argue  that  it  would 
threaten  both  the  security  and  the  Jewish  character  of  the  State.  43  For  Palestinians  the 
right  of  return  for  refugees  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  conflict.  The  expulsion  of  the 
refugees  in  1948  is  remembered  by  Palestinians  as  Al  Nakba,  the  catastrophe,  and 
possible  solutions  to  the  refugee  problem  have  generated  much  debate  amongst 
PalestinianS44 
. 
The  United  Nations  has  been  supportive  of  the  right  to  return.  On  the 
I  Ith  December  1948  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  passed  UN  resolution  194 
which  established  the  right  of  return  for  all  Palestinian  refugees  displaced  in  the  1948 
War: 
Resolves  that  the  refugees  wishing  to  return  to  their  homes  and  live  at  peace 
with  their  neighbours  should  be  permitted  to  do  so  at  the  earliest  practicable 
date,  and  that  compensation  should  be  paid  for  the  property  of  those  choosing 
not  to  return  and  for  loss  of  or  damage  to  property  which,  under  principles  of 
159 international  law  or  in  equity,  should  be  made  good  by  the  Governments  or 
authorities  responsible 
Ten  months  prior  to  Wye  the  'right  of  return'  was  re-affirmed  by  the  United 
Nations  by  the  margin  of  159  votes  to  two  (Israel,  United  States)  with  one  abstention. 
There  has  also  been  support  for  the  right  to  return  from  the  European  Union.  45 
Although  both  sides  admit  the  absolute  centrality  of  the  issue  to  any  resolution  of  the 
conflict  it  received  scant  mention  in  coverage.  References  to  the  refugee  question 
accounted  for  0.2  percent  of  coverage  (3  lines  out  of  1417).  On  each  occasion  the 
issue  was  named  but  not  explained: 
They  haven't  even  started  to  tackle  the  most  serious  issues  yet  those  include 
the  future  of  Jewish  settlements  like  this  one,  the  future  of  Jerusalem,  of 
Palestinian  refugees  and  the  shape  of  Israel's  final  borders.  (BBC  I  Evening 
News,  23  October  98) 
Is  there  to  be  a  right  of  return  for  Arab  refugees?  How  many  will  be  permitted 
to  come  in  from  exile,  and  when?  (BBC2  Newsnight,  23  October  98) 
Ahis  really  only  takes  us  through  till  the  final  settlement  which  will  involve 
the  most  difficult  problems  of  all,  questions  like  the  final  settlement  of 
Jerusalem,  the  return  of  refugees  (ITV  Lunchtime  News,  23  October  98) 
Control  of  Water  Resources 
Another  key  final  status  issue  concerns  the  water  supplies  of  the  occupied 
territories.  As  previously  noted  the  construction  of  Jewish  settlements  in  the  occupied 
territories  was  linked  to  the  struggle  over  the  water  supplies  of  the  region.  This  has 
meant  that  Israel  has  taken  control  of  the  water  supply  of  the  occupied  territories  most 
of  which  is  diverted  for  the  use  of  settlements  and  Israeli  industry.  The  Israeli  human 
rights  organisation  B'Tselem  has  noted  that  Israeli  water  practices  breach 
international  law  and  have  a  highly  negative  impact  on  all  aspects  of  life  in  the 
occupied  territories: 
160 Hundreds  of  thousands  of  Palestinians  suffer  from  a  severe  water  shortage 
throughout  the  summer.  This  shortage  of  water  affects  every  function  that 
water  plays  in  human  life:  drinking,  bathing,  cleaning,  and  watering  of  crops 
and  animals  The  shortage  drastically  affects  the  residents'  health  and  economic 
well-being.  The  shortage  of  drinking  water  can  cause  dehydration  and  the 
inability  to  maintain  proper  hygiene  and  thus  lead  to  illness.  Failure  to  water 
crops  and  animals  affects  the  livelihood  of  the  residents.  The  water  shortage 
violates  the  basic  human  rights  of  Palestinian  residents  of  the  Occupied 
Territories  such  as  the  right  to  health,  to  adequate  housing,  to  equality,  and  to 
benefit  from  their  natural  resources.  This  harin  results  from  Israeli  policy,  in 
effect  since  1967,  based  on  an  unfair  division  of  resources  shared  by  Israel  and 
the  Palestinians.  (B'Tselem,  1998,  The  Water  Crisis  in  the  Occupied 
Territories) 
The  United  Nations  has  been  critical  of  the  Israeli  policy  on  West  Bank  water 
noting  that  it  breaches  international  law.  It  has  passed  numerous  resolutions  pointing 
out  that  Israel  must  not  exploit  the  water  resources  of  the  occupied  territories.  46  The 
issue  of  water  is  of  central  importance  to  the  conflict  yet  it  accounted  for  only  0.07 
percent  of  total  coverage  (I  line  out  of  1417).  The  single  reference  to  the  issue 
appeared  during  BBC2's  Newsnight,  rather  than  during  the  mass  audience  bulletins 
on  BBC  I  or  ITV: 
How  is  water  to  be  shared  an  eternal  and  crucial  problem  in  the  Middle  East 
(BBC2:  22:  30,23  October  1998) 
This  reference  is  rather  brief  and  requires  explaining  so  as  to  make  clear  the 
importance  of  water  in  the  context  of  the  conflict.  Sometimes  j  ournalists  grouped  a 
number  of  interim  issues  together  in  their  discussion  of  what  was  still  to  be  negotiated 
as  in  the  following  examples: 
They  haven't  even  started  to  tackle  the  most  serious  issue  yet.  Those  include 
the  future  of  Jewish  settlements  like  this  one,  the  future  of  Jerusalem,  of 
161 Palestinian  refugees  and  the  shape  of  Israel's  final  borders  (BBC  I  evening 
news,  23  October  1998) 
We  have  to  recognise  above  all  that  this  is  an  interim  deal  that  really  only 
takes  us  through  to  the  final  settlement  which  will  involve  the  most  difficult 
problems  of  all,  questions  like  the  final  settlement  of  Jerusalem,  the  return  of 
refugees  and  for  example  the  final  borders  of  a  Palestinian  state.  (ITV, 
lunchtime  news,  23  October  1998) 
Well  if  so  they're  going  to  get  there  by  inches  because  these  are  small 
measures  of  progress  compared  to  the  really  big  issues  which  remain  to  be 
addressed  in  any  kind  of  final  settlement.  That's  for  example  the  fate  of 
Jerusalem,  the  fate  of  the  Israeli  settlements  on  the  West  Bank,  and  whether  or 
not  the  Palestinians  get  a  state.  Those  are  the  ones  that  they'll  really  have  to 
try  for.  (ITV,  early  evening  news,  23  October  1998) 
Just  naming  the  major  issues  is  unlikely  to  be  helpful  to  most  viewers.  Each 
issue  must  be  individually  explained  by  j  ournalists  so  as  to  make  clear  its  relevance 
and  importance. 
Theme  3:  The  Peace  Process:  Effects  and  Implications 
This  area  involved  Israeli  and  Palestinian  perspectives  on  whether  the  process 
was  achieving  its  objectives.  Under  the  terms  of  the  Oslo  Accords  by  the  time  of 
Wye,  Israel  was  due  to  have  withdrawn  its  troops  from  most  of  the  West  Bank,  and 
pennanent  status  negotiations  should  have  been  underway  for  more  than  a  year,  with 
their  completion  scheduled  for  May  1999.  However  when  the  Wye  Accords  took 
place  Palestinians  had  total  control  over  only  3  percent  of  the  West  Bank  and  the  final 
status  talks  had  not  even  begun,  with  each  side  accusing  the  other  of  bad  faith  in 
failing  to  implement  their  obligations  under  the  agreements.  Discussion  of  the  peace 
process  accounted  for  2  percent  of  total  coverage  (30  lines  out  of  1417).  All  of  this 
coverage  merely  stated  that  the  peace  process  has  been  stalled  for  approximately  18 
months  or  that  the  Accords  have  brought  19  months  of  deadlock  to  an  end: 
162 Tonight  the  summit  is  in  deep  trouble  it  was  supposed  to  revive  the  peace 
process  which  effectively  collapsed  19  months  ago.  Because  the  gap  between 
the  two  sides  is  so  wide  the  Summit  was  never  going  to  produce  anything 
more  than  a  limited  and  fragile  agreement.  (BBC  I,  Evening  News,  19  October 
98) 
A  clearly  elated  Yasser  Arafat  has  been  in  Austria  today  taking  the  plaudits 
from  European  ministers  for  his  part  in  the  settlement  which  has  broken  the 
deadlock  in  the  Middle  East.  (ITV,  Early  Evening,  24  October  98) 
After  nine  days  of  titanic  negotiations  it  seemed  the  Americans  had  managed 
to  broker  a  deal  on  a  land  for  peace  settlement  that  would  break  19  months  of 
deadlock.  (Channel  4,  News,  23  October  98) 
Here  is  a  discussion  on  the  subject  between  a  Channel  4  news  anchor  and  a 
journalist  on  the  state  of  the  'peace  process'  and  its  prospects: 
Newscaster:  And  what  is  the  Armageddon  scenario?  In  other  words  if  it  does 
go  wrong  and  people  are  saying  it's  pretty  serious? 
Journalist:  It's  serious.  It  just  drags  on.  It  seems  to  go  on  forever.  These  talks 
have  been  stalled  for  the  last  18  months.  They're  going  nowhere. 
Newscaster:  But  on  the  ground  people  are  saying  it  could  be  disastrous. 
Journalist:  On  the  ground  people  are  getting  angry,  Palestinians  are  getting 
angry,  Israelis  are  getting  angry.  Both  sides  are  getting  extremely  angry,  it 
never  seems  to  quite  boil  up  and  boil  over.  But  I  think  that  this  is  extremely 
serious  because  what  it  means  is  that  all  the  accords  that  were  signed  in  Oslo, 
all  those  years  ago,  they  really  are  going  absolutely  nowhere.  (Channel  4 
News,  21  October  1998) 
163 This  exchange  offers  a  descriptive  account  letting  viewers  know  that  there  are 
serious  problems  with  the  peace  process  and  that  this  is  intensifying  anger  on  both 
sides.  However  it  offers  viewers  no  explanations.  As  previously  noted,  the  Israeli 
argument  that  the  breakdown  in  the  peace  process  were  caused  by  the  failure  of  the 
Palestinian  Authority  to  halt  attacks  by  Palestinians  was  extensively  reported  by 
journalists.  The  Palestinian  position  that  the  Israelis  had  used  the  Oslo  process  to  take 
more  land  and  water  and  build  settlements  wasn't  provided  by  j  ournalists.  There  were 
four  references  claiming  that  the  Oslo  process  hasn't  achieved  its  objectives  for  either 
Palestinians  or  Israelis: 
The  peace  process  has  been  in  a  state  of  collapse  for  19  months.  Even  if  the 
Summit  does  produce  an  agreement  it  will  be  limited  and  fragile.  It's  almost 
impossible  these  days  to  find  anybody  Israeli  or  Palestinian  who  still  has  faith 
in  the  peace  process.  After  four  years  it  hasn't  delivered  peace  or  security  for 
Israelis,  or  the  land,  dignity  and  self-determination  that  the  Palestinians  want. 
(BBC  I,  lunchtime  &  early  evening  news,  19  October  1998) 
The  previous  Oslo  deal  was  signed  amid  euphoria  but  then  failed  to  deliver 
much  freedom  for  the  Palestinians  or  security  to  the  Israelis.  (ITV:  13:  00,23 
October  98) 
We'll  have  to  see  whether  this  is  a  turning  point  reviving  the  peace  process  or 
whether  this  is  one  good  day  in  a  process  which  for  so  long  has  been  deeply 
wretched  and  has  delivered  nothing  either  to  the  people  of  Israel  or  the 
Palestinians.  (BBC2:  22:  30,23  October  98) 
These  statements  may  be  difficult  for  viewers,  who  lack  detailed  knowledge  of 
the  conflict,  to  understand.  The  journalists  speak  in  a  shorthand  which  assumes  a  high 
level  of  background  knowledge  that  focus  groups  research  suggests  most  audience 
members  don't  possess  (Philo  &  Berry,  2004).  Words  like  'security',  'freedom',  and 
'self-determination'  which  are  employed  without  explanation  are  only  really 
comprehensible  if  you  understand  the  history  of  the  conflict  and  the  ramifications  of 
the  military  occupation.  One  of  the  reports  above  argues  that  the  process  'has 
delivered  nothing  either  to  the  people  of  Israel  or  the  Palestinians'.  This  is  a 
164 questionable  statement  which  ignores  some  of  the  central  factors  driving  the 
continuance  of  the  occupation.  Although  the  Oslo  process  had  failed  to  deliver 
security  to  ordinary  Israelis  it  had  allowed  the  Israeli  state  to  appropriate  more  West 
Bank  land,  expand  settlements  in  Jerusalem  and  across  the  occupied  territories, 
nionopolise  the  regions  water  resources  on  which  Israeli  industry  is  heavily  reliant, 
and  open  up  Arab  markets  to  Israeli  goods  and  services.  There  was  one  reference  on 
Channel  4  that  Israel  at  this  summit  may  finally  'sign  up  properly  to  the  Oslo 
Accords'  (19:  00,23  October  98)  and  one  reference  on  Channel  5  that  'Palestinians 
argue  that  peace  is  fragile  because  Israel  hasn't  even  enforced  what's  already  been 
agreed'  (12:  00,22  1998).  However  these  brief  and  cryptic  comments  needed  to  be 
expanded  and  explained.  Journalists  appear  to  be  shying  away  from  providing 
explanations  as  to  why  Palestinians  had  lost  faith  in  the  peace  process. 
Theme  4:  ODDosition/Attitudes  to  the  Wve  Accords 
Coverage  of  opposition  to  the  Wye  Accords  accounted  for  10  percent  of  all  coverage 
(138  lines  out  of  1417).  Two  thirds  of  this  coverage  (93  lines  out  of  138)  dealt  with 
the  issue  of  Israeli  settler  opposition  to  the  Accords,  a  fifth  (29  lines  out  of  138)  dealt 
with  Palestinian  opposition  and  approximately  a  tenth  (16  lines  out  of  13  8)  lumped 
Palestinian  and  Israeli  opposition  together  as  in  the  examples  below: 
They  [delegates  at  the  summit]  all  radiated  optimism  but  they  also  warned  that 
opponents  of  peace  Israeli  and  Arab  might  use  violence  to  try  to  destroy  what 
they  had  achieved.  (BBC  I,  Early  Evening  News,  24  October  1998) 
In  both  camps  zealots  will  do  their  damnedest  to  bring  down  the  peace  process 
as  it  continues  to  unfold.  Islamic  terrorists  on  the  one  side  fighting  what  they 
call  a  holy  war,  nationalists  bigots  and  ultra-religious  fundamentalists  in 
Israel's  midst.  (BBC2,  Newsnight,  23  October  1998) 
Israel's  security  forces  will  now  be  braced  for  attacks  from  either  hardline 
Jews  or  Palestinian  extremists  who  will  both  seek  to  destroy  the  deal  by 
protest  or  violence  even  as  it's  born.  (ITV,  Lunchtime  News,  23  October  98) 
165 Israeli  settlers  had  opposed  the  Oslo  Accords  for  two  reasons.  The  first  involved 
the  claim  that  Israeli  Jews  had  the  right  to  settle  anywhere  in  the  occupied  territories 
because  the  land  were  promised  to  their  ancestors  thousands  of  years  ago  by  God.  The 
second  maintained  that  any  return  of  land  captured  by  Israel  in  the  1967  war  would 
threaten  both  their  personal  security  and  the  security  of  the  entire  Israeli  state.  Both  of 
these  arguments  were  represented  in  coverage.  Journalists  also  discussed  the  power  of 
settler  groups,  their  political  opposition  to  the  Oslo  process  and  their  attempts  to 
pressurise  Netanyahu  into  not  handing  back  any  of  the  occupied  territories.  The 
potential  threats  to  the  security  of  Israeli  settlers  was  emphasised  by  journalists 
visiting  the  homes  of  settlers  and  discussing  their  fears.  Settlers  were  also  permitted  to 
make  very  contentious  statements  without  being  challenged  by  j  ournalists  as  in  two  of 
the  examples  below: 
Michael  Kleiner-  Knesset  Member:  I  believe  its  a  black  day  for  Israel,  a  black 
day  for  the  Jewish  people  if  one  knows  history  it  reminds  me  of  the  days  of  the 
Munich  agreement  when  Chamberlain  came  very  happy  with  a  piece  of  paper 
signed  with  Mr  Hitler  and  later  on  everyone  found  out  it  was  a  terrible 
mistake.  (Channel  4  News,  23  October  1998) 
Benny  Alon-  Israeli  Settler:  BB  Netanyahu  established  in  this  summit  the 
Palestinian  state  and  by  this  he  risks  not  only  the  Jewish  revival  he  risks  the 
Jewish  state  of  Israel's  survival.  (BBC I  Evening  News,  23  October  1998) 
Jewish  settlers  who  held  prayer  demonstrations  believe  this  land  was  given  to 
them  by  God  and  their  homes  and  their  families  already  heavily  guarded  will 
be  in  danger  if  any  more  of  it  is  turned  over  to  the  Palestinians.  (BBC  I 
Evening  News,  23  October  1998) 
I  was  just  at  an  Israeli  settlement  on  the  West  Bank  called  Betel,  they  run  the 
risk  of  being  virtually  isolated,  virtually  cut  off  under  this  agreement.  Not 
surprisingly  they  are  bitterly  against  it.  (ITV  Early  Evening  News,  23  October 
1998) 
166 Palestinian  opposition  to  the  Accords  was  motivated  by  many  factors. 
Professor  Khalil  Shikaki  (1999),  the  fon-ner  director  of  the  Centre  for  Palestine 
Research  and  Studies  in  the  West  Bank  city  of  Nablus  has  argued  that  the 
demographic  transformation  of  the  occupied  territories  had  led  to  a  substantial  shift  in 
Palestinian  public  opinion  during  the  five  years  between  Oslo  and  Wye.  Shikaki 
reports  that  when  the  Oslo  process  began  in  1993  support  for  the  process  stood  at 
approximately  two  thirds  of  the  population  but  that  'uncertainty  about  Israel's 
intentions  and  prospects  for  establishing  a  Palestinian  state  led  most  Palestinians  to 
support  both  continued  negotiations  and  violence  against  Israelis'.  By  early  1996  in 
the  wake  of  troop  withdrawals  support  for  the  peace  process  had  risen  to  80  percent 
whilst  support  for  attacks  on  Israelis  had  fallen  dramatically  to  about  20  percent  of  the 
population.  Support  for  militant  Islamic  and  nationalist  groups  also  slumped  by  half  to 
less  than  20  percent  of  the  population.  However  the  election  of  Netanyahu  as  Prime 
Minister  which  led  to  a  further  expansion  in  settlement  activity  resulted  in  a 
deterioration  in  all  peace  indicators  by  the  time  of  Wye.  Palestinian  faith  that  the  Oslo 
process  would  lead  to  the  creation  of  a  Palestinian  state  slumped  to  only  37  percent  of 
the  population,  whilst  only  31  percent  of  the  population  believed  that  the  two  sides 
would  reach  an  agreement  on  final  status  issues.  Support  for  violence  against  Israelis 
increased  dramatically  to  approximately  50  percent  of  the  population  and  this  support 
was  'equally  widespread  among  men  and  women  of  all  age  groups  and  educational 
levels,  and  among  residents  of  cities,  villages,  towns,  and  refugee  camps,  reflecting 
deep  anger  about  Israel's  failure  to  honour  its  peace  commitments'.  Shikaki  explains 
that  support  for  armed  violence  against  Israelis  was  not  seen  as  an  alternative  to  the 
peace  process  but  as  tactic  designed  to  prevent  further  Israeli  land  appropriations  and 
settlement  building  which  in  Palestinian  eyes  was  making  the  proposed  final  status 
negotiations  largely  irrelevant: 
Palestinian  public  opinion  approved  of  diplomacy  as  a  strategic  choice  while  it 
supported  armed  attacks  as  a  tactical  response  to  perceived  Israeli 
intransigence  and  broken  promises...  rather  than  viewing  violence  as  an 
alternative  to  diplomacy,  some  Palestinians  regard[ed]  violence  as  a 
supporting  tactic  to  improve  the  Palestinian  negotiating  position  and  to  force 
Israel  to  stop  creating  facts  on  the  ground  that  prejudge[d]  the  outcome  of 
negotiations.  (Shikaki,  1999) 
167 In  news  coverage  Palestinians  who  opposed  the  Oslo  process  were  described  as 
4extremists',  'militants'  or  'terrorists': 
In  Gaza  the  extremist  group  Islamic  Rhad  demonstrated  against  any 
compromise  with  Israel.  They  burnt  a  coffin  meant  to  symbolise  the  peace 
process.  The  Palestinian  Authority  which  controls  Gaza  has  promised  Israel 
they  will  stop  demonstrations  like  this  and  arrest  people  who  attack  Jews. 
Sheik  Ahmed  Yassem  the  leader  of  Hamas,  the  other  hard-line  Islamic  group, 
said  the  new  agreement  might  obstruct  them  for  a  while  but  they  would  fight 
Israel  until  freedom  or  martyrdom  (BBC  I  Evening  News,  23  October  1998) 
So  far  its  the  extremists  on  both  sides  who've  done  most  to  make  their  views 
on  this  agreement  known.  On  the  Gaza  Strip  Palestinian  supporters  of  Islamic 
Jihad  marched  in  the  white  shrouds  of  suicide  bombers.  A  speaker  declared 
that  the  struggle  against  Israel  will  continue.  (ITV  Evening  News,  23  October 
1998) 
Yasser  Arafat  also  has  to  overcome  his  normal  opponents.  Sheik  Yaseem  the 
leader  of  the  militant  group  Hamas  said  he  would  just  ignore  today's  accord. 
Anti-agreement  demonstrators  were  out  in  Gaza  expressing  their  habitual 
disapproval  for  the  benefit  of  the  cameras.  But  there  is  more  than  that 
profound  despair  amongst  most  Palestinians  who  believe  that  after  two  years 
of  foot  dragging  president  Netanyahu  can't  be  trusted.  (Channel  4  News,  23 
October  1998) 
It  might  be  asked  whether  it  is  appropriate  top  use  a  term  like  'extremist'  if  half 
the  population  supports  such  groups.  The  Channel  Four  journalist  appears  aware  of 
this,  when  she  adds  that  there  is  'profound  despair  amongst  most  Palestinians  who 
believe  that  after  two  years  of  foot  dragging  president  Netanyahu  can't  be  trusted'  but 
this  brief  reference  to  the  fact  that  scepticism  to  the  peace  process  was  widespread 
amongst  Palestinians  isn't  developed.  Many  of  the  Palestinian  grievances  were  not 
complicated  or  difficult  to  present.  It  viewed  the  Israeli  settlement  building  programs, 
human  rights  abuses  and  the  removal  of  the  Palestinian  population  from  East 
168 Jerusalem  as  the  opposite  of  what  the  Oslo  process  was  supposed  to  achieve.  Many 
Palestinians  and  some  Israelis  believed  that  the  end  of  the  Oslo  process  would  not 
result  in  a  viable  sovereign  Palestinian  state  but  in  the  creation  of  Bantustans  as  used 
to  exist  in  South  Africa,  a  prediction  that  Hamas,  Islamic  Jihad  the  PFLP,  and  some 
Palestinian  intellectuals,  such  as  Edward  Said,  had  made  at  the  outset  of  the  Oslo 
process  in  1993  (see  p.  113  -4).  Shortly  before  the  Wye  Summit,  Shlomo  Ben-Ami,  the 
Israeli  historian  and  Ehud  Barak's  chief  negotiator  at  the  2000  Camp  David  talks, 
wrote  that  'in  practice,  the  Oslo  agreements  were  founded  on  a  neo-colonialist  basis, 
on  a  life  of  dependence  of  one  on  the  other  forever.  '  The  peace  agreements  were 
designed  to  impose  on  the  Palestinians  'almost  total  dependence  on  Israel,  '  creating 
4  an  extended  colonial  situation.  '  which  is  expected  to  be  the  'permanent  basis'  for  'a 
situation  of  dependence.  '  (Ben-Ami,  1998,  cited  in  Carey,  2000:  ).  In  this  context 
journalists'  descriptions  of  Palestinians  who  opposed  what  was  occurring  as  'devoted 
to  wrecking  the  peace  process'  (BBC  1,  evening  news,  20  October  1998)  or  'the 
enemies  of  peace'  (BBC  1,  lunchtime  news,  24  October  1998)  could  sound 
incongruous.  It  highlights  the  lack  of  a  critical  informed  edge  in  reporting,  and  the 
tendency  ofjournalists  to  accept  at  face  value  the  American  perspective  on  the 
integrity  of  the  peace  process.  Alternative  perspectives  which  questioned  both  the 
legitimacy  and  trajectory  of  the  peace  process  were  not  present  in  coverage. 
Sourcing  and  Reported  Statements 
Here  I  was  interested  in  ascertaining  whether  there  was  an  equivalence  in  the  level  of 
coverage  offered  to  Israeli  and  Palestinian  sources,  and  whether  journalists  proffered 
the  perspectives  of  all  sides  equally  when  they  reported  statements  from  the  different 
parties.  To  do  this  I  tallied  up  the  total  space  given  to  direct  and  reported  statements 
from  both  sides.  Three  lines  of  direct  statements  would  look  like  this: 
Uzi  Landau-  Government  MP:  I  believe  that  the  minister  has  to  halt  these  talks,  go 
back  home  and  make  it  clear  to  the  Palestinians  that  we  are  prepared  to  negotiate  with 
them  but  only  on  condition  that  they  are  negotiating  really  for  peace  above  the  table, 
and  not  standing  behind  terrorism  under  the  table. 
169 Whilst  three  lines  of  reported  statements  would  look  like  this: 
Journalist:  A  spokesman  for  Mr.  Netanyahu  said  that  it  really  reinforced  the  need  for 
Israel  to  get  strong  and  complete  guarantees  both  in  word  and  deed  from  the 
Palestinian  side  that  they  could  control  terrorism  and  they  could  provide  security  on 
the  West  Bank. 
Figure  1.  Lines  of  direct  statements  Provided  by  Israeli,  Palestinian  and  American 
sources.. 
Figure  1.  Lines  of  direct  statements  from  different  parties. 
BBC1  BBC2  ITV  Channel  4  Channel  5  Total 
Israeli  18  4  9  11  13  55 
Palestinian  22  2  5  5  3  37 
American  37  7  13  8  3  68 
Overall  Israeli  sources  were  given  fifty  per  cent  more  space  than  Palestinians,  though 
both  were  eclipsed  by  American  sources  who  were  the  most  accessed  particularly  on 
the  mass  audience  bulletins  on  BBC  I  and  ITV.  Since  the  American  representatives 
tended  to  support  the  Israeli  positions  this  served  to  reinforce  the  imbalance  in  Israel's 
favour. 
Figure  2.  Reported  statements  from  different  parties 
BBC1  BBC2  ITV  Channel  4  Channel  5  Total 
Israeli  26  4  5  5  5  45 
Palestinian  19  2  1  2  1  25 
American  9  7  0  6  0  23 
The  reported  statements  shown  in  Figure  2  again  show  that  Israeli  statements  are 
overall  reported  almost  twice  as  much  as  statements  by  Palestinians,  which  are  given 
approximately  as  much  space  as  American  ones. 
170 'Terrorism'  and  Descriptions  of  Violence 
The  choice  of  language  is  extremely  important  in  indicating  the  social  legitimacy,  or 
lack  of  thereof  ,  of  different  groups  or  positions.  Terms  used  in  conflicts,  such  as 
4soldier',  'rebel',  'militant',  'insurgent',  'freedom  fighter',  'resistance  fighter', 
ýguerrilla'  and  'terrorist'  all  imply  different  levels  of  social  legitimacy  and  are  likely 
to  have  important  consequences  for  how  viewers  see  those  involved.  In  coverage 
important  differences  were  evident  in  the  terms  employed  to  describe  Palestinians  and 
Israelis.  Israelis  were  described  as  'soldiers',  'civilians',  'settlers',  'right  wing 
settlers',  'hardliners'  and  on  one  occasion,  during  a  Newsnight  broadcast,  'nationalist 
bigots  and  ultra-religious  fundamentalists'.  Palestinians  were  described  as  'terrorists', 
41slarnic  terrorists',  'militants'.  'Islamic  militants',  'zealots',  and  'hardliners'. 
Journalists  from  all  channels  except  Channel  Four  described  the  Palestinians  fighters 
opposing  the  occupation  as  'terrorists'.  This  trend  was  Particularly  noticeable  on  the 
BBC: 
Yes  even  before  this  bomb  attack  this  was  always  going  to  be  the  stumbling 
block  the  reluctance  of  Israel  to  pull  out  of  the  West  Bank,  the  13  percent  that 
they  are  negotiating  about  until  the  Palestinian  Authority  can  provide 
guarantees  that  they  can  control  the  terrorists  and  it  seems  that  this  is  exactly 
the  sort  of  thing  that  Israel  is  dreading  this  sort  of  attack  (BBC  1,  Lunchtime 
News,  19  October  1998) 
The  Middle  East  peace  talks  are  in  deep  trouble  tonight  after  a  Palestinian 
terrorist  hurled  two  grenades  into  a  bus  queue  in  Israel.  (BBC  1,  Evening  News 
19  October  1998) 
The  Americans  were  frustrated  that  the  Israelis  were  allowing  that  terror  attack 
to  shift  the  whole  nature  of  these  talks  there  were  serious  words  between 
President  Clinton  and  Benjamin  Netanyahu  about  that  last  night.  (BBC  1,  Early 
evening,  20  October  1998) 
171 The  Israelis  will  withdraw  troops  from  a  further  13  percent  of  the  West  Bank. 
They'll  also  release  hundreds  of  Palestinians  from  Israeli  jails.  In  return  the 
Palestinians  will  adopt  a  security  plan  to  arrest  terrorists  and  crack  down  on 
anti-Israeli  violence.  (BBC  I,  Evening  News,  23  October  1998) 
The  Middle  East  Peace  talks  are  in  serious  difficulties  tonight  after  a 
Palestinian  terrorist  hurled  two  grenades  into  a  bus  queue  in  Israel.  (BBC2, 
Newsnight,  19  October  1998) 
A  swap  of  more  Palestinian  land  occupied  by  Israel  since  1967  in  return  for 
tougher  Palestinian  measures  against  Islamic  terrorists  ... 
In  both  camps  zealots 
will  do  their  damndest  to  bring  down  the  peace  process  as  it  continues  to 
unfold.  Islamic  terrorists  on  the  one  side  fighting  what  they  call  a  holy  war, 
nationalists  bigots  and  ultra-religious  fundamentalists  in  Israel's  midst. 
(BBC2  Newsnight,  23  October  1998) 
Meanwhile  Israeli  officials  have  seized  on  this  latest  terrorist  attack  as  support 
for  the  tough  line  Israel  has  so  far  taken  at  the  peace  summit  in  the  United 
States.  (19  October  198  8,  ITV  Lunchtime  &  Early  Evening  News) 
Last  minute  negotiations  are  taking  place  in  Maryland  in  America  this  evening 
to  hammer  out  the  final  details  of  a  Middle  East  peace  deal.  Here  are  the  main 
points  of  the  proposed  agreement.  A  13  percent  Israeli  troop  withdrawal  from 
the  West  Bank.  The  release  of  750  jailed  Palestinians  by  the  Israelis  and  a 
timetable  for  Palestinians  to  arrest  suspected  terrorists  (ITV,  Early  Evening 
News  23  October  1998) 
The  latest  victims  of  the  latest  bloody  effusion  of  Arab  anger.  Over  50 
wounded  were  rushed  to  hospital  after  a  callous  terrorist  grenade  attack  upon  a 
crowded  bus  station  ...  As  the  southern  Israeli  city  of  Beesheba  reached  its 
morning  rush  hour  peak,  a  lone  terrorist  leapt  from  a  car  and  hurled  two  hand 
grenades  into  the  main  bus  station  ...  The  atrocity  has  cast  a  long  shadow  over 
the  latest  Middle  East  peace  talks  half  a  world  away  in  Maryland 
... 
Bus 
stations  have  in  the  past  been  favourite  targets  for  Hamas  and  other  terror 
172 groups  opposed  to  deal  making  with  Israel.  (Channel  5,  Lunchtime  News,  19 
October  1998) 
Back  in  America  President  Clinton  who  has  already  spent  57  hours  at  the  talks 
waits  in  Washinton,  hoping  to  be  called  back  to  the  talks  if  the  two  sides  can 
conclude  a  deal  on  land  and  terrorism  (Channel  5  Lunchtime  News,  20 
October  1998) 
There  are  a  number  of  problems  with  j  ournalists  using  the  label  terrorist.  Firstly  it  is 
so  emotive  that  it  can  serve  to  demonise  the  accused  to  such  an  extent,  that  it  can 
obscure  both  motives  and  possible  resolutions.  The  conflict  clearly  has  underlying 
political  dimensions  that  have  to  be  resolved  if  there  is  to  be  a  settlement.  However  if 
journalists  use  words  like  'terrorist'  the  danger  is  that  these  can  be  lost  and  the 
solution  to  the  conflict  get  reduced  to  'controlling  the  terrorists'.  Amnesty 
International  never  use  the  words  'terrorism'  or  'terrorist'  in  their  literature  (unless  it 
is  in  inverted  commas).  Marie-Anne  Ventoura  an  information  officer  for  Amnesty 
International  explained  that  this  was  partly  because  there  was  'no  internationally 
agreed  definition  of  the  term'  (Email,  22  September  2004).  She  also  claimed  that 
Amnesty  adopted  the  same  reasoning  as  been  taken  by  Ms  Kalliopi  Koufa,  the  Special 
Rapporteur  of  United  Nations  Sub  Commission  on  the  Promotion  and  Protection  of 
Human  Rights,  who  noted  in  2001 
that  the  issue  of  'terrorism'  has  been  'approached  from  such  different 
perspectives  and  in  such  different  contexts  that  it  has  been  impossible  for  the 
international  community  to  arrive  at  a  generally  acceptable  definition  to  this 
very  day'  The  Special  Rapporteur  also  points  out  that  'the  term  terrorism  is 
emotive  and  highly  loaded  politically.  It  is  habitually  accompanied  by  an 
implicit  negative  judgement  and  is  used  selectively.  '  The  Special  Rapporteur 
underscores  the  risk  of  mixing  definitions  with  value  judgements,  which  often 
leads  commentators  to  qualify  as  'terrorist'  those  acts  they  are  opposed  to,  or 
to  reject  the  use  of  the  term  when  it  relates  to  activities  they  support.  (Email, 
22  September  2004) 
173 Instead  of  using  the  words  'terrorism'  and  'terrorist'  Amnesty  specify  when 
international  human  rights  law  has  been  violated  and  by  whom.  This  is  also  more 
impartial  because  it  means  that  both  state  and  non-state  actors  can  be  held  to  account 
without  prejudice.  This  is  perhaps  a  tactic  thatjournalists  could  adopt.  This  points  to 
another  problem  in  that  there  is  a  certain  double  standard  in  the  way  that  human  rights 
violations  are  reported  by  the  media.  Whilstiournalists  described  Palestinian  violence 
as  'terrorism'.  Israeli  'security  measures',  at  the  this  time  being  largely  carried  out  by 
the  Palestinian  Authority  were  described  in  very  euphemistic  language.  However 
many  Palestinians  regarded  these  measures  as  'state  terrorism'  and  some 
commentators  and  human  rights  groups  suggested  that  the  Wye  Memorandum  would 
make  them  worse: 
The  most  significant  and  innovative  aspect  of  the  Memorandum  is  its  barely 
concealed  call  for  state  terror  to  achieve  the  goals  of  the  US  led  program.  That 
breaks  new  ground  for  international  agreements.  The  memorandum  emphasizes 
that  the  Palestinian  security  forces,  which  have  a  shocking  record  of  torture  and 
terror,  must  act  to  ensure  the  safety  of  Israelis.  The  CIA  will  supervise  them  as 
they  carry  out  arrests,  hold  mock  trials,  collect  arms,  and  'criminalise'  incitement 
against  the  agreements.  (Chomsky,  1999:  xvii) 
Chomsky  points  to  an  Amnesty  International  reports  on  a  history  of  major  human 
rights  violations  committed  by  security  forces  (both  Palestinian  and  Israeli)  during  the 
Oslo  process: 
Amnesty  International  published  an  assessment  of  the  human  rights  situation 
since  Oslo  as  the  Wye  Agreement  was  signed.  Al  estimates  1600  Palestinians 
routinely  arrested  by  Israeli  forces  every  year,  half  'systematically  tortured'.  AI 
notes  again  as  other  major  human  rights  organisations  regularly  have,  that  Israel 
is  alone  in  having  'effectively  legalised  the  use  of  torture'  (with  the  Supreme 
Court's  approval),  determining  that  in  pursuit  of  Israel's  perceived  needs  'all 
international  rules  of  conduct  could  be  broken'  AI  reports  similar  practices  on  the 
part  of  the  Palestinian  Authority,  including  execution  of  two  Palestinians  for 
'incitement  against  the  peace  process'.  The  State  Security  Courts  which  conduct 
such  abuses  have  been  endorsed  by  the  US  State  Department  as  demonstrating 
174 'Arafat's  commitment  to  the  security  concerns  of  Israel'  with  the  support  of  Al 
Gore.  (1999:  xvii) 
This  appears  to  be  a  persistent  feature  of  coverage.  In  their  examination  of 
coverage  of  the  Intifada,  some  two  years  later,  Philo  and  Berry  (2004)  also  found  that 
news  media  sometimes  used  very  different  language  when  describing  the  activities  of 
the  two  parties.  Whilst  the  killing  of  two  Israeli  soldiers  by  Palestinians  was 
describing  using  emotive  language  such  as  'lynch  mob'  and  'murder',  Israel 
launching  rocket  attacks  from  helicopter  gunships  on  crowds  of  demonstrators  was 
reported  as  'Israel  still  wielded  a  big  stick'  (BBC  1,18:  00,4  October  2000).  Some 
print  journalists  have  also  accused  the  news  media  of  using  more  euphemistic 
language  when  referring  to  Israeli  behaviour.  Robert  Fisk  writing  in  the  Independent 
noted  that  when  Israel  captures  Palestinian  fighters  they  are  often  taken  away  by  the 
army  and  killed  (17  April  2002).  He  points  out  that  j  ournalists,  who  are  well  aware  of 
what  is  occurring,  often  refer  to  these  actions  as  'mopping  up'  exercises. 
Another  issue  in  relation  to  the  use  of  language  involved  j  ournalist's  descriptions 
of  the  legal  status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  In  most  instances  journalists  did 
describe  the  territories  as  being  'occupied'.  However  in  three  bulletins  a  BBC  I 
reporter  refers  to  the  West  Bank  as  being  'disputed'  territory  (BBC  I  Lunchtime,  Early 
Evening  &  Evening  News  19  October  1998).  Channel  Five  journalists  also  referred  to 
the  territories  as  'disputed'  on  two  occasions  (Channel  5  Evening  News,  23  October 
1998  &  24  October  1998).  The  distinction  here  is  important,  'disputed'  territory 
implies  that  the  legal  ownership  of  the  West  bank  and  Gaza  strip  is  unclear,  whilst 
'occupied'  indicates  that  the  territory  is  Palestinian  and  the  Israeli  presence  there  is 
illegal.  This  seems  strange  since  the  official  British  government  position  (like  almost 
all  other  governments)  is  that  the  territories  are  'occupied',  not  'disputed'. 
This  content  analysis  has  pointed  to  a  situation  where  j  ournalists  seem  able  to  more 
easily  present  the  Israeli  perspective  on  most  aspects  of  the  conflict  than  the 
Palestinian  perspective.  In  the  next  chapter  I  will  examine  why  this  might  be  so. 
175 Chapter  4 
Productions  Factors  in  the  Reporting  of  the  Israel-Palestine  Conflict 
Years  of  experience  have  taught  me  that  one  should  never  venture  an  opinion, 
favourable  or  unfavourable,  on  events  concerned  in  any  way  with  Israel.  Any  attempt 
at  a  detached  view  opens  the  wayfor  letters,  telegrams,  personal  exasperations  and, 
above  all,  telephone  calls  on  what  the  late  Sir  Lewis  Namier  called  'the  terror  by 
telephone.  '  The  only  safe  course  is  never,  never,  never  to  have  any  opinion 
whatsoever  on  the  Middle  East. 
AJP  Taylor,  London  Review  ofBooks,  17  November  1982. 
Here  I  will  relate  the  theoretical  issues  discussed  in  chapter  one  to  the  specific 
problems  encountered  by  j  ournalists  reporting  on  the  conflict. 
Time  Constraints,  New  Technologies  and  Commercial  Pressures 
Journalists  operate  in  a  commercial  and  highly  competitive  environment  in  which 
there  are  time  constraints,  which  can  make  it  a  challenge  to  provide  the  necessary 
level  of  context  or  historical  background.  This  is  made  all  the  more  difficult  for 
journalists  when  they  are  dealing  with  an  area  like  the  Israel-Palestine  conflict  which 
is  uniquely  controversial.  Journalists  have  commented  that  it  a  challenge  to  provide 
context  and  background  when  time  is  short,  and  the  historical  record  is  fiercely 
contested  by  the  different  Parties.  The  Channel  4j  oumalist  Lindsey  Hilsum  has 
suggested  that: 
There  are  two  problems  ... 
how  far  back  do  you  go  is  one  and  the  other  is  with 
a  conflict  like  this,  nearly  every  single  fact  is  disputed 
...  I  think,  I  Oh  God  the 
Palestinians  say  this  and  the  Israelis  say  that'  and  I  have  to,  as  a  journalist- 
make  a  judgement  and  I  say  this  is  what  happened  and  it's  quite  clear  and 
there  are  other  things  where  I  wasn't  there  and  I  didn't  see  it  with  my  own 
eyes.  I  know  it's  a  question  of  interpretation  so  I  have  to  say  what  both  sides 
think  and  I  think  sometimes  that  stops  us  from  giving  the  background  we 
should  be  giving,  because  I  think  well,  bloody  hell,  I've  only  three  minutes  to 
do  this  piece  in  and  I'm  going  to  spent  a  minute  going  through  the  arguments. 
(cited  in  Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  245) 
176 The  emergence  of  new  technologies  and  television  formats  also  seems  to  have 
had  important  repercussions.  The  proliferation  of  new  digital  channels  and  in 
particular  the  arrival  of  24  hour  news  channels  have  been  cited  as  important  changes 
affecting  the  way  journalistic  operate.  Some  have  argued  that  the  proliferation  of  new 
channels  have  meant  that  j  ournalists  now  spread  themselves  more  thinly,  further 
reducing  the  time  available  for  researching  stories  and  providing  context: 
Part  of  the  problem  is  just  the  way  the  news  medium  works  nowadays  -  where 
you  are  geared  up  to  having  constant  twenty-four  hour  news  and  you  get  the 
feeling  that  some  of  the  journalists  on  the  spot  are  spending  more  time  in  front 
of  a  camera  because  they  have  to  do  fifteen  different  TV  news  programmes 
and  four  different  radio  programmes,  than  they  are  actually  finding  out  what's 
happening  in  the  story,  and  that  means  we  do  not  get  as  much  analysis,  as 
much  colour,  as  much  depth  in  what's  going  on.  You  get  moment  by  moment 
repetition.  (Photographer,  cited  in  Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  244) 
Others  have  suggested  that  the  advent  of  24  hour  news  has  meant  that 
controversial  views  can  be  shunted  to  the  margins  of  programme  schedules  where 
they  are  unlikely  to  reach  many  viewers.  The  former  BBC  correspondent  Tim 
Llewelyn  has  suggested  that  the  BBC  has  marginalized  the  Palestinian  perspective  in 
this  manner: 
The  BBC  can  banish  the  awkward  squads  who  might  raise  (or  answer)  real 
questions  about  the  Middle  East  to  the  watches  that  end  the  night.  Critics  who 
say  that  the  Palestinian  or  Arab  view  has  not  be  aired  can  be  referred  to  the 
World  Service  at  3.00am,  or  News  24  at  6:  00am,  and  so  on.  (Llewelyn,  2004: 
227) 
Others  have  pointed  to  how  the  progressive  relaxation  of  media  regulation 
over  the  last  two  decades  has  affected  the  climate  journalists  operate  in.  Greg 
Lanning,  an  experienced  documentary  producer,  has  argued  that  such  regulatory 
changes  have  led  to  the  creation  of  a  more  competitive  and  rating  driven  broadcast 
culture,  and  that  extended  into  all  aspects  of  the  schedule  including  news,  current 
177 affairs  and  documentaries.  Lanning  maintains  that  even  the  BBC,  which  is  supposed 
to  be  isolated  from  such  commercial  strictures,  was  under  pressure  to  maintain  at  least 
a  30  percent  audience  share  in  order  to  justify  the  licence  fee,  and  this  inevitably  led 
programmers  to  seek  material  that  was  immediate  and  dramatic,  at  the  expense  of 
providing  context  or  analysis.  Lanning  also  pointed  to  the  effects  of  new  media 
monitoring  technologies  which  allow  broadcasters  to  ascertain  the  exact  point  in 
programmes  when  viewers  switch  channels: 
We  are  coming  under  tremendous  pressure  to  make  the  first  five  minutes  of 
programmes  quick,  irresistible 
...  We  always  used  to  have  hooks  but  now  you 
can't  let  the  pace  drop  until  you  are  well  into  the  programme  because  they  are 
really  scared  that  people  will  change  channel.  You  should  ask  Channel  4  to 
show  you  their  meters.  They  can  tell  you  where  people  leave  the  programme 
and  where  they  go,  and  they  do  that  for  every  program  now.  So  they  can  tell 
you  that  after  90  seconds  you  mentioned  the  Bosnian  war  and  everyone  went 
to  Delia  Smith  or  something.  That's  what  is  driving  it  [programme  production] 
(Interview,  Greg  Lanning,  2  November  1999) 
The  BBC's  George  Alagiah  has  also  spoken  of  the  effects  that  such  monitoring 
equipment  has  had  at  the  Corporation's  news  service.  Alagiah  claims  that  according 
to  the  BBC's  meters,  approximately  three  million  viewers  change  channel  during  the 
first  minute  of  BBC  I's  early  evening  bulletin.  This  he  suggests  is  why  editors  are 
4constantly'  telling  journalists  that  'the  attention  span  of  our  average  viewer  is  about 
twenty  seconds'  and  that  broadcasters  must  seek  to  'grab'  them  with  arresting 
material  (cited  in  Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  211).  This  in  part  explains  the  tendency  for 
broadcasters  to  emphasise  the  dramatic  at  the  expense  of  the  analytical. 
Cultural  Preference,  Sourciniz  and  Public  Relations 
Most  international  journalists  covering  the  Israel-Palestine  conflict  are  stationed  in 
West  Jerusalem  and  have  close  links  with  the  Israeli  public  relations  machine.  In 
contrast,  there  are  very  few  j  ournalists  stationed  in  the  occupied  territories.  Tim 
178 Llewelyn  suggests  that  makes  it  more  difficult  for  reporters  to  understand  the  reality 
of  military  occupation  and  hence  the  Palestinian  perspective: 
The  news  people  should  move  people  out  of  West  Jerusalem.  It  should  base  a 
news  team  in  the  West  Bank-  not  just  some  luckless  stringer  but  a  senior, 
known  correspondent  who  can  force  his  or  her  way  onto  the  main  bulletins 
(what  the  BBC  likes  to  call  a  'brand'  reporter).  Here  the  reporters  will  get  to 
feel  what  daily  life  under  occupation  is  like,  live  it  and  empathise  with  the 
people  crushed  under  it,  as  news  crews  lived  the  invasion  of  Baghdad  or  as  we 
experienced  the  Israeli  invasions  and  occupation  of  Lebanon-  from  the  inside, 
not  just  down  there  on  a  visit.  (2004:  229-23  0) 
He  also  argues  that  the  inability  of  journalists  to  cover  the  Palestinian 
perspective  is  partly  a  function  of  a  cultural  preference  in  that  Israelis  are  seen  as 
closer  culturally  to  Europeans,  and  partly  because  state  actors  with  their  attendant 
prestige  and  trappings  are  seen  as  more  important  and  credible  sources  than  the 
spokespersons  of  what  is  still  a  resistance  movement: 
To  a  westerner  sitting  at  a  screen  in  London  a  dead  or  suffering  Arab  in  the 
rubble  of  a  bazaar  is  more  remote  than  a  dead  or  suffering  Israeli  in  a  shopping 
mall  with  a  Wal-Mart  in  shot;  studios  favour  good  English-speakers  rather 
than  men  with  heavy  accents;  producers  like  quality  sound  and  vision.  It  is  a 
presenter's  inclination,  in  many  cases,  to  take  more  seriously  a  representative 
of  a  state  and  an  authority,  a  uniform  or  a  dark  suit,  than  a  denizen  of  what  is, 
after  all,  not  quite  a  state  but  still  a  national  revolutionary  and  resistance 
movement,  a  man  perhaps  in  a  keffiyeh  or  a  militia  uniform,  speaking  in  poor 
English  or  being  translated  or  subtitled.  (2004:  229) 
A  current  senior  BBC  executive  has  also  suggested  that  cultural  preference  plays  a 
strong  role  in  how  'London-based  British  j  ournalists  who  are  not  themselves  Middle 
East  specialists'  see  the  conflict.  Their  'mind-set'  he  suggested  could  be: 
Summed  up  like  this:  (i)  Israel  is  a  liberal  democracy,  like  the  UK,  with  a  free 
press,  freedom  of  speech  and  frequent  elections  in  which  governments  are 
179 defeated;  (ii)  the  Palestinians  say  their  want  their  own  state,  they  were  offered 
it  at  Camp  David  and  rejected  it;  (iii)  throwing  stones  at  tanks  is  one  thing,  but 
suicide  bombs  on  buses  and  in  cafes  is  something  else  and  places  them  beyond 
the  pale.  (Letter,  9  July  2004) 
Some  might  question  the  characterisation  of  Israel  as  a  'liberal  democracy  like  the 
UK'  in  light  of  reports  produced  by  human  rights  groups  and  the  United  Nations.  It  is 
also  interesting  that  the  executive  claims  that  j  ournalists  were  likely  to  blame  the 
Palestinians  for  not  accepting  what  was  offered  at  Camp  David.  The  events  of  Camp 
David  are  highly  contested  (see  Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  83-86),  but  London  based 
journalists,  according  to  the  BBC  executive,  appeared  far  more  likely  to  accept  the 
Israeli  perspective.  Similarly  the  perspective  on  the  use  of  violence  is  revealing. 
Human  rights  groups  have  pointed  to  serious  breaches  of  international  law  (including 
war  crimes  and  crimes  against  humanity)  committed  by  both  sides  in  the  conflict  but 
it  seems  that  violence  committed  by  Palestinians  is  viewed  in  a  different  light  than 
that  committed  by  Israelis. 
Israel  also  appears  to  have  a  most  more  developed  public  relations  operation. 
A  number  of  journalists  have  commented  on  the  professionalism  and  effectiveness  of 
the  Israeli  PR  machine.  Jim  Hollander,  chief  photographer  for  Reuters  in  Jerusalem 
has  remarked  on  how  'savvy'  Israeli  officials  are  in  getting  their  side  of  the  story 
across  to  the  foreign  press  corps:  'The  Israeli  officials  are  very  literate  and  very 
professional  in  presenting  their  points  of  view  and  availing  themselves  to  the  media' 
(cited  in  el-Nawawy  &  Kelly,  2001:  102).  Some  journalists  have  also  commented  that 
the  Israeli  PR  machine  operated  by  the  Netanyahu  administration  was  especially 
forceful  in  getting  its  views  across.  Lyse  Doucet,  a  Canadian  reporter  for  the  BBC, 
notes  that  the  Israeli  public  relations  machine  is  unrivalled  in  the  Middle  East  and  that 
Binyamin  Netanyahu,  whose  background  is  in  PR,  is  the  'ultimate  spin-doctor'  (cited 
in  el-Nawawy  &  Kelly,  2001:  102).  Likewise,  Nicolas  Tatro,  the  bureau  chief  for 
Associated  Press  in  Jerusalem,  has  commented  that: 
Each  Israeli  government  is  different;  they  all  flood  us  with  information,  but 
this  current  government  [the  Netanyahu  administration]  has  been  more 
aggressive  in  presenting  its  point  of  view.  It  very  much  has  an  edge  to  it.  The 
180 rhetorical  factor  is  much  higher  than  it  has  been  since  the  early  days  of  the 
Begin  govenunent.  (cited  in  el-Nawawy  &  Kelly,  2001:  102) 
This  proactive  approach  involving  'flooding'  journalists  with  infonnation 
emphasising  your  perspective,  is  not  matched  by  anything  comparable  on  the 
Palestinian  side.  Edward  Said  claims  that  during  the  Al-Aqsa  intifada  the  Israeli 
public  relations  operation  was  employing  numerous  proactive  strategies  to  get  the 
Israeli  message  across,  helped  by  many  pro-Israel  supporters  in  publishing  and  the 
wider  media: 
Never  have  the  media  been  so  influential  in  determining  the  course  of  war  as 
during  the  Al-Aqsa  Intifada 
...  Israel  has  already  poured  hundreds  of  millions  of 
dollars  into  what  in  Hebrew  is  called  hasbara,  or  information  for  the  outside 
world  (hence,  propaganda).  This  has  included 
... 
lunches  and  free  trips  for 
influential  journalists 
... 
bombarding  congressmen-  and  women  with  invitations 
and  visits;  pamphlets  and  most  important,  money  for  election  campaigns; 
directing  (or,  as  the  case  requires  harassing)  photographers  of  the  current 
intifada  into  producing  certain  images  and  not  others  ...  training  commentators 
to  make  frequent  references  to  the  Holocaust  and  Israel's  predicament  today; 
many  advertisements  in  the  newspapers  attacking  Arabs  and  praising 
Israel  ...  Because  so  many  powerful  people  in  the  media  and  publishing 
business  are  strong  supporters  of  Israel,  the  task  is  made  vastly  easier.  (Said, 
2001) 
The  Independent's  journalist  Robert  Fisk  has  also  commented  on  how  the 
proactive  approach  involving  a  constant  flow  of  information  from  PR  professionals  to 
journalists  can  help  to  set  news  agendas: 
The  journalists'  narrative  of  events  is  built  around  the  last  thing  someone  has 
said  and  the  last  thing,  given  the  constraints  of  time  and  the  rolling  news 
machine,  that  they  have  heard  on  the  agency  wire.  So  what  you  would  find  on 
television  in  the  last  few  weeks  is  that  every  time  an  Israeli  statement  was 
made,  it  was  pushed  across  at  the  Palestinians.  So  the  Israelis  would  say:  'Can 
Arafat  control  the  violence?  '  and  instead  of  the  television  reporters  saying: 
181 'Well  that's  interesting,  but  can  the  Israelis  control  their  own  People?  '  the 
question  was  simply  taken  up  as  an  Israeli  question  and  became  part  of  the 
news  agenda.  There  seemed  to  be  no  real  understanding  that  the  job  of  the 
reporter  is  to  analyse  what's  really  happening,  not  simply  to  pick  up  on  the 
rolling  news  machine,  the  last  statement  by  one  of  the  sides.  And  given  the 
fact  that  the  Israelis  have  a  very  smooth  machine  operating  for  the  media, 
invariably  what  happened  is,  it  was  Israel's  voice  that  came  across  through  the 
mouths  of  the  reporters,  rather  than  [having]  people  who  were  really  making 
enquiries  into  both  sides  and  what  both  people  were  doing.  (The  Message 
BBC  Radio  Four,  20  October  2000,  cited  in  Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  247) 
In  Britain  the  Israeli  embassy  has  been  a  significant  player  in  setting  the  media 
agenda.  The  Independent  has  reported  that  the  'Israeli  embassy  in  London  has 
mounted  a  huge  drive  to  influence  the  British  media',  and  cited  comments  from  the 
embassy's  press  secretary  that 
London  is  a  world  centre  of  media  and  the  embassy  here  works  night  and  day 
to  influence  that  media.  And  in  many  subtle  ways,  I  think  we  don't  do  a  half 
bad  job,  if  I  may  say  so  ...  We  have  newspapers  that  write  consistently  in  a 
manner  that  supports  and  understands  Israel's  situation  and  its  challenges.  And 
we  have  had  influence  on  the  BBC  as  well.  (Independent,  21  September  2001, 
cited  in  Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  248) 
In  contrast  some  Zionists  have  argued  that  there  are  problems  with  Israeli  public 
relations.  For  instance  Joy  Wolfe  of  the  Women's  International  Zionist  Organisation 
has  commented  on  the  'inexperience'  of  representatives  from  the  IDF  who  have  'very 
poor  communications  equipment  and  not  even  a  proper  speaking  English  translator 
who  can  put  out  a  decent  press  release'  (cited  in  Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  246).  However 
most  commentators  suggest  that  that  the  Israelis  are  far  more  skilled  in  this 
department  than  the  Palestinians.  A  number  of  j  ournalists  have  commented  that  the 
Palestinian  public  relations  apparatus  is  amateurish  and  confused  in  comparison  to  the 
Israeli  operation.  A  US  journalist  who  ran  a  Jerusalem  based  news  agency  commented 
that: 
182 Palestinian  spokesmen  are  their  own  worst  enemy.  They  often  come  across  as 
boorish,  the  message  is  often  incoherent.  Official  Palestine  does  have  a 
method  problem.  They  miss  the  essential  points.  Arafat  is  a  one  man  show,, 
he  is  almost  always  incoherent.  (cited  in  Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  246) 
Palestinian  public  relations  also  suffers  from  the  disadvantage  that  the  Israeli 
perspective  is far  more  easily  accessible  through  the  English  language  versions  of  the 
Israeli  press,  whilst  little  of  the  Arab  press  is  available  in  English.  As  Dr  Toine  Van 
Teeffelen,  a  Dutch  human  rights  worker  who  lives  in  Bethlehem  notes: 
Arab  newspapers  appear  only  in  Arabic  while  some  major  Israeli  newspapers 
(Jerusalem  Post,  Raaretz)  appear  in  English,  thus  allowing  for  a  daily  stream 
of  Israeli-oriented  reports  and  analyses  easily  accessible  through  the  internet. 
In  fact,  most  westernjoumalists  are  more  familiar  with  the  realities  of 
occupation  through  the  critical  accounts  of  the  Israeli  Haaretz  journalists 
Amira  Hass  and  Gideon  Levi  than  through  accounts  from  the  Palestinian  or 
Arab  press.  (Van  Teeffelen,  2003) 
Other  J  oumalists  have  argued  that  the  lack  of  a  Palestinian  perspective  is  not 
just  a  function  of  poor  Palestinian  public  relations,  but  is  also  related  to  an 
unwillingness  on  the  part  of  some  broadcasters  to  prominently  feature  some  of  the 
more  articulate  Arab  spokespersons: 
The  BBC  has  been  plied  with  list  of  suitable  people  by  organisations  such  as 
the  Council  for  the  Advancement  of  Arab-British  Understanding,  the  Arab 
League,  individual  embassies  and  private  people,  only  for  these  lists  to  be 
ignored.  Whether  this  is  through  inefficiency  or  deliberation,  it  is  hard  to  say.  I 
do  know  for  example  that  the  Ambassador  for  the  Arab  League  had,  between 
January  2003  and  the  end  of  the  Iraq  war  in  early  April,  appeared  once  on 
BBC  TV;  a  colleague  of  mine  who  is  one  of  Britain's  most  articulate  and 
intelligent  Palestinian  spokespersons  is  missing  almost  completely  from 
mainstream  BBC  television  and  rarely  heard  on  domestic  radio.  (Llewelyn, 
2004:  224-5) 
183 There  does  seem  to  be  some  evidence  that  Israeli  public  relations  did  set  the 
media  agenda,  in  the  manner  described  by  Fisk  above,  during  the  coverage  of  the  Wye 
Accords.  As  already  noted,  there  were  essentially  two  explanations  about  why  the 
peace  process  was  stalled.  The  Netanyahu  administration  argued  that  the  central 
problem  was  that  the  Palestinians  wouldn't  control  the  'terrorists'  and  disarm 
Palestinians.  The  Palestinian  position  was  that  the  peace  process  was  being 
manipulated  so  as  to  allow  the  Israelis  to  take  more  land,  build  more  settlements,  and 
effectively  re-package  rather  than  end  the  military  occupation.  Whilst  the  official 
Israeli  perspective  was  featured  extensively  in  reported  statements,  the  Palestinian 
view  was  largely  absent. 
Pressure,  Intimidation  and  Accusations  of  Anti-Semitism 
In  chapter  one  I  discussed  work  by  Mayhew  and  Adams  which  suggested  that 
the  BBC  was  under  intense  pressure  from  Israeli  officials  and  lobby  groups  during  the 
1970s.  Journalists  have  suggested  that  thirty  years  later  little  has  changed.  The  BBC 
bureau  chief  in  Jerusalem,  Andrew  Steele,  has  spoken  of  the  extensive  monitoring 
capabilities  of  the  official  Israeli  public  relations  operation  and  the  pressure  this  can 
create: 
We  fairly  regularly  get  an  official  summons  from  one  side  or  the  other  to 
explain  our  actions.  I  would  say  the  frequency  is higher  on  the  Israeli  side,  but 
that  possibly  is  a  reflection  on  the  size  and  sophistication  of  their  publicity 
machine.  They  are  able  to  monitor  every  single  word  that  we  say-  someone 
sits  at  the  Israeli  Foreign  ministry  watching  BBC  World  24  hours  a  day.  If 
they  ever  have  an  issue  about  a  story,  they  have  a  taped  transcript  of  what  we 
said  and  they  can  quote  it  back  verbatim.  They  are  completely  open  about  this 
and  even  give  tours  of  their  monitoring  facility.  One  person  watches  Sky 
News,  another  CNN  and  another  the  BBC  [the  three  international  24-hour 
news  channels  broadcast  in  Israel].  We  are  very  aware  of  the  pressure. 
(Palestine-Israel  Journal  ofPolitics,  Economics  and  Culture,  2003,  vol.  10,2) 
184 Sometimes  the  pressure  can  involve  attempts  to  have  journalists  removed  if 
they  produce  critical  coverage  or  fail  to  report  stories  which  the  Israeli  press  office 
wants  covered.  In  April  2004  Chris  McGreal  reported  on  a  letter  sent  by  Natan 
Sharansky,  Israel's  minister  for  Diaspora  affairs  to  the  BBC  accusing  Orla  Guerlin  of 
anti-Semitism  and  'total  identification  with  the  goals  and  methods  of  the  Palestinian 
terror  groups'  for  questioning  Israeli  motives  in  their  handling  of  a  16  year  old  would 
be  suicide  bomber.  He  noted  that  this  came  at  a  time  when  a  number  of  foreign  news 
bureaus  had  complained  about  pressure  from  the  Israeli  press  office: 
The  letter  comes  as  several  foreign  news  organisations  complain  of  increasing 
government  pressure  to  curtail  critical  coverage  or  to  report  stories  Israel 
believes  help  identify  the  Palestinian  conflict  with  global  Islamist  terrorism. 
Officials  have  presented  editors  with  dossiers  on  individual  reporters  and 
singled  out  organisations  such  as  Sky  News  for  allegedly  having  an  anti-Israel 
agenda.  The  Tel  Aviv  press  has  called  for  the  expulsion  of  correspondents 
from  Sky,  the  Times  and  several  French  papers  for  failing  to  cover  a  story  the 
government  mobilised  embassies  worldwide  to  get  into  the  media  last  month. 
(Guardian,  I  April  2004) 
McGreal  also  reported  that  'CNN  sources  say  the  network  has  bowed  to 
considerable  pressure  on  its  editors'  and  that  'Israeli  officials  boast  that  they  now 
have  only  to  call  a  number  at  the  network's  headquarters  in  Atlanta  to  pull  any  story 
they  do  not  like'.  This  accusation  was  later  denied  by  CNN.  The  BBC  bureau  chief  in 
Jerusalem,  Andrew  Steele  has  also  spoken  of  the  pressure  that  the  corporation  is  under 
from  organised  lobby  groups: 
The  pressure  is  enormous.  And  not  just  from  our  audiences  in  the  UK. 
Because  the  BBC  is  broadcast  in  Israel,  the  West  Bank,  Gaza  and  everywhere 
else,  every  pressure  group  in  the  world  is  on  our  case.  I  have  never  had  as 
many  emails  as  I  get  here.  People  don't  just  phone  up  to  complain,  they  know 
how  to  get  their  complaint  noticed  in  a  way  that  means  we  actually  have  to 
address  it,  which  is  incredibly  time-consuming.  (Palestine-Israel  Journal  of 
Politics,  Economics  and  Culture,  2003,  vol.  10,2) 
185 In  the  United  Kingdom  there  also  exist  a  number  of  well  resourced  lobby 
groups  who  attempt  to  influence  the  media  agenda.  The  Britain  Israel 
Communications  and  Research  Centre  (BICOM)  is  one  of  the  most  prominent  lobby 
groups  working  in  the  United  Kingdom.  In  its  mission  statement  the  organisation  says 
that  its  objective  is  'to  bring  about  a  significant  shift  in  opinion  in  favour  of  Israel 
amongst  the  general  public,  opinion-formers  and  the  Jewish  community'.  To  achieve 
this  the  organisation  engages  in  numerous  activities  including  'operating  a  fully 
functioning  media  centre,  providing  real-time  briefings  and  high  quality  in-depth 
research,  publishing  daily  and  weekly  briefing  of  media  coverage  on  Israel  with 
analysis,  and  organising  and  delivering  visitor  programs  for  key  politicians, 
academics  and  journalists'  (BICOM  website).  In  October  2002  Stephen  Bates 
reported  that  BICOM  had  hired  both  Stanley  Greenberg,  former  pollster  and  advisor 
to  Bill  Clinton,  Tony  Blair  and  Ehud  Barak,  and  Frank  Lunz,  former  advisor  to 
George  Bush,  Silvio  Berlusconi,  and  Rudy  Giuliani  (The  Guardian,  12  October 
2002).  The  report  cited  comments  from  Lee  Petar,  the  acting  director  of  BICOM,  that 
4we  are  looking  at  ways  to  sharpen  the  message  and  to  choose  the  right  people  to  do 
it.  To  get  the  world's  best  professionals  -  and  these  are  the  world's  best  professionals  - 
you  have  to  pay  the  top  price.  ' 
All  of  Britain's  three  major  political  parties  also  have  internal  pro-Israel  lobby 
groups.  The  Labour  Friends  of  Israel  (LFI)  claims  to  be  'one  of  the  largest  interest 
groups  within  the  Labour  party'  that  can  call  on  'wide  support  from  MPs,  MEN  and 
Peers'  (LFI  website).  There  is  also  the  affiliated  Trade  Union  Friends  of  Israel  (TUFI) 
which  arranges  trips  to  Israel  for  trade  union  delegates.  The  organisation  claims  that 
its  'packed  annual  lunches  at  the  TUC  congress'  were  able  to  attract  'over  200  people 
and  leaders  of  the  largest  trade  unions  and  in  particular  TUC  General  Secretary  John 
Monks'  in  1997  (TUFI  website).  The  Conservative  Friends  of  Israel  (CFI)  claim  to 
have  the  support  of  many  MPs  including  senior  cabinet  members,  and  argues  that 
'much  of  the  reason  for  this  is  due  to  the  diplomatic  and  behind  the  scenes  operation 
of  CFI.  '  The  CFI  organises  many  events  at  each  year  at  the  Houses  of  Parliament 
involving  j  ournalists,  Peers,  MPs  and  visiting  dignitaries  from  Israel.  The  Observer 
reported  that  'for  those  working  for  organisations  perceived  as  being  biased  against 
Israel  these  can  be  uncomfortable  affairs'.  Members  of  these  lobby  groups  frequently 
claim  that  the  media  is  biased  against  Israel.  For  instance  the  Conservative  MP  Gillian 
Shephard  has  argued  that: 
186 Let's  not  suggest  that  Israel  feels  under  siege.  And  it  literally  is.  That  is  what 
drives  the  feeling  of  ultra-sensitivity.  They  feel  that  there  is  a  bias  and  there  is 
a  conspiracy  against  them.  There  is  a  perception  that  Israelis  are  portrayed  as 
instigating  the  problems  and  that  the  historical  context  of  the  threat  against 
them  is  forgotten.  There  is  a  feeling  too  that  Israel-  which  is  a  tiny  island  of 
democracy  amid  much  less  democratic  neighbours-  never  gets  enough  credit 
for  what  it  has  achieved.  (Observer,  17  June  200  1,  cited  in  Philo  &  Berry, 
2004:  250) 
Others  go  further  and  claim  that  the  media  itself  is  anti-Semetic.  The  Daily 
Mail  columnist  Melanie  Phillips  has  repeatedly  levelled  this  charge  against  the  British 
media: 
Coverage  of  Israel  is  obsessive  and  disproportionate,  and  marked  by  a  hysteria 
and  malice  not  applied  to  any  other  conflict.  And  it  cannot  be  divorced  from 
the  overt  Jew-hatred  that  has  now  surfaced  in  Britain  and  Europe,  particularly 
the  give-away  calumny  of  world  Jewish  power.  The  claim  that  Jews  conspire 
to  dominate  the  world  is  one  of  the  oldest  tropes  of  classic  Jew-hatred. 
Astonishingly,  claims  made  by  the  European  Left  are  not  far  removed.  It 
repeats  claims  that  the  'powerful  Jewish  lobby'  is  now  running  American 
foreign  policy.  (The  Observer  22  February  2004) 
Tim  Llewelyn.  has  suggested  that  the  BBC  is  particularly  sensitive  to 
accusations  of  anti-Semitism,  and  would  rather  avoid  having  to  answer  the  charge. 
The  pressure  from  lobby  groups,  he  maintains  has  led  the  corporation  to  tone  down 
any  criticism  and  avoid  using  terms  like  'ethnic  cleansing'  which  could  generate 
pressure: 
They  [the  BBC]  know  that  in  the  case  of  Israel  the  use  of  the  term  ethnic 
cleansing  would  bring  down  hell  on  their  heads  and  the  BBC  are  extremely 
nervous  about  Israel.  They  have  a  big  bureau  there,  they've  been  threatened 
already  by  the  Israelis  with  being  turfed  out.  They're  under  constant  pressure, 
the  phones  ring  all  the  time,  the  Israeli  lobby  here  know  exactly  who  to  ring 
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positions  like  that,  executives  in  public  service  corporations  like  the  BBC  are 
extremely  nervous  they  don't  like  this  and  they  don't  want  to  be  accused  of 
anti-semitism  however  false  the  charge  may  be 
...  and  so  they  play  it  safe  they 
play  it  carefully.  They  are  public  servants  and  that's  the  way  they  respond. 
(Interview,  16  April  2004) 
Journalists  have  also  been  personally  targeted  for  abuse  by  lobby  groups. 
Some  have  spoken  of  the  hate  mail  they  receive,  after  they  have  written  stories, 
questioning  Israeli  policy.  It  has  also  been  suggested  that  the  quantity  of  hate  mail 
received  by  j  oumalists  has  increased  greatly  with  the  advent  of  electronic  mail.  The 
Guardian's  reader's  editor  Ian  Mayes  has  commented  on  the  rise  of  the  'electronic 
lobby'  and  noted  how  organised  email  campaigns  'can  mean  two  or  three  hundred 
organised  emails  piling  into  a  queue  in  the  paper  in  the  space  of  a  few  hours  and 
threatening  to  clog  up  the  works.  '  (Guardian,  31  March  2001).  He  suggests  these 
organised  campaigns  'are  perceived  by  most  of  those  on  the  receiving  end,  not  as  the 
bearers  of  reasonable  argument  but  as  bullying  and  inhibiting  to  real  debate.  '  Mayes 
points  out  that  although  there  is  an  organised  pro-Arab  or  pro-Palestinian  lobby  it  'is 
not  on  anything  like  such  a  large  scale'  as  the  pro-Israel  operation.  The  Independent 
journalist  Robert  Fisk  has  also  spoken  of  the  hate  mail  addressed  to  both  himself  and 
the  newspaper: 
The  Independent's  web-site  received  an  e-mail  suggesting  that  I  was  a 
paedophile.  Among  several  vicious  Christmas  cards  was  one  bearing  the 
legend  of  the  12  Days  of  Christmas  and  the  following  note  inside:  'Robert 
Fiske  (sic)  -  aka  Lord  Haw  Haw  of  the  Middle  East  and  a  leading  anti-semite 
&  proto-fascist  Islamophile  propagandist.  Here's  hoping  2002  finds  you  deep 
in  Gehenna  (Hell),  Osama  bin  Laden  on  your  right,  Mullah  Omar  on  your  left. 
Yours,  Ishmael  Zetin.  '...  Almost  anyone  who  criticises  US  or  Israeli  policy  in 
the  Middle  East  is  now  in  this  free-fire  zone.  My  own  colleague  in  Jerusalem, 
Phil  Reeves,  is  one  of  them.  So  are  two  of  the  BBCs'reporters  in  Israel,  along 
with  Suzanne  Goldenberg  of  the  Guardian.  (Independent  14  May  2002) 
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particular  abuse.  In  early  2004  Brian  Whitaker  reported  on  the  case  of  Deborah  Fink, 
a  singer  and  music  teacher  living  in  London.  Fink,  who  was  a  member  of  Just  Peace 
UK,  a  predominately  Jewish  group  which  campaigns  for  an  end  to  the  Israeli 
occupation  and  the  creation  of  an  independent  Palestinian  state,  had  organised  an 
alternative  Christmas  carol  concert  in  which  traditional  carols  were  sung  with  new 
words,  some  questioning  the  occupation.  There  followed  a  'deluge  of  hateful  emails': 
One  came  from  a  rabbi  in  New  York,  informing  her:  'Your  soul,  my  dear,  is 
petrified  and  lost.  '  Another  said,  menacingly:  'Hitler  killed  the  wrong  Jews.  ' 
Yet  another  -  ostensibly  from  a  Jewish  doctor  of  medicine  in  the  US  - 
elaborated  on  the  Holocaust  theme.  'Too  bad  Hitler  didn't  get  your  farnily,  '  it 
said.  'With  six  million  Jews  dieing  [sic]  60  year  [sic]  ago  it's  a  shame  scum 
like  you  somehow  managed  to  survive.  '  (Guardian,  19  January  2004) 
Many  of  the  letter  writing  campaigns  are  organised  via  the  internet  by  activists.  One 
organisation  honestreporting.  com,  which  claims  to  have  12,000  subscribers,  has 
claimed  that  its  letter  writing  campaigns  have  directly  influenced  newspaper 
coverage.  After  the  Evening  Standard  art  critic  Brian  Sewell  had  written  an  article 
calling  on  Israel  to  'become  a  multicultural  society'  and  stop  using  the  Holocaust  to 
justify  unacceptable  behaviour,  honestreporting.  com  mounted  a  campaign.  'The  next 
day,  [we]  sent  out  a  letter  to  subscribers.  '  Standard  articles  recorded  'a  wave  of 
complaints...  hundreds  of  Jewish  readers  have  written  in'.  Then  'after  more  pressure' 
there  followed  a  pro-Israel  article  by  Simon  Sebag-Montefiore.  'This  is  an  example  of 
what  we  can  do.  '  (cited  by  David  Leigh  in  the  Guardian,  22  February  200  1).  Other 
attempts  to  influence  the  media  agenda  have  been  carried  out  in  a  more  subtle 
manner.  David  Hirst  has  written  of  the  Middle  East  Media  Research  Institute  (Memri) 
which  distributes  its  Arab  and  Jewish  translations  from  the  Middle  East  to  thousands 
ofjournalists,  diplomats,  politicians  and  activists.  The  organisation  which  presents 
itself  as  an  impartial  translation  service  is  run  by  Colonel  Yigal  Carmon,  a  former 
advisor  on  terrorism  to  two  former  Israeli  prime  ministers,  and  half  Memri's  staff  are 
former  Israeli  intelligence  agents.  Hirst  notes  that  Memri  is highly  selective  in  its 
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semetic,  statements  from  Arab  speakers.  Hirst  claims  that  that  Memri  never  produces 
translations  of  extreme  statements  from  fundamentalist  Jewish  groups  and  that  'its 
tendentious  choice  of  material  casts  the  Arab  world  in  a  much  worse  light  than  that 
discourse  taken  as  a  whole  could  reasonably  justify'  (2003:  77). 
Press  Coverage 
Many  studies  examining  the  operation  of  broadcast  news  organisations  have 
noted  that  much  news  gathering  is  not  proactive  but  structured  around  various  pre- 
determined  routines.  For  instance  all  news  organisations  utilise  what  is  know  as  a 
cnews  diary'  where  significant  future  events  such  as  state  visits,  elections,  legislation, 
and  the  release  of  official  reports  are  pre-logged  and  anticipated.  Similarly  what 
appears  in  the  broadsheet  press  is  also  important  in  determining  the  content  of 
television  news.  If  a  story  or  perspective  is  reported  in  the  broadsheets  it  acts  as  a 
marker  highlighting  it  as  a  potential  area  of  coverage  for  television  news.  It  also 
imparts  the  story  or  perspective  with  a  sense  of  legitimacy  and  credibility.  If  it  has 
been  reported  in  the  broadsheets  it  becomes  a  story  'worth  covering'.  Conversely  if  a 
story  or  perspective  has  not  been  covered  by  the  broadsheet  press,  it  may  be  more 
difficult  for  aj  ournalist  to  convince  his  editor  that  it  is  a  legitimate  piece  of  news.  As 
the  Glasgow  Media  Group  have  noted: 
Two  other  key  factors  in  routine  journalistic  practice  are  the  general  reliance 
on  the  press  to  define  the  parameters  of  an  'acceptable'  story  plus  the  reliance 
on  news  services  such  the  Press  Association  to  supply  a  large  amount  of  basic 
news  material.  Journalists  in  television  news  to  whom  we  spoke  complained  of 
the  difficulties  of  initiating  news  stories  unless  something  like  them  had 
already  appeared  in  the  press.  Attempts  by  j  ourrialists  to  initiate  new  themes 
were  met  by  the  question,  'where  are  the  press  cuttings  on  this?  '  (Glasgow 
Media  Group,  1985:  2) 
There  have  been  claims  in  the  media  that  the  two  highest  circulation  British 
broadsheets  employ  editorial  policies  which  are  strongly  supportive  of  Israel,  and  that 
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September  2001  Sam  Kiley  aj  ournalist  at  The  Times  resigned  from  the  publication, 
claiming  that  his  reports  had  been  subject  to  pro-Israeli  censorship.  In  an  interview  in 
the  Evening  Standard  he  pointed  to  the  friendship  between  Rupert  Murdoch  and  Ariel 
Sharon  and  the  press  baron's  extensive  investments  in  Israel.  He  maintained  that  this 
led  executives  to  rewrite  copy  so  as  to  be  favourable  to  Israel: 
The  Times  foreign  editor  and  other  middle  managers  flew  into  hysterical  terror 
every  time  a  pro-Israel  lobbying  group  wrote  in  with  a  quibble  or  complaint 
and  then  usually  took  their  side  against  their  own  correspondent  (cited  in  The 
Guardian,  5  September  2001) 
He  also  claimed  that  he  was  told  'not  to  refer  to  'assassinations'  of  Israel's 
opponents,  nor  to  'extra-j  udicial  killings  or  executions'.  On  one  occasion  when  he 
interviewed  an  Israeli  army  unit  responsible  for  killing  a  12  year  old  Palestinian  boy, 
he  claimed  that  he  was  told  to  file  the  report  without  mentioning  the  dead  boy.  He 
concluded  that  'no  pro-Israel  lobbyist  ever  dreamed  of  having  such  power  over  a  great 
national  newspaper'. 
Similar  claims  have  been  made  in  relation  to  Britain's  highest  circulation 
broadsheet,  The  Daily  Telegraph.  In  a  letter  to  the  Spectator,  three  writers  from 
Conrad  Black's  Telegraph  group  argued  that  Mr  Black's  strong  pro-Israeli  views 
made  it  impossible  for  any  journalist  to  cover  the  Palestinian  perspective  (cited  in  the 
Guardian,  16/3/2001).  They  pointed  to  a  strongly  worded  attack  by  Black  on  a 
Spectator  j  ournalist  who  had  criticised  Israel,  as  well  as  a  blanket  condemnation  of 
the  Independent,  Guardian  and  BBC,  who  according  to  Black  were  guilty  of 
propagating  pro-Palestinian  propaganda.  The  writers  argued  that  such  attacks  made  it 
difficult  for  editors  or  j  ournalists  on  his  publications  to  air  opposing  views. 
Lack  of  Specialist  Knowledge 
To  produce  critical  informed  journalism  requires  journalists  with  a  deep 
knowledge  of  the  issues  they  are  writing  about.  However  in  an  area  such  as  the 
Israeli-Palestine  conflict,  which  is  complicated  and  contested,  it  has  been  suggested 
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may  lack  a  firm  grounding  in  the  history  of  the  conflict,  and  that  this  can  adversely 
affect  coverage: 
My  hunch  is  that  you  would  find  that  many  of  the  words,  phrases,  etc  that 
reflect  either  ignorance  or  lack  of  balance  were  written  in  London,  rather  than 
by  correspondents  in  the  field.  It  might  be  an  interesting  exercise  one  day  to 
seek  to  analyse  the  historical  knowledge  and  understanding  of  TV  newsroom 
writers  and  sub-editors,  which  I  fear  may  not  always  be  much  greater  than  that 
of  the  viewers  in  your  focus  groups.  On  a  matter  of  weeks  ago,  a  senior  BBC 
programme  editor  asked  me  if  I  could  recommend  a  good  Middle  East  history 
book,  as  how  felt  he  had  an  inadequate  grasp  of  the  issues  and  background. 
(Letter,  9  July  2004) 
This  certainly  seems  to  back  up  the  comments  made  by  Kevin  Williams  in 
chapter  one  concerning  the  need  for  j  ournalist  training  to  incorporate  in  its  remit  some 
knowledge  of  world  politics  and  history.  If  senior  editors  are  worried  about  their  grasp 
of  one  of  the  most  covered  stories  in  international  news,  this  is  likely  to  present 
problems. 
Britain's  'SDecial  RelationshiD'  with  the  United  States 
Though  it  is  sometimes  argued  that  the  Foreign  Office  is  more  pro-Arab  than  Israeli, 
the  close  political,  economic  and  diplomatic  links  between  the  US  and  Britain,  often 
referred  to  as  'the  special  relationship',  are  likely  to  have  an  effect  on  how  j  ournalists 
report  the  conflict.  There  was  little  in  the  coverage  of  the  Wye  Accords  about  the 
more  controversial  aspects  of  America's  role  in  the  conflict,  such  as  its  financing  and 
diplomatic  support  for  settlement  building  in  the  occupied  territories.  There  was  also 
no  information  about  its  supply  of  weaponry  to  Israel,  much  of  which  is  provided  free 
of  charge.  More  recent  research  examining  news  coverage  of  the  Al-Aqsa  intifada 
also  found  that  journalists  tended  to  avoid  discussing  the  more  controversial  aspects 
of  America's  role  in  the  conflict  (Philo  &  Berry,  2004).  This  appeared  to  leave 
viewers  confused  about  motives.  For  instance,  few  understood  that  Palestinians  might 
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Philo  and  Berry  also  found  that  'even  those  people  who  were  concerned  about  how 
much  explanation  could  be  included  in  news  programmes  said  that  this  was  'the  least' 
they  should  be  told  (2004:  211). 
So  why  do  journalists  avoid  discussing  the  'American  connection'9  Previous 
research  suggests  that  the  tone  of  BBC  journalism  is  partly  shaped  by  pressures 
filtering  in  from  senior  politicians.  In  his  ethnography  of  BBC  news  gathering  in  the 
1970s  Philip  Schlesinger  (1978)  examined  how  the  Corporation's  news  output  was 
ideologically  tuned  to  conform  to  British  foreign  policy,  through  the  editorial  system 
and  the  vetting  of  personnel.  The  corporation,  which  had  always  had  close  links  with 
M15,  employed  an  ex-army  officer  Ronnie  Stonham,  whose  task  was  to  weed  out 
journalists  with  'subversive'  views  who  were  then  blacklisted.  The  vetting  process 
was  conducted  in  strict  secrecy  with  no  right  of  appeal  (see  also  'Revealed  how  M15 
vets  BBC  staff,  The  Observer  18  August  1985).  Schlesinger  also  revealed  how  the 
minutes  of  meetings  involving  senior  editors  and  the  Director  General  demonstrated 
the  pressures  feeding  into  the  top  BBC  hierarchy  from  politicians  and  organised  lobby 
groups.  Decisions  taken  in  response  to  these  pressures  were  then  diffused  downwards 
through  the  editorial  system.  Schlesinger  notes  that  this  top-down  system  of  control  is 
rarely  perceived  in  this  way  by  j  ournalists  because  of  a  desire  to  maintain  an  image  of 
autonomy  and  because  decisions  taken  by  upper  management  become  taken  up  as 
personal  decisions  by  those  lower  down  the  hierarchy.  Coverage  of  certain  'sensitive' 
areas  such  Northern  Ireland  or  official  secrets  were  delegated  to  senior  sub-editors 
who  had  shown  conformity  and  could  be  trusted  as  a  'safe  pair  of  hands'.  In  contrast 
those  who  took  controversial  positions  such  as  a  sub-editor  'who  had  insisted  on 
damning  the  American  presence  in  Vietnam'  were  subject  to  a  range  of  official  or 
unofficial  sanctions  (1978:  15  1). 
Tim  Llewelyn  suggests  that  the  BBC  will  have  picked  up  on  New  Labour's 
attitude  towards  the  conflict,  and  shaped  the  'tone  of  its  correspondents'  and 
reporters'  coverage,  and  its  presenters'  and  producers'  attitudes  accordingly:  very 
cautiously,  in  lockstep  as  close  as  can  be  with  the  government  and  the  policymakers  at 
No.  10  Downing  Street'  (2004:  228) 
It  is  no  secret  that  Blair  is  very  close  to  Israel.  His  old  crony  and  party 
financier,  Lord  Levy,  has  been  rewarded  with  the  post  of  special  adviser  on 
193 Middle  East  matters.  Lord  Levy  is  a  peer  who  has  close  contacts  with  Israel 
and  a  multi-million  pound  villa  near  Tel  Aviv-  his  son  David  Levy  worked  in 
the  office  of  Israel's  former  Justice  Minister  Yossi  Beilin...  The  Blair  vision 
of  the  Middle  East-  that  the  Americans  have  all  the  answers,  but  need  a  little 
gentle  coaxing  from  Whitehall,  that  the  Israelis  are  victims  of  terror,  and 
'terror'  is  our  main  universal  enemy,  that  the  Palestinians  are  their  own  worst 
enemies  and  must  do  what  they  are  told-  will  have  been  sensed  at  the  BBC  and 
passed  on  down  the  line 
...  The  process  of  getting  the  boys  in  the  front-line  into 
line  does  not  work  by  diktat  from  above  but  by  hint  and  nudge  and  whispered 
word,  almost,  in  such  a  very  English  way  by  extra-sensory  perception  (2004: 
225-226) 
The  pressures  that  I  have  highlighted  in  this  chapter  have  not  created  a  situation  where 
no  criticism  of  Israel  is  possible  in  the  media.  Critical  documentaries  such  as  Channel 
Four's  The  Killing  Zone  (19  May  2004)  and  BBC's  reports  on  Israel's  nuclear 
weapons  (Correspondent,  17  March  2003)  and  the  Sabra  and  Shatilla  killings 
(Panorama  June  17,2001)  continue  to  be  made  and  broadcast.  However  the  complex 
mixture  of  economic,  political  and  cultural  factors  indicated  above  do  help  to  explain 
why  journalists  tend  to  find  it  easier  to  present  the  Israeli  perspective. 
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Six  months  after  the  start  of  the  September  2000  al-Aqsa  intifada  Harpers  magazine 
featured  an  article  examining  the  public  relations  strategy  employed  by  the  Israelis. 
The  piece  featured  comments  from  the  Israeli  government  spokesperson  Nachman 
Shai  and  Danny  Yatom,  the  national  security  advisor  under  Ehud  Barak.  The  title  of 
the  article  was  'Fighting  the  Media  War'  and  in  it  Shai  commented  that: 
Prior  to  the  Shann  el-Sheikh  summit  I  put  together  a  committee  of  ten  to 
twenty  Israelis  to  Plot  our  media  strategy  in  the  United  States.  And  I  told 
them:  we  are  losing  the  media  battle  and  it  is  our  job  to  put  each  of  you  on 
television  to  call  the  Palestinians  liars.  We  have  to  win  the  media  war  to  win 
the  larger  war.  We  designated  one  week  for  planning,  rebutting  the  Palestinian 
position,  and  giving  assignments  to  people.  These  were  the  top  people  -  Itamar 
Rabinovich,  Peres's  top  aides,  former  Rabin  people,  you  name  it  -  and  we 
gave  out  assignments.  Our  purpose  was  to  turn  around  American  public 
opinion.  We  were  very  fortunate,  because  we  aimed  at  putting  our  strategy 
into  effect  at  Sharm  el-Sheikh.  And  we  succeeded,  but  like  I  said  we  were 
lucky.  There  were  no  Palestinian  media  people  at  Sharm  el-Sheikh,  and  so  we 
had  the  American  media  to  ourselves.  We  gave  interview  after  interview  and 
they  [the  Palestinians]  were  very  under-staffed.  We  should  not  underestimate 
our  victory,  in  many  ways,  the  media  war  will  decide  who  is  wrong  and  who  is 
right  in  this  struggle,  and  we  must  convince  people  that  we  are  right.  We  have 
some  major  problems  with  the  American  media.  There  are  many  media  outlets 
that  understand  our  position,  but  there  are  others  that  are  completely  against 
us.  We  are  especially  upset  at  CNN.  They  have  two  Palestinian  reporters,  and 
they  are  very  anti-Israeli.  And  we  are  putting  real  pressure  on  the  heads  of 
CNN  to  have  them  replaced  with  more  objective  pro-Israeli  reporters  who  are 
willing  to  tell  our  side  of  the  story.  You  know  the  importance  of  the  media  in 
molding  public  opinion,  so  we  need  you  cooperation.  We  need  our  friends  in 
the  United  States  to  counter  the  Palestinian  allegations.  We  need  to  get  our 
story  out.  (Harpers  Magazine,  May  2001) 
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by  media  researchers  in  discussions  over  the  power  and  influence  of  the  mass  media. 
These  include  the  importance  of  systematic  propaganda  and  public  relations  as  well  as 
the  significance  of  attempts  to  intimidate  and  pressure  media  outlets  to  toe  a  particular 
line.  Shai  certainly  sees  the  public  relations  campaign  as  vital  as  evidenced  by  his 
comment  that  'we  have  to  win  the  media  war  to  win  the  larger  war'.  The  media  thus 
serve  as  a  site  of  ideological  struggle  where  parties  seek  to  win  public  consent  for 
their  own  policies  and  perspectives,  as  well  as  to  degrade  the  arguments  of  their 
opponents.  In  the  midst  of  these  propaganda  wars  stand  j  ournalists  and  news 
organisations  whose  job  is  it  to  somehow  pick  their  way  amongst  the  minefield  of 
competing  explanations  and  simplify  a  fractious  and  complicated  reality  for  the 
viewers  at  home.  The  purpose  of  this  research  was  to  address  how  i  ournalists 
approached  this  task  when  reporting  on  the  Wye  River  Peace  Accords  signed  in 
October  1998.  Although  the  Oslo  peace  process  was  widely  seen  to  be  in  crisis  there 
were  a  whole  series  of  competing  explanations  for  the  breakdown.  The  Israeli 
government  stressed  that  the  problems  were  related  to  'terrorism'  and  the  failure  of 
the  Palestinian  Authority  to  prevent  incitement  and  attacks  against  Israelis.  The 
Palestinian  delegation,  on  the  other  hand,  were  keen  to  stress  that  they  had  grave 
doubts  about  Israeli  intentions.  As  one  delegate  interviewed  on  BBC  I  had  put  it  'it  is 
very  clear  there  is  no  commitment  to  a  genuine  peace  and  that  the  process  is  being 
manipulated  to  continue  Israeli  control  and  to  undermine  Palestinian  rights'  (BBC  1, 
Evening  News,  19  October  1998).  There  was  also  the  position  of  the  various  groups 
both  Israeli  and  Palestinian  who  opposed  the  Oslo  process  for  a  variety  of  reasons, 
and  the  somewhat  ambiguous  position  of  the  United  who  was  ostensively  acting  as  a 
peacemaker. 
The  results  of  the  content  analysis  reported  in  chapter  three  indicated  that  there 
was  a  strong  emphasis,  especially  on  BBC  I,  on  the  security  concerns  of  the  Israelis  at 
the  expense  of  reporting  on  issues  which  were  important  to  Palestinians.  The 
Palestinian  view  that  the  security  issue  was  being  used  to  avoid  returning  occupied 
land,  although  expressed  by  Palestinian  sources  when  given  an  opportunity  to  speak, 
was  not  picked  up  and  elaborated  on  by  journalists.  In  contrast  the  Israeli  argument 
that  the  central  problem  was  the  Palestinian  failure  to  curb  'terrorism'  was  frequently 
picked  up  on  and  explained  to  viewers.  Palestinian  'terrorism'  was  presented  by 
journalists  on  a  number  of  occasions  as  the  'key  issue'  or  'stumbling  blocking'  to  the 
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6  security  clampdown'  which  were  heavily  criticised  by  human  rights  groups  at  the 
time  were  not  highlighted  by  j  ournalists.  The  central  issues  for  Palestinians  including 
ending  the  occupation,  curbing  human  rights  abuses  and  resolving  the  status  of 
Jerusalem  and  the  future  of  the  refugees  were  barely  mentioned  in  coverage.  This  also 
ties  in  closely  with  previous  research  (Philo  &  Berry,  2004;  Ackerman,  2002; 
Lowestedt  &  Madhoun  2002;  Chomsky,  2000,1999,1996a,  1996b,  1993,1992, 
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of  historical  context  or  information  about  the  origins  of  the  conflict  in  news  bulletins. 
All  of  the  major  issues:  Jerusalem,  the  military  occupation,  the  settlements,  refugees 
etc.  are  tied  in  to  the  events  of  1948  and  1967.  Without  any  knowledge  of  what 
occurred  in  these  years  it  is  very  difficult  to  understand  the  motivations  of  Israelis  and 
Palestinians.  As  Lindsey  Hilsum  noted  in  chapter  four  this  is  made  especially  difficult 
when  the  historical  record  is  so  fiercely  contested  and  j  ournalists  are  working  under 
time  constraints. 
Another  finding  from  the  research  was  that  j  ournalists  presented  only  one 
view  of  the  peace  process.  This  was  that  Israelis  and  Palestinians,  helped  along  by  Bill 
Clinton,  were  striving  to  reach  a  peace  agreement  but  that  extremists  on  both  sides 
(the  'enemies  of  peace'  BBC  1,  lunchtime  news,  24  October  1998)  threatened  to 
destroy  their  good  work.  However  this  was  not  how  the  peace  process  was  regarded 
by  many  Palestinians,  perhaps  the  bulk  of  the  population.  Some  time  after  Wye  the 
Israeli  j  ournalist  Danny  Rabinowitz  reported  in  the  Israeli  press  on  a  letter  send  by 
Palestinian  leaders,  illustrating  the  gap  between  mainstream  depictions  of  the  peace 
process  and  how  many  Palestinians  saw  it: 
One  view,  which  is  accepted  by  the  majority  of  Israelis,  considers  Oslo  a 
positive,  symmetric  process:  an  elected  government  in  Israel  is  conducting 
peace  negotiations  with  a  Palestinian  leadership  that  reflects  the  true  interests 
of  the  Palestinian  people.  Pursuing  this  joint  path  will  ultimately  lead  to  a 
durable  peace  between  the  two  peoples.  The  second  view,  which  is  asserted  by 
the  signatories  to  the  letter,  considers  Oslo  an  inherently  asymmetric  process 
whose  forgone  conclusion  is  not  only  unfair,  but  also  dangerous.  The  gist  here 
is  that  Israel,  which  is  strong,  big,  rich  and  backed  by  a  superpower,  is 
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leadership  that  has  sold  out.  (Haaretz,  19  March  2000) 
Some  Palestinians  viewed  the  peace  process  as  likely  to  lead  not  to  an  equitable 
settlement  but  to  the  creation  of  a  series  of  South  African  style  Bantustans,  a 
prediction  made  at  the  outset  of  Oslo  in  1993  (see  p.  113-4),  and  the  belief  gained 
more  adherents  with  Israeli  moves  to  change  the  demographics  of  the  West  Bank  over 
the  next  five  years.  These  included  the  doubling  of  the  settler  population,  the  seizure 
of  more  than  40  percent  of  the  West  Bank,  and  the  creation  a  matrix  of  Israeli  only 
roads  across  the  West  Bank  which  effectively  cantonised  the  area  and  made  it  difficult 
for  Palestinians  to  move  any  distance.  It  also  severely  damaged  the  economy. 
Journalists  on  a  number  of  occasions  spoke  of  the  anger  and  frustration  felt  by 
Palestinians  but  did  not,  apart  from  on  a  single  occasion,  mention  these  major 
demographic  changes  that  were  generating  resentment.  This  pattern  of  presenting 
Palestinians  as  motivated  by  hate  or  anger  without  explaining  the  factors  behind  their 
resentment  was  also  found  by  Ackerman  (2002)  and  Philo  and  Berry  (2004)  in  their 
analyses  of  the  al-Aqsa  intifada. 
The  letter  cited  above  by  Rabinowitz  also  points  to  the  remarkably  ambivalent 
attitude  between  Yasser  Arafat  and  the  Palestinians  in  the  occupied  territories. 
Arafat's  Palestinian  Authority  had  been  accused  of  corruption  and  human  rights 
abuses  and  some  Palestinians  doubted  that  Arafat  could  be  trusted  to  negotiate  a  fair 
settlement.  In  fact  he  had  been  declared  a  'collaborator'  by  a  number  of  prominent 
Palestinians  including  Edward  Said  (1996).  More  than  a  year  before  the  Wye 
agreements  the  Israeli  journalist  Tanya  Reinhardt  had  written  in  the  Israeli  press: 
At  the  eve  of  the  Oslo  agreement,  the  PLO  was  in  a  serious  crisis,  whose 
centre  was  a  growing  resentment  of  Arafat's  leadership,  There  were  many 
reports  in  the  press  of  public  gatherings  in  the  West  Bank  denouncing  the  lack 
of  democracy,  the  dissociation  of  the  Tunis  group  from  the  reality  of 
occupation,  and,  especially,  the  complete  control  Arafat  had  over  the  budget 
and  the  finances.  Arafat  may  have  felt  that  the  way  to  regain  control  is  a 
sweeping  agreement  with  Israel.  Today  it  is  already  a  public  knowledge  that  in 
the  circles  of  Rabin,  the  idea  was  formed  that  under  these  circumstances,  it 
may  be  possible  to  extort  Arafat  into  a  complete  surrender.  The  process  in 
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Lahad  of  South  Lebanon,  is  complex,  but  with  a  fixed  script  of  pressure  and 
bribery.  (YediotAharonot,  4  July  1997) 
However  in  news  bulletins  the  only  issue  appeared  to  be  whether  Arafat  could 
4control  the  terrorists'  amongst  his  people.  This  is  certainly  the  official  Israeli 
perspective.  The  lack  of  a  more  balanced  account  of  how  Arafat  and  the  Oslo 
agreements  were  perceived  by  Palestinians  was  partly  a  result  of  the  restricted  range 
of  sources  used  by  j  oumalists.  As  already  noted  Israeli  and  American  sources  were 
given  more  television  access  than  Palestinian  sources  and  their  perspectives  were 
more  likely  to  highlighted  by  j  oumalists  in  the  form  of  reported  statements. 
Palestinian  authority  officials  were  the  only  Palestinians  interviewed,  apart  from  a 
single  bulletin  in  which  a  young  Palestinian  mentioned  that  he  couldn't  move  freely, 
and  a  reported  statement  from  a  Hamas  leader  who  declared  that  the  Palestinians 
'would  fight  Israel  until  freedom  or  martyrdom'.  The  same  was  true  in  relation  to 
Israelis  interviewed  by  journalists.  Israeli  officials  were  most  featured,  followed  by 
settlers  and  on  one  occasion  Channel  Four  featured  a  representative  of  a  British  pro- 
Israel  lobby  group.  The  range  of  Israeli  and  Palestinian  public  opinion  is  much 
broader  than  this.  Israel  has  a  number  of  well  developed  peace  and  human  rights 
organisations  such  as  Meretz,  Peace  Now,  Gush  Shalom,  Rabbis  for  Human  Rights, 
B'Tselem  and  the  Israeli  League  for  Civil  and  Human  Rights.  However  none  of  these 
were  interviewed  or  featured  in  news  reports.  A  brief  interview  with  a  member  of  an 
Israeli  peace  group  might  have  offered  a  very  different  picture  of  the  peace  process. 
For  instance  nine  months  before  Wye,  Gush  Shalom  published  a  report  on  the 
progress  of  the  Oslo  process  which  was  very  different  from  anything  featured  in 
British  news  broadcasts: 
The  Netanyahu  government  has  stopped  the  peace  process  and  threatens  to 
bury  it  altogether,  putting  all  the  blame  on  the  Palestinians.  It  asserts  that, 
while  Israel  has  faithfully  fulfilled  all  the  provisions  of  the  agreements,  the 
Palestinians  have  systematically  violated  them.  The  Israeli  media,  nearly 
without  exception,  are  aiding  and  abetting  this  propaganda.  However,  the  facts 
are  quite  different:  while  the  Palestinian  violations  are  few  and  quite  marginal, 
as  clearly  emerges  from  the  pathetic  document  composed  by  government 
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systematic  and  substantial.  (Gush  Shalom,  1998) 
This  reliance  on  a  narrow  selection  of  powerful  institutional  sources  appears  a 
consistent  feature  of  coverage  in  this  area.  Research  conducted  on  the  al-Aqsa  intifada 
also  found  that  official  sources  were  routinely  over-accessed  in  bulletins  and  this 
effectively  meant  that  there  was  a  wider  level  of  debate  featured  in  the  Israeli  media 
than  on  British  television  (Philo  &  Berry,  2004).  Similarly  the  image  of  Israeli  settlers 
also  replicated  the  findings  of  Philo  and  Berry  (2004).  These  tended  to  be  presented  as 
vulnerable  to  attacks  from  Palestinians,  though  j  ournalists  didn't  explain  why  their 
presence  might  be  resented  by  Palestinians.  There  was  no  mention  that  settlers  had 
been  censured  by  the  UN  and  human  rights  groups  for  attacking  Palestinians  and 
taking  their  land,  or  that  their  presence  in  the  occupied  territories  is  considered  by 
most  countries  as  illegal  under  international  law. 
America's  role  in  the  peace  process  was  also  more  contradictory  than  it  appeared  in 
coverage.  Journalists  presented  an  image  of  an  American  president  working  hard  to 
bring  two  bitter  enemies  together  and  forge  a  peace.  One  j  ournalist  even  questioned 
whether  the  pressure  from  the  Americans  had  been  so  great  that  it  might  lead  to  a 
fracture  in  the  relationship  between  Israel  and  the  United  States.  However  such 
coverage  tends  to  overlook  the  fact  that  many  members  of  the  pro-Israel  lobby  were  in 
senior  positions  in  the  Clinton  administration  including  the  two  men  who  headed 
Clinton's  Middle  East  negotiating  team,  Martin  Idynk  and  Dennis  Ross,  both 
members  of  AIPAC,  the  most  powerful  pro-Israel  lobby  group  in  American  politics. 
Some  might  also  consider  it  contradictory  to  emphasise  the  American  role  as 
peacemaker  whilst  neglecting  to  mention  that  the  US  was  arming  one  side,  as  well  as 
providing  economic  and  diplomatic  support  for  settlement  building,  which  many 
Palestinians  thought  was  undercutting  the  possibility  of  a  just  settlement.  Chomsky 
has  argued  that  whilst  reporting  the  conflict  American  journalists  tend  to  accept  at 
face  value  whatever  the  US  claims  to  be  doing,  such  as  supporting  peace,  even  when 
it  may  be  actually  carrying  out  policies  which  undermine  that  goal: 
The  most  interesting  element  of  the  doctrinal  framework  is  the  notion  of 
'peace  process'  itself.  That  the  U.  S.  and  its  Israeli  partner  have  always  sought 
peace  is  not  in  question:  everyone  seeks  peace,  even  Hitler,  Stalin,  and  Attila 
200 the  Hun.  The  question  is:  what  kind  of  peace?  In  U.  S.  discourse,  the  term 
6peace  process'  is  conventionally  used  to  refer  to  whatever  the  U.  S. 
government  happens  to  be  doing,  often  undermining  diplomatic  efforts.  That  is 
dramatically  true  in  the  present  case.  For  25  years,  the  U.  S.  has  stood  virtually 
alone  in  rejecting  two  basic  principles  of  the  international  consensus  on  a 
peace  settlement:  that  Israel  withdraw  from  the  occupied  territories  in 
exchange  for  peace,  and  (from  the  mid  1970s)  that  Palestinian  national  rights 
be  recognized  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  (I  996b) 
However  the  close  political,  economic  and  military  ties  between  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  meant  that  it  was  always  unlikely  that  j  ournalists  themselves  would 
question  the  dominant  American  perspective  on  what  was  occurring.  As  Philo  and 
Berry  have  noted  to  'explain  in  detail  the  rationale  of  those  who  oppose  US  policy  is 
to  court  controversy.  It  is  simpler  to  avoid  explanations  or  to  leave  them  to  the 
margins  of  television  and  radio'  (2004:  107).  The  problem  with  this  approach  is  that 
viewers  are  likely  to  receive  a  partial  and  sometimes  misleading  account  of  events. 
A  final  point  to  make  about  coverage  was  the  tendency  for  journalists  on  all  channels 
except  Channel  Four  to  go  beyond  merely  reporting  the  Israeli  perspective  on 
'Palestinian  terrorism'.  but  to  actually  endorse  it.  Groups  such  as  Amnesty 
International  have  suggested,  that  the  use  of  the  expressions  'terrorism'  or  'terrorist' 
can  create  problems.  The  organisation's  view  is  that  the  terms  are  imprecise,  emotive, 
politically  loaded  and  employed  selectively.  For  instance  some  Palestinians  regard  a 
number  of  Israeli  actions  such  as  extra-judicial  killings  and  torture  as  'state  terrorism' 
but  j  ourrialists,  do  not  endorse  or  even  report  on  this  perspective.  An  alternative  course 
of  action  would  be  for  j  ournalists  to  report  but  not  to  endorse  the  use  of  such  terms, 
and  indicate  when  international  law  has  been  violated.  This  approach  is  more 
impartial  and  allows  for  a  clearer  legal  and  moral  accounting. 
News  Coverage  and  Public  Belief 
The  results  from  the  content  analysis  indicated  that  television  news  was  largely 
devoid  of  history  and  context,  featured  a  preponderance  of  official  Israeli  perspectives 
at  the  expense  of  providing  the  Palestinian  point  of  view,  and  tended  to  avoid 
explaining  the  ambivalent  and  contradictory  position  of  the  United  States.  How  might 
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drawn  between  how  the  conflict  is  presented  by  journalists  and  how  it  is  understood 
by  viewers?  Focus  group  and  questionnaire  research  reported  by  Philo  and  Berry 
(2004)  suggests  there  is  evidence  that  it  can.  The  authors  found  that  television  news 
was  the  key  site  on  information  about  the  conflict  for  over  80  per  cent  of  those 
questioned  and  that  those  who  were  comparatively  well  informed  (and  tended  to  come 
from  middle-class  and  professional  backgrounds)  augmented  their  knowledge  of  the 
conflict  by  reading  books  and  broadsheet  newspapers.  Some  viewers  interviewed 
were  openly  disparaging  about  the  lack  of  context  in  television  news.  One  commented 
that: 
There  is  no  depth  to  it  -  television  news  more  or  less  covers  everything 
superficially.  I  think  we  are  dumbing  down.  Someone  has  told  the  BBC  that 
the  average  person  has  an  attention  span  of  less  than  two  minutes  and  that  is 
rubbish  but  they  are  buying  into  it.  More  and  more  it's  all  about  'How  can  we 
keep  them  watching  -  whether  we  are  giving  information  or not?  '  I  certainly 
wouldn't  rely  on  BBC  television  news  for  anything  that  I  though  was  really 
important.  (Middle  class  male  focus  group,  cited  in  Philo  &  Berry,  2004:  210) 
Some  news  editors  have  reacted  defensively  to  accusations  that  television  news  fails 
to  provide  enough  context  when  reporting  on  the  conflict.  For  instance  Roger  Mosey, 
the  head  of  BBC  television  news  has  argued  that  too  much  is  expected  of  the  medium: 
Television  is  still  the  dominant  medium  of  our  age,  and  36  million  people  a 
week  watch  BBC  news.  But  if  you  printed  a  transcript  of  the  Ten  O'Clock 
News  it  would  not  fill  one  page  of  a  newspaper  like  this:  it  is,  inevitably,  a 
brief  digest  of  the  day's  events  with  as  much  analysis  as  we  can  manage.  For 
the  complete  background  you  may  need  to  go  to  a  website  or  a  newspaper  or  a 
book 
...  news  is  an  account  of  the  world  as  it  is  and  not  as  we  want  it  to  be,  and 
television  news  is  a  starting  point  for  our  exploration  of  it  and  not  the  last 
word.  (Guardian,  27  July  2004) 
In  an  ideal  world  people  most  people  might  seek  out  information  from  alternative 
information  sources  but  for  the  great  bulk  of  the  population  television  news  remains 
their  primary  window  on  the  world.  This  can  be  seen  very  clearly  by  comparing  the 
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issues  in  the  conflict.  The  absence  of  historical  background  found  in  television  news 
reports  was  strongly  mirrored  in  the  audience  research  studies.  Philo  and  Berry  (2004) 
found  that  few  viewers  were  aware  of  the  historical  origins  of  the  conflict  or  could 
name  any  of  the  region's  wars.  In  the  focus  groups  only  19  per  cent  were  aware  that 
the  Palestinian  refugees  were  related  to  the  establishment  of  the  state  of  Israel  in 
1948.  The  lack  of  historical  knowledge  made  it  very  difficult  for  viewers  to 
understand  the  key  issues  in  the  conflict.  So  for  instance,  whilst  a  number  of  viewers 
expressed  the  opinion  that  'land'  was  an  issue,  in  practice  there  was  a  great  deal  of 
confusion  about  what  this  actually  signified.  One  viewer  expressed  his  surprise  that 
the  Palestinians  had  actually  had  land  taken  from  them  in  the  conflict: 
The  impression  that  I  got  was  that  the  Palestinians  had  lived  around  that  area 
and  now  they  were  trying  to  come  back  and  get  some  more  land  for 
themselves  -I  didn't  realize  that  they  had  actually  been  driven  out,  I  just 
thought  that  they  didn't  want  to  live  as  part  of  Israel,  and  that  the  places  they 
were  living  in  they  decided  they  wanted  to  make  self-govemed  -I  didn't 
realize  that  they  had  been  driven  out  in  wars  previously.  (Student  group, 
Glasgow,  cited  in  Philo  and  Berry,  2004:  216) 
What  this  illustrates  is  that  without  some  kind  of  understanding  of  a  narrative 
structure  viewers  lack  the  ability  to  fit  the  major  issues  into  an  interpretive  framework 
to  help  them  understand  what  is  occurring  in  the  conflict.  When  for  instance  during 
the  Wye  Accords  a  BBC  journalist  stated  that  'they  haven't  even  started  to  tackle  the 
most  serious  issues  yet  those  include  the  future  of  Jewish  settlements  like  this  one,  the 
future  of  Jerusalem,  of  Palestinian  refugees  and  the  shape  of  Israel's  final  borders', 
most  viewers  would  not  understand  such  a  statement  because  they  lack  the  historical 
knowledge  to  appreciate  the  salience  of  each  issue  in  the  overall  context  of  the 
conflict.  Philo  and  Berry  (2004)  found  the  absence  of  historical  background  left  many 
viewers  bewildered  by  the  conflict  and  how  it  might  be  resolved.  The  lack  of 
historical  context  also  had  another  important  and  deleterious  effect  in  that  it  led 
people  to  avoid  news  bulletins  dealing  with  the  conflict.  Ironically  broadcasters' 
desire  to  maximise  audiences  by  prioritising  dramatic  scenes  of  violence  and  conflict 
over  analysis,  actually  had  the  opposite  effect  in  that  it  led  many  viewers  to  turn  away 
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suffering. 
There  were  also  other  areas  where  audience  understandings  closely  mirrored 
the  presence  or  absence  of  issues  within  news  coverage.  For  instance,  during  coverage 
of  the  Wye  Accords  journalists  did  not  explain  the  nature  of  the  military  occupation 
that  the  Israelis  were  imposing  on  the  Palestinians  or  its  consequences  such  as 
restrictions  on  movement  and  lack  of  access  to  clean  water.  There  was  also  no 
mention  of  human  rights  abuses  such  as  torture  and  extra-judicial  killings  that  have 
been  committed  by  the  Israelis  or  the  large  number  of  United  Nations  resolutions 
condemning  these  and  the  illegality  of  the  occupation.  Since  so  many  viewers  rely  on 
television  news  as  their  main  source  of  information  on  the  conflict  it  is  perhaps 
unsurprising  that  so  few  were  aware  of  such  issues: 
Given  that  so  many  did  not  know  there  was  a  military  occupation,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  consequences  of  it  for  Palestinians  were  little  understood. 
Even  in  groups  that  were  comparatively  well  informed,  such  as  middle  class 
males  in  Glasgow,  there  was  little  knowledge  of  economic  consequences  such 
as  those  caused  by  the  Israeli  control  of  water.  In  the  focus  groups  as  a  whole 
only  9  per  cent  were  aware  of  this  issue.  There  was  little  understanding  of 
areas  such  as  human  rights  -  only  two  people  in  all  the  focus  groups  raised 
these  as  an  issue.  Even  in  groups  that  tended  to  be  sympathetic  to  the 
Palestinians  (such  as  low  income  males  in  London)  there  was  some  surprise 
when  they  heard  that  there  were  pass  laws  and  identity  cards  which  restricted 
movement.  There  was  also  no  knowledge  of  the  large  number  of  UN 
resolutions,  which  have  been  passed,  either  those  relating  to  the  legality  of  the 
occupation  or  to  human  rights  abuses  in  the  territories  (Philo  &  Berry,  2004: 
218) 
Strong  parallels  could  also  be  drawn  between  media  coverage  and  audience 
understanding  of  issues  such  as  Israeli  settlements  and  American  mediation.  Philo  and 
Berry  (2004)  report  that  there  was  a  strong  tendency  for  viewers  to  see  Israeli 
settlements  in  the  manner  in  which  they  were  presented  in  news  bulletins,  as  small 
embattled  communities  subject  to  attack  from  Palestinians  for  no  clearly  identifiable 
reason.  Few  viewers  interviewed  in  the  focus  groups  saw  the  settlements  as  serving  a 
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widely  seen  as  illegal  under  international  law.  Similarly  only  a  minority  of  viewers 
were  aware  that  the  United  States  supplies  Israel  with  economic  and  military  support. 
Whilst  many  saw  the  United  States  as  fulfilling  a  peace-brokering  role,  far  fewer 
understood  why  Palestinians  might  distrust  this  mediation. 
Overall  audience  research  tends  to  suggest  that  many  gaps  in  audience 
understandings  are  related  to  specific  absences  in  television  news  coverage.  The 
consequence  of  this  appears  to  be  that  most  viewers  are  badly  informed,  lack  a  basic 
understanding  of  the  Palestinian  perspective  and  are  confused  about  the  ways  in 
which  the  conflict  might  be  resolved. 
Media,  Power  and  Ideological  Closure 
In  chapter  one  I  outlined  a  number  of  factors  which  affected  the  production  of 
news.  These  included  commercial  imperatives,  sourcing,  public  relations,  intimidation 
by  government  or  private  bodies,  cultural  assumptions  and  j  ournalism  training.  A 
number  of  theorists  have  formulated  models  which  incorporate  some  of  these  factors 
in  order  to  address  the  question  of  the  relationship  between  j  ournalism  and 
economic/political  power  (Milliband,  1973;  Althusser,  1971;  Murdock  and  Golding, 
1979;  Glasgow  Media  Group,  1975;  Herman  &  Chomsky,  1988).  In  The  State  in 
Capitalist  Society  Ralph  Milliband  argues  that  the  mass  media  play  an  instrumental 
role  in  providing  the  ideological  justification  for  a  particular  pattern  of  class 
domination.  He  identifies  three  key  factors  that  produce  this  outcome:  the  ownership 
and  control  of  media,  the  economic  and  cultural  effects  of  the  mass  media's  reliance 
on  advertising  and  pressure  from  Government  and  other  parts  of  the  state.  Milliband 
argues  from  a  strong  structuralist  position,  rooted  in  political  economy,  which  leaves 
little  space  for  journalists  to  challenge  (even  if  they  had  the  inclination,  which  he 
suggest  they  mostly  do  not)  the  assumptions  of  the  status  quo: 
Given  the  political  and  economic  contexts  in  which  they  function  [the  mass 
media  cannot  fail  to  be,  predominately,  agencies  for  the  dissemination  of  ideas 
and  values  which  affirm  rather  than  challenge  existing  structures  of  power  and 
privilege  .... 
The  notion  that  they  can,  for  the  most  part,  be  anything  else  is 
either  a  delusion  or  a  mystification  (1973:  211) 
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model  and  adds  an  organizational  dimension  by  pointing  to  way  in  which 
relationships  between  institutional  sources  and  j  ournalists  tend  to  filter  out 
oppositional  voices.  Like  Milliband,  Herman  and  Chomsky  see  the  media  as  Primarily 
fulfilling  the  role  of  reflecting  and  legitimizing  the  present  social  order  and  the 
activities  of  the  state.  Also  like  Milliband,  Herman  and  Chomsky  see  this  outcome  not 
as  the  result  of  deliberate  intent  or  a  conspiracy  but  rather  as  a  consequence  of  the 
interplay  of  various  structural  factors,  primarily  rooted  in  political  economy. 
A  rather  different  model  of  media  filters  was  suggested  by  Richard  Hoggart  in 
the  foreword  to  Bad  News.  Hoggart's  model  is  more  concerned  with  the  constraints  of 
the  medium  and  the  practices  of  journalism  than  with  political  economy.  It  is  a 
formulation  which  is  far  less  overtly  ideological  and  functional  than  those  offered  by 
Milliband  or  Herman  and  Chomsky.  Hoggart  suggests  that  the  'news  selects  itself  by 
four  main  filtering  processes'  (Glasgow  Media  Group,  1976:  x).  These  are  time  and 
resource  constraints  inherent  to  the  medium,  'news  values',  'television  values'  and 
what  Hoggart  describes  as  the  'cultural  air  we  breathe,  the  whole  ideological 
atmosphere  of  our  society,  which  tells  us  that  some  things  can  be  said  and  that  others 
had  best  not  be  said'  (Glasgow  Media  Group,  1976:  x).  Hoggart  was  also  critical  of 
what  he  describes  as  'high  conspiracy  theories'  of  the  mass  media  which  he  suggests 
assume  too  great  a  degree  of  ideological  closure: 
But  the  basic  inadequacy,  even  of  the  most  subtle  forms  of  'high  conspiracy 
theory  '  is  that,  useful  and  revealing  though  they  can  be,  they  miss  the 
complexity  of  the  matter  if  you  hang  onto  them  for  too  long.  For  in 
commercial  democracies  such  as  Britain  the  agenda  is  not  wholly  structured 
and  the  deviant  items  are  not  simply  'permitted  variations',  the  repressive 
tolerances  of  an  authority  which  is  wholly  in  control  in  the  background. 
Something  sometimes  escapes,  precisely  because  the  controls,  explicit  or 
implicit,  are  not  complete,  because  the  claims  for  ob  ectivity  and  neutrality  by 
the  broadcasters-  though  often  made  too  smugly  and  blandly-  do  also  have 
behind  them,  in  some  people,  a  belief  that  the  effort  at  objectivity  and 
neutrality  is  important  beyond  all  outside  pressure  (Glasgow  Media  Group, 
1976:  xii) 
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would  wish  to  see  issues  reported  and  how  they  are  actually  reported  in  practice.  We 
are,  he  suggests,  not  dealing  with  a  completely  rigid  and  closed  ideological  system, 
but  a  more  complicated  situation  in  which  political  and  economic  power  confers 
significant  advantages  in  ideological  struggles  but  does  completely  determine  them. 
Commercial  imperatives,  organizational  priorities  and  the  journalistic  ethos  of 
'impartiality'  can  all  mediate  this  relationship  and  we  should  be  aware  of  the  potential 
complexities  that  are  involved.  In  many  ways  Hoggart's  criticisms  of  'high  conspiracy 
theories'  are  analogous  to  Schlesinger's  (1990)  criticisms  of  Stuart  Hall's  concept  of 
6primary  definers'.  In  Policing  the  Crisis  Hall  et.  al.  (1978)  had  argued  that  powerful 
institutional  sources  are  consigned  the  role  of  'primary  definers'  who  because  of  their 
privileged  access  to  the  media  are  able  to  set  the  terms  of  debate  for  issues.  Those 
who  then  engage  in  the  media  debate  must  work  within  the  framework  that  has  been 
set  down  by  the  primary  definers.  Hall  illustrated  this  by  pointing  to  a  debate  about 
social  disorder  and  immigration  where  he  suggested  the  primary  definition  was  that  it 
was  a  'problem  of  numbers'.  He  then  showed  how  the  debates  around  immigration 
were  structured  around  the  issue  of  numbers  rather  than  drawing  in  alternative 
explanations  such  as  white,  working  class  racism.  However  as  Schlesinger  (1990)  has 
argued  this  leaves  open  the  question  of  how  and  why  the  framework  of  debate 
established  by  the  primary  definers  might  break  down.  Again  we  are  back  to  the 
argument  that  media  are  not  a  completely  closed  ideological  system  where  the  views 
of  the  powerful  are  handed  down  like  tablets  from  Mount  Sinai.  Hall's  model  can  also 
overstate  the  degree  of  ideological  conformity  amongst  institutional  sources,  and 
underestimate  the  potential  for  non-institutional  sources  such  as  pressure  groups  to 
alter  the  terms  of  the  debate.  We  can  see  this  very  clearly  if  we  look  at  two  others 
studies.  In  their  research  on  the  struggle  over  the  definition  of  the  AIDS  crisis  Miller 
et.  al.,  suggest  that  although  the  institutions  of  the  state  were  able  to  access 
promotional  resources  and  influence  media  agendas,  they  did  not  completely  control 
the  debate: 
Definitions  of  social  issues  do  not  simply  emerge  from  the  centres  of  political 
power.  Campaigners  did  manage  to  influence  the  production  and  circulation  of 
definitions  around  AIDS.  In  addition,  the  media  can  themselves  contribute  to 
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suggested  that  the  construction  of  'primary'  definitions  in  the  media  may  not 
necessarily  set  the  terms  for  policy  decisions.  As  we  saw  in  the  discussion  of 
the  health  education  campaign,  the  ability  of  ministers  or  others  to  intervene  in 
the  production  process  was  sometimes  quite  independent  of  the  dominant 
definitions  carried  in  the  media  (Kitzinger  &  Miller,  1998:  223-224) 
Similarly  in  their  study  of  how  the  Toronto  media  interacted  with  the  state's 
law  enforcement  agencies,  Ericson,  Baranek  and  Chen  (1989)  point  to  a  complex 
series  of  negotiations  between  j  ournalists  and  source  bureaucracies  over  how  issues 
were  to  be  framed  in  news  reports.  The  public  relations  staff  employed  by  the  state's 
criminal  justice  certainly  worked  hard  to  try  and  get  their  perspective  across  but  were 
not  always  successful,  and  their  efforts  were  mediated  by  the  commercial  and 
organizational  priorities  of  the  media  organizations  they  interacted  with. 
There  is  however  one  way  in  which  at  least  a  partial  rapprochement  can  be 
achieved  between  the  stronger  structuralist  theories  such  as  the  Herman  and  Chomsky 
propaganda  model  and  those  who  advocate  the  existence  of  a  more  fluid,  contested 
space.  This  requires  an  acceptance  that  the  space  for  ideological  openness  and  closure 
on  issues  is  related  to  both  the  nature  of  the  issue  and  the  particular  moment  at  which 
the  issue  is  debated.  Certain  issues  will  have  more  latitude  for  contestation  because 
their  definition  is  not  considered  important  or  'sensitive'  by  governments.  The  issue 
of  AIDS  information  strategies  discussed  by  Miller  et.  al.  above,  would  appear  to  fall 
into  this  category.  How  the  issue  was  defined  and  debated  was  not  likely  to 
significantly  affect  the  fortunes  of  the  Conservative  party.  Conversely  on  issues  such 
as  the  reporting  of  unemployment  or  the  Northern  Ireland  conflict,  both  subjects 
which  were  important  for  the  image  of  the  Tories  in  the  1980s,  it  was  clear  that 
significant  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  on  broadcasters  to  limit  dissent,  though  this 
was  not  always  successful  (see  chapter  one).  The  contours  of  openness  and  closure  on 
controversial  issues  is  also  strongly  determined  by  political  and  economic 
circumstances.  At  certain  moments  governments  may  face  a  potential  crisis  of 
legitimacy  and  the  space  for  dissent  may  become  constrained.  This  of  course  is 
particularly  noticeable  during  wartime  when  the  need  to  win  public  consent  is 
probably  at  its  peak.  Those  who  express  alternative  opinions  at  such  moments  may  be 
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BBC  journalist  Andrew  Gilligan  is  perhaps  the  most  obvious  recent  example. 
So  how  does  the  research  in  this  thesis  relate  to  these  arguments  about 
political/economic  power  and  ideological  openness  and  closure?  In  many  ways  the 
research  provides  evidence  that  many  of  the  factors  identified  by  theorists  have  a 
crucial  impact  on  reporting  on  the  Israel-Palestine  conflict,  but  it  also  suggests  that 
coverage  is  not  completely  monolithic  or  rigid.  Of  particular  importance  appears  to  be 
three  of  the  factors  identified  in  Herman  and  Chomsky's  propaganda  model:  'flak', 
sourcing  and  the  need  to  maximize  profits  (or  audiences).  The  pro-Israel  lobby 
appears  able  to  intimidate  both  news  organisations  and  journalists.  The  application  of 
pressure  through  organised  campaigns  of  letter  and  email  writing,  as  well  as 
complaints  from  Israeli  officials  and  embassies,  together  with  interventions  from  well 
connected  Israel  supporters  in  the  media  and  political  life  appears  to  have  created  a 
climate  where  journalists  and  editors  are  sometimes  reluctant  to  air  the  Palestinian 
perspective.  There  is  also  the  charge  of  anti-Semitism  which  is  sometimes  levelled 
against  j  ournalists  and  broadcasters,  which  it  has  been  suggested  has  a  particularly 
chilling  impact  on  dissent,  especially  at  the  BBC.  According  to  Mayhew  and  Adams 
(1975)  this  is  not  new.  Nearly  thirty  years  ago  they  alleged  that  attempts  were  made  to 
silence  and  discredit  those  who  criticised  Israeli  behaviour.  This  they  alleged  was 
carried  out  using  the  same  techniques,  organised  campaigns  of  letter  writing  and 
telephone  complaints  directed  at  media  outlets  and  the  interventions  of  influential 
Israel  supporters  in  the  media  and  political  spheres.  This  points  to  the  enduring  impact 
of  networks  of  power  and  influence,  able  over  decades  to  fundamentally  influence  the 
climate  in  which  j  ournalists  operate. 
The  obverse  of  'flak',  public  relations,  also  seems  to  be  of  crucial  importance. 
Whilst  the  Israelis  run  a  slick  and  highly  professional  operation,  the  Palestinian  effort 
has  been  rather  amateurish  in  comparison.  The  proactive  approach  employed  by 
Israeli  PR  professionals  involving  'schmoozing'journalists  and  flooding  them  with 
the  official  Israeli  perspective  appeared  effective  in  setting  the  media  agenda  during 
the  Wye  negotiations,  as  evidenced  by  the  prominence  given  to  the  Israeli  perspective 
on  security  at  the  expense  of  reporting  what  was  of  concern  to  Palestinians.  Israeli 
sources  with  their  good  English,  excellent  presentational  skills  and  use  of  soundbites 
are  likely  to  come  across  as  more  credible  to  viewers  than  Palestinians  representatives 
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consequence  of  the  cronyism  of  Yasser  Arafat's  Palestinian  Authority  where  the 
responsibilities  for  putting  the  Palestinian  perspective  has  been  delegated  to  Arafat 
supporters  many  of  whom  lack  the  necessary  public  relations  skills. 
The  issue  of  sourcing  also  appears  highly  significant.  Israeli  sources  were  featured 
more  often  than  Palestinian  sources  but  neither  were  as  accessed  as  much  as 
American  sources.  Since  American  sources  tended  to  support  Israeli  positions  this 
magnified  the  imbalance.  Taken  together  Israeli  and  American  sources  were  given 
more  than  three  times  as  much  space  as  Palestinian  sources.  A  similar  pattern  was 
also  found  in  relation  to  the  amount  of  space  given  to  reported  statements,  where 
those  from  Israelis  outnumbered  those  from  Palestinians  by  a  factor  of  nearly  two  to 
one.  As  previously  noted  there  was  also  a  pronounced  emphasis  on  official  sources. 
This  meant  that  the  wide  variety  of  debate  about  the  conflict  within  the  Israeli  and 
Palestinian  publics  was  largely  absent.  This  was  particularly  significant  in  regard  to 
Palestinian  public  opinion  because  it  meant  that  the  highly  ambivalent  relationship 
between  Yasser  Arafat's  Palestinian  Authority  and  the  Palestinian  population  was 
missing  from  news  reports.  The  theory  that  the  media  tends  to  'over-access'  the  views 
of  officials  and  other  powerful  institutional  sources  was  supported  in  this  research. 
The  arguments  rooted  in  political  economy,  the  need  for  media  organizations  to  profit 
and  hence  audience  maximise,  also  appear  to  have  had  an  important  effect  on 
coverage.  The  need  to  grab  audiences  by  injecting  drama  partly  explain  the  absence  of 
historical  background  and  the  pronounced  emphasis  in  coverage  of  the  latest 
developments  of  a  peace  process  'in  crisis'.  Whilst  it  might  be  assumed  that  the  BBC 
as  a  public  corporation,  not  dependent  on  advertising,  would  be  insulated  from  the 
need  to  audience  maximize,  in  reality  it  is  obliged  to  seek  high  rating  in  order  to 
justify  the  license  fee.  It  could  of  course  be  argued  that  Hoggart's  stress  on  the 
importance  on  'news'  and  'television'  values  is itself  aj  ournalistic  justification  for 
what  are  in  effect  choices  structured  by  the  need  to  maximize  audiences  and  profits. 
In  this  sense  two  of  his  filters  are  perhaps  closer  to  the  political  economy  perspective 
than  he  overtly  concedes. 
Finally  the  research  in  this  thesis  points  to  the  importance  of  Britain's  foreign  policy 
orientation  in  setting  the  tone  for  how  journalists'  report  on  the  conflict.  How  this  is 
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Outright  censorship  by  government  is  relatively  uncommon  and  attempts  by 
government  to  gag  and  intimidate  the  media  are  a  sign  that  more  informal  controls 
have  broken  down.  But  how  do  these  informal  controls  operate  in  practice?  The 
former  BBC  journalist  Tim  Llewelyn  expressed  to  me  the  view  that  the  BBC  in  effect 
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and  then  adjusted  its  coverage  accordingly.  As  discussed  in  chapter  four, 
Schlesinger's  ethnography  of  a  BBC  newsroom  in  the  1970s  provided  evidence  that 
journalists  whose  perspectives  differed  widely  from  those  of  the  governments  on 
sensitive  foreign  policy  issues  such  as  the  Vietnam  War  or  the  conflict  in  Northern 
Ireland  were  subject  to  a  range  of  official  and  unofficial  sanctions.  In  this  way  editors 
who  were  trusted  as  a  'safe  pair  of  hands'  could  be  relied  upon  to  limit  dissent  on 
certain  issues.  Conversely  the  activities  of  senior  members  of  the  Government  can 
(sometimes  unintentionally)  open  up  opportunities  for  discussion  of  perspectives  that 
wouldn't  generally  be  aired.  For  instance  at  the  end  of  October  2001  Tony  Blair 
visited  Syria  and  met  with  President  Assad  before  continuing  on  to  Israel.  A  BBC 
journalist  reported  that: 
Tomorrow's  hosts  are  the  very  same  people  that  today's  hosts  regard  as  bloody 
state  terrorists,  and  of  course  the  Israelis  think  much  the  same  thing  of  the 
Syrians,  the  Palestinians  and  others. 
The  j  ourrialist  also  remarked  that: 
Syria's  President  Assad  ...  regards  Palestinian  suicide  bombers  and  assassins  as 
fteedom  fighters.  (BBCl  late  news,  30  October  2001,  cited  in  Philo  &  Berry, 
2004:  172-3) 
Philo  and  Berry  (2004)  note  that  this  was  the  only  time  that  the  Palestinian 
perspective  that  they  were  victims  of  Israeli  'state  terrorism',  and  were  themselves 
'freedom  fighters'  was  reported  on  by  j  oumalists.  This  suggests  that  Blair's  visit  to 
Syria  in  effect  served  to  temporarily  legitimize  the  reporting  of  the  Palestinian/Arab 
view  of  the  conflict  47 
. 
In  this  way,  the  activities  and  orientations  of  major  political 
figures  are  picked  up  on  by  j  oumalists  and  can  affect  the  range  of  debate  on  issues. 
This  is  similar  to  the  theory  of  primary  definition,  though  it  lacks  the  rigidity  inherent 
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viewpoints,  but  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  on  that  all  those  who  later  engage  in  the 
debate  must  work  within  those  parameters.  Furthermore  the  viewpoint  of  the  primary 
definers  may  be  challenged  and  sometimes  de-legitimised  especially  if  the  arguments 
are  contested  by  other  high  ranking  politicians. 
The  research  reported  in  this  thesis  indicated  that  during  the  Oslo  peace  process 
journalists  found  it  much  easier  to  present  the  official  Israeli  perspective  than  the 
views  of  Palestinians  and  the  wider  international  community.  This  was  the  result  of  a 
host  of  factors  creating  constraints  on  how  journalists  could  report  on  the  conflict. 
However  the  research  did  not  support  the  stronger  structuralist  models  such  as  Hall's 
theory  of  primary  definition.  Some  aspects  of  the  official  Israeli  perspective  on  the 
conflict  were  challenged  by  Palestinian  spokespersons,  though  these  perspectives 
were  much  less  likely  to  be  highlighted  and  elaborated  on  by  j  oumalists.  Furthermore 
the  relative  prominence  of  Israeli  perspectives  cannot  simply  be  taken  for  granted  on 
the  basis  of  structural  factors.  The  comments  of  Nachman  Shai,  which  opened  this 
chapter  illustrated  that  winning  public  acceptance  for  the  Israeli  government's 
perspective  is  a  constant  and  continuous  process  that  requires  a  great  deal  of  work.  It 
is  not  as  automatic  and  pre-ordained  as  some  of  the  structuralist  theories  imply  and  it 
can  break  down.  Whilst  the  Israelis  have  been  much  more  successful  than  the 
Palestinians  in  getting  their  point  of  view  across  to  viewers,  this  may  not  always  be 
the  case.  For  instance  the  death  of  Yasser  Arafat  may  allow  for  the  emergence  of  a 
new  generation  of  Palestinian  spokespersons,  better  equipped  to  contest  the  public 
relations  struggle.  The  election  of  American  administration  inclined  to  adopt  a  more 
even-handed  attitude  to  the  conflict  will  also  likely  affect  reporting.  All  of  these 
factors  should  alert  researchers  to  the  contingencies  and  complexities  inherent  in  the 
production  of  news. 
212 Endnotes 
'  Chomsky  maintains  that  it  'has  been  virtually  an  axiom  of  US  foreign  policy  that  these 
energy  reserves  should  remain  under  US  control;  '  and  that  'the  flow  of  petrodollars  should  be 
largely  funnelled  to  the  US  through  military  purchases,  construction  projects,  bank  deposits, 
investments  in  treasury  deposits,  etc.  '  (  1999:  17).  He  argues  that  to  protect  against  the  threat 
that  indigenous  nationalist  movements  might  want  to  gain  control  of  their  own  resources,  the 
United  States  supports  Israel  and  the  region's  Arab  monarchies  who  are  encouraged  to  act  as 
cregional  gendarmes'  in  support  of  American  interests 
2  These  have  included  Idi  Amin  in  Uganda,  Mobutu  in  Zaire,  the  Contras  in  Nicaragua, 
Rhodesia,  South  Africa,  Honduras,  El  Salvador  and  Turkey. 
3  In  a  letter  dated  24  October  1915  McMahon  laid  out  the  areas  that  Britain  planned  to  grant 
independence:  'The  two  districts  of  Mersina  and  Alexandretta  and  portions  of  Syria  lying 
west  of  the  districts  of  Damascus,  Homs,  Hama  and  Aleppo  cannot  be  said  to  be  purely  Arab, 
and  should  be  excluded  from  the  limits  demanded.  With  the  above  modification,  and  without 
prejudice  to  our  existing  treaties  with  Arab  chiefs  we  accept  those  limits.  As  for  the  regions 
lying  within  those  frontiers  wherein  Britain  is  free  to  act  without  detriment  to  the  interests  of 
her  ally,  France,  I  am  empowered  in  the  name  of  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  to  give  the 
following  assurances  and  make  the  following  reply  to  your  letter:  (1)  Subject  to  the  above 
modifications,  Great  Britain  is  prepared  to  recognize  and  support  the  independence  of  the 
Arabs  in  all  the  regions  within  the  limits  demanded  by  the  Sharif  of  Mecca'  (letter  cited  in 
Ingrams,  1972:  2) 
4  According  to  the  British  census  of  1922  the  total  population  of  Palestine  was  752,048, 
comprised  of  83,790  Jews,  589,177  Muslims  and  71,464  Christians  (United  Nations,  1945). 
5  In  a  memorandum  to  Lord  Curzon  on  II  August  1919,  Balfour  wrote:  'the  contradiction 
between  the  letters  of  the  Covenant  and  the  policy  of  the  Allies  is  even  more  flagrant  in  the 
case  of  the  'independent  nation'  of  Palestine  than  in  that  of  the  'independent  nation'  of  Syria. 
For  in  Palestine  we  do  not  propose  even  to  go  through  the  form  of  consulting  the  wishes  of 
the  present  inhabitants  of  the  country,  though  the  American  [King  Crane]  Commission  has 
been  going  through  the  form  of  asking  what  they  are'  (British  Government,  Foreign  Office, 
1919b,  cited  in  Ingrams,  1972:  73) 
6  The  Revisionist  Movement  were  a  political  rival  of  Ben-Gurion's  Labor  movement.  They 
espoused  a  more  militant  attitude  towards  the  Arabs  and  a  more  liberal  economic  policy. 
Much  of  their  support  came  from  Polish  immigrants  in  the  1920s  and  1930s.  The  Revisionists 
laid  claim  to  all  of  Palestine  and  Transjordan  and  argued  that  conflict  with  the  Arabs  was 
inevitable.  Their  military  wing  Betar  was  formed  in  the  1920s.  Some  Betar  members  split 
213 away  in  the  1930s  to  form  the  Irgun  paramilitary  group  who  fought  the  British  mandatory 
authorities  in  the  1940s.  The  Revisionist  movement  later  provided  much  of  the  constituency 
for  the  Herut  and  Likud  parties. 
'  The  Oxford  historian  Albert  Hourani  described  the  Joan  Peter's  book  as  'ludicrous  and 
worthless'  in  The  Observer.  Ian  and  David  Gilmour  described  it  as  'preposterous'  in  the 
London  Review  ofBooks.  Time  Out  described  it  as  a  'piece  of  disinformation  roughly  the  size 
and  weight  of  a  dried  cowpat',  whilst  the  chair  of  the  Philosophy  department  at  the  Hebrew 
University,  Avishai  Margalit  condemned  Peter's  'web  of  deceit'.  (reviews  cited  in 
Finkelstein,  2001:  45-6).  McCarthy  argues  that  unrecorded  Arab  immigration  into  Palestine 
during  the  Mandate  period  was  'small'  and  that  for  it  to  'have  had  a  significant  effect  on  the 
ethnic  composition  of  Palestine  it  would  have  had  to  have  been  immense'.  He  concludes  that 
the  'argument  that  Arab  immigration  somehow  made  up  a  large  part  of  the  Palestinian  Arab 
population  is  thus  statistically  untenable'  (1990:  34).  For  a  discussion  of  the  effects  of 
improvements  in  sanitation  and  hygiene  on  population  increase  in  Palestine  see  Friedlander  & 
Goldscheider  (1979). 
8  The  U.  S.  Secretary  of  State,  James  Byrnes,  wrote  to  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Lord 
Halifax,  arguing  that  American  Jewry  was  not  interested  in  the  plight  of  the  refugees  in 
Europe,  their  main  concern  was  that  Jews  'ought  to  have  a  country  to  call  their  own'.  Harold 
Beeley  in  the  British  Foreign  Office  complained  that  'the  Zionists  have  been  deplorably 
successful  in  selling  the  idea  that  even  after  the  Allied  victory  immigration  to  Palestine 
represented  for  many  Jews  'their  only  hope  of  survival"  (both  cited  in  Ovendale,  1999:  94). 
9  The  pressure  to  open  up  Palestine  to  the  Jewish  refugees  worried  the  British  who  feared  the 
impact  on  public  order.  Ovendale  (1999)  claims  that  the  U.  S.  War  department  had  estimated 
that  it  would  have  to  send  300,000  troops  to  Palestine  to  keep  the  peace  if  the  area  was 
opened  to  Jewish  immigration.  He  also  suggests  that  the  U.  S.  State  Department  was  also 
concerned  that  an  Arab  backlash  would  strengthen  Russian  influence  in  a  vital  geo-strategic 
area  and  recommended  that  the  British  colonial  Empire  be  maintained  intact. 
10  For  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  case  put  forward  by  the  Arab  delegates  see  the 
Official  Records  of  the  General  Assembly,  Second  Session,  Ad  Hoc  Committee  on  the 
Palestine  Question,  pp.  276-279,  cited  in  UN,  1990). 
A  number  of  delegates  including  Lebanese  representatives  claimed  during  debates  at  the 
UN,  that  representatives  from  the  US  and  USSR  had  used  bribes  and  threats  of  economic 
sanctions  in  order  to  coerce  smaller  States  to  vote  for  the  Partition  of  Palestine  (Official 
Records  of  the  General  Assembly,  Second  Session,  Plenary  Meetings,  vol.  11,124th  meeting: 
1310) 
214 12  For  an  overview  of  the  concept  of  transfer  in  Zionist  thinking  see  Masalha  (1992).  This 
perspective  is  challenged  by  Karsh  (2000). 
"  In  1959  the  Palestinian  historian  Walid  Khalidi  went  through  the  official  records  of  Arab 
governments  as  well  as  Arab  newspapers  and  the  radio  monitoring  reports  of  the  BBC  and 
CIA  and  could  find  no  evidence  of  broadcasts  urging  Palestinians  to  nee.  This  research  was 
also  independently  corroborated  by  the  Irish  scholar  Erskine  Childers  in  196  1.  For  an 
overview  and  discussion  of  the  controversy  see  Hitchens  &  Said  (1988).  Some  historians  such 
as  Gilbert  (1999)  argue  that  many  Arabs  left  voluntarily  prior  to  the  arrival  of  the  Arab  armies 
in  May  1948  without  mentioning  the  impact  of  the  alleged  broadcasts. 
14  This  controversial  incident  has  been  the  subject  of  much  debate.  The  Israeli  authorities  have 
always  maintained  that  it  was  a  'tragic  case  of  misidentification'.  Bregman  (2003:  120-122) 
notes  that  others  have  suggested  that  it  was  deliberately  undertaken  to  prevent  the  Liberty 
from  detecting  Israeli  troop  concentrations  massing  in  Galilee  as  part  of  the  next  days  attack 
on  the  Golan  Heights.  He  argues  that  recently  declassified  tapes  of  conversations  between 
airforce  personnel  support  the  conclusion  that  the  attack  on  the  American  ship  was  deliberate. 
15  Yitzak  Rabin  remarked  after  Israel's  victory  that  'I  do  not  believe  that  Nasser  wanted  war. 
The  two  divisions  that  he  sent  into  Sinai  on  May  14  would  not  have  been  enough  to  unleash 
an  offensive  against  Israel.  He  knew  it  and  we  knew  it.  '  (Le  Monde,  29  February  1968  cited  in 
Hirst  1977:  211).  In  a  1982  speech  at  the  National  Defense  College  Menachem  Begin  stated 
that  'The  Egyptian  Army  concentrations  in  the  Sinai  do  not  prove  that  Nasser  was  not  really 
about  to  attack  us.  We  must  be  honest  with  ourselves.  We  decided  to  attack  him.  '  (New  York 
Times,  21  August  1982). 
16  Menachem  Begin  claimed  that  in  the  penultimate  Ministerial  Committee  on  Defense  prior  to 
the  War  military  leaders  'had  no  doubt  of  victory'  and  'expressed  their  belief  not  only  in  the 
strength  of  the  anny  but  also  in  its  ability  to  rout  the  enemy'  (Begin  cited  in  Finkelstein, 
1999:  135)  The  former  Commander  of  the  Israeli  Air  Force  Ezer  Weizmann  has  claimed  in 
relation  to  the  1967  War  that  'there  was  no  threat  of  destruction  to  the  State  of  Israel  but  that 
the  war  was  justified  so  that  Israel  could  'exist  according  to  the  scale,  spirit  and  quality  she 
now  embodies'  (Haaretz,  29  March  1972,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  100). 
17  Norman  Finkelstein  (1999)  alleges  that  Marshall  Tito  of  Yugoslavia  put  forward  a  peace 
plan  involving  a  full  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  occupied  territories  in  exchange  for  'full 
demilitarization  and  other  security  guarantees  in  the  evacuated  territories,  as  well as  an  'end 
to  the  call  for  an  Arab  state  of  Palestine'.  He  alleges  that  this  proposal  was  accepted  by  both 
Egypt  and  Jordan  but  rejected  by  Israel  as  'one-sided'. 
18  The  British  representative  Lord  Carodon  denied  any  ambiguity  in  the  interpretation  242 
claiming  that  'in  our  resolution  we  stated  the  principle  of  the  'withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed 
215 forces  from  territories  occupied  in  the  recent  conflict'  and  in  the  preamble  emphasized  the 
'the  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  war'.  In  our  view  the  wording  of  the 
provisions  is  clear.  '.  The  French  delegate  emphasised  that  'on  the  point  which  the  French 
delegation  has  always  stressed  as  being  essential  -  the  question  of  the  withdrawal  of  the 
occupation  forces-  the  resolution  which  has  been  adopted,  if  we  refer  to  the  French  text  which 
is  equally  authentic  with  the  English,  leaves  no  room  for  any  ambiguity,  since  it  speaks  of 
withdrawal  'des  territoires  occupes',  which  indisputably  corresponds  to  the  expression 
4occupied  territories'.  The  Indian  representative  asserted  that  'the  principle  of  the 
inadmissibility  of  territorial  acquisition  by  force  is  absolutely  fundamental  to  our  approach' 
and  'it  is  our  understanding  that  the  draft  resolution,  if  approved  by  the  Council,  will  commit 
it  to  the  application  of  the  principle  of  total  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  ftom  all  of  the 
territories-  I  repeat,  all  the  territories  -  occupied  by  Israel  as  a  result  of  the  conflict  which 
began  on  5  June  1967.  '  (all  cited  in  Finkelstein  2001:  146) 
19Finkelstein  points  to  the  memoirs  of  the  American  diplomat  Dean  Rusk  who  claimed  that 
the  United  States  favoured  omitting  the  definite  article  in  the  withdrawal  clause  because  'we 
though  the  Israeli  border  along  the  West  Bank  could  be  'rationalised'  certain  anomalies  could 
easily  be  straightened  out  with  some  exchanges  of  territory,  making  a  more  sensible  border 
for  all  parties'.  (Rusk,  1992:  388-9,  cited  in  Finkelstein,  2001:  148).  However  he  stressed  'we 
never  contemplated  any  significant  grant  of  territory  to  Israel  as  a  result  of  the  June  1967  war. 
On  that  point  we  and  the  Israelis  to  this  day  remain  sharply  divided'.  (Rusk,  1992:  388-9, 
cited  in  Finkelstein,  2001:  148) 
20  See  for  instance  Efrain  Karsh,  What  Occupation,  Commentary,  July  2002  or  Max  Singer, 
Right  is  Might,  Jerusalem  Post,  29  June  1997. 
21  Chomsky  points  to  an  article  by  Yedidia  Segal  in  the  3  September  1982  issue  of  Nekudah, 
thejournal  of  the  religious  West  Bank  settlers,  which  stated  that  'those  among  us  who  call  for 
a  humanistic  attitude  towards  our  [Arab]  neighbours  are  reading  the  Halacha  [religious  law] 
selectively  and  are  avoiding  specific  commandments'.  Segal  argues  that  the  Gentiles  are  'a 
people  like  a  donkey'  and  that  the  scriptures  insist  that  'conquered'  peoples  must  'serve'  their 
Jewish  masters  and  must  be  kept  'degraded  and  low'  and  'must  not  raise  their  heads  in  Israel 
but  must  be  conquered  beneath  their  hand 
...  with  complete  submission'.  'There  is  no  relation' 
Segal  insists  'between  the  law  of  Israel  and  the  and  the  atheistic  modem  humanism'  citing 
Maimonides  that  'in  a  divinely-commanded  war  [such  as  the  1982  Lebanon  invasion]  one 
must  destroy  kill  and  eliminate  men,  women  and  children'  there  being  'no  place  for  any 
humanistic  considerations'  (cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  123-4) 
22  United  Nations  General  Assembly  resolution  54/37  adopted  I  December  1999 
216 23  Hirst  claims  that  'In  Israel's  Arab  schools  children  have  always  had  to  see  their  own  Arab 
culture,  history  and  religion  through  Israeli  eyes:  they  saw  it  deliberately  mocked  and 
falsified.  Arab  history  became  little  more  than  a  series  of  revolutions,  murders  feuds  and 
plunderings,  whilst  everything  in  the  Jewish  past  was  ennobled  and  glorified.  It  was  always 
the  Arabs  in  decline  they  learned  about,  never  in  their  greatness;  the  heroes  of  the  past,  the 
Prophet,  the  Caliph  Harun  al-Rashid  and  Saladin,  got  perfunctory  mention.  In  four  years  of 
secondary  education  Arab  children  had  384  periods  of  Jewish  history  as  against  only  32  of 
their  own.  The  study  of  Old  Testament  was  compulsory,  while  the  Muslim  and  Christian 
religions  were  not  taught  at  all.  (1977:  23  8) 
24  For  instance  General  Assembly  Resolution  53/56  passed  3  December  1998  by  151  votes  to 
2,  Resolution  52/67  passed  10  December  1997  by  151  to  2,  Resolution  51/134  passed  13 
December  1996  by  149  votes  to  2,  Resolution  49/36C  passed  9  December  1994  by  145  votes 
to  2,  Resolution  47/70D  passed  14  December  1992  by  142  votes  to  2. 
25  In  the  late  1970s  a  Sunday  Times  report  (19  June  1977)  found  that  torture  was  so 
widespread  and  systematic  that  'it  appears  to  be  sanctioned  at  some  level  as  deliberate  policy" 
perhaps  'to  persuade  Arabs  in  the  occupied  territories  that  it  is  least  painful  to  behave 
passively'.  More  recently  Amnesty  International  has  issued  annual  reports  cataloguing  the  use 
of  torture  by  the  Israeli  authorities  (e.  g.  Amnesty  International:  2001  a,  2000,1999b,  1998, 
1997)  A  report  (Amnesty  International,  1999a)  entitled  Flouting  UN  Obligations  in  the  Name 
ofSecurity  concluded  that  Israeli  'interrogation  methods,  such  as  violent  shaking,  or  hooding 
and  shackling  detainees  to  low  chairs  with  loud  music  playing,  constituted  torture  or  cruel, 
inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment  and  thus  contravened  Article  I  of  the 
Convention  against  Torture'  and  that  torture  is  'officially  authorized  at  the  highest  level  and 
indeed  effectively  legalized.  '  In  the  same  report  it  was  noted  that  the  1600  Palestinians 
detained  by  Israeli  security  forces  in  1998  were  'routinely  tortured  or  ill-treated  during 
interrogation'  The  Independent  journal  ist  Robert  Fisk  has  produced  a  number  of  reports  from 
the  Israeli  controlled  Khiam  detention  centre  in  Southern  Lebanon  detailing  the  use  of  electric 
shock  torture  applied  to  the  genitals.  (Independent,  20  May  2000).  A  BBC  Correspondent 
documentary  (4  November  2000)  also  reported  from  Khiam,  claiming  that  torture  had  also 
been  used  against  children  and  pregnant  women,  and  that  prisoners  had  been  tortured  to 
death,  in  what  Amnesty  International  described  as  'war  crimes' 
26  The  use  of  'administrative  detention'  involved  detaining  Palestinians  for  long  periods 
without  trial  or  legal  recourse.  In  the  1970s  Hirst  alleges  that  many  Palestinians  suspected  of 
involvement  with  opposition  movements  were  interned  in  camps  in  the  desert:  'At  its  worst  it 
meant  the  establishment  of  veritable  concentration  camps  buried  in  remote  comers  of  the 
Sinai  desert.  Nakhl,  Abu  Zu'aiman,  Kusseimah  were  the  names  of  places  where  whole 
217 families  were  kept  in  isolation  from  the  outside  world.  They  were  there  because  relatives  of 
theirs  were  suspected,  no  more,  of  working  for  the  resistance.  Crowded  into  tents  surrounded 
by  barbed  wire,  they  were  denied  radios,  newspapers  or  the  most  basic  amenities  from  their 
homes,  which  were  frequently  destroyed  during  their  captivity.  Women  and  children  would 
be  put  in  one  camp,  male  relatives  of  'wanted  persons'  brother,  nephews,  cousins-  in  another' 
(1977:  248).  By  1980  the  Israeli  daily  Haaretz  estimated  the  number  of  security  prisoners  or 
detainees  passing  through  Israeli  jails  since  1967  at  close  to  200,000  people  or  20%  of  the 
population  leading  to  a  situation  of  'horrendous  overcrowding'  and  'appalling  human 
suffering  and  corruption' 
(8  August  1980,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  128).  For  more  recent  reports  on  detention  without 
trial  see  Amnesty  International  (1999a). 
27  Collective  punishment  could  involve  curfews  where  the  local  population  is  not  allowed  out 
for  more  than  a  hour  or  two  a  day  for  weeks  or  months  at  a  time,  schools  are  closed  and  there 
is  no  employment.  Israel  has  justified  the  use  of  curfews  on  the  basis  that  confining  the 
Palestinian  population  to  their  homes  for  long  periods  prevents  militants  from  attacking  Jews. 
The  use  of  collective  punishment  is  illegal  under  international  law  and  Israel  has  drawn 
repeated  censure  from  the  United  Nations:  'The  United  Nations  Commission  on  Human 
Rights  calls  upon  Israel  to  cease  immediately  its  policy  of  enforcing  collective  punishments, 
such  as  demolition  of  houses  and  closure  of  the  Palestinian  territory,  measures  which 
constitute  flagrant  violations  of  international  law  and  international  humanitarian  law, 
endanger  the  lives  of  Palestinians  and  also  constitute  a  major  obstacle  in  the  way  of  peace' 
(United  Nations,  1999).  A  report  by  the  Israeli  journalist  Aharon  Bachar  in  the  Israeli  daily 
Yediot  Ahornot  described  a  meeting  where  Labour  Alignment  leaders  presented  Menachem 
Begin  with  'detailed  accounts  of  terrorist  acts  [against  Arabs]  in  the  conquered  territories' 
They  described  the  collective  punishment  in  the  town  of  Halhul  where:  'The  men  were  taken 
from  their  houses  beginning  at  midnight,  in  pyjamas,  in  the  cold.  The  notables  and  other  men 
were  concentrated  in  the  square  of  the  mosque  and  held  there  until  morning.  Meanwhile  men 
of  the  border  guards  broke  into  house  beating  people  with  shouts  and  curses.  During  the  many 
hours  that  hundreds  of  people  were  kept  in  the  mosque  square,  they  were  ordered  to  urinate 
and  excrete  on  one  another  and  also  to  sing  Hatikva  [Jewish  National  Anthem]  and  to  call  out 
'Long  Live  the  State  of  Israel'  Several  times  people  were  beaten  and  ordered  to  crawl  on  the 
ground.  Some  were  even  ordered  to  lick  the  earth.  At  the  same  time  four  trucks  were 
commandeered  and  at  daybreak,  the  inhabitants  were  loaded  onto  the  trucks,  about  100  in 
each  truck,  and  taken  like  sheep  to  the  Administration  headquarters  in  Hebron.  '  (3  December 
1982,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  13  1)  The  report  further  alleged  that  prisoners  were  beaten, 
tortured  and  humiliated  and  that  settlers  were  permitted  into  prisons  to  take  part  in  the 
218 beatings.  For  more  recent  reports  on  collective  punishments  see  Amnesty  International  report 
(200  1  b;  2001  c)  or  Human  Rights  Watch  (1996). 
28  Hirst  cites  evidence  from  the  Israeli  League  for  Civil  and  Human  Rights,  that  searches 
4were  often  carried  with  great  brutality  and  violence'.  During  night  time  raids,  Hirst  claims 
that  it  was  a  4regular  practice  to  ...  carry  men  off  to  prison  without  any  good  reason,  beat  them 
up  and  torture  them'  (1977:  249) 
29  After  1967  there  were  numerous  diplomatic  efforts  to  break  the  deadlock,  all  of  which  were 
fruitless.  King  Hussein's  issued  a  six point  peace  plan  in  early  1969  at  the  National  press 
club  in  Washington.  Speaking  officially  in  conjunction  with  Egypt's  Nasser,  Hussein  offered 
a  comprehensive  peace  treaty  and  recognition  of  Israel  in  exchange  for  'the  withdrawal  of  its 
armed  forces  from  all  territories  occupied  in  the  June  1967  war,  and  the  implementation  of  all 
the  other  provisions  of  the  Security  Council  Resolution  (242)',  adding  that  Israel  may  have 
either  peace  or  territory-but  she  can  never  have  both'  (Washington  Report  on  Middle  East 
Affairs,  2  April  1984)  This  proposal  was  rejected  by  Israel.  In  December  1969  the  American 
Secretary  of  State  William  Rogers  put  forward  another  peace  agreement  based  on  UN 
Resolution  242,  specifying  that  Israel  would  return  to  the  pre-  1967  borders  (with  minor 
border  modifications)  and  a  solution  to  the  Palestinian  refugee  problem  would  have  to  be 
found,  in  exchange  for  a  comprehensive  peace  treaty.  The  proposals  were  rejected  by  the 
Israeli  cabinet  who  declared  that  'if  these  proposals  were  carried  out,  Israel's  security  and 
peace  would  be  in  grave  danger.  Israel  will  not  be  sacrificed  to  by  any  power  policy,  and  will 
reject  any  attempt  to  impose  a  forced  solution  upon  it.  '  (cited  in  Shlaim,  2000:  291).  In  1971 
the  Swedish  diplomat  Dr.  Gunnar  Jarring  reported  that  Egypt  had  offered  Israel  a  full  peace 
treaty  based  on  resolution  242,  with  the  stipulation  that  Israel  also  had  to  withdraw  from  the 
Sinai  and  Gaza  Strip,  settle  the  refugee  problem  in  line  with  UN  resolutions,  and  establish  a 
UN  force  to  keep  the  peace.  Israel's  reply  though  positive  insisted  that  'Israel  will  not  return 
to  the  pre-5  June  1967  lines'  (Shlaim,  2000:  300).  This,  Shlaim  (2000)  suggests,  doomed  the 
Jarring  Initiative.  It  also  drew  repeated  criticism  from  the  United  Nations.  The  Jarring 
Initiative  was  followed  by  attempts  at  achieving  an  interim  solution  which  Shlaim  suggests 
floundered  on  Israel's  refusal  to  accept  a  timetable  for  a  permanent  settlement,  and  its  desire 
for  territorial  revisionism.  There  followed  in  1972  and  1973  a  number  of  openly  annexationist 
pronouncements  by  Israeli  leaders.  Moeshe  Dayan  told  Time  magazine  in  July  1973  'there  is 
no  more  Palestine.  Finished'  and  in  April  1973  interview  he  talked  of  'a  new  state  of  Israel 
with  broad  frontiers,  strong  and  solid,  with  the  authority  of  the  Israeli  government  extending 
from  the  Jordan  to  the  Suez  Canal.  '  (both  cited  in  Shlaim,  2000:  316).  Shlaim  suggest  that  this 
together  with  the  later  publication  of  the  Galilee  document  detailing  a  large  expansion  of 
219 settlement  building  in  the  occupied  territories,  left  Sadat  little  choice  but  to  use  force  to  try 
and  regain  the  Sinai. 
30  Boyle  (2002)  argues  that  when  the  Israeli  forces  started  advancing  the  Soviets  had 
considered  inserting  their  own  force  into  the  conflict  leading  the  Americans  to  raise  their 
nuclear  alert  to  Def  Con  Three,  the  highest  state  of  preparedness.  He  claims  that  in  the  face  of 
this  the  Soviets  backed  down  but  that  the  World  had  come  perilously  close  to  a  nuclear 
confrontation  between  the  superpowers.  Three  Israeli  and  American  analysts  have  also 
clamed  that  Israel  threatened  to  use  nuclear  weapons  against  Egypt  and  in  fact  prepared  to  do 
so  at  the  beginning  of  the  1973  war  in  order  to  force  America  to  provide  a  massive 
consignment  of  conventional  weapons,  which  was  forthcoming  (Perlmutter,  Handel  &  Bar- 
Joseph,  1982). 
31  In  March  1977  the  Palestinian  National  Council  called  for  an  'independent  national  state'  in 
Palestine  and  an  Arab-Israeli  peace  conference.  Prime  minister  Rabin's  reply  was  that  'the 
only  place  the  Israelis  could  meet  the  Palestinian  guerillas  was  on  the  field  on  battle'  (New 
York  Times,  21  March  1977)  In  1977  the  PLO  leaked  a  'peace  plan'  in  Beirut  that  stated  that 
the  (explicitly  rejectionist)  Palestinian  National  Covenant  would  not  serve  as  the  basis  for  a 
interstate  relations  and  that  any  progression  beyond  a  two  state  solution  'would  be  achieved 
by  peaceful  means'  (Manchester  Guardian  Weekly,  7  August  1977).  In  November  1978 
Tillman  claims  that  Yasser  Arafat  in  requesting  a  dialogue  with  American  representatives 
issued  the  following  statement:  'The  PLO  will  accept  an  independent  Palestinian  state 
consisting  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  with  connecting  corridor,  and  in  that  circumstance  will 
renounce  any  and  all  violent  means  to  enlarge  the  territory  of  the  state.  I  would  reserve  the 
right,  of  course,  to  use  non-violent  means,  that  is  to  say  diplomatic  and  democratic  means,  to 
bring  about  the  eventual  unification  of  all  Palestine...  we  will  give  de  facto  recognition  to  the 
State  of  Israel'  (Tillman,  1982:  215-8)  In  April  1981  after  PLO  acceptance  of  the  Soviet 
peace  plan,  the  PLO  representative  Issam  Sartawi  declared  that  'from  this  it  follows  that  the 
PLO  has  formally  conceded  to  Israel,  in  the  most  unequivocal  manner,  the  right  to  exist  on  a 
reciprocal  basis'.  A  week  later  Sartawi  issued  ajoint  statement  with  the  former  Israel  general 
Mattityahu  Peled:  'the  PLO  has  made  its  willingness  to  accept  and  recognize  the  state  of 
Israel  on  the  basis  of  mutual  recognition  of  each  nation's  legitimate  right  of  self- 
determination  crystal  clear  in  various  resolutions  since  1977'  (all  references  cited  in 
Chomsky,  1999:  68-78) 
32  Testimony  of  Dr.  Chris  Giannou  before  the  House  Subcommittee  on  Europe  and  the  Middle 
East,  13/7/1982  (cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  229) 
33  Fort  other  reports  on  ill  treatment  of  detainees  see  Der  Spiegel,  14  March  1983;  Haolam 
Haze,  15  December  1982;  or  The  Times,  18  March  1983 
220 34  On  the  subject  of  Palestinian  weaponry  see  Ze'ev  Schiff,  (Haaretz,  18  July  1982)  or 
Hirsh  Goodman  (Jerusalem  Post,  9  July  1982)  who  suggested  the  Palestinian  'army'  and 
weapons  posed  no  significant  threat  to  Israel  and  that  many  of  the  claims  regarding  the  scale 
of  weaponry  were  exaggerated.  With  regard  to  cease-fire  violations  the  Christian  Science 
Monitor  (18  March  1982)  reported  that  the  PLO  had  observed  the  ceasefire  despite  many 
Israeli  provocations.  The  Abu  Nidal  group  who  attempted  to  assassinate  the  Israeli 
ambassador  were  sworn  enemies  of  the  PLO  leadership  and  had  previously  tried  to 
assassinate  Yasser  Arafat.  All  above  references  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  210). 
35  All  extracts  taken  from  Do  Not  Say  That  You  Did  Not  Know,  a  report  by  the  Israeli 
Committee  for  solidarity  with  Bir  Zeit,  June  5  1982,  cited  in  Chomsky,  1999:  60) 
36  See  for  instance  Report  of  the  Special  Committee  to  Investigate  Israeli  Practices  Affecting 
the  Human  Rights  of  the  Population  of  the  Occupied  Territories,  A/RES/38/79,15  December 
1983  or  Special  Committee  to  Investigate  Israeli  Practices  Affecting  the  Human  Rights  of  the 
Population  of  the  Occupied  Territories,  A/RES/39/95,14  December  1984  or  UN  Commission 
on  Human  Rights:  Question  of  the  violation  of  human  rights  in  the  occupied  Arab  territories, 
including  Palestine,  E/CN.  4/RES/1985/1,19  February  1985. 
37  A  B'Tselern  (Israeli  human  rights  group)  report  on  the  treatment  of  children  detained  by 
Israeli  forces  found  that  'illegal  violence  against  minors,  ...  many  [of  whom]  are  innocent  of 
any  crime,  ...  occurs  on  a  large  scale.  '  It  found  that  violence  directed  against  minors 
including  'slapping,  punching,  kicking,  hair  pulling,  beatings  with  clubs  or  with  iron  rods, 
pushing  into  walls  and  onto  floors,  '  was  'very  common'.  It  also  detailed  more  severe  forms  of 
ill  treatment:  'Beating  the  detainee  as  he  is  suspended  in  a  closed  sack  covering  the  head  and 
tied  around  the  knees;  tying  the  detainee  in  a  twisted  position  to  an  outdoor  pipe  with  hands 
behind  the  back  for  hours  and,  sometimes,  in  the  rain,  at  night,  and  during  the  hot  daytime 
hours;  confining  the  detainee,  sometimes  for  a  few  days,  in  the  'lock-up'  -a  dark,  smelly 
and  suffocating  cell  one  and  a  half  by  one  and  a  half  meters  [five  by  five  feet];  placing  the 
detainee,  sometimes  for  many  hours,  in  the  'closet'  -a  narrow  cell  the  height  of  a  person  in 
which  one  can  stand  but  not  move;  and  depositing  the  tied-up  detainee  for  many  hours  in  the 
c  grave'  -a  kind  of  box,  closed  by  a  door  from  the  top,  with  only  enough  room  to  crouch  and 
no  toilet.  '  The  Israeli  daily  Hotam  (I  April  1988)  reported  the  beating  of  a  ten  year  old  during 
an  army  interrogation  who  was  left  c  looking  like  a  steak',  noting  that  soldiers  'weren't 
bothered'  when  they  later  found  out  that  the  boy  was  deaf  mute  and  mentally  retarded. 
Reporting  on  the  treatment  of  Palestinians  as  young  as  14  arrested  'on  suspicion  of  stone 
throwing'  the  Israeli  daily  Hadashot  (24  February  1992)  cited  the  testimony  of  a  insider  at  the 
Hebron  detention  centre:  'What  happened  there  ...  was  plain  horror:  they  would  break  their 
clubs  on  the  prisoners'  bodies,  hit  them  in  the  genitals,  tie  a  prisoner  up  on  the  cold  floor  and 
221 play  soccer  with  him  -  literally  kick  and  roll  him  around.  Then  they'd  give  him  electric 
shocks,  using  the  generator  of  a  field  telephone,  and  then  push  him  out  to  stand  for  hours  in 
the  cold  and  rain....  They  would  crush  the  prisoners,  ...  turning  them  into  lumps  of  meat'  All 
above  reports  cited  in  Finkelstein  (1996:  47-9). 
3'For  other  references  on  Hezbollah's  influence  on  Hamas  see  Haaretz  (21  April  1994)  or 
Nida'al-  Watan  (15  November  1996) 
39Amongst  others  the  poet  Mahmoud  Darwish,  the  PLO's  Lebanon  representative  Shafiq  al- 
Hut  (both  of  whom  resigned  from  the  PLO  executive  committee  in  protest),  the  leader  of  the 
Palestinian  negotiating  team  and  Gaza  Red  Crescent  Society,  Haidar  Abd  al-Shafi,  the 
Palestinian  negotiator  as  well  as  other  prominent  Fatah  and  PLO  officials 
40  Hezbollah  which  also  run  a  network  of  social  services,  claim  they  are  trying  to  protect  the 
local  population,  many  of  whom  have  been  expelled  from  their  home  by  Israel's  proxy  force 
the  South  Lebanon.  Human  rights  groups  have  condemned  the  expulsions  as  'war  crimes'  and 
demanded  that  they  stop  (Human  Rights  Watch,  1999).  The  organization  has  also  condemned 
both  Israel  and  Hezbollah  for  targeting  civilians. 
4'  European  Parliament  1997-8  Session.  Extract  of  the  Minutes  of  the  meeting  of  13'h  March 
1997.  Resolution  on  Israel's  policy  of  new  settlement  and  the  peace  process  in  the  Middle 
East,  B4-0198,0219,0224,0233,0248  and  0264/97. 
42Amnesty  notes  that  this  has  been  achieved  by  restricting  residency  since  'the  only 
Palestinians  allowed  to  live  in  East  Jerusalem  are  those  holding  blue  identity  cards  -  i.  e. 
people  counted  in  the  census  following  the  1967  occupation,  and  their  descendants'  This 
policy  has  also  served  to  curtail  'the  normal  migrational  flows  from  rural  areas'.  Amnesty 
reports  that  although  the  blue  cards  are  supposed  to  grant  permanent  residency  status  in  East 
Jerusalem  'in  practice  however  at  least  6,257  of  these  blue  cards  had  been  confiscated  under 
various  pretexts  up  to  1998,  rendering  the  holders'  continued  presence  in  their  native  city 
illegal  and  aimed  at  expelling  the  holder  and  family  from  East  Jerusalem'.  Since  1996 
Palestinians  have  also  had  to  prove  that  their  'centre  of  life'  is in  Jerusalem  using  a  variety  of 
official  documents.  This  had  meant  that  the  number  of  expulsions  'has  increased  to  an 
average  of  700  a  year' 
43  Israel  has  consistently  argued  that  a  large  influx  of  returning  Palestinian  refugees  would 
present  the  state  with  serious  security  problems.  The  Israeli  historian  Benny  Morris  has 
argued  that  allowing  the  return  of  refugees  to  Israel  would  lead  to  the  'physical  destruction'  of 
the  state: 
'A  country  divided  between  Israelis  on  the  one  hand  and  on  the  other  Palestinians 
who  had  returned  and  were  filled  with  anger  not  only  at  the  way  they  had  been  treated 
222 in  the  past  but  also  at  not  finding  their  villages  or  homes  available-that  country 
would  quickly  become  ungovernable.  Each  individual  Jew  living  in  the  country 
would  be  facing  a  real  physical  danger'  (The  Right  of  Return:  An  Interview  with 
Benny  Morris,  Tikkun,  March/April  2001) 
Morris  also  argues  that  the  'state  envisioned  by  the  founders  of  Zionism  was  a  state  composed 
of  a  large  majority  of  Jews'  and  that  'if  you  were  to  allow  a  right  of  return  for  several  million 
Palestinians  (who  have  higher  birthrates  than  Israeli  Jews)  you'd  soon  have  an  almost 
balanced  Arab/Jewish  population-and  that  would  soon  mean  that  you'd  no  longer  have  a 
Jewish  state.  '  Unlike  Western  democracies,  which  are  considered  legally  as  the  state  of  their 
citizens,  Israel  is  defined  as  the  'state  of  the  Jewish  people'.  Israel  argues  that  granting  a  right 
of  return  to  Palestinians  would  lead  to  a  dilution  in  the  scale  of  this  Jewish  majority  and 
therefore  destroy  the  'Jewish  character'  of  the  state.  A  few  Israelis,  such  as  Yehudith  Harel,  a 
member  of  the  Peace  Now  movement,  however  have  argued  that  the  positions  taken  by 
intellectuals  such  as  Benny  Morris  and  the  mainstream  peace  camp  are  self-serving  and 
inflexible: 
The  attitudes  reflected  in  [Amos]  Oz's  (founder  of  the  Peace  Now  movement)  article, 
even more  than  the  political  positions  expressed,  are  the  epitome  of  the  intellectual 
corruption  and  the  emotional  handicap  of  the  Israeli  mainstream  peace  camp 
intelligentsia.  This  has  generated  within  Israeli  circles  a  deep-rooted  patronising,  self- 
righteous  discourse,  a  lack  of  empathy  for  other  people's  suffering,  a  lack  of 
understanding  of  their  perspective  and  needs  and,  above  all,  an  almost  chronic 
conviction  that  the  'other'  has  to  act  in  the  best  of  Israeli  interests.  '  (Yehudith  Harel, 
Peace  Now  and  its  'Other'.  Al-Ahram  Weekly,  January  II-  17,200  1) 
44  Some  elements  of  Palestinian  opinion  such  as  Al-Awda,  the  Palestinian  Right  to  Return 
Coalition,  made  up  of  grassroots  activists  have  declared  in  public  statements  that  the  right  of 
return  is inalienable  and  non-negotiable  and  cannot  be  bartered  away  by  Yasser  Arafat  or  any 
other  Palestinian:  'We,  the  Palestinians  undersigned  below,  at  home  and  in  exile,  affirm  once 
more  that  the  Right  of  Return  is  an  Inalienable  Right,  has  no  statute  of  limitation  and  does  not 
permit  concessions  or  delegation  by  others.  It  is  a  basic  Human  Right  as  affirmed  by  the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  regional  Conventions  and  UN  resolutions  especially 
the  oft-repeated  UN  resolution  194.  It  is  also  derived  from  the  sanctity  of  private  ownership 
which  is  not  extinguished  by  occupation  or  sovereignty'  (Al-Awda,  Press  Release,  9.2.2002). 
Others  have  suggested  mechanisms  whereby  the  right  could  be  accepted  in  principle,  but 
223 curtailed  in  practice,  with  significant  numbers  returning  to  a  future  Palestinian  state,  and  a 
small  number  of  symbolic  refugees  returning  to  Israel.  For  more  information  on  these  debates 
see  Shaml:  The  Palestinian  Diaspora  and  Refugee  Centre  website. 
http:  //www.  shaml.  org/groundNusseibeh/index.  htm 
"  See  for  example  the  Letter  dated  16  June  1980  from  the  Permanent  Representative  of  Italy 
to  the  United  Nations  addressed  to  the  Secretary-General,  UN  Document  A/35/299.  This  was 
the  common  position  put  forward  by  nine  Heads  of  State  and  Government  and  Ministers  for 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  European  Community  in  Venice,  in  June  1980. 
46  For  instance  UN  resolution  3005  passed  15  th  September  1972:  'The  General  Assembly.... 
affirms  the  Principle  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  population  of  the  occupied  territories  over  their 
national  wealth  and  resource  ... 
Calls  upon  all  States,  international  organizations  and 
specialized  agencies  not  to  recognize  or  cooperate  with,  or  assist  in  any  manner  in,  any 
measures  undertaken  by  the  occupying  Power  to  exploit  the  resources  of  the  occupied 
territories  .... 
Requests  the  Secretary-General  [to  investigate]  The  exploitation  and  the 
looting  of  the  resources  of  the  occupied  territories' 
47  It  is  also  likely  that  Blair's  visit  to  Syria  provided  an  opening  to  discuss  the 
Palestinian/Arab  perspective  without  attracting  pressure  from  the  pro-Israel  lobby.  Reporting 
on  the  perspective  of  the  Syrian  president  during  a  visit  by  a  British  Prime  Minister  is 
unlikely  to  attract  the  degree  of  intimidation  and  pressure  that  broadcasters  could  face  if  they 
were  to  report  that  ordinary  Palestinians  viewed  the  Israelis  as  'state  terrorists',  and  suicide 
bombers  as  'freedom  fighters'. 
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